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
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THE JOURNAL

OF

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

VOLUME XXII.

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
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THOMAS HILL GREEN'S PHILOSOPHICAL AND RELIGIOUS TEACHING.¹

BY PERCIVAL CHUBB.

The assertion that we live in a revolutionary age is now commonplace enough not to excite feelings of consternation among educated people. We most of us admit the fact, and, except at moments when social disturbances make it especially evident, it has ceased to disquiet us. Occasionally some persons whose recollection reaches back to the "good old days" are startled into a new sense of the change that is coming over things, or slumbering orthodoxy is awakened to the fact that beneath the surface of society there is at work a powerful leaven of skepticism and of revolt against "the established fact" in religion, science, art, and social life, a leaven of new ideas and new aspirations. Thus, when "Robert Elsmere" was published, a fresh fit of dismay seized the hosts who walk in the beaten paths of dogmatic Christianity, although the doubts which turned the hero of that novel from his first faith have long been current coin among thinking people, and are quite familiar in the literature of the age. The novel only expressed, in a way to arrest popular attention, what is taking place all around us—the dissolution and rejection of the old view of the world. The old conception of the universe,

¹ This was one of a series of three lectures on T. H. Green's life and teaching. It was delivered to a mixed audience, and written with such an audience in view.

which gave a unity to common thought and life, is breaking up; the old sanctions of right and duty are ceasing to bind; the old order of society is called in question—ay, is openly rebelled against—by masses of people driven by discontent born of a new vague feeling of injustice and of hope. The evidences of this change (especially of the social change) may be less obvious, and the sense of it less acute, in America than in Europe, where the signs of upheaval are frequent and unmistakable; but there are clearly marked signs here, too—signs visible from Europe; which is indeed only to be expected, seeing that America now forms part of that close confederation of nations which share in the influences of a single Time-Spirit.

The truth is, then, if we come to realize our situation, that our lives are cast in a momentous epoch of the world's history. As Mrs. Lynn Linton wrote a year or two ago: "We are in the midst of one of the great revolutions of the world. The old faiths are losing their hold and the new are not yet rooted; the old organization of society is crumbling to pieces, and we have not even founded, still less created, the new." If that is true, a great task is imposed upon us, the task of building a new world; of finding a new faith and establishing a new social order.

If we ask ourselves what is the first and the main work to be undertaken in the pursuit of this end, we shall find, I think, that it is an intellectual work. If the world is to be once more for us what it was to those of old, a cosmos, a divine unity; if life is to be a rational meaning which gives it deep significance and worth; we must go in quest of a new philosophy which shall satisfy the intellect's requirements, and with them the requirements of the heart and imagination. As a matter of fact, we find numbers of people who recognize that this is the task of the age. Some stand appalled before it, not knowing where to turn for help. Others seem to get a certain satisfaction either in Agnosticism or in a gospel of Culture which counsels them to seek consolation and delight in a nosegay of ideas (if I may be allowed the phrase) culled from "the best that has been thought and said in the world." There is a strenuous and sincere Agnosticism which commands all our respect and requires our consideration. It is, in the view of the present writer, the consequence of taking a wrong turn in the road of thought and getting into a *cul-de-sac*. But

the *cul-de-sac* is genuine, and we sympathize with the baffled pilgrim. There is, however, another and more prevalent kind of Agnosticism which is the mere outcome of intellectual indolence; and that is simply deplorable. As for Culture, its nosegay may be pretty, but the flowers are separate and are apt to fall to pieces at any moment; moreover, plucked from the shrubs which bore them, they are without the sap of life and must, sooner or later, fade and droop.

Now, no man has felt the stern necessity for a sound and thorough philosophy as the basis of a worthy life and a means of deliverance from our present dangers, more than the late Professor Green. No one has appreciated more keenly than he the evils that result from contentment with that fortuitous concourse of ideas, miscalled Culture, which affects to do duty for a philosophy. No one has seen more clearly the hopelessness and, as he believed, the error of the modern Agnosticism which results in an intellectual deadlock. It seemed to him that, without some rational—*i. e.*, consistent—view of the world and of human life, men tended more and more to be ruled by personal taste and inclination, and to be driven by the pressure of circumstances, instead of resisting circumstances with a will that is firm in its allegiance to principle. In this tendency he saw the seeds of modern decadence; and he attributed to it the disappointing results of so many originally hopeful movements of reform in the past. For him the only safety lay in the domination of our spiritual life by our intellect, in the subjection of feeling and impulse to reason and will. It is a notable saying of his that—

“It is the true Nemesis of human life that any spiritual impulse not accompanied by clear and comprehensive thought is enslaved by its own realization.”

This saying gives the key to his work as a philosopher; and it will be readily seen how unsatisfactory to him were some of the most marked tendencies of modern life. The fashionable rejection of philosophy seemed to him disastrous. In his earliest essays we find him tilting against the great enemies of integrity in our personal and national life—divided, unharmonized knowledge and detached thinking. He says:

“To be free, to understand, to enjoy, is the claim of the modern spirit. It is a claim which is constantly becoming more

articulate and conscious of itself. At the same time it is constantly finding expression in practical contradictions of thought, which rhetoric, itself the child of the claim, is always at hand to manipulate, to entangle, to weave into the feelings and interests of men. The result is the diffusion over society of a state of mind analogous to that which we sometimes experience when discussion has carried us a long way from our principles and we find ourselves maintaining inconsistent propositions."

Similarly, in the Introduction to his latest work, the "Prolegomena to Ethics," we find him, with the Culture gospel of Matthew Arnold in his mind, insisting on the unsatisfactoriness of the position in which men allow certain ideas, derived from poetry and philosophy, "to a joint lodgment in their minds, with inferences from popularized science, which do not admit of being reconciled with these deeper convictions in any logical system of beliefs."

In this way it is Green's immediate significance as a philosopher that his philosophy is brought into close relation with the needs and insufficiencies of the age. The preceding quotations make his position clear. On the one hand he sees that a mind, divided against itself because it has no co-ordinating creed or philosophy is necessarily weak and ineffectual. On the other hand, he sees that, so far as there is a popular philosophy—the philosophy of scientific Materialism and Agnosticism, of which Mr. Herbert Spencer is the most distinguished exponent—it is a very slough of despond and confusion. It is this philosophy that he has constantly in his mind, and that acts as a foil to his own views. The further value of Green's philosophical teaching, in relation to that work of reconstruction which lies before us, is that it branches out, as by a natural growth, to the domains of religion, ethics, and politics. These are all co-ordinated in one organic view of life. I venture to think, then, that Green is one of the men who has a message for the new time, and that he will be found to be one of our deliverers in this present intellectual and moral crisis.

In order to understand Green's philosophical work, it will be necessary to take a short survey of the development of English thought during the last two centuries. This is all the more necessary, because his own work was based on a minute inquiry

into the ancestry of latter-day thought in England. He went back to the first founders of modern speculation, Locke and Berkeley and Hume; and his earliest important production was his lengthy Introduction to the works of Hume—perhaps the most subtle piece of criticism which has appeared in recent times. Here he discovered the parentage of our modern errors. He found that our philosophy was, as to its first principles, just where Hume had left it. The wave of philosophical thought which had gathered in Germany had for the most part gone over its head. Worse still, our English thinkers did not seem to see what Kant saw with alarm—that with Hume philosophy had been brought to an *impasse*. That was just the reason why it had made no further step forward in England; it had accepted Hume's—which are Locke's—postulates, and had necessarily been barren of any noteworthy progeny.

At the beginning of this century Carlyle, touched with the emancipating spirit of German thought, which had extricated itself somewhat from the Humean coils, found philosophy in England a “mud-philosophy”; and poured his fierce but necessarily ineffectual anathemas upon it—ineffectual, that is, except in so far as they kept alive the stubborn but unreasoning spirit of revolt against the mud-philosophers. His rebellion typifies the history of spiritual life in England since Hume, which has been largely one of opposition between professional philosophy and some of the chief forces in literature. If we call over the roll of philosophers we shall see that for the most part they have been the descendants of Hume—all with a marked family likeness. Scotland has produced a few recalcitrants—Reid, Stewart, Hamilton; but they were not big enough to turn the current, and indeed had not “the root of the matter in them,” to use a favorite expression of Green's. Tracing the main line of descent in England, we find that Hume begat Hartley, Hartley begat James Mill and Bentham, who begat John Stuart Mill; but here the type undergoes a little modification through alliance with another family—the physical scientists. Darwin and the Evolutionists appear and prove immensely attractive to the philosophers. The union produces the full-fledged scientific, materialistic philosophy of Lewes and Spencer and their adjutants. Thanks to the wonderful clew to history which evolution has undoubtedly supplied, the marvellous vistas of time and

space and change which science has disclosed, and even more to the materialistic, commercial tendencies of the age—thanks to these, I say, the philosophy of evolution, as it is styled, has carried all before it, and Herbert Spencer is now the ruling light in the philosophic firmament. But already his beams have begun to pale by the rising of a new and larger light.

We must note, however, before passing on to investigate this new and hopeful illuminant, that the philosophers have not, as I suggested, had it all their own way. Arrayed against them all along has been a line of poets and writers whose teachings have been the negation of the ruling philosophy. At the end of last century and the beginning of this, we have Wordsworth and Coleridge and Shelley giving song to the old faith in a spiritual world and a spiritual presence in the heart of man and nature. German influences, although they do not touch the hard-hearted philosophers, touch the *littérateurs*. Kant and Fichte and Schelling and Goethe and Schiller have their disciples in Coleridge, De Quincey, Maurice, Carlyle, and others. There are frequent revolts and reactions. The finer spirits at Oxford get comfort in the peace and charm of Catholicism, and give us the Tractarian Movement. Maurice and Kingsley rebel in the Church. Emerson conveys across the ocean the message of Transcendentalism. Tennyson and Browning hand on the fire of the former faith in God and the future. A fierce Protestantism against Materialism in thought and life utters its voice in Ruskin. Still, all these influences have been overborne to a dangerous degree by the dead weight of modern materialistic civilization, which naturally finds congenial sustenance in a materialistic philosophy. That philosophy is separatistic and disintegrating in its influence; and, as I have remarked, has not, in Green's opinion, any power of reconstruction in it. We must replace it by a new philosophy and a new attitude toward the facts of life—an attitude similar to that of the poets and religious teachers, but backed by a clearly reasoned and consistent creed.

The main lines of this new philosophy Green finds marked out by Kant and the post-Kantians. And I should have noticed, as one of the saving influences at work in our midst, the ascendancy which this philosophy has already gained here and there—in Scotland, for instance, where Kant and Fichte and Hegel have found

champions like Dr. Stirling and Dr. Smith the translator of Fichte. But the growth of this influence has really been contemporaneous with, and not anterior to, Green's career. Green, then, builds on Kant and his successors, Fichte and Hegel; but he revises their results, goes back once more to the main line of English development, and gives his work an English impress and a modern application.

We are now in a position to pass in review the leading tenets of Green's philosophy. It will be convenient if in our attempt to do so we set out, as he himself does, by showing the inadequacy and inconsistency of that which now prevails among us in England. This philosophy is, as I have just observed, a combination of the sensationalism of Hume and the naturalism of the scientific evolutionists. The one supplies an answer to the question, What is experience? or What is involved in knowledge? The other professes to answer the questions, What is man? What is his relation to Nature? How has he come to be what he is?

Now Hume, carrying with unerring logic the premises of Locke to their last conclusion, had arrived at the result that all knowledge is reducible to sensations. He said that all the simple elements of knowledge come to us through the senses, and all that we know consists in combinations and recombinations of these elements of sense. These combinations and recombinations, constituting ideas of varying complexity, are not the work of an arranging mind, but result from the tendency of the sensations to recur in their original order and to cohere in certain groups. The original sensations were called impressions; their reproductions—fainter than the originals—were called ideas. The idea of a horse, for example, is nothing but a reassemblage or faint reproduction in the mind of the complex of sensations which have constituted our manifold experiences of that animal. The sensations which in their union constitute its mane, associate themselves with the sensations which in their union constitute its tail; and so on with the rest of the beast. It all comes of ideas having an inexplicable habit of forming regular associations. That is all we can say of them. They do not inhere in anything, and may upset our expectations at any moment. Thus cause and effect are reducible to that orderliness of sequence in which certain sensations usually follow one another.

This doctrine of the association of ideas is a wonderful solvent ; it not only dissolves cause and effect, but it dissolves the idea of a mind, an Ego, an external world. If ideas make their associations on their own responsibility, there is obviously no need of a master of ceremonies, a director, or a referee. If a thing and a sensation are one and the same, then we may dispense with the unnecessary assumption of an external world. The curious tendency of these assumptions of cause and effect, of a self, of an external world, to form themselves, Hume never explained. In short, the whole philosophy is a *felo de se*. For, let us observe, the very initial distinction of an original sensation from its reproduction necessitates a distinguishing and recognizing mind ; it implies memory ; it implies judgment. The idea of orderliness in association or in sequence implies the same. Nevertheless, it is a fact that this contradictory philosophy has been good enough for the bulk of English philosophers since Hume ; and the same sensationalism and the same associationism survive in the materialistic philosophy advocated by men of no less eminence than Mr. Herbert Spencer. The theory of evolution has made the way much clearer for them. It did seem not a little difficult to account for the elaboration through a single person's experience of such a wonderfully complex system of associations as that which the man of to-day possesses. Evolution explains that it is not the work of the individual, but has been the work of ages. Man had a considerable number of associations stored up when he first appeared on the earth ; his sub-human ancestors, possessed of the power of hereditary transmission, left them as their legacy to him. In short, the slowly accumulated effects of experience have been handed on from generation to generation through a purely physical agency—the modification of bodily structure ; and so we no longer need to assume *a priori* forms of thought to account for elementary conceptions. Mr. Spencer has a more elaborate argument in support of his sensationalism ; but it is at bottom the same old contention that the edifice of thought is built up of bricks of sensation, cemented by the tendency to association. The only difference is that the flux of the mind's thoughts and sensations is styled a series of states of consciousness ; but it is still a straggling, disorderly procession with no spectator to view it, or know it as a procession.

But with Spencer we have something which Hume had not—

Nature, an external world. This is clearly necessary as a basis for the thesis that man is a product of Nature, and the latest phase in a process of animal or physical development. How does Mr. Spencer get his Nature, his external world? He assumes the reality of an external order and an elementary consciousness of it. He professes to prove the existence of such a reality, and its power of determining thought; but observe the flaw in the proof. He starts, as he must, from the conception of knowledge as involving a relation between a subject and an object. But he then proceeds to assign to one of the terms of this relation an independent, superior existence—in short, he destroys the correlation. The object, only known, to start with, in relation to a subject, is known also (by what is now said to be a deliverance of consciousness) as existing out of relation to it—*i. e.*, an object is supposed to be known after we have cancelled the knowing subject. Nay, more, the object is actually claimed to be the cause and determinant of the subject. The result is, in other words, that the objects of thought, while these are objects only by reason of there being a subject, are illogically supposed to be the cause of the subject which is the condition of their appearance. There is, of course, a great parade of demonstration in the “Principles of Psychology”; but that is, in brief, the sum of the argument. It is thus that we get the cause of thought and of man as external-Nature. The way is clear for a natural history of man by the application of the evolution hypothesis.

Now let us see what Green—apart from the foregoing criticism which is really a rough epitome of his own arguments—has to say with regard to these views, and what is the truth which he opposes to them. In the first place, he affirms that of mere sensation we know, and therefore can say, nothing; it is an abstraction. Clearly, of sensation in general we can know nothing; we only know particular sensations. Let us take one. What is implied when we affirm the experience of a sensation of redness? Simply the fact that the mind has been at work distinguishing the sensation as one of redness from other sensations that are of different colors. Its reality is constituted for us by its relations to other colors—its place in the color scale. The greater the number of relations we are able to place it in, the fuller is the reality which it has for us. If we are uncultivated, these relations will be few; if we are sci-

entific specialists, they will be very numerous. Reality, "a fact," is not therefore sensation, but relation. An object of thought—and all objects are objects of or for thought—is what it is by reason of its place in that system of relations which constitutes the world as it exists for us—as known by us. If we are asked to give an account of an object, we shall tell what we know about it; and this statement will be in terms of its relation to other objects that we know. Our account will be true if it fits into the body of knowledge; if it is not in harmonious relation, if it does not square with other facts, it is false. Error, illusion, unreality is false relation. This is Green's first dissent and his first affirmation. Knowledge is *not* of sensations, but *it is* of relations.

But what is implied in relation? Firstly, two terms, and the affirmation of a connection between them—subject and object; we have a subject which cognizes itself as knowing (*i. e.*, is self-conscious), and a series or world of relations as known, from which it distinguishes itself. But we can say more than this. To know these as related we must be able to hold them together; we must discern them on comparison as distinct and different; and this power of comparison is possible only by seeing things together and simultaneously before the mind. In other words, the mind must be present at once to all the elements distinguished and compared. For instance, we are asked to pronounce as to which is the most brilliant of a number of colors arranged in a row. How do we decide? Only by carrying the recollection of each color with us as we pass from it to the next, and at the end of our survey holding the whole of them simultaneously in our mind for a decision. We are taken, let us suppose, to a color apart from these, and are asked whether we think it brighter than they. Our decision can be made only by holding our past experience of the many colors—which the mind has the power of recalling—and comparing it with the present experience of the one color. What does this signify? It signifies that the mind can grasp a past and a present at once; that it can comprehend more than one moment in time and more than one point of space. In fact, we see that we are obliged to postulate as a condition of experience or of judgment a mind that is fixed amidst the succession and change which we call experience. This is, I think, clear; but it is a very

important point in Green's philosophy, and we must be in no doubt about it. Let us put it in another way.

The mind is conscious of a succession of things in time, or, to make use of Spencer's phrase, a succession of states of consciousness. But it could not know succession unless it were not itself out of and apart from the succession. To use our former figure, we should not know a procession as such unless we were outside of it. One separate state of consciousness in a stream of such states could not know itself as a part of such stream without knowing itself as related to a before and an after in a process. Similarly with change. Change could not know itself as change unless it were something that remained unchanged amidst change. The conclusion is, then, that we must postulate as a condition of knowledge a mind or spirit out of time, therefore eternal; and out of space, therefore immovable, infinite or unbounded; and self-conscious—that is, distinguishing itself from a world of fact, which is, as we have seen, a world of relations.

Now we must ask, What is this world of relations present to consciousness, and what is the relation of consciousness to it? In the first place, let us note that consciousness does not make this world; it does not establish the relations, and it does not make them a system. The angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, fire burns, the sun warms, quite apart from any will or any individual preferences of ours. (Hence the absurdity of the assertion made against the idealist—that the individual makes the world.) In the next place, observe that we only discover the relations as they exist in a unity or "cosmos of experience." That there is a unity, a law of things, a cosmos, is an axiom of the mind; thought, and even doubt itself, are meaningless without such an axiom. What, we proceed to ask, must we understand as implied by such a system of relations? We must conceive it as a unity in difference—that is, a number of distinct things held together in a harmony, each individual thing being what it is because of its place in the whole. Take the case of a house. The house is a unity composed of a number of distinct stones, and each stone has a meaning and a function derived from its relation to the whole structure. Now, the only way in which we can comprehend such a cosmos of relations—the only idea we can form of a differentiated unity or a unified differentiation—is in terms of mind. When we speak of a unity

we mean, first, a totality which has a unity for thought, and, secondly, that thought has gone to the making of this totality. That which requires thought for its comprehension implies thought in the constitution of it. It is only thought that can constitute a unity for thought. Wherever we come upon design we are obliged to postulate thought behind it. We assume a designer, or rather a designing mind. That is the very meaning of design—thought-relation. The relation is not in the separate things; it is in the idea or the thought that presides over the whole of which the things are constituent parts. This may be otherwise expressed by saying that the world as a related whole is essentially a rational world, or an embodiment of reason.

The conclusion to which we are brought by the foregoing argument is that man, as knowing a cosmos or rational world, is mind knowing and discovering mind. The human mind, defective in knowledge and power, confronts the universal mind expressed in the manifold of experience. This universal mind man only partially apprehends; and, because he only knows it in part and finds it difficult to piece the parts together, he labors under a sense of incompleteness. He forever seeks to widen his knowledge and harmonize its elements by exploring the heights and depths of the world of Nature and Man, which are equally the home of the Cosmic Mind. In other language, one Mind expresses itself *in* Man and, through Nature, *to* Man; and our mental growth is, in fact, our progressive assimilation of the Cosmic Mind, or the Cosmic Mind becoming more and more articulate in us. The self in us finds its enlargement and the possibility of its completion by its comprehension and assimilation of the not-self. We realize our imperfection because we dimly apprehend perfection; because the germ of the perfect is in us, and, in the longing for more knowledge and deeper life, stirs us to strive after the perfect. If we call the Universal Mind or Spirit, God, we shall, from Green's point of view, say that man has his being in and through God, and that God has his being—though not his whole being—in and through man. The selfhood of God is none other than the selfhood of man.

It will now be obvious enough wherein Green dissents from the evolution philosophy. The latter says that man is the product of Nature, in the sense that he is but the latest outcome of a process

of natural or material development—a child of matter and motion. He is merely a last link in a chain of cause and effect. But, as Green, in effect, would urge, to know himself as a link in a chain, man must know the chain. To know the chain, he must unlink himself, so to speak, and survey the long line of his fellow-links before and after—in short, he must cease to be a part of the chain. If, then, man were merely a product of Nature, he could not know himself as such, for he could not know Nature as a producing agency without standing apart from her. But he does know Nature, and, what is more to the point, he knows that he knows her. He knows himself as her spectator and interrogator. He stands firm amid her passing shows, noting her changes, remembering her history, comparing her past and present.

Man, according to Green, is not a piece of material Nature, nor is Nature herself mere matter and motion. She is traversed with the currents of thought—is, indeed, only the symbolic language of thought; known and knowable by man only because she speaks to him in his own speech. Man, instead of being a transient being in a transient world, is an eternal, spiritual being in an eternal, spiritual world. That perfect world he sees only a part of at a time, and probably can never see it in its entirety. He knows it now under the limitations of his animal organism and under the forms of time and space. But he knows that it is entire; he knows that his imperfection implies its perfection.

So far I have given merely a rough sketch of the basic elements of Green's thought or those features of it which separate him fundamentally from the naturalists or evolutionists. These are, after all, the main and important features. If we accept these, we have turned our backs upon a universe which is blind and speechless, and upon a humanity which is its pitiful sport and victim. We have gained a universe which is, as it were, the eye and tongue of an infinite perfection. We have exchanged a perishable and meaningless chaos for an eternal and purposeful cosmos.

But here I am already leaving philosophy, which should be a calm statement of ultimate truths, for religion, which is the response of the mind, heart, and imagination, in the contemplation of these truths. Without this response philosophy is barren and unprofitable; it fails in the purpose of its quest. For that quest,

the aim of which is to discover our true relations to the world, is made in the interests of our whole nature. Now, our nature is tripartite: we are beings of thought, feeling, and will, and find the fullest satisfaction only in harmonious thinking and feeling and acting. Religion is, I take it, at once the bond and the inspiration of this harmonious life. Its object is to keep us whole, so that the central energy and fire of life may circulate through us fully, and fuse us into a singleness of being. Religion takes philosophy for granted—not, of course, a dogmatic, finally fixed philosophy, but a philosophy which holds itself subject to correction and enlargement. It is the result of the union of the truths of philosophy with the impulsions of the heart.

Philosophy, as Green conceived it, gave us an incomplete self in a complete world, from which it could gain completeness. It prescribed as the aim of life the harmony or the fullest and closest union of the microcosm with the macrocosm. We may state this, in other words, as the perfection of character, which is the highest realization of our own powers in and through a true life in the world. We have two things implied here—a harmony within us in accord with a harmony without us. The outer or objective world is composed of Nature and Humanity. Nature has to be subjected to our uses; it has to be explored by Science, and ordered to the ends of beauty by Art. In the case of Humanity we are in a world of wills and personalities like our own, and our task is to harmonize these wills so that they may not conflict, but may mutually assist one another in the pursuit of a common good. This is the work of Ethics, Politics, and Education, with their subordinate sciences.

With this glance at the view of the world given us by philosophy, let us return to the place and function of religion. Religion, Matthew Arnold has said, is morality touched with emotion; but it is surely a larger and more fruitful description if we say that it is philosophy touched with emotion—that is, an emotional apprehension not only of the moral law, but of the world as a whole. The mood of religion is the mood in which the heart seizes upon the truths of philosophy, sublimates them, and gives them impassioned utterance in symbol and allegory. The spiritual presence which philosophy has discovered in Nature and in Man religion calls God, and, to aid its grasp and assimilation of this presence,

invests God with the idealized attributes of Man. Nature, as the conjoint seat and revelation of this divine presence, becomes a parable and a song. Before this now poetically or imaginatively clothed universe man falls down in wonder and worship, and strives through art and by noble conduct to express the depth of his passion and the beauty of his vision. He is impelled to find an outlet for this heightened thought and feeling and desire in great actions and in beautiful works. Thus for religion the web of common life is everywhere shot through with threads of loveliness. It sees the actual in the light of the ideal, man pregnant with divine possibilities, and nature full of deity.

“ Nothing’s small !

No lily-muffled hum of a summer bee
But finds some coupling with the spinning stars ;
No pebble at your foot but proves a sphere ;
No chaffinch but implies the cherubim.

. . . Earth’s crammed with heaven,

And every common bush afire with God.”

This, expressed somewhat popularly and emotionally, is the view Green took, and it finds frequent expression in his writings. It was his sense of the spiritual in Nature and Man that attracted him to the poetry of Wordsworth. His own nature was akin to Wordsworth’s in that he was given to the same “ impassioned contemplation ” ; only, in place of the lyrical utterance of the poet, we have the more sober speech of the philosopher, as though the bare, ungarnished statement of the truth were all-sufficing for the mind’s nutrition. It was not so much through the beauty of the world, as with the artist or poet, or its interest and intricacy, as with the scientist, that the power of religion laid hold upon Green ; but in the intellectual vision of the divine unity of the world and the mystical sense of the communion between the individual and the universal spirit. Whereas Wordsworth found the divine presence chiefly in Nature, Green found it equally—nay, more—in the history, experiences, and institutions of man. He saw everywhere traces of man’s consciousness of an ideal which man did not realize, but always in some way or other sought to approach ; and all human institutions were for him instances of man’s effort to express this ideal. Out of this perception came his eager desire to forward the

political movements of his time. Reform was for him the removal of those obstacles which stood in the way of the fuller and ever fuller expression of this ideal tendency in the heart of man.

But while Green was aware that in the religious life man gained the fulness of peace and joy, he was also keenly conscious of the impediments which thwarted the attainment of this religious life—the barriers of circumstance, the allurements of the senses, the incubus of doubt, the indolence of hopelessness and despair. The Christian sense of sin in the world and of morality as a hard struggle, was very strong in him; and it was this sense which invested the Christian scriptures of the New Testament—and especially the writings of St. Paul—with immense value and significance. He says in one place:

“Man knows that it is his littleness, not his greatness, that separates him from the divine; that not intellectual pride, not spiritual self-assertion, but the meanness of his ordinary desires, the degradation of his higher nature to the pursuit of animal ends, keep him under the curse.”

This gives us Green's conception of sin as partiality, defect, negation. It follows naturally from his view of the world. He has expressed himself more precisely in another place, where he says that, whilst “intellectual error consists in regarding the relations under which, at any given time, an object is presented to us, and which through the limitations of sense are necessarily partial, as the totality of its relations”; so “sin consists in the individual's making his own self his object, not in the possible expansion in which it becomes that true will of humanity, which is also God's, but under the limitation of momentary appetite or interest.”

He thought that no writer had given such telling expression of this conviction—of this sense of a war between the law in the members and the law of the spirit—as Paul. It was a matter of regret to him that the spiritual meaning of the Pauline writings had been obscured by the literal dogmatic interpretation in vogue among the orthodox. The two lay sermons of his, “The Witness of God” and “Faith,” are devoted to an attempt to bring out the real import and value of Paul's teaching; and in this he was doing very much the sort of work that Matthew Arnold did in “St. Paul and Protestantism.” He considered that great harm was inflicted on religion by making its truth and reality depend on

the truth of certain historical occurrences in connection with the life of Jesus Christ. The witness of God to man is not in any outward events, or signs, or wonders—if such were possible, which is not to be granted—but in the heart of man, and in the order and harmony of the world. The gift of the spirit is not a miraculous revelation through the utterances and acts of certain men, but “that recognition of an eternal relationship between God and man which carries with it a new insight into the things of God, and a new energy of love.” The importance of Christ to us lies not in his supposed advent as a Messiah, or his supernatural place in a scheme of redemption; but, as it lay for his apostle Paul, in the power of his spirit and example. The statement that he died and rose again the third day is of itself unimportant for spiritual ends, and tends to materialize them; whereas the symbolized fact, which is as the marrow of Paul’s teaching, that he died unto sin and rose into the higher life, is of central importance to us. The conception of a death into life puts the problem of the moral life in a striking and helpful manner, as even a man like Goethe saw. True faith is not faith in material resurrection, or in any other miraculous event; but faith in the higher leadings of the spirit that moveth in us, faith that all things work together for our good if we follow these. Everywhere around us we find religion mischievously identified with belief in miracle, and its supremacy assailed because miracles are no longer credited. Becoming aware that the religion so founded cannot stand, the skeptic disowns religion altogether. Surely no greater service can be done than to disengage religion from the clutches of such a foe.

Doubtless some will feel that Green shows too exclusive a preference for Christianity and too eager a desire to reinstate it, and it only, as the religion of the future. Many believe that what we have to look forward to is the foundation of a great world-religion, of which Christianity is a factor—may be even the most important factor—but still only a factor. And yet we must all recognize that this religion of the future will probably come through such an expansion of Christian teaching as Green was anxious to promote. One thing, at any rate, seems certain, that no religion can thoroughly serve us which does not include just that particular element which Green prized in Christianity—the keen sense of shortcoming in ourselves, and of the weight of

sin in the world, issuing in that embracing sympathy which is found in the case of the man of sorrows, acquainted with grief, the friend and uplifter of the guilty and helpless and outcast. Without this unshrinking sympathy with weakness and suffering and disease and failure, life becomes superficial and trivial. Bright and joyous and fair it may be for a time and for a few, as in the pleasurable days of pagan Greece and Rome, but it can never be founded on a solid and enduring basis, never reach down to the heart of things. The retention of this element is especially important in view of that work of social reformation which lies before us. It must be a great element in any worthy democracy.

So far I have been trying to express, mainly in my own words, the sense and gist of Green's religious views. It is well that he should be allowed to speak to us in his own words. Let us hear him. His ideal of life he described as that of "Christian Citizenship"—that is to say, a citizenship deriving its conception of the state and of civic virtue from Greece, but enlarged and consecrated by the Christian temper of brotherliness. Let us then see what Green's conception of Christianity was.

"The divine mind touches, modifies, becomes the mind of man, through a process of which mere intellectual conception is only the beginning, but of which the gradual complement is an unexhausted series of spiritual discipline through all the agencies of social life. In the nations outside Christendom, as a matter of history, this complement has not been vouchsafed, or only in the most limited and elementary way. Hence the idea of death into life, which is the seed of the divine in man, has there lain barren."

This idea is, he considers, the central idea of Christianity; and the test of its truth is in the life which it inspires. That is the only possible test of the truth of a practical idea.

"As the primary Christian idea is that of a moral death into life, as wrought for us and in us by God, so its realization, which is the evidence of its truth, lies in Christian love—a realization never complete, because forever embracing new matter, yet constantly gaining in fulness. All other evidence is fleeting and accidental, but this abides. Tongues cease, prophecies fail, knowledge—the mere unrealized idea—vanisheth away; but charity never faileth, and, in the higher life of the Christian society, we may recognize it and make it our own."

Hence religion consists not in word only, but in power; not in passive virtue, but in active righteousness. Its end and justification are in a pure, helpful, and self-denying life and in the formation of a character simple, sincere, and sympathetic.

"The least experienced among us must know that it is not in the outward cast of a life, but in the way of living it that the spirit of a man is shown; and that there are those about him in whose character, though with no outward mark of distinction, and perhaps under a surface of yet unconquered weaknesses, the love of God and the brethren is the ruling power. All he has to do is to share in the higher spirit of such men."

The refreshing touch of simplicity which there is in this passage meets us constantly in Green's writings on religion—the trait which made him an influence in Oxford. How rare and how inspiring it is to come upon a man who, besides being a subtile thinker and a power in the world of thought, retains this feeling for simple goodness and rightness of heart! The more so because it is this simplicity that we stand in danger of losing nowadays, hedged about as we are by the pretentiousness of modern life, with its polite artifices, its venerated manners, its little insincerities of intercourse, its smallness and triviality. The great preservative against these is the faith that helps us to keep a sort of child-like attitude of heart.

"If we are honest with ourselves we shall admit that something best called faith, a prevailing conviction of our presence to God and his to us, of his gracious mind toward us, working in and with and through us, of our duty to our fellow-men as our brethren in him, has been the source of whatever has been best in us and of our deeds. . . . Faith of this sort is the salt of the earth."

With one more short quotation, in which Green puts his finger upon the salient danger which besets the cause of religion among us, let us leave him:

"The enemy which religion, *i. e.*, a God-seeking morality, has now to fear, is not a passionate atheism. Such atheism is often a religion which misunderstands itself. . . . Not from it is our danger, but from the slow sap of an undermining indifference which does not deny God and duty, but ignores them; which does not care to trouble itself about them, and finds in our acknowledged inability to know them, as we know matters of fact, a new

excuse for putting them aside. It is this which takes off the native beauty from the fair forehead of a child-like faith, and leaves, not the scars of a much-questioning and often-failing but still believing search after God, whom so to seek is to find, but the vacancy of contented worldliness or the sneer of the baffled pleasure-seeker."

If, then, we think, as the great souls of all time have thought, that religion is the power that binds man to what is best and highest, we shall be on the alert against this "undermining indifference" and this "vacancy of contented worldliness" of which Green speaks. Is it not too true that modern civilization, with its sense of security, its comfort and luxury, and the ignoble greed of gain which the attractiveness of these has bred, tends to produce such an undermining indifference and contented worldliness? These, the enemies of religion, are the hindrances to that renaissance of our social life of which I spoke in the opening of my paper. The first work in the promotion of that renaissance is, I said, to gain a new philosophy—that is, a new view of the world, which shall give life unity and import. But it is a difficult task to induce men, prone to this indifference and worldliness and sorely tempted by it, to make the effort to think out a new philosophy of life. How are they to be braced to make it? What can we do to counteract the tendencies of the time? We cannot, of course, do anything until we ourselves have gained a new philosophy; and, having gained it, we must express it by word and deed. If we are bent on trying to find the philosophy, we cannot do better than go to Green. There is every indication that it is along the lines of his thought that advance will be made.

If, further, we pass from philosophy to religion, here again we shall find in Green a helpful ally. We may not get entire satisfaction from the form in which he would cast religion; but in the spirit of the religion which he upholds we cannot steep ourselves too deep. And one point upon which he insists, as we have already gathered, we can not pay too much heed to—that, if we wish to bear witness for religion, we must do so through our lives. Nothing promotes skepticism so much as disloyalty; it gives the skeptic, the cynic, and the indifferentist their chance and excuse. It is an undoubted fact that what, more than anything else, is bringing Christianity, and with it all religion, into disrepute

is the disloyalty of Christendom to the lofty professions of its creed. It is futile to profess to believe that all men are brethren, if we treat them as enemies on the mart and in the store. It is useless professing to believe that it is difficult for a rich man to enter into the Kingdom of Heaven, if we devote a life to getting rich. It is a mockery to declare adhesion to the principle that human greatness is won by service, if we despise those who serve, and strive for a worldly position in which we are the masters of many servants. If we follow Green's teaching, we must believe that the first condition upon which the revolution now in progress may be a change for the better, lies in our making our lives eloquent with the spirit of unswerving devotion to our ideal.

ON THE CONGRUENCE OF SINS AND PUNISHMENTS IN DANTE'S INFERNO.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF DR. J. A. SCARTAZZINI ("JAHRBUCH DER DEUTSCHEN DANTE-GESELLSCHAFT," VOL. IV, 1877) BY THEKLA BERNAYS.

According to Christian popular belief, an almost absolute transformation takes place in man at the moment of death. The life hereafter is not, in the first instance, the direct continuation of the psychic spiritual earth-life of the individual, but rather, according to current Christian notions, an entirely new life, with scarcely a resemblance to earth-life, and connected with this latter only inasmuch as in its immense variety it is conditioned by it (earth-life) for each individual. More clearly expressed, it depends upon the conduct of man while on earth—whether he will reach the abode of infinite blessedness or the regions of indescribable torture. But when once the narrow bridge is passed which forms the mysterious crossing between this world and the hereafter, then is fulfilled in its absolute sense the word: "The old is vanished; see, all has become new!" According to this conception, even the most individual thing in man, his consciousness, is subjected to a mighty change. The consciousness of one and the same individual changes in part as to its contents as soon as the journey through the dark valley is completed. The Christian who

starts upon his upward journey relies upon receiving in the river of death the magic drink of Lethe, which will wash away out of his consciousness everything that could in any way dim his feeling of absolute beatitude. According to the same Christian, however, he who is condemned to take the opposite route must in the selfsame river of death drink of Lethe, which, on the contrary, extinguishes from his consciousness whatever might shed a ray of light into the unending dark night of his eternal life. But the regions of the worlds beyond have only too great a resemblance to those here below. The colors in which pious fancy paints the abodes of eternity are taken throughout from temporal life. Here a world of infinite enjoyment and delight, there a world of infinite torture and privation; both, however—enjoyment and privation, delight and torture—are more sensual than spiritual, more external than internal; a world similar to the one here below—only its inhabitants are quite different.

This is the common popular belief, these are the current notions. We will not here investigate the question in how far this belief and its conceptions may be based upon the Scriptures. Even if we were forced to admit such a basis, this would only prove that the Bible is, as to origin and purpose, a true people's book, and not a compendium of metaphysics. Purified modern philosophical thought, to be sure, as far as it does not believe itself in duty bound to deny the hereafter, forms conceptions of it which essentially differ from those mentioned. A world wholly different from this, because purely spiritual, yet the people who inhabit it, inasmuch as they are spiritual beings, are the same ones that once walked this earth. Consciousness is the same, infinitely developing in a straight line. No Lethe is to be found either in the one direction or in the other, but in the hereafter a further development of that which had begun here below to germinate and to unfold. In this application the reference to the analogy between birth and death was very appropriate. As the new-born child is the same that it was before birth, so too the human being who yonder reawakens to consciousness will be the same he was before he threw off this mortal frame. Here, as there, is found simple development, though upon a wholly different territory. Hence heaven and hell are nothing external, but purely internal; not merely in the future, but already in the present—be-

ginning here, reaching there to completion. In the hereafter take place the disclosure, development, and heightening of that which existed here below, but which man is often able to hide from himself and others by means of the senses and the sensual.

The more complete following out of this thought does not belong to the province of the investigation and study of Dante, but must be left to metaphysics and philosophical dogmatics. Occasion will offer in the course of this disquisition to mention whatever of this is indispensable to the understanding of the problem under discussion.

Standing upon the boundary-line separating two epochs, Dante intones his song. His poem is a requiem, and at the same time a cradle-song. With one foot he stands upon the territory of the middle ages, with the other he is already upon that of modern times. As in all other, so too in his eschatological ideas, he is a child of his time; but he is, besides this, the prophet who with deep and far-reaching presage hastens on in advance of his time. Dante's conception of the hereafter is based not upon mediæval belief alone, but in part too upon deeper metaphysico-psychological cognition. He has transferred much that is sensual from the temporal into eternity, driven perhaps in part by the necessity of painting a picture which should clearly show to man, cleaving as yet to the sensual, the purely spiritual, and that which is but foreshadowed in his mind. The punishments and expiations of his *Inferno* and Mount of Purification partake as much of a sensual as of a spiritual nature—perhaps more of the former than of the latter. But if sometimes the internal connection seems often missing between sin and punishment—such a connection that the one appears as the unavoidable result of the other—this connection must always be presupposed in Dante, and the more so with him, as it is clearly apparent in many instances. If, owing to the guidance of scriptural passages like Job, xxi, 7-26, Psalms, lxxiii, 2-14, the inclination has been but too great heretofore to relegate the punishment following sin entirely to the hereafter, making blessedness here to be followed by misery there, and misery here by blessedness yonder, in Dante, on the contrary, the realms of the hereafter are realized none the less in the present life. *Poeta agit de inferno isto in quo peregrinando mereri et demereri possumus.* These words do not originate with Dante; they are a saying of

ancient times, but it is nevertheless a saying which undoubtedly gives the poet's meaning a clear and universally intelligible expression.

Whoever engages more deeply in the study of the "sacred poem" does not to-day doubt the truth of the position that this poem proposes to hold up for contemplation not only the revealed truth of the hereafter, but also the revealed truth of the inner self, and that its contents are not merely of a metaphysical, but fully as much of an ethical nature; the revealed truth of the inner self *also*, but not this alone. Those who deny the reference to the hereafter in the *Divina Commedia* err no less than those who deny its reference to earth-life. Both references are inseparably, organically united. Whatever was prepared here below is there completed; what there becomes visible to the prophetic eye of the poet has been already felt here below in the bosom of the individual. Punishment and bliss are the fruit maturing in the temporal, on toward eternity. Both damnation and blessedness, weal and woe, are not something imposed from without, but rather something developing out of the inner being.

In accordance with this, the punishments of the Inferno in Dante—and this disquisition is for the present limited to these, to the exclusion of the expiations of the Mount of Purification and the delights of Paradise—these punishments must be developed from the corresponding sins, and it must be possible to show how they are their product, how they spring from them by an inner necessity. It is by no means claimed that this is a new thought; it is one which has, on the contrary, often found expression. But the relation, the inner connection between sin and punishment, has not hitherto been deemed worthy of a thorough investigation; and yet such an investigation might prove of greater value than the numerous and sometimes very prolix ones upon difficulties of a very inferior nature, such as on the *Più fermo*, on Plutus's unintelligible words, or Ugolino's alleged eating of his children.

The centre of the universe is the lowest region of Dante's Inferno, and at the same time that spot in the universe which is farthest removed from God. Now, as it is sin which estranges man from God, as the difference, the chasm between man and God must be wider in proportion as the sin to whose service man had devoted himself is heavier, the gradation from above downward

which we meet in Dante results. Sin is a burden which man imposes upon himself and the centre of the universe,

"il punto,
Al qual si traggon d'ogni parte i pesi,"

which is to be understood not only in the physical but in the moral sense as well. The heavier the burden of sin, the deeper is man dragged down by it. Without metaphor, the more depraved man, the greater his estrangement from God, and that in time no less than in eternity. God and the devil, the prince of light and the prince of darkness, are the two extreme antagonistic principles, the latter therefore held exactly in the centre of the universe by his own heaviness. Between these two extremes man, according to the path he chooses, approaches the one or the other. The approach will be the greater the more decidedly and recklessly he pursues the path once chosen; but if man remains standing, undecided between the two, then in all eternity he will be in suspense. His condition is the faithful mirror of his mode of thinking and acting and its necessary consequence. A popular legend tells of men so depraved that even the devil refuses them admission to his realm, and they are forced to wander about after death without finding rest. As if man were capable of becoming more corrupt than devils! The poet, too, knows of such as are excluded both from heaven and from hell. These, however, are not in his estimation the most depraved of villains; they are the lukewarm ones, sinners, whose guilt in the opinion of the world is simply weakness of character, not sin. For these the poet has created a separate region. Their habitation is on this side of the circles of hell—indeed, this side of Limbo.

With a few strokes of the brush the guilt of the inhabitants of Limbo is depicted. Wretched souls, passing their life without blame and without praise, lacking the resolution, the vigor of mind, and the energy to do either good or evil. Like the angels of the legend, they did not take sides in the war of the Titans, but remained indolently gazing on the eternal conflict between light and darkness—vulgar souls, unable to take an interest in this struggle for higher blessings. Their life is no animated life, but simply the existence of a plant—turning as the wind blows, only to avoid being disturbed in that comfortable repose which

they strive for as the highest blessedness; following any standard, because in their eyes principles, opinions, and convictions are nothing but fine words, empty phrases. Lukewarm—neither cold nor warm, neither good nor bad; cowards, men of pleasure.

And now their punishment! The inner indecision is visibly represented by the suspense between heaven and hell, by the exclusion from both places. But they are placed in the entrance to hell—that is, infinitely nearer hell than heaven. Their state of suspense is eternal; they can never escape from it—*non hanno speranza di morte*. This, too, in a double sense: eternal their inner indecision, eternal their hanging between heaven and hell, as it were. And this suspense is their worst torture, for, as their disposition and conduct are unnatural, so also is their condition unnatural. It is in the nature of man that he must decide, but the desire is also in his nature to exist in stable and fixed situations. More tormenting far than the suffering caused by misfortune that has actually come to pass is the suspense of fearful and uncertain expectation. Therefore do these wretches feel envious of every other lot. Better to be a whole than only a half. The coward is apt to envy any one who, be it in the one direction or in the other, shows decision. But his very slothfulness and cowardice are the hindrances to his ever becoming more resolute. They fear to miss that sweet repose which is the ideal of their aspiration if they should emerge from their indecision. This is their low-mindedness, which will not struggle, or fight, or exert itself, or sacrifice aught. And the low-mindedness is low life also—*vita bassa*. What is within them is here made externally visible. As the baseness of their disposition, so also the falseness of their calculation. The very thing which they seek—comfortable repose—they do not find, because in their blindness—*cieca vita*—they pursue a wrong course to reach true repose. He only can attain repose who, braving the wind, stands firm as a tower, whose spire does not tremble though the winds rage ever so wildly (“Purgatorio,” v, 14, 15). Those wretches, however, too indolent to brave the wind, out of baseness accommodate themselves to and turn with the wind; they follow any standard. But, as the wind is subject to constant change, they are forced, instead of enjoying repose, ever restlessly to turn in a circle, ever to follow the standard as it moves round in a circle. Such natures

flee and avoid, of course, as far as possible, heavy cares and great suffering. But baseness, too, and cowardice have their sufferings and cares—small ones, to be sure, only gadflies and wasps; but for these people they are no less afflicting than great and heavy ones for strong, determined natures. Much more keenly do the inhabitants of Limbo feel the sting of the gadflies and wasps than the high-minded Farinato the fire of his coffin. In base and paltry cares their energy is consumed; the stings of the insects cause their faces to drip with blood. How great their cowardice is clear from the fact that the slight pain of the sting of the gadfly is sufficient to make them dissolve in tears. The loathsome worms at last, which suck up the blood mixed with tears, are an image at once of the base creature and his base objects, upon which are wasted his vitality, symbolized by the blood—and his cares—of which his tears are the emblem.

Too much has, perhaps, been said about these sinners, of whom Dante's guide says: "Not a word of these; look and pass." Nevertheless, the poet himself, after hearing this admonition, employs six triplets in speaking of them.

Beyond, on the opposite shore of Acheron, in the first circle of hell, we meet nobler beings than those we leave here. Children, women, wise men, poets, heroes—human beings who have no other fault than that they have not heard of Christ, not believed in him, which is the only way that leads to God. Even though they have gained merit, this does not suffice, for "No one can come to the Father except through the Son." Their life is a constant longing. In the temporal state it is a longing with hope, but in eternity it is a longing without hope. The presumption is here, on the one hand, that the innate longing of man for the infinite cannot be satisfied by ethical means alone, but that there must be resort to religion; on the other hand, that he who has not found salvation in the temporal state through scorn of honest search will not find it in all eternity. And here the influence of the dogmatics of his church and of his time upon our poet is unmistakable. *Not to sin* (Inf., iv, 34) and *to be lost*, nevertheless (Inf., iv, 41), is an idea which has in truth been worked out by the too exclusive dogmatics of the Church, but which correct thinking finds it impossible to follow. Here is a point where it might be difficult to trace the revelation of the

true spiritual meaning of the future life on the part of our poet, and it is easy to understand that a restoration of the dwellers in this circle has been thought of, in spite of the decided *senza speme* (iv, 42). The inner state of this class of human beings is indeed appropriately depicted. An eternal search for something unknown; a sighing for something to allay the thirst of the human heart. No sunlight, but at best the dim light of a fire. The first, as is known, comes from above; the latter, however, only lights a hemisphere of darkness, and that from below. Therefore the first is the appropriate symbol of revelation, the latter the symbol of the natural light of reason. On the whole, they have quite an agreeable place of abode; these inhabitants of Limbo rejoice in fresh, green meadows, a noble castle, a light, and the choicest of society. Still the abode is in hell. One thing they lack—blessedness. We repeat, if we accept the Christian premise, that the thirst for God is innate in the human soul, and that the soul can only become happy in God, the inner state of these beings is appropriately described. On the other hand, we can hardly admit that here too the unalterable life of eternity is meant. The moral law postulates that the honest seeker shall find—shall find hereafter—if the proper opportunity was not given him on earth. And the philosophical belief in immortality also implies infinite development in the hereafter—not stagnant life.

With the inhabitants of the second circle (Inf., v) the relation between sin and punishment is only too apparent. Sensual passion, to whose service man is addicted, becomes a mighty storm, which seizes the souls, throws them hither and thither in torment, and dashes them together. The throwing hither and thither a symbol of the inconstancy of the voluptuous, the dashing against each other a symbol of jealousy—which so easily makes its appearance in people of this stamp, and so easily causes them to collide. No light in their unquiet habitation, for these “wicked souls” will not be lighted up either by the light of revelation or by the natural light of reason. Desire obeying no law but that of its own will—*il talento*—to which they have subjected reason, has made them the will-less sport of their own arbitrariness. It is a significant touch, furthermore, that the storm is hushed the moment our poet addresses two of the sinners (v, 96), for the storm of passion, too, may be temporarily silenced by the presence

and the speech of an earnest man. Nor must we overlook the fact that this circle of hell is by no means an abode of unalloyed torment; on the contrary, it harbors joys for its inhabitants within its pale. To these souls is granted the highest wish of those who truly and fervidly love—to be forever united with the object of their love, never to suffer separation. Francesca and Paolo are united in eternal embrace (v, 135). To be sure, their joy is not untroubled, such as that which the inhabitants of heaven enjoy. An infinitely bitter drop is mingled with it. For, though the lover desires most fervently to be united with his beloved, he desires no less that the beloved shall enjoy blessedness, shall partake of eternal happiness. But here the sight of the beloved tortured, suffering, forever unhappy, is continually before him, and that sight reproaches him, inasmuch as he is forced to say to himself that he is in part the cause of the unhappiness and the suffering of the beloved one. So even the joy of eternal union bears the character of hellish torment. Silvio Pellico has most strikingly, in my opinion, expressed the two sides of this situation when he puts in dying Francesca's mouth the lament:

“Eternal torments,
Alas! await us below there!”

while Paolo expires with the consolation:

“Eternal,
Too, will be our love.”

The congruence in the case of the inhabitants of the third circle is not so obvious, but does not present any particular difficulties. Here we have to do with the gluttons, with people “whose God is their belly, and who glory in their shame, who mind earthly things” (Philipp. iii, 19). The type of these sinners is the monster Cerberus, the guardian of their circle. He has three mouths, for one does not suffice to still his insatiable appetite. So, too, are the people who are guarded by him—beings whose most valuable and precious organ is their throat, who would like to be all gullet, that they might the better pander to their insatiable greed—human beings who would divest themselves of their humanity to clothe themselves with the purely animal nature, as it appears especially in the dog. For this reason they are guarded by the three-throated

hell-hound, and the lamentations which cross their lips sound like the howling of dogs, and are drowned in the barking of dogs. The abode they are in is itself a torment to them. The air is gloomy, the ground filthy, and the atmosphere is filled with stench—a picture, no doubt, of the grossness in which people of this kind dwell. But could not a still better application be found? Have we not before us an exact image of the low pot-houses and taverns in which such sinners sojourn longest and oftenest? Their bodily condition is as loathsome and vexatious as the place where they are. From vi, 92 and 93, as well as 37, it is obvious that they only appear to be human, while they are in reality beasts lying on their bellies, their faces wallowing in filth; for they only fix their gaze upon that wherewith they hope to fill their bellies. Here in the light of eternity these objects of their longing appear in their true form, divested of all delusive coloring—as filth! But as filth is used in the Scriptures as a symbol of contempt and of a contemptible state (I Sam. ii, 8; Psalms, cxiii, 7; Lam. iii, 45), so we must recognize in this wallowing in filth the symbol of that contempt which necessarily falls to such vulgar souls. But here, too, a still closer relation involuntarily is suggested to us. We seem to see them bodily before us, these carnal beings, as they lie on the ground like cattle and wallow in their dung after they have pandered to their gluttony until they have been deprived of the use of their reasoning powers! Such a sight probably as often presented itself to the poet in his wanderings as it presents itself to the observer of to-day who travels through Italy—and not through Italy alone. It will not do to object that these traits and correspondences are taken from the life of the people of the present, for, as regards sin—especially the sin of gluttony (and drunkenness)—humanity was and is ever the same. No profound knowledge of the people's life in the middle ages is required to persuade one's self that in respect of gluttony that time was like the present. In the punishments even which are inflicted upon these souls by their type and guardian Cerberus, I am forced to perceive the same close relation. With his claws he scratches, flays, and lacerates them. This is a punishment which men often suffer here on earth. When they sit together the long hours of day and night to serve their God, how often are Cerberuses found among them who handle them no better than that

Cerberus in the third circle of hell! How often are they barked at no more gently than in the eternal regions! But as the souls, arrived at their posts, lie still, and of Ciaccio, after having again fallen upon the ground, it is expressly remarked that he will not awake until the last trumpet sounds, the meaning seems to be that these spirits do not repeatedly receive such treatment at the hands of Cerberus, but once only upon their entrance into the third circle of hell, whereupon, scratched, flayed, and lacerated, they seek their posts. It may be permissible to interpret this circumstance in the following manner: That it does indeed sometimes fall to the lot of such men to seek their homes after such treatment, but that, having once reached their homes, no further molestation is to be feared. Finally, the hail, the snow, and the cold rain are to be considered, by which also the spirits of this circle are tormented. This is all, besides filth. Hail and snow may be taken as the symbols of food, rain as the symbol of drink. But food and drink represent the highest good which this class of people know. To eat and to drink well is to them paradise and eternal bliss. Here they have what they covet in abundance. But, of course, these things are divested of their delusive semblance, and appear as what they are in reality. Therefore they no longer tend to satisfy their animal appetites, but only serve to increase their torment. For this reason they are to them no longer a good which they desire and strive for, but rather a plague, which they seek to ward off as well as they are able (vi, 19, 20).

To be sure, it has been assumed in the above remarks that the inhabitants of this circle of hell are not recruited from the higher and cultured, but from the lower and more vulgar classes. It lies in the nature of the case that this presumption is correct. But this is not to be understood as if rioting and gluttony were sins unknown to the higher classes of society. The reveller and glutton in the Gospel (Luke, xvi), on the contrary, belongs to the higher class. But these vices are practised more clandestinely by that class, and where they do exist it is not in so ugly and beastly a form as among the lower classes. Furthermore, we do not lack allusions coming from the poet himself, which seem to support this assumption. As a comparison, the dog—an image of voracity to be sure, but also of the base and vulgar—is repeatedly used. The only sinner, too, who is called by name, seems to prove by

his very name (Ciaccio = pig), to our satisfaction, that he was not wont to move in the more refined circles while on earth. The chief point remains, as the preceding details seek to illustrate, that the whole description of the condition and suffering of these people paints for us a vivid picture of the life and doings of the gluttons of this lowest type. That people of the lower classes are not the only ones who people this circle of hell is, however, self-evident, and the meaning to be conveyed is merely this: that these are in the majority and that the poet has taken the colors for his picture from their life and doings. And that justly; for whoever panders to these low vices sinks to the level of the most vulgar class of men, even though by virtue of rank, riches, or culture he occupy a privileged position in society.

On the misers and spendthrifts (fourth circle, *Inf.*, vii, 22-26) a few short remarks will suffice, which are added only for the sake of completeness, as their relation has been justly recognized and duly mentioned above. It is well known that the reason that these two are mentioned together and suffer the same punishment is that, according to Aristotle, every [?] virtue is a mean between too much and too little, and misers and spendthrifts both are unable to find this golden mean. Their opposite sins spring from a wrong estimation of the true value of earthly goods. The one overrates, the other underrates them. Both sins have for their inseparable companion a ceaseless inner unrest, and for that reason these souls appear ceaselessly fatiguing and harassing one another, the heavy masses of stone which they roll toward each other from opposite directions symbolizing the lumps of gold upon which they have spent all their efforts, all their meditations and speculations. The lump is now no longer an agreeable and desired burden, for the gold has lost its captivating glitter and appears as that which it is in reality—a heavy, barren mass, the burden of which oppresses the soul at first in the temporal state, afterward in eternity also. The affronts which they put upon one another echo on, as bitter reproaches, from eternity to eternity. And here, as everywhere else, the poet has transferred the temporal state of the soul to eternity. The lack of desire for rest becomes incapacity for rest, the voluntary toil and weariness have now become an enforced state, their lack of insight a disfigured countenance which obscures them from all recognition.

As regards the sinners who people the fifth circle of hell, it is, to begin with, indispensable to decide the question wherein the sin of one half of them consists. They are all condemned to the same punishment; they lie in the far-extended, dark, grayish-red swamp which is formed by the waters of the Styx. But they differ in this that the ones in the swamp rise above its surface and storm against one another like animals, whilst the others are under water and, instead of beating and hacking at each other, scream out miserable lamentations in a gurgling tone and only make known their existence through the bubbles on the surface of the water. According to the oldest and thus far most generally accepted view, two classes of sinners are punished in this circle, which have sinned by opposite vices—namely, the angry and the indolent. In support of this view it is urged, in the first place, that those who are under the water themselves confess: “Portammo dentro accidioso fummo” (vii, 123).

But as the sense of these words is obscure and doubtful, they prove absolutely nothing in themselves, but must be explained according to the context. The above-mentioned Aristotelian theory, holding virtue to be a mean between two extremes, which our poet adopted (“Convito,” iv, 17), has also been appealed to. However, it is but too plain that Dante in his classification of sins by no means followed this theory. Had he done so, we should meet in every circle of hell the spirits of those who sinned by opposite vices, which, however, can only be said with absolute certainty of the fourth circle. But the reason for grouping spendthrifts and misers together is not solely the Aristotelian theory, but also the circumstance that misers and spendthrifts appear to work into each other's hands here below, which could be symbolically represented only by making them occupy the same circle in hell. If now the grounds which are cited in support of this view are by no means stringent, there exist, on the other hand, reasons of no trifling importance which speak against it. It is true that the souls of this circle invite comparison with those of another—not of the fourth, but rather with those of the first division of the seventh. In truth, the punishments which the violent suffer bear a striking resemblance to those of the fifth circle, and there, as here, is a gradation—the sinners being immersed the deeper in the stream of boiling blood the more heinous the crimes they have

committed. Now, analogy would seem absolutely to demand that here too the immersion more or less deeply in the mire should be determined by the greater or less degree in which the respective sinners had pandered to the one vice. But why, if indeed the indolent must be mentioned here, they should stick in the mire deeper than the angry, can by no means be divined or made to seem reasonable. And then have we not met the indolent before? Or do not the cowards whom we saw in the entrance to hell belong to the family of the indolent? This view (which I too formerly held and have retained in my commentary), furthermore, seems to be at variance with a subsequent passage of the poem. From xi, 70, and the following, it appears that in the second, third, fourth, and fifth circle the sins of *Incontinentia* are punished. Now, it is difficult to understand how the sin of sloth could be classed under those of *Incontinentia*. If we take into account, besides, that the passage (vii, 115, 116) seems to refer to *all* the sinners of this circle, we shall be obliged to see the angry in the *Tristi* also, who, because they harbor in their breast *accidioso fumno*, are under water and—by the analogy of Inf., xii, 108–116 *et seq.*, 121 *et seq.*, 125, 130 *et seq.*—such as have sinned more heinously than those which project above the water. To examine more closely the relation between the two classes of the angry cannot enter into the present disquisition. It suffices if we know in general with what kind of sinners we have to deal.

The punishment which they suffer is, for one half of them at least, a double one. In the first place they are immersed in the marsh, covered with mud; in the second they are striking, beating, biting, and lacerating one another. This second punishment is simply a continuation of their sin, for it is in storming and raging against others that anger seeks to find vent. Herein the angry one strives to satisfy his passion, for to storm and to rage is, it seems, a pleasure to him. It only *seems* so, however. To him who regards not only the external, but also penetrates into the depths of the soul, the matter wears a somewhat different aspect. The giving vent to rage is not a satisfaction but a torment, a hell which he who allows anger to get the mastery over himself carries in his own bosom—a hell which he neither will nor dare shake off when he wanders across into the life hereafter, a hell

whose torments there grow even keener, more intense, and more horrible. To this is added another element which must not be overlooked. These sinners not only rage against others, but they are exposed also to the outbreaks of fury on the part of others. They must thus suffer the very thing that they have inflicted on others, and upon them is fulfilled in its literal sense the word of the Scriptures (Matt. vii, 2): "For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged; and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again." As regards the stream wherein they are immersed, we must look upon it as the sensual image of passion. As passion disfigures man not only in his innermost soul, but also in his outwardly visible features, so the Styx disfigures these spirits by covering them with its loathsome mire. As anger surrounds man with a mist, depriving him of the proper use of his powers of understanding, so the spirits of the angry are correspondingly enveloped in mist by the dark and gloomy stream. Man is even hindered in the use of his organs of sense by passion, the spirits of this circle by the mire beneath which they utter their sighs. They cannot fully express their lament; they can only convey it by a rattling sound of the throat. As anger blinds man, so these spirits are deprived of all light. The poet, it is true, does not especially dwell upon this point; but this was by no means necessary. It is self-evident that those who sigh under the water can have positively no use for their organs of sight, the more so as the mournful stream is described as dark—indeed, is simply called the black marsh—*belletta negra*.

So far the finding of relations between sins and punishments has presented no serious difficulties. This changes, however, as soon as, at the hand of our poet, we pass the threshold of Dis, the city of hell! In the sixth circle we meet with the heretics (Inf., ix, x, xi), whose punishment consists in lying in sepulchres aglow with fire, the lids of which are raised until the day of judgment, but thenceforward to be closed for all eternity. Now, what have these sepulchres to do with heresy? And what relation lies in the circumstance so significantly dwelt upon that the tombs are open as long as time endures, but shall be closed when time shall be no more? The interpreters, so far as I can see, have not propounded this second question at all, or, if it did present itself to their minds, they have passed it over in silence. As regards

the first question, the fact has been quite generally noted that punishment by fire was in the middle ages considered as the most appropriate for the sin of heresy; but clearly this observation, which betrays no great profundity, does not in the least serve our purpose, for in our poet we have not to do with the stake whereon the heretic was burned, but with tombs. And that Dante was not thinking of the usual manner of punishing heretics is not only clear from the circumstance that punishment by fire occurs in other parts of his poem, but also because fire seems to play an even more important part in the punishment of other sinners than in that of the heretics. It is quite possible, of course, that the poet had in his mind the punishment of heretics common in his time; but this circumstance would not explain to us the relations between heresy and the torment the heretics are made to suffer in his hell.

If we proceed from the position that, according to the biblical principle, "Wherewith thou sinnest thereby shalt thou be punished," the punishments in Dante's hell are a continuation of the inner state of the sinner on earth, we must, in order to discover the relations between sin and punishment, inquire into the inner state of the heretic as pictured in the poet's mind. I think I have found the key to the solution of this question in passage x, 18-15. According to this, heresy consists in the main in the denial of immortality in the belief that the soul ceases to exist at the same time with the body; but if herein lies the real gravity of their sin, it is easy to discern its relation to the punishment which such souls are subjected to. They have in a certain sense found in the hereafter exactly what they expected to find. Life, according to them, ceases with the tomb, the church-yard, the grave; and, in truth, a tomb, a church-yard, a grave, have become the end and goal of their existence. The tomb, according to them, the last goal of all development of the spirit longing for eternity, receives them and forever holds them prisoner. They could not direct their glance beyond church-yard and grave; now church-yard and grave have become their eternal habitation; but, of course, they have not found the repose of no longer existing, of no longer feeling. The tomb wherein they lie is red-hot—no abode of rest, a place of bitter torment rather, for it is a mistake to believe that the denier of eternity finds rest in the thought that his existence

will have ceased when once he lies in his tomb. This idea, indeed, regarded in its true light, is neither more nor less than the red-hot tomb of Dante's hell, whose fire consumes all strength and enthusiasm and oppresses the soul, burdening it with pressure as of hundred-pound weights; and so the punishment to which the poet condemns his sinners appears as a well calculated and happily accomplished disclosure of the condition of their inmost soul. The second of the questions above propounded is also easily answered from this point of view. Being, seeing, and knowledge are possible, according to the deniers of eternity, only as long as the world perceptible to the senses exists; but if the world should some time fall to pieces, then all being ceases, for no one will be there to say, I am. All seeing ceases, for extinguished is every material eye, which alone, as they opine, can see. All knowledge ceases, for those who would know are no more. According to this view, the universe is nothing but an immense church-yard full of graves which hold both soul and body. Therefore the poet closes their tombs forever from the moment when the world of sense reaches its end. Their knowledge ceases in its absolute sense from this moment, as does also their vision (*Inf.*, x, 106). They lie, then, in their tombs with body and soul as they desired. *Desired* because the proposition that man most readily *believes* what he most ardently *desires* is scarce anywhere as fully verified as in this instance.

Considering this, the punishment appears no less clear and appropriate in this circle than in the preceding ones. According as the passage from which we proceeded is interpreted, the objection might be raised that only one class of heretics is here spoken of, and the presumption that the poet considers every heresy at bottom a denial of immortality might be deemed erroneous. We have to say against this that the poet, in spite of the *grande avello* (xi, 7), only speaks of heretics, "che l'anima col corpo morta fanno," and that this passage must be made to refer to *all* the heretics of Dante's hell—a position which, to be sure, can only be maintained by fully disproving any counter-objection. The observation is here to be added that the expression *da questa parte* (x, 13) must be applied to the whole of the sixth circle, and not merely to a part of it.

In the "Purgatorio" (xii, 56) Dante had in mind the legend

mentioned by Herodotus and Justin of the Scythian queen Tomyris, who is said to have ordered the head of Cyrus to be thrown into a vessel full of human blood, and to have exclaimed: "After blood thou didst thirst; I will fill thee with blood!" The author of the Revelation of John writes: "For they have shed the blood of saints and prophets, and thou hast given them blood to drink!" We therefore find the shedders of blood in Dante's hell in a stream of blood, in which they are immersed more or less deeply, according to the quantity of blood which they have shed upon earth. It seems as if the blood that was shed flowed down to hell, there to await the arrival of the shedder for the purpose of avenging itself upon him. And if we seek this hell in the bosoms of the murderers and tyrants themselves, Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, for instance, furnishes the commentary to this sort of punishment. The unlawfully shed blood cleaves to the sinner; he cannot wash it off; he is doomed to his torture ever to see it before him. The murderer in all probability will not fail to make efforts to escape from the tormenting thoughts, from the harassing view of blood. But vain are all his pains, for divine justice has placed guards in the persons of the Centaurs, who circle round the damned pool, checking with their shafts each one who emerges farther than his guilt permits (*Inf.*, xii, 73). Boccaccio sees in the Centaurs the images of the warriors, the myrmidons and the assassins whom the tyrants and the violent are wont to employ for the execution of their plans. In support of this conception it might be observed that the mere view of the instrument which has served him reawakens in the soul of the murderer thoughts of the blood he has shed. However, there seems to be neither a necessity nor an indication for seeing in the mythological figures which the poet employs in his hell concrete embodiments of earth-life. We shall have to regard them rather as the abstract symbols partly of the sin in question, partly of the instruments of divine vengeance. So the Minotaur is here in its double nature the abstract symbol of cruelty and violence, which owe their origin to sin against nature, and partake as well of bestiality as of humanity. And so the strong and fleet-footed Centaurs must be regarded as the abstract symbols of the instruments by which divine penal justice causes its vengeance to be wreaked upon the sinner. Perhaps the poet may have had it in his mind

to hold up these brutal bloody-minded Centaurs before the tyrants and the violent as a mirror wherein they might recognize their own image.

A dismally sombre but inimitably true soul-painting is displayed to us when we enter the second division of the seventh circle. A soul-painting we call it, for it is the subjective world of the despairing which has here become objective. The view of external nature which fills the poet with rapture and makes him intonate the song that is wont ever to refresh and revive the human heart and make it forget its vulgar earthly sorrows—this view does not have a cheering influence upon the darkened soul, for such a soul only perceives the night side of nature and of human life, and wherever it turns its gaze the image of its own interior presents itself. When the world and all earthly things cease to have a charm for man—when he is able to perceive only pain and sorrow on all sides—when every hope is dead in his heart and the last spark of faith in God has disappeared—then he forcibly severs the tie that connects him with the terrestrial world, then the benighted soul plunges into eternity of its own accord. A thicket without a path, without an exit—so the world appears to such a soul. The green which refreshes the eye does not exist for it, but has been transformed to a sombre color (*color fosco*, *Inf.*, xiii, 4). The branches of the tree seem gnarled and matted, its fruit poison-bearing thorns; monsters only, hideous harpies, inhabit such a horrible world; howling and lamentation, and not songs of joy, are heard there. Thus the world appears to the suicide, and thus the poet paints to us the world where the suicides dwell in eternity. Here we readily perceive that in Dante's hell we have to do primarily with the unfolding of inner life, and that that hell is to be sought for not only in eternity, but already in time. The same is true of those other sinners of this circle who have not, it is true, laid hand upon themselves, but who have squandered their earthly possessions and have then, like Lano of Sienna, sought and found death. They are "naked," for they have squandered all—down to their very clothing—torn with briars, for they are exposed to all kinds of necessity and privation; they are persecuted by ravenous black female dogs, which are probably the symbol of their persecuting creditors. Here, therefore, is a punishment in hell which is already accomplished in this world—a punishment in

hell which is nothing else than the necessary consequence of the sin in question.

But these consequences of sin are not only temporal, but eternal as well. Surely it is not unintentional that in this circle the incidents of the last judgment are again referred to. Precisely because his description seems to wear the character of earth-life the poet, no doubt, desired by this express mention to admonish the reader not to remain stationary and content here below, but to fix his gaze upon the hereafter. And here, too, the punishment in the hereafter appears as a continuation and an involution of the earthly condition of the soul. Yonder the benighted soul sees itself surrounded by a world which exactly corresponds to the shape with which it had here invested the beautiful world of God. Yonder that soul is a slave of chance (xiii, 97); here it imagined that blind chance alone reigned. Yonder it hangs its body for all eternity, as here below it hung it temporarily only. In a word, *that* moment in which the soul, being utterly benighted, despaired of everything and forcibly tore itself asunder from life and its earthly vesture—that moment continues through all eternity.

“Andiam, chè la via lunga ne sospigne!”

The third round of the seventh circle is inhabited by the violent against God, which are divided into three classes—blasphemers, Sodomites, and usurers. They all dwell in an arid desert, which is deluged with a rain of fire from above. The blasphemers lie stretched upon their backs, the usurers are seated in a crouching attitude, and the Sodomites run ceaselessly to and fro upon the burning soil. The idea of the punishment which these sinners suffer is taken from Biblical passages. According to Jewish mythology, God “rained brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven” upon the Sodomites (Genesis, xix, 24), which the author of the pseudonymous epistle of Jude (5, 7) enlarges upon, so that, according to him, the Sodomites are “suffering the vengeance of *eternal* fire.” As, furthermore, all these sinners in question are such as “offer violence unto God” (Inf., xi, 46)—unto that God which the Scriptures now and then call a “consuming fire” (Deuteronomy, iv, 24; Hebrews, xii, 29, etc.)—the poet may have taken this for an indication that the fire of divine anger rains down upon them, and that the soil whereupon they stand “is devoured

by the fire of his jealousy" (Zephan. i, 18). It is to be observed, moreover, that the sin of these souls is essentially sin against nature. That this is the case is obvious as regards the Sodomites, and as regards the usurers the poet has made the same assertion before (Inf., xi, 94). But blasphemy also is an unnatural sin, a sin contrary to Nature—Nature herself teaching man to love, praise, and glorify *Him*, who is the first cause and the author of all good, "for in him we live and move and have our being" (Acta, xvii, 28). Therefore Graul, who, in spite of some extravagant ideas, is very profound and has been too much disregarded, calls the blasphemers, not without good reason, "the most unnatural of the unnatural." If, accordingly, the sin of the inhabitants of this circle consists essentially in unnaturalness, here again it happens that "whereby they have sinned, thereby shall they be punished." The fiery rain is the counterpart of the natural rain which revives and refreshes the fields; the arid and burning desert, the counterpart of the natural soil of earth. Here too the condition of the sinner's soul is made objective. We gaze into a soul which looks like an arid desert, upon which the fire of divine anger is incessantly raining—which is barren of every good work whatever. We see at the same time in the eternal punishment imposed upon such a soul a continuation again and a higher potency of its internal state in this world.

If, then, the relations between sin and punishment are here disclosed to us in general, we are struck, on closer inspection of the single classes of sinners, by the authentic expression of the fact that the punishment of the damned consists really and essentially in the continuation of their ancient state of sin. On the one hand, Capaneus continues to blaspheme in hell and boast, "Such as I was when living, such now I am dead" (Inf., xiv, 51). On the other hand, Dante's guide confronts him with the significant words (Inf., xiv, 63-66):

" Capaneus !

Thou art punish'd, in that this thy pride
Lives yet unquench'd; no torrent save thy rage
Were to thy fury pain proportion'd full."

It is not then in the external infliction of pain that the punishment of the damned consists, but rather in his having carried over into eternity his own self, and in having carried it over in that *very*

condition to which, by virtue of his own free will, he had developed and formed it in time. Upon death the account is summed up; this sum represents the net result of a life which the soul carries with it to the hereafter and retains there forever.

If the highest degree of unnaturalness is represented by the region assigned to all the violent against God and nature, the position given to the sinners by the poet in this one region marks a difference, according to the quality of the sin committed. The blasphemers lie outstretched upon their backs on the blazing ground. This position illustrates the impotence of man in opposition to that God whom in his delusion he believed himself able to dethrone. By this position such sinners are forced to gaze above, upward, as it were, to that heaven against which they have launched so many curses and blasphemies—to that heaven where all these now accumulated curses and blasphemies appallingly present themselves to their sight. Nay, more! The curses and blasphemies fall back upon them from above in the shape of fiery flames, that drop down, scorching their souls. The very arms which, Titan-like, they had raised with clenched fists toward heaven, accompanying their blasphemies with this gesture, are now kept in ceaseless motion by them (xiv, 40, *sqq.*), to ward off, if possible, the blasphemies now falling back upon them. The Sodomites suffer a punishment similar to that inflicted upon the voluptuous in the second circle. As there the storm of passion seizes the spirits and aways them backward and forward in agony, so here their unnatural lust gives these spirits no rest, neither by day nor by night. Hither and thither they run without respite, and that in correspondence with their sin upon a fearfully unnatural soil and in a constant unnatural rain. The usurers have, like Capaneus, remained in death what they were in life. They, who never worked themselves, but made others work for them, now sit crouching upon the ground. They have taken with them into the hereafter their money-bags, on which in life all their thoughts and dreams centred. Who they are is only made known by the emblem upon their money-bags; the face does not discover them, for it is as devoid of character as their actions have ever been. And as the money-bags had absorbed all their thoughts here below and had not left them time to think of anything higher, so yonder, also, the money-bags are the

only delight of their eyes. To be sure they cannot now lay their hands quietly in their laps, but must keep them in ceaseless motion to shield themselves from the fire falling down upon them. "Base through and through," as the above-mentioned Graul appropriately remarks, "these high-born usurers know no other conversation than malicious gossip about other usurers of their native cities, thus in reality maligning themselves, and in doing this they make dog-like noises and stick out their tongues like oxen." In their low, beastly behavior (xvii, 49 sq. 74, sq.) the interior of a soul is mirrored, having neither interest nor taste for the ideal good of mankind—for them there is nothing more sublime, neither in heaven nor upon earth, than their dear money-bag and its contents. Whatever more refined manners they may have assumed are but an outside garment, which vanishes in the light of eternity and before the eye of the poet.

As soon as we reach the sinners of the first chasm ("Bolgia") we notice a certain resemblance between them and those of the fourth circle. As there, so here, they are separated into two troops; as there, so here, they move in opposite directions. The panders might be likened to the spendthrifts, the seducers to the avaricious, inasmuch as the latter only seek their own interest or pleasure, the former that of others also. In assigning to the seducers a place nearer the centre (xviii, 26, 27), the poet pronounces a sentence directly opposed to the general verdict. In the eyes of the world seduction is far less disgraceful than the trade of a pander. Dante considers panders and seducers alike guilty, and, in case a difference of degree is assumed to exist in their guilt, the latter more so than the former. As regards the nature of their sin, it is here again baseness that we have before us, but a baseness which is inseparably linked to infamy. The honor of another has absolutely no value for these two classes of sinners; they were utterly incapable of respecting it during life. These people unscrupulously sacrificed the honor of woman, the one to contemptible interest, the other to contemptible lust. And in this their own infamy was revealed at the same time; for whoever looks upon the honor of another as a mere illusion, as a worthless possession, which may be squandered and destroyed at pleasure, proves thereby that honor, in general, his own included, is to him but as a phantom,

a mere outward, empty illusion. Therefore the damned of this ditch, though their position locally qualifies them as blacker sinners than those of former circles, suffer a punishment which seems less severe than most of those before witnessed. Only that this apparently lighter punishment is—in exact correspondence with their character and with their sin—an infamous one. They themselves are so conscious of their infamy, they know so well that they are placed in the pillory, as it were, that here for the first time we see sinners who seek to hide their countenance from the searching gaze of the poet (xviii, 46, 47). This latter circumstance seems to give us the key to the relation between sin and punishment. To be sure, we meet not a few sinners of this class, who are impudent enough to boast of their vice. Yet in their inmost souls they bear the consciousness of their own baseness and infamy. Before every earnest eye their own gaze must drop. The whiplashes of their own conscience destroy their illusions and call to their minds what they are in reality. This is the condition of their soul, this the hell, where in time already they dwell, and which will pursue them into eternity, there to be fully accomplished. Furthermore, it must not be overlooked that this is the only place in all the poem where horned devils appear. The correct explanation of this circumstance Kopisch has given, in so far as time is concerned, and Blanc as regards eternity. Kopisch observes: "The anger of the betrayed husbands and relations comes into the consciousness of these sinners in the shape of horned demons, before whose scourges their souls forever flee, as the Sodomites flee before the flame-vision of God, against whom they have sinned." And Blanc writes: "The poet depicts these demons as horned for this reason: that they are ever to remind the condemned, in a horrid manner, of the husbands whom they deceived, and in mockery called *becchi cornuti*."

In the case of the flatterers the congruence is so clear that it is scarcely necessary to stop to point it out. They are in Dante's hell such as they are in life, and as they appear not only to the penetrating eye of the poet, but to every honest man as well: individuals wallowing in filth. In the poetic hell they continue their trade of "lick-spittle." To be sure, the weaknesses, faults, and vices which they seek to palliate or even to praise here appear as what they are—as filth. In this filth the flatteries themselves,

which to a frank man present so disgusting an aspect, are perhaps supposed to be mirrored. They strike themselves (xviii, 105), for with each adulation the flatterer gives himself a blow. Regarding the ordure in which they wallow, the poet remarks that it "appeared to ooze from human privies" (xviii, 114). As the tears flow downward and form the rivers of hell, so, as it were, all the filth of earth flows down to fill up the ditch where these miserable creatures dwell. Together with the flatterers, in the exact sense of the word, we find the courtesans, for the reason, probably, as Philaethes observes, because "their shameful trade is also based upon flattering, wanton arts and wiles."

Crossing over to the third chasm, we see, as it were, an inverted world opening out before us. The reason is not difficult to guess. Perversity is the essence of the sin which takes its name from the mythical Simon Magus (Acts, viii, 9, *sq.*). The Simonist reverses the precepts of the Gospel. "But seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness"; thus reads the precept of the Gospel (Matt. vi, 33). But the principle according to which the damned of this "chasm" (xix, 7) acted and lived reads quite the reverse: "But seek ye first money and earthly possessions, and the kingdom of God will on occasion be added to you also." The merchant in the Gospel sold all he had to buy the one precious pearl (Matt. xiii, 45, 46). These merchants, on the contrary, sold the one precious pearl to purchase instead perishable earthly goods. Although it was their sacred vocation to hate evil and love good, to seek good and not evil (Amos, v, 14, 15), they have, on the contrary, loved and sought evil, treading the good under foot (Inf., xix, 105). Reversing the divine order of the world, they have called the bad good and the good bad. They have put darkness for light and light for darkness, bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter (Isaiah, v, 20). That which according to Christ's commandment (Matt. x, 8) they ought to have given freely, they have, on the contrary, delivered to the highest bidder. They trod into the dust the flame of the Holy Ghost which was to have illumined their minds and to have made them capable to win souls for the kingdom of heaven, and they made it serve the sole purpose of amassing worldly treasures. Their walk should have been as a "walk in heaven" (Phil. iii, 20). They, however, did not find the strength and enthusiasm to soar upward; they permitted them-

selves to be held and chained by the narrowness of the earth. Not in heaven above, in the depths of the earth they sought their God and thought to find him (Inf., xix, 112 *sq.*). Therefore their head and trunk are thrust into the earth, whence they stretch forth their legs into the air as if they were striving to penetrate into the depths of the earth, perchance there to seek precious ore. Therefore the gaze upward is now made impossible to them, now they *cannot* gaze there any more, whither they *would not* gaze before. Therefore has this earth of which alone they thought, for which alone they cared, and above which they could not raise themselves, become ever narrower little by little until it is no more than a hole into which they are thrust, unable to move. Therefore the cloven tongues of fire (Acts, ii, 3, *sq.*) have become gliding flames which consume the soles of those very feet wherewith they had been trodden into the dust. The flames which lick the soles of the Simonists might also be regarded as the opposite of the aureola. They were indeed called upon to win the glory of the saints. But, as they accounted this glory for nothing and trod it under foot, it now clings to their soles and has been transformed from a splendid ornament to a horrible torment; and at last the poet makes them sink entirely into the entrails of that earth which alone they sought, there forever to remain. This sinking down does not, of course, bring with it a diminution of their suffering; on the contrary, it must be regarded as a heightening of their torments.

Before turning from the Simonists another very obvious relation must be touched upon. Dante puts into the mouth of Pope Nicolas III the words: "My havings in my purse above I stowed—and here myself" (*su l'avere, e qui me misi in borsa*, Inf., xix, 72). It will not be amiss, then, to regard the hole into which the condemned one is thrust and which is here called a "purse," as the symbol of the money-bag which contains the "treasure" of the Simonist, and consequently, according to an expression of Christ (compare Matt. vi, 21, Luke, xii, 34), the "heart" also of the Simonist. And now what fearful irony of divine justice! It was the highest solicitude of the condemned, their only object in life, to fill their money-bag. To attain this object they carried on a most shameful traffic with all, even with the most holy things. Now, in the third chasm they enjoy the satisfaction of seeing the

purse full—so full that they could not possibly desire it fuller. To be sure, it is not filled with gold and silver. They themselves have got into the purse, where they had placed their heart. Truly, not a very dignified treatment of human beings, especially not of such eminent gentlemen as we see here, not a very worthy treatment to be stuffed into a purse, like single pieces of dead metal! Eternal justice here treats them exactly as they treated the spiritual, the eternal good. Whenever they possibly could, they put these eternal goods into their money-bags and thereby pronounced their own sentence.

According to the gospel-legend (Acts, viii, 9), Simon, the progenitor of the Simonists, had occupied himself with sorcery before he was converted to Christianity, and for a long time had bewitched the Samaritans with sorceries. Both vices, sorcery and simony, in him were united in one person. Indeed, an intimate connection between these two sins is not to be denied; for, to quote Graul again, "Whoever seeks to obtain the power of imparting the Holy Ghost for money and for the sake of money, he, like Simon, sees in this power no more than an act of magic, and, unhallowed as he is, will not shrink from abusing the gift bestowed upon him to perform miracles, and may in the end even join hands with those lying powers, by the assistance of which the sorcerer accomplishes his juggling tricks, for from the desecration of the Holy Ghost it is but a step to the submission to the evil one." Therefore in Dante the sorcerers and soothsayers follow the Simonists. The ditch wherein these are located presents, like the preceding one, the aspect of inversion, only inversion of a different nature. Each one is reversed from the chin to the beginning of the trunk.

"Each wondrously seem'd to be revers'd
At the neck-bone, so that the countenance
Was from the veins averted; and because
None might before him look, they were compell'd
To advance with backward gait."

What is the essence of the vice to which these damned ones were addicted? An arbitrary and wicked interference with the ways of divine Providence and his government of the world. The soothsayer seeks to investigate futurity and the occult—indeed,

everything which, according to divine law, should remain veiled to the human eye. The sorcerer strives, by the aid of supernatural forces and powers subservient to himself, spirits subterranean or superterrestrial, to limit divine rule by his own positive interference. But we must lay stress on the fact that Dante sums up soothsaying and sorcery under the general head of fraud (*frode*) (Inf., xi, 58). This seems to express a strong doubt of the actuality of soothsayings and wonderworkings by demoniac aid, and to regard the doings of this class of sinners as simple fraud calculated to deceive the superstitious. If this was, indeed, the purport of the poet—which I do not dare positively to assert—we should here have a new and brilliant proof of how high he stood above his time and his contemporaries.

The punishment which these sinners suffer consists in having their necks twisted, so that, instead of looking forward, they gaze backward, and are forced to walk the crab's walk. So they wander along, silent and in tears, with slow steps. Graul, whom I cite repeatedly, because he of all Dante investigators has expended the most care upon the finding of relations between sins and punishments, thinks that God, externally to portray the perversity of their doings, worked a penal miracle (*Strafwunder*) upon them, as he did upon the sorcerer and false prophet Elymas (Acts, xiii, 8–11). How little apt this observation is, is evident from the fact that in other circles, too, we meet with miraculous punishments, and such as are greater still than the one here in question. We call to mind the suicides, the thieves, the evil counsellors, and the schismatics! Upon all of these God has worked greater penal miracles than upon the soothsayers and sorcerers. And, furthermore, we must presuppose here, too, physical punishment to be only a symbol of the spiritual condition of the sinner hardened in his sin (compare Witte, introduction to his translation of the "Divina Commedia," p. 12). Even supposing God to have worked a penal miracle upon them, we must still ask, How is this miracle an emblem of their spiritual state?—a question which in the above observation is not touched upon, much less answered.

If we more closely inspect the punishment, Dante himself (xx, 22) calls our attention to that wherein it principally consists. What moves him, moves him to tears, is to view "our form distorted." According to this, it seems that the distortion of the

human form constitutes the essence of the punishment. But the sin of sorcery and soothsaying may also be traced back to unnatural distortion and perversity, and that from the modern as well as from the ancient stand-point. Proceeding on the ancient view, according to which sorcery is accounted more than mere fraud and trickery, it (soothsaying as well as miracle-working sorcery) appears as distortion and perversity, inasmuch as it transgresses and perverts the order established by God, displaces the boundaries between the visible and invisible world, and makes man undertake to associate with unearthly powers, before which his pure, natural human feeling, aside from the fear of God, should cause him to flee. Upon this latter circumstance the chief stress is laid. It is precisely this perverse and unnatural looking toward the dark powers, the seeking aid there, whence only harm and ruin can come, which the poet has depicted. At the same time, the punishment of these damned ones presents a picture of their powerlessness and of their vain endeavors. They who with their gaze thought to embrace not only the present and the past, but also the future, they cannot now even see the things nearest before them. They who were so ready to open their mouths to speak of secrets hidden from others are here silent (v, 8). They who were once so ready to laugh at the credulity of their fellow-men here weep over their own misery. They who were so eager to move forward rapidly now walk backward at a slow pace.

But if, on the other hand, perhaps in accordance with our poet, we regard sorcery from the modern stand-point, it consists in the perversion and distortion of truth. Looked at from both stand-points, the punishment presents itself, on the one hand, as the disclosure of the spiritual state of the sinner; on the other hand, as a just retribution, corresponding exactly to his sin. The inner perversity of the sense, the aridity and barrenness of the heart, the consciousness of their own misery, the incapacity to rouse themselves from their state of sin and to enter new and separate paths—all this is poetically portrayed in the condition in which we find the condemned of the fourth chasm. On the other hand, what they have done unto others, that has here befallen them. As by their fraudulent tricks of legerdemain they have turned people's heads, so now their own heads have been turned. As they worked with all their might to promote the retrogression of

morals and culture, so here they must walk backward. As by their fraud they often wrung tears from those they defrauded, so here they shed abundant tears. According to the "*jus talionis*," like has been requited by like.

To the *barattieri* Dante devotes two whole cantos (xxi, xxii). In spite of the terror of the punishment as well as the critical condition in which the two poets are placed, the description here passes from the tragic to the comic ironical style. The poet has covered the sinners of this chasm with marked scorn (compare xxi, 37 *sqq.*, 46 *sq.*, xxii, 25 *sq.*, 49 *sq.*, 85 *sq.*), probably from very personal reasons. His enemies had, as is well known, accused him of *baratteria*, and it is for this reason probably that Dante pours out the vials of his scorn over the *barattieri* to prove how far he was removed from indulging in a sin he despised from the bottom of his heart. The danger, too, into which he and his guide fall might be interpreted as a slight allusion to actual dangers passed through from temptation by venal officers, for while reading these two cantos the idea involuntarily obtrudes itself upon us that the ill-famed decree of the *Canto de' Gabrielli* would furnish the best commentary to them; but we will let this question, which does not immediately concern our subject, rest in itself, and we will more closely inspect the sin and punishment of these condemned. Bribery and office-selling are vices which sneak about in the dark and do not step before the public, as do, for instance, sorcery and soothsaying. Therefore Dante remarks that the ditch of the *barattieri* is exceedingly dark (*mirabilmente oscura*, xxi, 6), for it is easy to sneak and whisper in the dark. The venal one avoids the light. He would like to envelop himself and his deeds in eternal darkness. So these sinners are steeped in pitch which effectually hides them from the eyes of men. Their wish is fulfilled. And yet how painful is their condition! The darkness with which they must surround themselves burns into their consciences like the boiling pitch in the fifth chasm. If such a being dares to show himself by daylight he immediately beholds the threatening hooks, which force him to dive down again; but those who threaten are devils. Like seeks its like no less in Dante's poetic hell than in the world. In the devils, too, we see in a certain measure the image of the *barattieri*. Dante has very well illustrated the life and actions of this class of people as well

as their inner state, mutual enmity, pleasure at others' misfortunes, hatred; besides this, inner fear and torment. Dante hints that he has in mind the doings in life here below by the mocking speech he puts into the mouth of the devils (xxi, 53, 54): "Cover'd thou must sport thee here. So if thou canst, in secret mayest thou filch." It is further to be observed that the poet repeatedly uses the verb *inviscare* (xxi, 18, xxii, 144). The expression has a double meaning. In its direct sense it means to rub or paste over with bird-lime; in its figurative sense it signifies to deceive, entrap by fraud, etc. So we can say, "L'arte del barattiere invischia gli incauti"—that is, the venal man catches the incautions by his tricks. It is characteristic that now the *invisicatori* are themselves *inviscati*. They have themselves fallen into the pit they dug for others. This is then an entirely suitable punishment, and discloses at the same time the true state of the soul. The poet says of one of these *barattieri* (xxii, 109) that he "fail'd not in rich store of nice-wove toils" (*aveva lacciuoli a gran dovizia*). What is true of this one is true also of all others. Craft is their weapon; but it turns upon themselves. By his craft a Ciampolo only succeeds in exchanging one torment for another—the torment intended for him by the devils for that in the boiling pitch.

Grail very aptly remarks: "These swindler-souls who brought others into the pitch [a German idiomatic expression, meaning who brought misery upon others] are now themselves over head and ears immersed in the pitch, in which, because it is easy to catch fish in muddy water [also a cant phrase in German], they dart about to their heart's content. Dante sees only a mass of pitch covering all these sinners, who were so fond of getting together under one cover [German idiomatic expression, which signifies to be in a ring with, to conspire together, make a secret agreement]."

The cantos relating to these sinners are written in a somewhat burlesque style, corresponding entirely to the character of the inhabitants of the fifth ditch. The appearance of the arrant knave is more droll than terrible; but this comic exterior serves only to hide something bitterly earnest. The same is true of the cantos dedicated to these rogues. In spite of the burlesque form, corruption is most excellently described in all its dangerous power and in all its hideousness. We must remember that the devils

which here appear represent types of rogues, a fact already indicated by their really comical names. To subdue them, Virgil is obliged to appeal to them in the name of God (xxi, 78); and still to a certain degree the poets are made the victims of their craft. Here the lie takes the semblance of truth to ruin them. Even Virgil, the type of enlightened human reason, does not see through the lie. All these are telling illustrations. It is difficult even for the prudent and the cautious to avoid the snares of such rogues. Dante himself has had the painful experience.

Venality blots out and confuses in a horrid manner all traces of right and justice among men. But so great and strong is the power of right that it infuses respect even into those who in their souls are opposed to it. When right itself is missing, men seek to retain its semblance at least. Here we have hypocrisy, which consists in this: that men strive to appear different on the outside from what they are inwardly; they wish to appear *just* while trampling justice under foot, *affectionate* while sacrificing everything to their selfish pleasures, *humble* while placing themselves above all others, *fearing God* while adoring no God but themselves, *sincere* while harboring deceit and falseness in their hearts.

The hypocrites are most plastically drawn by Dante. He calls them a "painted tribe" (*gente dipinta*). This, of course, does not refer to their clothing, but to their faces, which are not shown in their natural color, but painted. The painted woman wishes to appear more beautiful than she is; the hypocrite, as before said, better, more pious than he is. Therefore Christ calls the hypocritical Pharisees "whited sepulchres, which indeed appear beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones and of all uncleanness" (Matt. xxiii, 27), a passage from which doubtless our poet has borrowed the term *gente dipinta*. These whitened people "move along at a slow pace" (xxiii, 59)—exactly in the manner of hypocrites, whose measured step resembles that of a solemn procession, and who seek thereby to make exhibition of a seriousness, a collectedness, and a punctilious bearing totally foreign to their inmost nature. In tears these people advance (xxiii, 60)—the tearful manner being a characteristic of the hypocrite. We are familiar with the rolling of eyes and the settled melancholy over the world's woe displayed by those who are of a sad

countenance; for they "disfigure their faces, that they may appear unto men to fast" (Matt. vi, 16). They are "faint in appearance and overcome with toil," "nel sembiante stanca e vinta" (xxiii, 60), as such people like to play the martyr and are fond of narrating the sufferings which they undergo. They are often heard to sigh: "it is only God's aid and grace which keep them up, else they would break down powerless and feeble." They wear cowls (xxiii, 61), the garment of the monk, as a sign-board of their religious disdain of the world, which hypocrites constantly have at their tongue's end. Besides the cowl they wear the hood which covers the eyes (xxiii, 61, 62). This serves to give them the appearance of having "made a covenant with their eyes not to think upon a maid" (Job, xxxi, 1), of carefully guarding their eyes to avoid seeing evil. Cowls and hoods are gilt on the outside and of dazzling splendor (xxiii, 64), an appropriate picture of the exterior brilliant semblance of virtue and the fear of God, with which such sinners know how to endow themselves—at the same time a counterpart of the sheep's clothing wherein false prophets walk about, although inwardly they are ravenous wolves (Matt. vii, 15). They pace along a narrow path because strait is the gate and narrow the way which leadeth unto life (Matt. vii, 14), and the hypocrite wants to appear as if he were walking along this way. The way, the gait, the dress, the mien, the bearing—all about them has the appearance of holiness and of virtue. That all the sinners mentioned of this kind belong to the clergy is probably due to the circumstance, as Graul has correctly observed, that this profession offers the most temptations to sanctimony; the worldly-minded priest at least wishes to seem what he is not, because he feels that he ought to be so, for no man of any sense of honor likes to be caught in an irreconcilable inconsistency of word and deed. It is scarcely necessary to call attention to the congruence between sin and punishment which we have here. It is so obvious that we should have expressly to close our eyes not to see it. The appearance that the hypocrites wished to give themselves has become a terrible reality. The slow and measured step has become dead earnest; the burden under which they groan is too heavy to permit them to hasten their steps. Their whining mien has become dead earnest; their mournful condition continually moves them to bit-

ter and painful tears. Dead earnest now is their lassitude and their languor; they not only *seem*, but they *are* really tired and languid, and yet they find no rest nor quiet in all eternity. In dead earnest now they wear the cowl; forever it remains to them a load of lead, golden and shining on the outside, which drags them to the ground—a garment which now they would like to throw off, but which they can no longer throw off. In dead earnest now they wear the hoods that cover their eyes; those eyes, which always sought the ground of their own accord, can not any longer gaze above, nor to the right, nor to the left; they are constantly, incessantly fixed upon the ground. Dead earnest now is the narrow way; painfully and with extreme effort only can they pace along it. They literally reap as they have sown.

Are we not tempted to exclaim: If there is really a hell, the punishments and torments can scarcely be essentially different from those invented by the poet.

But—*Poeta agit de Inferno isto, in quo peregrinando ut viatores, mereri et demereri possumus.* This marginal note, in a Magliabechian manuscript, on § 8 of Dante's letter to Can Grande (compare Witte, "Dantis Epistolae," Patavia, 1827, p. 81, note 43), certainly corresponds to the intentions of the poet, as we have remarked before, and, although it does not originate with him, it was made in his spirit and in accordance with his thought. Indeed, the punishment of the hypocrites is not deferred to the hereafter; like that of the other sinners, it begins whilst they still walk the earth. The torments of hell which Dante so thrillingly describes are borne in their own breast while yet in this life. Only the superficial observer is dazzled by the glittering case of gold. Whoever penetrates beyond the surface soon sees that the hypocrite is dragged down to the ground by the fearful burden of his thoroughly worldly mind; that the cloak which this sanctimonious palliator of his own sinful weakness wears is made of heavy lead, under which he secretly groans and weeps. What torment, to be forced to be forever on the watch, so as not to exhibit the inner man outwardly before the eyes of the world! Like every other sin, hypocrisy may little by little become second nature. But, even where it has become so, it remains a heavy burden. No hypocrite can be happy, none can feel content. The inner harmony is lacking, and where this is wanting there is hell. "They

have their reward," says Christ—that is, they obtain nothing by their sanctimony. Nothing in this life, still less in the hereafter. Punishment will not be omitted. In the first place, they are given over to contempt and ridicule, as he would appear ridiculous and contemptible who would in reality wear the *in eterno faticoso manto* described by the poet. They despise each other, tread each other under foot, as, for instance, the inhabitants of the sixth ditch tread under foot the archetype of hypocrisy, Caiaphas. They are still more despised by others, and dare not look a frank and honest man in the face; they only look at him askance, in silence and ashamed (xxiii, 85 *sq.*). This is their condition, this is their inner state, while yet in this life.

In the hereafter the outer covering drops off. They are there exactly the same beings they were here, but they have not the sorry consolation, at least, to seem what they are not. They know and are known. Here they keenly feel the delusion of hypocrisy, and it bears down upon them with an enormous weight; and whoever sees them, notices at once that their cloaks are of heavy lead, gilt only on the outside. To sum up, they have the same impulses yonder, but any, even the most delusive, satisfaction of these impulses is denied them.

We come to the seventh chasm. It is inhabited by the *thieves*. Wegele ("Dante Alighieri's Life and Work," 2d ed., p. 465) only says of them: "The thieves mutually rob each other of their only possession, their form." I myself, led by Wegele, repeated nearly the same thing in my first work on Dante ("Dante Alighieri," p. 513). But that is saying very little, and obtaining still less. Graul here too was able to speak much better on the congruence of sin and punishment. "Dante," he says (p. 239), "sees there (in the seventh chasm) enormous quantities of snakes. Within these are hidden the wily thieves, who creep up un-awares, after the manner of snakes. In the midst of these, some of the souls of thieves run about in their natural human shape. Here they find no hiding-place from the fraternizing snakes, who only inflict upon them what they were wont to inflict upon others: sudden attack, wounds, chains, fire, death. No law here protects these lawless ones, who undeservingly enjoyed the blessing of the law while upon earth; eternal justice shows them whither their principle, generally carried out, would lead." And

again (p. 248): "In the punishment which divine justice causes to rain down upon the damned (xxiv, 119, 120), the ultimate power of the despised law, which cannot be wholly rejected, is revealed. It does not reform the sinner after the lapse of the reprieve, but only hardens him, as the rain does not still further ripen the fruit which has attained maturity, but at the utmost spoils it. Therefore the church-robber, recovering from his torment, vents his wrath in blasphemous gestures and words until the snakes throttle him. This violent murderer and wily robber is chased by the Centaur Cacus, the emblem of his twofold sin; for, as the animal half symbolizes brutal force, so the human half, covered with snakes, symbolizes fraud, man's own proper sin (xi, 25). As the souls, which leave the world more naked than they entered it, possess nothing in hell but their airy shape, the souls of the thieves, who cannot desist from stealing, mutually purloin from each other this, their miserable shape, their last rag, as it were, of property."

This is all very well and truly said, but it does not suffice to solve the problem we have propounded. The question, according to what principle and system the different classes of thieves have been classified by the poet, can here be omitted, as it has little bearing on our theme. But another question, in how far the condition of the thieves in the seventh chasm is a disclosure of their inner state while yet living the life here below, cannot be evaded, and has at least not been satisfactorily answered by the above observations. Let us follow the description of the poet feature by feature. The first thing he affirms of the chasm or *bolgia* of thieves is that it, like that of the barterers, is extraordinarily dark and gloomy (Inf., xxiv, 70). Night, darkness is the element in which the thief is wont to practise his trade, and in which he is at his best. So the thieves live in a dark region, where they never need fear that the light of day will enter. Furthermore, the poet lays stress on the fact that from the spot he first occupied he could hear, but not understand ("i' odo quinci e non intendo," xxiv, 74). In their nocturnal dealings thieves are accustomed to whisper; during the day they talk to each other in unintelligible thieves' Latin. Even he who hears their whispering cannot understand it. Both traits exactly tally with the doings of the thieves and robbers here below. When he reaches a point from which the secrets of the dark deep are revealed to his eye, Dante becomes

aware of a hideously wild brood of strange and manifold snakes (xxiv, 82). The snakes are—a fact not to be overlooked—the souls of thieves which have been changed into snakes. The different, wonderful, and terrible transformations described by the poet prove this to satisfaction, it seems to me. The nature of the snake is peculiar to the thief and the robber. Like snakes, they sneak about, secretly enter houses, lie in wait for the life and property of their neighbor. This, their snake nature, becomes externally apparent in the seventh chasm. There are human beings among the snakes, but those who have externally preserved their human form are not for a moment sure that they will not lose it and be forced to exchange it for the shape of a snake. So, too, thieves and robbers, when they show their faces among other men, hiding their inner aspect, are not for a moment safe from being unmasked. These people run about *naked* (xxiv, 92). By all their stealing they have not been able to scrape together enough to cover their nakedness. Lightly come, lightly go, says the proverb. No one has become rich for any length of time by stealing. Unjust possessions are a fire that consumes even what was legitimately earned if it be mixed with them. In spite of all his stealing, the thief remains *naked*. A special kind of punishment which these sinners must suffer is the terror and fright with which they are constantly filled and tormented. They run about in fear, and no hope ever to be able to escape comforts them (xxiv, 92, 93). Their fear and terror is heightened by the fact that the thieves themselves are constantly robbing and harming each other, and also by the sight of their companions, who are being transformed—that is, robbed—or who have already been transformed. Indeed, the thief suffers a severe punishment while yet here below by the fear which never forsakes him. He is obliged to fear those who are better than he, and also his equals; for he may be unmasked to-day—to-morrow he may be robbed in the same way he has robbed others. Their hands are bound behind them with serpents (xxiv, 94); probably an allusion to the manner in which the thief caught in the act is bound and led away by the officers of the law. But we might also say that the hands which would not be bound by the divine commandment, *Thou shalt not steal*, are now bound in a more forcible, painful, and disgraceful manner. The shame, too, which seizes upon the

thief as soon as he is discovered and recognized (xxiv, 132) belongs more to the life on earth than to that hereafter. The fury against God which seizes upon one of them (xxv, 1 sq.) is a picture of the impotent rage of the thieves and robbers against divine and human laws, against divine and human order. So here again it becomes apparent that we have to seek and, alas! are sure to find, Dante's hell here below, and that the punishments which the criminals suffer hereafter are simply the necessary, natural, and, therefore, inevitable consequences of their sins.

The varied and terrible transformations narrated by the poet call for some reflections. The first transformation consists in this, that the sinner—in this case Vanni Fucci—upon the bite of a snake is consumed and turned to ashes, then regains his original shape, only—as we are meant to picture to ourselves—to suffer the same terrible punishment again and again from eternity to eternity (xxiv, 97–120). This Vanni Fucci is a church-robber, his crime theft and, at the same time, sacrilege. Doubtless it was the object of the poet to make him the representative of a whole class of criminals—viz., the robbers of holy objects. To be sure, *every* thief transgresses a human and, at the same time, a divine law. But the sin of all others is more a sin against their neighbor than against God. The church-robber, however, sins, in the first place, against God. He does not rob his fellow-men, but the sanctuary—God himself, as it were. Therefore he must experience the wrath of that God who is called “a consuming fire” (Deut. iv, 24; Heb. xii, 29); from eternity to eternity he is ever and again consumed to ashes. Furthermore, the church-robber shows himself by his crime to be thoroughly corrupt; the voice of reason, of justice, of religion, of the fear of God—all has been silenced in him, all is wasted and ruined. The symbol of this inner waste and ruin is the external fact of being consumed by flames. In the next place, this church-robber had appeared in human society as innocent; his crime was laid at the door of others (xxiv, 138, 139). Therefore his revival, after being consumed to ashes. He again assumes his former shape. Finally, even the most hardened sinner cannot banish from his heart the fear of that God whom he has so insolently insulted. After the church-robber has committed the crime, a twofold terror seizes upon him—a terror of his fellow-men and, at the same time, of God, against whom he has sinned

in the first place. This fear is symbolized by the confused and blighted condition of the sinner reviving like a Phoenix from out of the ashes (xxiv, 112-118). This revival is significantly compared to the coming back to consciousness of one possessed. The church-robber is, indeed, as one possessed, whom the pangs and fears of conscience, after having accomplished his crime, bring back to consciousness. Here again, then, we have before us the truth of the inner soul revealed in poetic garb.

Quite a different kind of transformation is experienced by Agnèl, who is, according to the oldest commentators, Agnolo Brunelleschi, of Florence (Inf., xxv, 46-78). After transformation he unites two natures in himself—the nature of man and that of the snake. The transformation consists in this: that human nature unites most intimately with the snake-nature and forms a monster—so intimately that it is afterward an *imagine perversa*, a hideous form being neither one nor two. There are thieves who are constantly thieves in their inmost soul; that is, they are constantly planning theft and robbery, but do not always commit the deed. Often they lack the courage. They would gladly do the deed, but do not dare. They unite two natures in themselves, as it were—the wily, creeping nature of the snake, and that of man. Is not Agnèl perhaps the representative of these thieves' souls? This would make it perfectly clear that the poet is depicting by this monstrous transformation the image of the inner consciousness of sinners, who are man and snake at once and yet neither; no professional thieves, and still no human beings in the ethical sense of the word. It must, however, be remarked that an old interpreter (compare my commentary to the Inf., xxv, 68) reports that this Agnolo Brunelleschi often disguised himself to be able to carry out his robberies, and that for this reason Dante thus transformed him. If this explanation were correct, it would be necessary to assume that all thieves which undergo a transformation were in the habit of disguising themselves during earth-life, and then the principle according to which Dante proceeded in his enumeration of the various transformations would be difficult, if not impossible, to divine.

We have an example of a third kind of transformation in Buoso degli Abati and Francesco Cavalcanti (Inf., xxv, 79-151). The one has human form, the other the form of the snake. Both

exchange with each other; more correctly speaking, the one robs the other of his human shape and leaves him instead his snake-shape. Thus we have before us thieves which from human beings are changed into snakes, and *vice versa*. These two also must be the representatives of a certain class of thieves. There are prudent thieves, who manifest the prudence of the snake by being able to retain the semblance of honesty. They watch for the favorable opportunity, where there is little or no risk. If such a one offers, they steal; if not, they are quite honest. They are snakes when there is a fair inducement to be so, and they assume human shape again as soon as the opportunity for stealing has passed, or when none offers. They also mutually rob each other, as Buoso and Cecco rob each other of their shape. They are fond of enveloping themselves in the veil of mystery and of "throwing sand into the eyes of others"; this is alluded to by the vapor surrounding both, which emanates from the wound of the one and the mouth of the other (xxv, 88 *sq.*). The vapor from the wound of the one mingles with that from the other's mouth; whilst they are robbing each other, they work in common at enveloping themselves in mist—a striking picture of the concord existing between this class of people and the assistance they mutually offer each other.

But these are rather suppositions than results of strict exegesis. It is certain to us that Dante proceeded with design in depicting these various transformations. But the sense he has hidden in his verses we can at best only guess at. The simpler explanation perhaps is Graul's, who observes concerning the latter two modes of transformation: The first case (Agnolo and Cianfa) probably pictures the suspension of any marked boundary between mine and thine, while the second (Buoso and Cecco) gives the last decision upon mine and thine, determined by the right of strength. Corresponding to this, the first couple slowly walk along in the shape of a tangled coil, while the victorious part of the second puts the vanquished part to flight; an excellent image of a state composed entirely of a rabble of thieves.

In the eighth ditch we find the evil counsellors. Invisible and enveloped in consuming flames, they wander along as will-o'-the-wisps. Genovesi ("Filosofia della Divina Commedia") says shortly and concisely: "I consiglieri frodolenti sono tra le fiamme in pena

dell' aver acceso co' loro detti e colle loro insinuazioni malvagie grandi incendi di liti e di sventure umane." And Graul—whom we must cite again, because he is, as we remarked above, the only one of all interpreters who enters more particularly into the question of the congruence of sin and punishment, and whom I also like to quote because I desire to draw him forth from the oblivion into which he has so undeservedly fallen—writes (p. 257): "The pert counsellors, the *lumina mundi*, these Lucifers, flit about all wrapped in fire like glow-worms. They have in a certain sense purloined from the God of light the natural light of reason which they would not employ in His service; now they in turn are stolen away by it; in childish wantonness they have played with the spark of the divine mind; from this spark a flame has blazed up enveloping their heads past help; they have not restrained their wit by bridle or bit; now it runs away with them (xxvi, 21, 22). They have led others astray; now they themselves flit about as will-o'-the-wisps; as prompters they have thrown out from the wings upon the world's stage most fatal words; now they can only speak with extreme effort from out of their hiding-places."

We agree with him in this on the whole, but cannot see that the question is hereby exhausted. First of all, it is to be noted that the men who appear in the two cantos here in question (xxvi, xxvii) are men who have played an important part upon the world's stage, have exerted a mighty influence upon the life of nations and states. They are more definitely characterized military men, whose wily counsels are often conducive to kindle the torch of war. By their advice Ulysses and Diomedes kindled the flames which reduced Ilion to ashes; by his wily advice, Guido, of Montefeltro, has lighted the fire which was to consume the Colonna. Whenever a wily counsel is given a consuming fire is kindled, whether it be the fire of war between nations or the fire of discord between individuals. Therefore their punishment is one of fire. But here, too, it is not necessary to think only or even in the first place of the fire in the hereafter. The fire which they ignite upon earth already burns in their hearts while in this life. If their tongue wherewith they give the wily counsels "is set on fire of hell" (James, iii, 6) it is only a consequence of justice that they are themselves consumed by their own fire. As flames of fire the

souls of the eighth ditch spread light about them, so that the region inhabited by them is resplendent round about (*tutta risplendea l'ottava bolgia*, xxvi, 31, 32). For the wicked counsellors are possessed of intelligence; they diffuse the light of reason and knowledge round about them. Endowed with great minds, they sometimes soar so high that when they give counsel it seems as if a man had inquired at the oracle of God (II Sam. xvi, 23). The spirits dwell invisibly in these fires, each enveloped in the one wherewith it is ablaze (xxvi, 47, 48). Dante only sees the flames and has to be informed by Virgil that spirits dwell in them. So in life, too, very often only the flames which the wicked counsellors have kindled are visible, they themselves remaining hidden behind the scenes. Only a few of the initiated know that they are, as it were, concealed in the blazing fire. In other words, it is often unknown to the world for a long time who it was that had given the wily counsel; but in this their torment, their hell, consists that they are concealed in the flame and that this flame becomes as hell to them. If we descend into the depths of the souls of these counsellors, how consumed and tormented by fire do we behold them! If their counsels are not adopted and followed, this inner fire of hell may become so unbearable, so terribly tormenting, that the counsellor "puts his household in order and hangs himself and dies" (II Sam. xvii, 23). But if their counsels are adopted and followed, and success does not attend as they had believed, events do not happen as they had hoped, then again torment and despair. If their counsels lead to the desired result, alas! *others* often reap the glory thereof. So their intelligence, their penetration, their reason, is a brilliant light and at the same time the instrument with which they are tortured. Below there, in the eighth *bolgia*, their tongue is not very ready of speech. The flame wherein Ulysses is concealed begins to flicker and to hiss as if it were battling against the wind, then moves its point to and fro as if it were the tongue to speak, and only after these probably laborious preparations speech ensues (xxvi, 85). One may well call this an allusion to the fact that their tongue, the member by which they have sinned, is most severely and sorely punished; that the tongue once so much in haste to speak fatal words is now paralyzed and can only stammer with pain and effort. But is not another relation perhaps still more obvious? Might we not

recognize in this trait the laborious, preparatory digressions and twistings and turnings which such counsellors are wont to employ before coming out with their real opinion? An honest man speaks out his mind clearly and distinctly without circumlocution. But he who meditates evil—he who, like the Count of Montefeltro, is preparing to give an evil and craftly counsel—cannot and dares not speak out plainly and frankly. He must needs use preparatory introductions, must needs carefully turn and twist his words, so that the malice and hideousness of his advice may not be too clearly apparent, for he is well aware that an evil counsel betrays an evil cast of mind. And is it not also a bitter torment, a hellish pain, not to dare to speak out frankly and honestly, this necessity to search for ways of circumlocution, windings, twistings, and the proper wording? Here too, then, the relations lie clear before us—the punishments of hell both in this life and in the hereafter, which develop out of the sin itself, which lie in the sin and are inseparable from it. It is sin itself which effects the punishment—sin is in itself its own punishment.

Let us cross over to the ninth ditch (xxviii, 1, to xxix, 36). It is inhabited by the schismatics. We must first propound the question into how many classes these are divided, into how many the poet himself divided them. Graul thinks into three classes: those which sowed discord in the Church, those which sowed discord in the state, and those which were guilty of the same crime within the family. We might therefore say religious, political, and social schismatics. Graul writes: "At first those are presented to us who have sought to divide the body of the Christian Church, which is destined to unite the whole human race into a single great divine commonwealth; then those who divide the body of the State, in which a nation is to grow together to form a single large family; at last, those who have divided the body of the family, the basis of the unity of the State." I cannot share this view, although it is adopted by a great many ancient and modern commentators. We have rather to distinguish *four* classes of schismatics, as we have in the following chain four classes of forgers. The analogy would seem to signify so much. Discord may be created in the Church, in the State, between the single families of a city, and, finally, in the bosom of one and the same family. Governed by passion or fanaticism, perhaps

also imbued with the desire to make their names famous, the first lacerate the moral and political body of the nations by inventing and spreading new doctrines, by founding new religious communities. The representatives of this class of schismatics are Mohammed, the originator of the greatest religious schism, and his son-in-law Ali, who again divided Mohammedanism. Others create strife and discord between nations and states. This second class of schismatics is represented by Pier, of Medicina, who is said to have kindled again and again the strife between the Polentas and Malatestas, and by Curio, who, being banished from Rome, exclaimed to Cæsar, hesitating, at the Rubicon: "Away with delay! Hesitation has ever but harmed men prepared!" Others create strife and discord between the families of one and the same cities, which happened frequently enough in the Italian cities in Dante's time. He himself was, as is well known, the victim of such discord. The representative of this third class of schismatics is Moeca Lamberti, who exclaimed the fatal words: "Capo ha cosa fatta!" He gave the advice to kill the faithless Buonelmonte, which brought about the disunion of the mighty Florentine families. Finally, still others throw the dragon-seed into the sanctuary of the family, creating discord between its members, inciting husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers and sisters, against each other. The representative of this fourth class of schismatics is the troubadour Bertrand de Born, who spurred on "the young king," Prince Henry, against his own father, Henry the Second of England. We have not, then, to distinguish religious, political, and social schismatics, but schismatics of Church, of state, of communities, and of the family.

But as the sin of these four classes is at bottom identical, they all dwell together in the same *bolgia*, and suffer the same punishment; only the degree of the punishment marks some difference. But it would not be very easy to say whose wounds are the more painful, those of Mohammed or of Bertrand de Born. Those of the latter are, like his sin, more unnatural, but that they are also more painful is more than we can undertake to assert.

The sin of all these people may be expressed in a word: they have separated what according to divine order should form one; they have destroyed the unity of the Church, of the State, of the community or of the family. That the punishment which they suffer—

their body is split by the sword of discord, so that the limbs and members, closely united by nature for mutual service, no longer work together (I Cor. xii, 12-27, and Graul, p. 277)—that this punishment perfectly corresponds to the special nature of their sin stands to reason and does not require further proof. Viewed as the punishment of *the hereafter*, it offers a terribly clear example of the literal fulfilment of the law: "An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." What they have done unto others is requited to them upon their own body. But we desired to investigate also in what degree the punishments in Dante's hell are inner conditions of this life, and in how far they are developed from the sin itself. But one answer can be given to this question in my estimation: The exterior is an image of the interior, the dismemberment and laceration of the body is an image of the inner laceration of the soul. It is true, every sin destroys the inner harmony of man, effects an inner laceration, and the law reads quite generally: "No peace for the wicked" (Isa. lvii, 21). But the inner disharmony, the lack of peace, the laceration of soul, are in a still higher degree the heritage of those who plant discord and strife outside of themselves. Yea, more! If we can say of every sin that it consummates its own punishment, we can say of this one that it consummates its own punishment even before the sin has been committed. The pleasure in discord, in schism, in strife, presupposes an unsettled state of mind and lack of inner peace. Whoever is at peace within himself is also outwardly peaceable. *Vice versa*: Whoever has lost the inner peace, he cannot keep peace with others. That is especially obvious in the case of the schismatics upon the field of religion and the Church. They must of necessity be internally at variance with their religion and Church before they can think of founding a new one. The one is here developed from the other: the punishment from the sin, the sin from the punishment. So, in the case of the sinners of this region of hell also, we shall have to regard the punishments first as pertaining to this life, as its inner conditions. The interpreters have repeatedly laid stress upon the great significance of the single punishments suffered by these sinners. Mohammed, who has divided the Christian Church from end to end, is now torn asunder along his full length—*dal mento insin dove si trulla*—so that "twixt the legs dangling the entrails hung." Ali, who increased

the schism by again dividing the whole of the Mohammedans, is split from the chin to where his predecessor Mohammed is still whole. Pier da Medicina, who was wont to lend one ear to one, the other to another, and to pry into everything, goes about with one ear lopped off and his nose mutilated; and because he was forever interfering, he now has his throat pierced. Curio, who (according to the poetic legend) urged Cæsar to that decision, so fraught with discord for the Roman Empire, to cross the Rubicon, has had his persuasive tongue entirely cut out, and he, who was formerly so daring that he infused courage into Cæsar, now walks along quite dispirited, and allows Pier da Medicina to open his mouth and place him on exhibition. Mosca, who agreed to Buondelmonte's murder, which became the source of discord in Florence, has had both his crime-stained hands mutilated. Bertrand de Born, who incited the son to war against the author of his existence, has had his brain severed from where it springs in the spinal cord, and he is forced to carry his own head in his hand.

Before bidding farewell to the ditch it may be permitted to add a few remarks about the solemn appeal of the poet to his conscience, which occurs here. The passage reads in the original:

“ E vidi cosa ch'io avrei paura,
 Senza piu prova, di contarla solo;
 Se non che la coscienza mi assicura
 La buona compagnia che l'uom francheggia
 Sotto l'osbergo del sentirsi pura.”

What does Dante wish to convey by these words? All interpreters, from the oldest down to the most recent, interpret this passage as if the poet had meant to say: “I saw such incredible things that I would fear to be thought a liar if I told them alone, without further proof; but my conscience gives me assurance,” etc.¹

¹ Nearly all of the very oldest commentators and those who followed next after them (Laneo, Ottimo, Postillatore Cassinese, Petrus Dantis, Falso Boccaccio, Dolce, Volpi), as well as some of the more modern ones (Portirelli, the *Editori dell' Ancora*, Wagner, Brunetti, Gioberti, and others), pass over this passage in silence. The first one who makes a remark about it is the Anonimo Fiorentino, edited by Fanfani, who writes (i, 609): “Niuna cosa, dice Seneca rende gli uomini vili quanto la coscienza della loro reprobabile vita; et però bene dice l'Auttoe che la buona coscienza l'assicurava, ch'era pura sotto il petto.” This observation at bottom *explains* nothing. Still it contains the

Against this conception I have already raised objection in my commentary (i, 344), and I have since seen with great satisfaction

germs of the above-given correct explanation of the passage, for the quotation from Seneca has some meaning only when it is thus understood, for in that case only a *coscienza pura* can be spoken of; but, unfortunately, this hint of the old "Anonymous" remained unnoticed. The succeeding commentators took *prova* in the sense of *testimonianza* (instead of *esperimento*) and *solo* as an adjective = *non-accompagnato* (instead of taking it as an adverb = *solamente*), and explained the passage as above related. So *Benedetto Rambaldi da Imola*, whose chiosa in the edition of Tamburini (i, 692) gives: "Sanza più prova, col solo testimonio di mia voce." So Francesco da Buti (ed. Gianini, i, 780): "Avrei paura cioè temerei; senza piu prova cioè di me; di contarla solo, questo dice l'Autore per fare verisimile la sua fizione." Still clearer Guiniforte Barziza (ed. Zacheroni, p. 649): "Dico ch'io avrei paura di contarla senza prova, se non che la coscienza mi assicura, perocchè io sò ch'essa è vera." From this time on we find the same explanation in *all* interpreters, and we must suppose that those who pass it over in silence agree with this explanation, now grown traditional, and only refrain from repeating it because they consider it as a matter of course. Landino writes (ed. Burgo-franco, 1529, fol. cxv): "Vidi cosa ch'io harei paura di contarla senza testimonio. Imperocchè chi narra cose incredibili et non vuole esser tenuto bugiardo, cerca testimoni. Qui como ottimo poeta dimostra che conosce esser difficile a persuadere quello che narra; acioche non sia tenuto vano et improvido e dimostrando conoscerlo gl' acquieta autorità e fede." Velutello (ed. Marcolini, 1544, to this passage): "Dice, haver veduto cosa, ch'egli haveria paura di contarla e dirla solo, senza più provo, senza altro testimonio, che quel di lui stesso, temendo, come vuol inferire, che non gli fosse creduta, tanto incredibil cosa era, quella che havea veduto." Vincenzio Buonanni (*Discorso*, Florence, 1572, p. 181): "Sentza più pruova di contarla solo cioè cantando dirla senza testimone." Bernardino Daniello (ed. da Fino, Venice, 1568, p. 186): "Dice aver veduto cosa che contandola egli solo, senza aver altra prova, o testimonio, temeria che creduta non gli fosse stata." In the first edition of his commentary (Lucca Cappuri, 1732, i, 219) Venturi has not taken any notice of our passage; but we find in the Veronese edition by Berno, and in all subsequent editions of Venturi's commentary of Dante, the following: "Senza testimonianza da potere addurre, che mi possa conciliare credenza, e farmi tenere per veridico; starei in forse di dirla, per tema d'esser riputato menzognere e d'essere smentito." The same is repeated by the later commentators, only in words slightly different. Lombardi (Rome, 1791, i, 403): "Temerei d'essere tacciato d'impostura—di contarla solo, io solamente, io primo et unico senza più prova, senza aggiungere al mio detto maggior prova." Paggiali (Livorno, Masi, 1807-'13, iii, 372, of the quarto-edition): "Vidi cosa che io avrei del ribrezzo a raccontarla, come fo, io solo, volendo che mi si creda sulla mia parola, senza darne altra pruova, se non che me ne assicura la mia coscienza, cioè un intimo schietto sentimento della verità di ciò che dico." Biagioli (ed. Naples, 1858, p. 149): "Senza aver prova più forte che quella della mia veduta. E però soggiunse quella che nei suoi pari valer debbe per mille." Costa (Bologna, 1819-'26, i, 173, and in all subsequent editions): "Temerei d'essere tenuto bugiardo narrandola solamente senza recarne altra prova." Torelli (ed. of Padua i, 615): "E vidi cosa che temerei di solamente raccontarla, non avendone altra prova che la mia veduta." The Editori Padovani simply repeat the notes of Lombardi, Biagioli, and Torelli. Cesari (*Bellezze della Divina Commedia*, Verona, 1824, i, 535): "Solo, cioè se i miei lettori

that Gregorio di Siena (Inf., p. 437) had preceded me in this. Witte ("Beilage zur Allgemeinen Zeitung," 1875, No. 229, p. 3602) pointed out my objection "as one of the passages in which I had

dovessero stare a solo il mio detto senza più." Borghi (Paris, 1844, p. 67): "Di contarla solo; di raccontarla solamente, senza recarne la prova." Tommaseo (Venice, 1837, i, 222; Milan, 1865, i, 405; Milan, 1859, i, 330): "Questa protesta non solo tende a scusare la singolarità della cosa; ma trattandosi d'uomo famoso e ammirato da Dante, tende a mostrare ch'egli a nessuno perdona se turbatore della pubblica pace." Brunone Bianchi (Florence, 1863, p. 198; Florence, 1868, p. 198): "Temerei di essere tenuto bugiardo narrandola solo, cioè senza testimoni o altre prove che facessero fede al mio detto." Fraticelli (Florence, 1865, p. 214; the same in the edition of 1871): "Avrei timore di passar per bugiardo, raccontandola io solo, senza recarne altra prova." Martini (Turin, 1840, i, 176): "Vi ha non poche cose che all'umana intelligenza appaiono impossibili," in this we see that such a trivial remark could be made about the poet's verses. Gregoretti (Venice, 1856, p. 220): "Avrei paura di contarla solamente senza altra prova che la mia asserzione." Andreoli (Naples, 1863, p. 184; Florence, 1870, p. 94): "Temerei di esser tenuto bugiardo, narrandola così io solo, senz' alcuna prova di testimonianza altrui." Trissino (Milan, 1864, i, 204): "Temerei d'esser tacciato d'impostura, narrandola io solamente, senza aggiungere al mio detto prova maggiore." Bennasuti (Verona, 1864, i, 540): "Prova d'altri testimoni, etc." Camerini (Milan, 1868, i, 112): "Temerei d'esser tenuto bugiardo narrandolo solo—senza testimonj o altre prove." De Marzo (Prato, 1873, i, p. 940): "A farne narrazione da me solo, senza ravalorarla di testimonianza veruna, temerei di non esser creduto." Cappelli (Padova, 1875, p. 128): "M'ha toccà veder cossa, che paura De contar senza prova gavarìa."

I have registered this long list of notes to the verses in question not only to prove the correctness of the assertion that all the commentators understood and explained them in the manner quoted, but also to show for once by an example how the commentators often copy each other without thinking and at best try to express the same thought in other words. As I am once engaged in this, I will also pass in review a number of translators:

D'Aquino (Naples, 1728, i, 259): "Non habitura fidem vidi; memorare nec ausim, Redderet audacem nisi me mens conscia veri." Piazza (Leipsic, 1848, p. 109): "Et res oblata est, quam me narrare vetaret Ipse timor, nullo meo testante; sed ipsa Conscia mens veri; comes optima, sueta juvare, Auxiliis hominem etc."

French: Aroux (Paris, 1856, i, 234): "Et je vis une chose encore dont je craindrais D'être seul à parler, sans autre témoignage." P. A. Fiorentino (Paris, 1868, i, 146; the same, 1872, p. 118): "Je vis une chose que je n'oserais jamais raconter tout seul, sans autre preuve." Brizeux (Paris, 1872, p. 271): "Je vis ce que je n'oserais conter sans autre témoignage." Ratisbonne (Paris, 1870, i, 385): "Quand je vis un spectacle étrange, épouvantable, Dont point ne parlerais, sans preuve ni témoin." Villain Lami (Paris, 1867, p. 204): "A la sincérité de ce que je vais dire, peut-être le lecteur ne voudra pas souscrire."

English: Longfellow (London, 1867, i, 91): "And saw a thing which I should be afraid, without some further proof, even to recount." V. Botta (Dante as a Philosopher, etc., New York, 1865, p. 222): "And saw a Thing, such as I may fear without more proof, to tell of." W. M. Rossetti (M. F. Rossetti, "A Shadow of Dante," London, 1872,

shown difficulties to exist and had been at pains to solve them." That did not prevent him, however, from still adhering to the common view of this passage in the third edition of his excellent translation of Dante by translating thus: "And I would fear to

p. 90): "And saw a thing which I should be in fear, without more proof of telling, I alone."

The Spaniard, Aranda y Sanjuan (Barcelona, 1868, p. 90): "Y vi cosas que no me atreveria à referir sin otra prueba."

The Dutchman, Van Mijnden (Haarlem, 1867, i, 196): "Op eens outwaar'k een schouwspel, dat 'k moet vreezen zóó zonder één getuige te verhalen."

We come to the Germans. As I am not about to write an inventory, I only quote according to the latest editions. It will not, I think, be necessary to give the title and number of the page.

Friedrich Diez ("Leben und Werke der Troubadours," p. 189):

"Ich aber blieb, die andern anzuschauen
Und was ich sah, ich würde schüchtern sein,
Es unverbürgt dem Liede zu vertrauen."

Kannegiesser :

"Ich aber blieb, zu schauen das Gedränge,
Und sah ein Ding, den Muth würd'ich vermissen
Dass ohne Zeugniß ich allein es sänge."

Streckfuss :

"Ich aber blieb die andern anzuschauen
Und was ich sah, so furchtbar und so neu,
Nicht wagt ich's unverbürgt euch zu vertrauen."

So also in the newest edition by *Pfeiderer*.

Philalethes :

"Doch ich verblieb, die Schaar noch zu betrachten
Und sah Etwas, das ich mich scheuen würde
Allein ohn' anderen Beweis zu melden."

Guseck :

"Ich aber blieb, die Schaaren dort zu zählen
Und sah, was ich allein mich würde scheuen
Hätt' ich nicht and're Proben zu erzählen."

Kopisch :

"Allein ich blieb, die Rotte zu betrachten,
Und sah etwas, das ich mich scheuen würde
Ohn' andere Beweise zu erzählen."

Graul :

"Noch hatt' ich auf die Must' rung nicht verzichtet
Und sah etwas, das haett' ich ohne Zeugen
So ganz allein, wohl nimmermehr berichtet."

Julius Braun :

"Ich aber blieb, den Haufen anzusehn
Und sah etwas, und nimmer würd' ich's sagen
So ohne Buergschaft, zeugend mir allein."

tell what I have seen had I no other proof than my own word." So, too, the latest translator, Bartsch (who, moreover, does not seem to know the Leipsic edition), translates: "And something I did see which I would tremble to narrate were not further proof at

Blanc :

"Ich blieb Zurück, den Haufen zu betrachten,
Und sah ein Ding, das auch nur zu erzählen
Ich fürchten würde ohne mehr Beweis."

Witte's translation is given in the text above.

Bötner :

"Ich aber blieb, den Schwarm mir zu betrachten
Und sah—darob ohn' anderen Beweis,
Der Muth mir fehlen würde zu berichten."

Tanner :

"Ich aber blieb, den Rudel anzuschauen ;
Und sah, was ich, da sonst Beweise fehlen
So ganz allein wohl kaum zu melden wagte."

Von Hoffinger :

"Ich aber blieb, den Schwarm noch anzuschauen,
Und sah Etwas, das ich allein dem Wort
So unverbürgt nocht wagte zu vertrauen."

Baron :

"Ich aber verweilte
Noch zu beschauen die Schaar, und sahe ein Ding das ich fürchten
Würde ohn' weiteren Beweis allein zu erzählen."

Krigan :

"Doch ich behielt die Schaaren im Gesichte ;
Da sah ich, was ich fürchtete zu sagen,
Hätt' ich nicht Zeugnis mehr, als was ich dichte."

Notter :

"Ich aber blieb, dass mehr des Volks ich sähe,
Und sah Etwas, von dessen grausem Bild
Nie hätt' ich nur mein Wort, Meldung geschähe."

Bartsch's translation is given above in the text.

I think this list is long enough. This perfect conformity of interpreters and translators might make it appear hazardous to try to make a new interpretation prevail. When writing the commentary to my Leipsic edition of the "Divina Commedia," I believed that I stood quite alone with my view of the passage. Strange to say, however, Gregorio di Siena had preceded me in this view, as I have stated above. He says ("Commedia di Dante Alighieri," Naples, 1870, p. 441): "Vidi cosa che avrei paura, cioè temerei, senza più pruova, nonchè di farne nuova esperienza o vederla di nuovo, ma di contarla solo, ma di pur narrarla. Se non che ecc. Ma io di ritrarla punto non temo perchè il non sentirmi l'animo rimorso dalla colpa ond' è punito Beltramo, mi francheggia, mi fa franco e ardito a mostrare al mondo in che guisa dalla divina Giustizia vien punita l'aggiù. E così la coscienza pura presta al Poeta franchezza a flagellare il vizio, non mica argomento a far credere altrui le proprie visioni." The new, and surely the only correct, version seems to be gaining partisans, at least among the Italian Dante investi-

hand." In the first place, it is to be observed that the interpreters here forget that, after all, Dante neither cites nor can cite any other testimony than his own word, any other witness than himself alone. He is made to speak then of other witnesses and testimonies, which he has not and which simply do not and cannot exist. Then why at all this solemn appeal to his conscience? Has he not narrated things in plenty, which were certainly in no wise less incredible than what he is preparing to tell of Bertrand de Born? And what, furthermore, would this solemn appeal to the testimony of his conscience signify here? This certainly exceeds the bounds of poetic license! Who in all the world would appeal to his conscience for the truth of a poetic fiction? That would be ridiculous, if it were not blasphemous. It is said that (in xvi, 127) Dante also swears, *per le note di questa Commedia*, that he really saw Geryon ascend out of the deep, as he describes. Yes, of course! Only it must not be forgotten that to swear by one's own poem is simply to toy poetically, while an appeal to one's conscience is an ethical action. The interpreters and translators, without wishing to do so, and often without even knowing that they do this, here accuse our poet of a piece of frivolity carried rather far, of which they certainly do not think him guilty. But the whole thing was so simple! For *prova* means *proof*, and *solo*, *alone*. Then the verse must read: "Without further proof alone to recount." Not "must" read so, but "might" read so if this made any sense; but it simply makes no sense, for we vainly look round for the *più prove*—*i. e.*, further proofs. It must not be

gators. *Francesca* is to be numbered among them; his note ("Divina Commedia," Turin, 1873, i, 241): "La coscienza (quella buona compagnia, che affidata nella propria innocenza rende l'uomo franco) mi assicura," permits of no other interpretation; also Jaccarino, who translates (Naples, 1871, i, 128):

"Vedenno cosa ch'avarria paura
De contà sulo, tanto m'ha stonato
Si non che la coscienza m'assicura
La bona compagnia de l'ommo franco,
Che se sente 'nnocente e sta sicura."

The very latest interpreter, *Luigi de Biase*, has decidedly adopted our explanation. He writes ("Divina Commedia," Naples, 1876, i, 161): "Vide cosa sì orribile, che sente ribrezzo a rimembrarla. . . . Però non prova repugnanza veruna a narrarla, chè la sua coscienza non lo fruga, nè rimorde e flagella per quella colpa ond'è punito il nuovo peccatore, ch'ei vede."

So truth, once recognized, after all, gradually makes its way.

forgotten that *prova* may mean something besides *proof*—namely, experience; and *solo* something besides *alone*—namely, *only*. It must not be forgotten, furthermore, that verses 113 and 114 admit of the construction: *Vidi cosa ch' io avrei paura sol di contarla, senza più prova—i. e.*, “I saw such things that I would fear even to narrate them—without further experiencing them—did not my conscience reassure me.” Far from appealing to his conscience to prove the objective truth of a poetic fiction, Dante here appeals to his good conscience to prove his innocence. And if the motive for this solemn protestation of his innocence is asked for, here, where the schismatics are spoken of, the answer simply is this: Because his enemies and opposers might easily have thrown up to him *Mutato nomine de te fabula narratur*. For indeed it did not require much to accuse the poet of being a schismatic; indeed, an accusation of this kind is easily to be read, so it seems to me, between the lines of those fine sentences of Messere Cante de Gabrielli and his accomplices. It did not require any particular penetration to take from the essay on monarchy and from some of the poet's letters the plausible proof that he too incited the children against the mother—on the one hand the Christians against the Church, on the other the Florentines against their native city. Against such accusations, which might be made and perhaps were really made against him, Dante solemnly protests his innocence in this passage. It is accordingly to be understood thus: “I saw things which I would fear—so terrible were they—merely to narrate—not to mention having any further experience of them, if, namely, I myself had been guilty of such sins.” It will be found, I think, that this conception is more consistent with the sense of the passage and more worthy of the poet, and I dare hope that I shall never again come across the nonsense of making the poet first speak of further proof, which he neither adduces nor can adduce; secondly, of making him appeal to the testimony of his conscience for the truth of a poetic fiction; I dare hope, I repeat, never again to meet with this nonsense in a German translation and commentary of the “*Divina Commedia*,” or I should really be obliged to think of a passage in Schiller, which tells against what power even the gods battle in vain.

My readers will pardon this rather lengthy digression. I was at some pains to call attention to a false and, at bottom, ridicu-

lous conception, which, like an old disease, was being inherited from generation to generation by the interpreters. We will now return to our own proper subject.

In the tenth and last chasm we find the forgers. They, like the schismatics, are divided into four classes: forgers of uncoined metal, or alchemists; forgers of person; forgers of coined metal, or counterfeiters; and, finally, forgers of words (xxix, 37, to xxx, 148). As regards the first class, or alchemists, we first observe that Dante, in condemning them all, without exception, to hell, differs from his teacher, Thomas of Aquino, whom he usually follows. The latter really believed that alchemy, which was then accounted a science, might succeed in making good, pure gold, which it would not be wrong to circulate. He says ("Summa theologiae," P. II, 2a. qu., lxxvii, art. 2): "Aurum et argentum non solum chara sunt propter utilitatem vasorum quae ex eis fabricantur, aut aliorum hujusmodi, sed etiam propter dignitatem et puritatem substantiae ipsorum. Et ideo si aurum vel argentum ab alchymicis factum veram speciem non habeat auri et argenti, est fraudolenta et injusta venditio, praesertim cum sint aliquae utilitates auri et argenti veri, secundum naturalem operationem ipsorum, quae non conveniunt auro per alchymiam sophisticato, sicut quod habet proprietatem laetificandi, et contra quasdam infirmates medicinaliter juvat, frequentius etiam potest poni in operatione, et diutius in sua puritate permanet aurum verum quam aurum sophisticatum. Si autem per alchymiam fieret aurum verum, non esset illicitum ipsum pro vero vendere, quia nihil prohibet artem uti aliquibus naturalibus causis ad producendos naturales et veros effectus, sicut Augustinus dicit in 3 de Trin., cap. 8, de his quae arte daemonum fiunt." Thus the saint of Aquino. We see Dante was somewhat more enlightened and less superstitious in certain things than his great master.

The sin of the forger is essentially lying. He gives things, persons, and words a false shape and a false external appearance. Concerning the intimate relation which here exists between sin and punishment, I will again give Graul's words first. "The lie," he writes (p. 286), "fastens itself upon truth like a parasite, and absorbs all the healthy sap, as it were; it has a perverting, destructive, decomposing effect. Very ingeniously the liars (in the full as well as in the restricted sense of the word) are supposed

by the poet, as if they were in an immense hospital, to be afflicted with all kinds of diseases, the putrid odor of which fills the whole valley. The alchemists who sought to get gold from base metals have their pure humors changed to impure ones; their whole skin is covered with a disgusting scab, which, tormented by itching, they are ceaselessly scratching and rubbing, as during lifetime, driven thereto by a secret tickling; they were forever handling and working upon base lead—*leprous gold*. The alchemist seeks to heal the fault of Nature, and to get precious gold from the base lead which Aristotle calls “leprous gold.” As leprosy in the ore springs from vitiated and rotten substances, so the leprosy of the skin is the consequence of tainted and corrupt humors (p. 291). And of the forgers of persons he says (p. 295): “Because they have outraged the highest good of humanity—for personality is, as it were, the patent of nobility of all free-born beings—they begin to doubt their own personality as well as that of others. Like unclean swine, they run about as if possessed, and tear down without reason or consideration everything in their way. Myrrha, timid by nature, as women are, losing herself in the madness of her heart, flits hurriedly by. But Schiechi, man-like, is less timid by nature, and lays violent hands on Capocchio, who in this wise suffers violence, and has no one to help him. The counterfeiters suffer from the dropsy. By mixing inferior ingredients with it, they had, as it were, swelled the metal, so that the passing looker-on might think it of full weight; now their body is swollen with ill-digested humors, so that they appear at first sight to be in perfect health, while in reality their inside is parching. The falsifiers of words are tormented by burning fevers. Lying fever fancies flit round their brain, in which truth and fiction were wont to cross each other in a motley mixture; it seems as if the whole body of these liars (German slang, *Dunstmacher*, literally ‘manufacturers of vapor’) was about to dissolve in empty vapor.”

We have but little to add to these comments of Graul’s. The first observation which the poet makes in this region of hell is, that horrid, heartrending screams assail him, so that he covers his ears with his hands (xxix, 43). Laments then, cries of sorrow and woe—that is the harvest which the forgers have reaped! They have caused others to lament and cry with woe by deceiving them with their forgeries; now these sighs, these lamentations, are

required from them. And how often before while yet in life! Not only when they were discovered and unmasked, but also when they had succeeded in hiding their crime. They are all afflicted with disgusting diseases, and diffuse a horrid stench round about. Their own self is not natural, but has been falsified, as it were. Here, too, the bodily disease is an image of the spiritual, the exterior an image of the interior. They are shunned as one seeks to shun bad odors. Their natural position, too, is falsified: they lie piled upon each other in horrid confusion (xxix, 67-69). The confusion they had brought about in life is now for them. Two of them prop themselves up against each other (xxix, 73), as they had helped each other during life and had together worked at their dark trade. Their body is afflicted with such an itching that they are constantly busy with their hands, tearing off the scabs with their nails, lacerating themselves with their own fingers (xxix, 76-90). The love of gold which inspires the alchemists fills them with a restlessness, a haste, which forms their torment. Their scratching does them little good, the means which they devise have not the power to give them rest. The counterfeiter who would not check his love of riches, whose ideal was a bag full of money, is bloated with foul water, while his tongue languishes for a drop of water (xxx, 64). The dropsy is an image of those desires which seem to bloat him, as it were, while his thirst is the image of that insatiety which consecrates the heart to Mammon. In another place ("Convito," tr., iv, c, 12) Dante, speaking of riches, says: "Promettono le false traditrici di torre ogni sete e ogni mancanza, e apportar saziamento e bastanza. E questo fanno nel principio a ciascuno uomo, questa promissione in certa quantità di loro accrescimento affermando; e poichè quivi sono adunate, in loco di saziamento e di refrigerio, danno e recano *sete* di esse con *febbre intollerabile*: e in loco di bastanza, recano nuovo termine, cioè maggior quantità di desiderio, e con questo *paura e sollecitudine grande*." The whole chapter relating to this in the "Convito" ought to be read; it forms an excellent commentary to the "misera del maestro Adamo" in hell, and again demonstrates that the poet poetically described a hell which he had really seen—in this world.

The giants in the abyss (XXXI) are the representatives of that insolent, Titanic strength which presumes by heaping mountain

upon mountain to storm heaven itself. Appearing as towers of defence, they present an imposing appearance. The mere sight of them fills the poet with terror (verse 39). And still they stand there powerless, a vivid picture of the impotence of man when his strength attempts to rebel against the higher powers. Fulfilled upon them is the word: "But thou, O God! shall bring them down into the pit of destruction" (Psalms, lv, 25), as well as: "To bind their kings with chains, and their nobles with fetters of iron" (Psalms, cxlix, 8). They still rage and storm, as they used to do; but only to their own torment. Their rage is impotent, so that it only makes them subject to mockery (xxxix, 70-75), which again reminds us of the word: "He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh; the Lord shall have them in derision" (Psalms, ii, 4). Amongst those which are especially mentioned, one—Nimrod—belongs to Scripture legend, three to mythology: Ephialtes, Briareus, and Antæus. The latter three are antediluvian; Nimrod is the only one of those named who lived after the deluge. Thomas of Aquino had expressed the opinion ("Summa theologiae," P. I, qu. lii, art. 3): "Neque enim omnes gigantes fuerunt, sed multo plures ante diluuium quam post." Dante seems to follow his authority here. According to a very ancient (Josephus "Antiquitates," 1, 2, 4) and very general (compare Augustinus "De civitate Dei," xvi, 4; Brunetto Latini, Tesoro, i, 25) acceptation, the idea of building the tower of Babel originated with Nimrod, consequently the chief fault of the confusion of tongues upon earth lies with him (xxxix, 76). Now he is himself all confused and distraught, an *anima sciocca*, who speaks a jargon which no one can understand and he is unable himself to understand the language of men (79-81). Ephialtes, who once raised his arms against the Most High, now carries the one tied up in front, the other on his back. In vain he shakes himself and seeks to rid himself of his chains by force. Although inwardly unsubdued and consumed by defiant rage, he is forced to feel that in opposition to a higher power he is nothing. In this—that they wish, but are not able to do—lies their punishment; that they want to speak with all their might and can utter no intelligible sounds; that they desire to get rid of their chains with all their might and yet cannot free their arms. These giants have remained exactly as they once

were, only that their impotence is apparent now with terrible distinctness. Or rather these giants are the bodily impersonations of those insolent Titanic men, teeming with strength, which seek to storm heaven and yet are reminded every moment that they have reached the limits of their power and that these limits are very closely drawn.

As the passions in Dante's hell are no other than those of real earth-life, and as the wish to be something—not to die and leave no vestige of having existed, but to leave a name, if possible, an eternal memory of one's self in the world—is a general one, inherent, as it were, in the nature of man, we easily understand how, according to the poet's description, the promise to revive their memory upon earth, to proclaim their fame now and then, moves the souls of the condemned to grant the wish of the wanderers in making themselves known or otherwise doing their pleasure. Antæus, too, the lion-tamer, who, because he has taken no active part in the rebellion against divine omnipotence, has, unlike Nimrod and Ephialtes, retained both his tongue for intelligent conversation and his arm for a kind service, allows himself to be won by the prospect of new glory; and, yielding to Virgil's prayers, stoops and, "dumb as treachery itself" (Graul), puts the two poets down at the desired place. But here the scene changes. As all else, so this natural-human feeling also is benumbed and extinct in the inhabitants of the ninth and last circle of hell. In vain Dante holds out to the traitor Bocca degli Abati the prospect of fame to induce him to tell his name. "The contrary of what I covet most, thou tender'st; hence nor vex me more. Ill knowest thou to flatter in this vale." This is the answer he receives (xxxii, 94). A single feeling remains to these souls—the feeling of hatred and revenge. All else is benumbed, inside of them as well as round about them. The region which they inhabit is the distinct image of the heartless, unfeeling, icy soul of the traitor. "I traditori sono nel gelo o nella ghiaccia, il che significa essere il tradimento la forza, che congela il cuore essenzialmente; perchè è il contrario assoluta della carità" (Genovesi).

Dante has divided the *traitors* into four classes (Cantos xxxii, xxxiii)—traitors to blood-relations, traitors to their native country, traitors to friends, and traitors to benefactors. Type of the first class is Cain, the first fratricide. He has given his name to the

first division of this circle—"Caina." Type of the second class is that Trojan who assisted the Greeks to rob the Palladium and advised the stratagem of the wooden horse. His division is therefore called *Antenora*. Type of the third class is that Ptolemy, son of Abobi, who hospitably received his friend and father-in-law, Simon, and his sons, and then treacherously murdered them (I Maccab. xvi, 11-16). From him the third division takes the name of *Ptolemæa*. Type of the fourth and blackest class of traitors is Judas Iscariot, the betrayer of the Saviour of the world. *Judecca* is therefore the name of that lowest division of hell, where dwells the extreme depravity, the very dregs of hell, as it were. The betrayers of benefactors are nearest to Satan; in fact, the three most prominent ones are in the very mouths of Satan, come into the most immediate contact with him, are united, so to speak, into one terrible organism with him.

Treachery is cold, treachery is numb. Not a spark of warm feeling, not a breath of warm and life-giving love, dwells in the traitor's heart. Even the tear congeals in his eyes. He who can weep is not yet fully hardened. Obdurate, entirely hardened sinners cannot even shed tears. No more feeling, no more love, no more pity. An icy breath, arising from Satan's storming, makes everything in and about them congeal. They are therefore immersed in a horrid sea of ice, more or less deeply according to the gravity of their crime. Graul aptly remarks: "Man is born into the two relations against which the betrayers of blood-relations and of their country offend, the former of which is a narrow sphere, the latter a wider one; the two other relations against which the betrayers of friends and benefactors sin are based upon choice, and in the one the natural, in the other the ethical element of choice prevails. As choice stands higher than accident, we find the latter two kinds more wicked ones, nearer to Satan; and as, furthermore, amplification is more than restriction, as the ethical relation is more important than the natural, the traitors to blood-relations are followed by the traitors to country, the traitors to friends by the traitors to benefactors" (p. 313).

The close connection, the intimate relation, between sin and punishment is clearly apparent in this last region of Dante's hell. It is equally clear that the punishments which the souls of the traitors suffer is the emblem of their inner state during earth-life.

It seems as if we entered a vast assembly, consisting entirely of traitors, and watched the life and actions of its members. It seems almost superfluous, therefore, to tarry longer in this region. But we will accompany our poets awhile longer. The betrayers of blood-relations are immersed in ice, *insin là dove appar vergogna* (xxxii, 34)—that is, up to the face. It is not in vain that Dante uses this paraphrase. Their face is free only, that they may eternally exhibit their confusion. But though their face be free, they dare not raise it, but all hold it downward in the consciousness of their depravity. The spiteful thoughts of their souls, the treachery over which they brood in their hearts, reveals itself externally in their pale lips, in the false eyes full of frozen tears, which congealed upon their very lids. Being questioned, they do not answer, for they know too well that they could only give a name covered with infamy (xxxii, 43). Placed in close proximity to each other, they mutually accumulate and increase each other's tortures, striking their foreheads against each other, like goats. If it was a certain consolation to Francesca and Paolo to be eternally united in infinite love, though it were in hell, because they had sinned out of love with each other and against each other, it is a torture to the two counts of Mangona to be forever chained together contrary to their will, as they had sinned against each other out of hatred. If they seek to hide and conceal their name, they are betrayed by their companions (xxxii, 52, etc., 106 and 112), for they all meditate nothing but revenge and treason against one another. And the traitor at last betrays himself (xxxii, 67), as he knows only too well that the betrayed would betray him (xxxii, 112), and he begrudges them that pleasure—the pleasure of revenge. A deep psychological truth lies in this trait. On the whole, the character of these sinners is depicted true to life. Bocca, who at first demeans himself so defiantly, all at once becomes quite tame and complaisant out of revenge; after seeing himself betrayed, he gives the poet all the information possible about his companions in sin and misery—only to be practicing his trade. There is only one feeling left—the pleasure of revenge. Dante soon perceives this himself and tries to loosen Ugolino's tongue, who is filled with beastly rage, and to induce him to give his name by holding out the prospect of reviving the disgrace of his enemy, and he thus actually gains his end. It is true, in Ugo-

lino's touching narrative the most glowing paternal love finds expression beside the most furious hate of his enemies. But it must be observed that Ugolino, in a certain sense, forms an exception in this region. In Dante's poem he is the *betrayed*, placed next to the traitor, rather than the traitor himself. Then this placing next to each other the most terrible hatred and the most touching paternal love is psychologically most true. Love is so essentially a part of human nature that one would have to be wholly a devil to banish it entirely from his heart. In Ugolino this last remnant of love seems to be wholly concentrated upon his sons. Or perhaps Graul is right in calling to mind (p. 322) the passage of St. Luke, vi, 32-35: "For if ye love them which love ye, what thanks have ye? for sinners also love those that love them. . . . But love ye your enemies," etc. However that that may be, we repeat, the figure of Ugolino here forms an *exception*; in the midst of the region where icy cold, hatred, treason, rage only dwell, he is the only one from whose lips words of love issue.

Chilliness, indifference, hatred, rage—yes, this hellish region is also to be found upon earth. Here too it is sin which consummates its own punishment. The poet of the "Commedia" has not only sung the other world of eternity, but he has also removed from the soul the wrappings of delusive appearance, and has disclosed to us the truth of the inner life of man.

Here we pause. We might, it is true, follow the poet in his wanderings through the other two realms of eternity, and we might investigate, if we are not to see in the torments of the land of expiation the inner struggles of those who seek to conquer sin, to free themselves from it—if we are not to see in the joys of paradise the inner peace, the inner beatitude of those who have become reconciled to God, and therefore to the world and to themselves. But we desire here to limit ourselves to hell. May others better fitted for the task be at the pains to solve in a satisfactory manner the problem here alluded to.

"The description of the condition of the departed souls is only the outer shell. Dante himself says: The theme of the poem is man, who, doing either good or evil, in consequence of the freedom of his will, is subject either to punishing or to recompensing

justice. If, then, the *words* speak of the eternal life, the *true meaning* applies to the life upon earth. The physical punishment, the infliction of pain, however variously the fancy of the poet may have graded it, is, after all, but an emblem for the condition of soul of the sinner hardened in his sin. It is easily seen in many instances how the punishment which the poet assigns to a sin is only an expression of this sin." Thus wrote Witte, the chief of Dante students, in the introduction to his translation of the "Divina Commedia." But neither Witte, nor other investigators in this field, have undertaken to give the proof in each separate instance that the punishments are developed from the respective sins themselves, and are, so to speak, the expression of these sins. A few examples, in which the congruence was, of course, easy to recognize, were made to suffice, and it was perhaps stated that this congruence must, according to the poet's intention, be present also in other instances, where we can no longer trace and recognize it. The present disquisition has, as far as the limits placed permitted, followed the poet step by step and grade by grade, seeking to establish the intimate relation between sin and punishment. It cannot and will not claim to have found the right thing in every instance, but would be content if it had succeeded in proving that *it is possible*, by dint of meditation, to find the relation, or, as we have called it, the congruence. If it has succeeded in this, though it may need correction, deepening, amplification, modification in particular instances, it has attained one of the objects it had in view.

But only one. Another object was in our mind—namely, to utter, though perhaps not to establish, the thought that DANTE'S ESCHATOLOGICAL VIEWS AND IDEAS WERE FAR IN ADVANCE OF THE VIEWS AND IDEAS OF HIS TIME.

Herewith we return to the beginning, to the idea with which we started out. It was there designated as an error to see no more in the "Divina Commedia" than a mere picture of the internal and external life *upon earth*. I cannot assent to the words of Witte, above quoted, if their meaning should be that the punishments which the poet assigns to the sins are to be regarded as merely of this world, or, as Witte expresses it, that "they are *only* an emblem of the condition of soul of the sinner hardened in his sin." They are *that* to be sure. That they are this has

often enough been dwelt upon and proved in this disquisition. But they are not that *only*, but *something else besides*. Quite in the beginning we said that the "Divina Commedia" contained not only the revealed truth of the soul, but also the revealed truth of the hereafter, and these two in organic connection. To deny this would be to make of the poet of the *Poëma sacro* one of those Epicureans *che l'anima col corpo morta fanno*, or a materialist of the nineteenth century. A *Christian* poet, whose poem is, first of all, a description of the condition of the departed souls in the hereafter very likely reflected, if he believed at all in a hereafter, in immortality, in life of the spirit after the death of the body—very likely reflected, I say, on that condition of the departed souls in the hereafter which he was about to describe, and his description probably contains the result of his reflections. Or did Dante, perhaps, describe the condition of the departed souls without seriously reflecting thereupon? Or did he describe it quite differently from the manner in which he really imagined it to be? To assume this would be folly.

No, Dante imagined that world as he describes it in his poem. This must not, however, be misunderstood. We do not here speak of the topography of eternity, nor of the geography and architectonic construction of the three realms of the hereafter. All that does not concern our problem in the least. We have only to do with the *condition of the souls in the hereafter*, with the question: "Wherein, according to Dante's view, did damnation, wherein did eternal bliss, consist?" And to this our assertion applies, that Dante, without doubt, *thought and believed* eternity to be as he *described* it in his poem.

And how has he depicted it? The life hereafter is represented as the continuation in a straight line, as an uninterrupted continuation, of this life. It is the completion of what was prepared in this life; the blossoming out of what here existed in the bud, the fulfilment of that which was threatened or promised here below. The false lustre has vanished, the wrappings have dropped, the dross has fallen down, the chaff has flown to the winds. The pure light of truth, which was here fettered, as it were, by the dense atmosphere of the earth and could not penetrate the coarse sense of earth, there shines like the bright sun of noonday, and either warms the unclothed souls with love or burns like fire into

their wounds. That Dante, a child of the middle ages, was able to lift himself to this pure and lofty view—this makes him truly great, and in this he stands alone in his age.

Dante's age imagined eternity as the common belief of the people, or, let us rather say, as superstition still conceives it to-day. In the moment of death the proceedings are fully closed. Yonder the one awakens—and finds himself in heaven. He has become a different person from what he was before his last slumber. His passions, his thoughts, his inclinations, his impulses have died with his body and are forgotten. He sits up yonder and thinks of nothing but singing hallelujah. "The ecclesiastic idea," says Hase very aptly ("Gnosis," 2d ed., ii, 434), "of a constant singing of praises, praying, and hearing sermons, hardly gives promise of a very intellectual life." Another, awaking beyond from the slumber of death, finds himself in hell. He, too, has at bottom become quite a different person. He has only a feeling of pain, perhaps of repentance, left. Fancy has been at pains to depict the torments of hell as terribly and fearfully as possible, and literature is full of such descriptions, which are as fantastic as they are horrible. Researches have been made from time to time to see if Dante did not imitate such an one. But take in hand whatever one you will—for instance, the vision of Frate Alberico—what a difference! Vivid colorings of torments, which, however, for the most part, have no connection, or only a very slight external one, with the sins! In Dante, on the contrary, the departed souls are what they were in earth-life; the punishments are developed directly and with logical consistency out of the sin itself; the hereafter is the direct continuation of the life on earth. He does not describe punishments for the purpose of heating the fancy and inspiring fear, but only as the natural fruit of sin. That was his deed. To an age which had the most absurd views of the life hereafter he, as the first and only one, proclaimed: "Heaven and hell are only the poetry of the belief in immortality—you, O human beings, carry either in your breast! In the hereafter only that will be continued and completed which was begun and prepared here below. There is but *one* bliss—*Godliness*; but *one* damnation—*Godlessness*."

HOMER'S ILIAD.

BY D. J. SNIDER.

Book Seventh.

Each of the preceding Books has been marked by some special characteristic; the Seventh Book also has its particular quality. The main fact which it brings into strong relief is the present equipoise between the two sides. The Greeks and the Trojans are placed in the hovering balance, as it were; the scales sway up and down without any decision. This is also the ethical situation just now; in Troy the wrong of Helen, in the Greek camp the wrong of Achilles, are equally hateful to Zeus, the supreme governor. It is true that the reader has long since known the purpose of the highest God: he intends to give victory to the Trojans in order to destroy them; but first the Greek side is to be disciplined out of its wrong by the victory of Troy. At present, however, the equipoise is sustained, though in the following Book Zeus will weigh the Fates of the two armies, and that of Troy for the time will triumph. The equality is, hence, but temporary, a phase of the great struggle, the quivering point of supreme uncertainty, which has its counterpart in most wars and battles.

The connection with the preceding Book is direct, both in the outer circumstances and the inner motives. Hector arrives with Paris at the Trojan camp; the leader finds his people quite as they were when he left them to go to the city. Equally close is the connection in thought. In the preceding Book Pallas was not conciliated; she cannot be. Accordingly, when the struggle opens anew she appears almost at the beginning to aid her side, the Greek. But Diomed the individual was conciliated with a Trojan hero, and will not fight him. The result is, Diomed passes decidedly into the background, and another hero, Ajax, is the central figure. Still, Diomed is not forgotten; he does no famous deed, but he makes a famous speech, which is implacable to excess; he will not now accept even Helen as a peace-offering from the Trojans. Still, he is not the former Diomed in action, whatever he may be as speech-maker.

There is also a general connection with the entire movement of

the poem hitherto, both in events and motives. We find a pointed allusion to the wrath of Achilles, which must refer back to the First Book. Moreover, the statement is emphatically made that the Greeks have other heroes besides Achilles, and will go on fighting without him—a fact shown in the Second and following Books. Diomed, in the Fifth Book, was one of those heroes; Ajax, in the present Book, is another. In like manner the Trojan side, since the withdrawal of Achilles, has developed a hero, Hector, who, though not a new man in the war, has been rising more and more into prominence since the Third Book. The two heroes, Greek and Trojan, sifted out by the changed circumstances of the war, are now to be tested, one by the other, in single combat. These are Ajax and Hector.

In correspondence with the two terrestrial heroes, two Gods are shown in equipoise, and their selection follows from the preceding Books. The Trojan deities, Mars and Venus, Diomed conquered, but he could not put Apollo down; there is, then, one unconquered God on the side of Troy, and he now appears. On the Greek side, Pallas has been the most active antagonist of Apollo's efforts, especially in the Fifth Book. Each of these divine energies has counteracted the other; both are now shown suspended in the balance. Thus many small, delicate threads knit the present Book with the Books that have gone before; the little fibres remain quite unnoticed till, through some attempted dislocation, the whole poem begins to limp. The main fact just at this point of the struggle, we must repeat, is the equality of the two sides, which equality is set forth in a pair of divine and in a pair of human representatives, and unfolds through them into the structure of the Book.

This structure, with its divisions and subdivisions, is as follows:

I. The divine and human equipoise of the conflict shown in Gods and men.

a. The divine side shown in the mutual counteraction between Apollo and Pallas.

b. The human side shown in the drawn combat between Hector and Ajax.

II. The effect of this equipoise, made visible by the drawn combat, upon both sides.

a. Upon the side of the Trojans, who debate anew the proposition to restore Helen, which results in nothing.

b. Upon the side of the Greeks, who build now a wall, concerning which a divine decree is uttered.

The whole sweep of the Book, then, is the equipoise and its consequences. It is manifest that both sides are startled—indeed, frightened—and reach out for the readiest means of protection. We cannot fail to see again how the Upper and Lower Worlds—the grand Homeric dualism—play most deeply into the poetic organism, and how they reflect each other, casting a double image of what is one in thought. We may now turn to the details, and observe whether they fit harmoniously into the form which has been given.

I.

The Trojans have a turn of luck with the coming back of Hector and Paris from the city; three Greeks, of no great fame apparently, are slain without hurting their Trojan antagonists. This beginning resembles that of the preceding Book, when the Greeks had their spurt of good fortune. The present success of the Trojans is but an eddy in the great river of events, and merely countervails the former success of the Greeks; each side neutralizes the other; equilibrium is the result, which is now to be set before our eyes in the divine and the human order.

a. First comes Pallas flitting down from Olympus when she beholds her Greeks perishing in battle. Opposed to her, Apollo darts from Pergamus, "wishing to give victory to the Trojans." Here we might expect a divine duel, a battle of the Gods, such as will occur in a later Book, but Apollo speaks a peaceful word: "Let us cause the war to stop to-day." To this Pallas assents; she had the same thought in mind. Then the two Gods hatch the scheme whereby Hector is to send a challenge to the Greeks. But we note that even Apollo implies that Troy is to be destroyed in the conflict hereafter. Thus the two divine partisans counterbalance, and come to rest, while they throw the decision of the struggle down to earth, to be fought out by mortal men.

In this passage we must again apply the fundamental principle of Homeric theology: the Gods are both objective and subjective, in the world and in the man. Apollo and Pallas are deities of

wisdom; they reflect the present situation in its divine or spiritual sense; the side of Greece with its wrong and the side of Troy with its wrong quite balance each other; there is an ethical equilibrium just at present, though Apollo foresees and states the end of Troy. The two Gods assume the form of birds—vultures—and sit upon the beech-tree as spectators of the duel; they do not assail each other, and do not participate in the conflict; we witness a divine image of the equipoise. Not only an image, but an omen is shown by the Gods in the shape of birds; here the birds, though vultures, do not tear each other, as they do sometimes in Homer; they are in a balance. All Greek augury implies this divine possession of the feathery tribe; and Helenus, “the very best augur of the Trojans,” perceived the purpose of the Gods, and at once set about bringing it down among men.

On the other hand, this same equipoise is the present unconscious state of feeling in both Greek and Trojan. Achilles having withdrawn, is there any hero able to cope with Hector? Or is Hector now able to meet the best Greek in the field? Thus both sides are in the condition of uncertainty, and are ready to look upon the duel between the two grand protagonists for some omen or hint of future tendency. It is clear that the Upper and Lower Worlds image one supreme fact; there is a balance of Gods and men, of principles and parties. Helenus, the divine interpreter, finds his human audience ready; he voices their dumb instinct.

b. The duel is proposed by the Trojans, and the essential question is, Which side has the best man after Achilles? Without the heroic individual the Hellenic spirit is helpless, has no embodiment, has no living, plastic shape of what is godlike upon earth. Significant to the last degree is this search for the hero; he must be found before any great work can be done. In fact, is not that just the great work of the Trojan or other conflict—to reveal the divine in action through the deeds of the hero? The present duel, then, is the competitive trial for heroeship, and is wholly different from the duel between Menelaus and Paris, in the Third Book. Then it was a personal encounter between the injured husband and injurer; now it is the representatives of two nations, of two continents, who are to enter the combat, not for an individual grievance, but for a cause which has become not only national, but world-historical. Paris may fight for the personal

detention of Helen, but Hector cannot, for he does not believe in it; still he must fight for his country, though it refuse to restore Helen.

The Trojans are going to keep the Greek woman, and have already broken the compact for her restoration—"Zeus did not ratify it," says Hector apologetically. Troy has made the deed of Paris its own, which is its fatality; the wrong of the individual has become national, and the national hero has to appear, though Destiny is getting her shears ready for him. In like manner, on the Greek side, the personal injury done to Menelaus has been made national. Accordingly, nation must fight nation as wholes or in their heroes. It will be observed that the restoration of Helen is not spoken of now—a very skilful silence on the part of the old poet; the Greeks would hardly have faith in any new contract. But they are challenged to fight in single combat; as men of courage and military honor, they must accept, and send forth their hero. The duel undecided is not so much the end as the beginning of battles.

Still we shall witness a touch of the personal side of the wrong. When the Greeks hesitate to accept the challenge of Hector, Menelaus steps forward, and, with sharp rebuke of his countrymen, offers to fight the Trojan hero. This striking passage indicates that the sting of private wrong is sharper in him than in any other Greek, though his disposition be humane, as we see by his sparing Adrastus. But Menelaus may meet Paris, not Hector. The poet thereby intimates that this duel is different from that of the Third Book, and introduces Menelaus expressly to set him aside, in contrast with the former case. The personal phase has risen to the national, whose representative must, in one way or other, be produced.

But he is not forthcoming; he does not report of himself, nor is he so easy to find in the absence of Achilles. Then Nestor, the aged man of wisdom, has to make him show himself through stinging words of reproach. Nestor is the orator, using his weapon at the right moment in the right manner. His argument is that of shame: ye, present race of Greek chieftains, are degenerate; see what your fathers did! Then he weaves a bit of his own life into a cunning legend, which reflects the present situation, and suggests what is to be done. How well the old orator

knew his audience! Not by abstract reasoning, but by a mythical exploit does he rouse these children of the imagination; they know what to do when they see the fabulous example. Not one, but nine respond, and a new selection has to be made—this time by lot. Surely it is not easy to find the hero. Then we note that the Greeks in their prayer select three, not one, though Ajax is mentioned first, while Diomed is second. They are not so very certain who is the hero after Achilles. But the lots, under the discreet management of Nestor, call for the right man—Ajax. Chance in some way was controlled by Wisdom in that Greek camp; sad would it be, then and to-day, if she were not thus controlled. Still we affirm Nestor did not stuff the ballot-box.

The main point in the description of the duel, which is a marvel of clearness and rapidity, is the equality between the two combatants. Each throws two spears, yet both men escape; next each hurls a stone; finally each seizes his sword in exact counterpart, when they are separated by heralds from both Greeks and Trojans. "Cease, Zeus loves you both"; you are quite equal in the supreme eye. "Night has come; obey the night." Such is the decree of the spectators on both sides—a mutual recognition of the equipoise, which is not broken by the duel, but confirmed.

Yet we observe a slight leaning of the balance to one side, in favor of Ajax; not sufficient to change the result, but noticeable. The Greek hero wounded Hector slightly with his spear, draws the first blood, then crushes him to earth with a stone, "but at once Apollo raised him up." Here, too, the God is inside the man, whose hurt is not so severe that he could not keep his shield and get up again. Divine grit the poet may well call it. The two antagonists exchange compliments and presents, like Diomed and Glaucus; but, unlike these, Hector speaks of renewing the contest at another time, and of fighting till the God shall decide for one or the other.

This duel is remarkable in another respect: it has a decided tinge of chivalry. There is so much knightly feeling and such a lofty utterance of courtesy between the combatants that we seem to feel the first breath of the Middle Ages. The Greek hero says to his enemy, "Begin your battle"—throw the first spear. Hector replies by telling him to get ready—"I shall not smite thee by stealth, but openly." Is not this the chivalrous spirit of a

Bayard? Then in their speeches when they have ceased to fight there is the same high tone of personal honor and courtesy. Not without the deep suggestion from the elder poet has Shakespeare introduced the manners of chivalry into his "Troilus and Cressida," which is based upon the tale of Troy.

Each hero returns to his own side, and is received with joy. Yet there is anxiety for the future among both Greeks and Trojans. It was a drawn battle, with some odds possibly in favor of Ajax. That fateful equilibrium has brought new care. It is manifest that Achilles must come back to insure victory to the Greeks. The case of the Trojans is even more doubtful; they cannot drive the enemy from their territory if the Greeks still have, after the withdrawal of Achilles, the equal of Hector. Sorrow will sharpen care, for the dead are now to be obtained under truce and to meet with funeral rites. But when the war is renewed, what then?

II.

We are now to see the more permanent consequences of the duel to both Greeks and Trojans. First we beheld joy at the escape of each hero, then sorrow for the fallen; but the main result is a settled anxiety, which leads to the two last actions of the Book—the building of the wall by the Greeks, and the new proposition to restore Helen by the Trojans.

a. Nestor, the man of experience and forethought, voices this anxiety on the Greek side, and, at the same time, suggests the means of protection. He tells the princes in council that while they are making a tomb they should turn it into an earthwork, with entrance, towers, ditch, palisade, "to be a bulwark for our ships and ourselves." His last words show his solicitude, "lest the war overwhelm us." All the princes assented; it is plain they do not feel certain of the field with Ajax. For ten years no fortification was needed; Achilles was the wall; even when he was absent on a foraging expedition, his name was a sufficient terror to keep the Trojans inside the city. But now they know of his wrath; they come forth, and the Greeks have to build a wall in the greatest haste, taking advantage of the day of truce, and converting even the tomb into a part of the fortified line. Very timely and subtle was the advice of Nestor. The Trojans could

now prevent the construction of the wall, but they naturally suppose that their enemies are merely building a monument to the dead. So they keep the truce, and attend to their own funeral duties. But the Greeks had good reason to be anxious; hence their hurry, and, as we think, their stratagem, to get the work done.

Now we are to have a very curious utterance—nothing less than a divine judgment concerning this work. All the Gods admired it but Neptune, who was jealous, fearing lest men would forget the wall built by the Gods—by himself and Apollo—namely, the wall of Troy. So he makes an appeal to Zeus in regard to the work of the Greeks. To the Hellenic consciousness there were two kinds of walls, the everlasting and the transitory. The first kind was reared by the Gods to contain the Gods and their temples, along with the political organization of the city. Such walls, built of enormous blocks of stone, were eternal, and those of Troy, as well as of Mycenæ and of many other Greek cities, have outlasted the Gods themselves. A wall to hold institutions must be enduring; so we may feel a genuine though rugged piety in the huge Cyclopean structures of primeval Hellas. But the present earthwork is but temporary and for a temporary purpose, raised “without becatombs to the Gods.”

Hear, then, the decree of Zeus: When the Greeks have gone home, do thou break down the wall, and carry it into the sea, and hide again the great shore with sand. This wall is indeed transitory, compared to that of Troy, built by the Gods. Some authors have seen in this passage an attempt of the poet to account for the condition of the Trojan plain in his day. He is supposed to have visited the scene of the war, and found that the earthwork, so famous in tradition, had vanished. Its disappearance rises before his imagination into a legend and unconscious symbol; it was not a divine wall, built to protect a city; it was rather built to destroy a city, and then to be abandoned. Another question comes up: How long after the destruction of Troy was it till Homer made his visit? Impossible to tell; say one hundred years, and drop the conjecture.

In another respect, the Greeks are now reduced to an equality with the Trojans. If they have the advantage, they have also the disadvantage, of a wall; they are liable to be penned up, as the

Trojans have been for so many years; in fact, this is just what is about to happen. There is but one relief—the hero, Achilles, who has the wall in his right arm, must return.

b. While the anxious Greek princes in council had resolved to build the wall, the Trojans in equal anxiety were holding an assembly in the acropolis of Troy. Antenor comes forward with his proposition to restore Helen and all her wealth; the reason he gives is the broken treaty of the Fourth Book. Thus the Trojans have again the opportunity to fulfil their pledge and to do justice; they can now make undone their acceptance of Pandar's faithlessness, and even of the primal wrong of Paris. It is another test of the ethical tendency of Troy, which has been repeatedly shown, and which is the ground of her fate.

Paris is present and speaks. He refuses directly to give up the Greek woman; he is defiant, even contemptuous; he well knows that he has the power on his side. That power is twofold: First, he doubtless has a majority of the people, though many hate him and curse him. More than once the Trojans have made his wrong their own; in fact, that wrong is their consciousness. Paris would long since have been compelled to leave the city if the greater portion of the inhabitants had been hostile to him. Indeed, Troy would not perish did it not share in the guilt of Paris. In the second place, the power of the throne is with him. Hear now King Priam; he simply commands that what Paris proposes be made known to the Greeks by the herald. We are compelled to think that Priam leans to the side of Paris.

Thus we see that there are two parties in Troy, which divide upon this question of the restoration of Helen. Hector and Antenor are leaders of the minority, who wish to give back the Spartan woman to her nation and husband; this is the Greek party in Troy, the Hellenic counter-current to the Oriental tendency of the city. Paris, evidently a political leader and representative of his time and people, has on his side not merely the majority, but his father the king. It is true that we read of many outbursts against Paris as the cause of the war; still, he is the typical Trojan, the embodiment of Troy's spirit far more than Hector.

The proposition of Paris, which was to restore, not Helen, but the treasures stolen with Helen, and add wealth of his own, is rejected by the Greeks; they are not to be bought off, even in the

present uncertainty, wherein they show that they have a principle at stake, and will not surrender it. Both sides end their labors and sorrows in a banquet; the Greeks purchased their wine evidently from the neighboring islanders, with "brass, iron, slaves, attle, and hides"; a statement which suggests a lively picture of trading in the Greek camp, as well as the absence of any general circulating medium.

We see that the equipoise is at present complete, even established by the new work of the Greeks. Two walls now balance each other, as it were; but the war must go on; neither party will compromise, though both are anxious concerning the result. But, hark! through all the night Zeus thunders terribly; the equipoise is about to be disturbed, whereof the following Book will give an account.

The main object of the preceding observations has been to bring to light the motives which connect the various portions of the Book. These motives are not always brought to the surface by the poet, but constitute an undercurrent which flows unconsciously through the reader, who listens in deep sympathy to the story. For instance, the building of the wall is not openly connected with the drawn combat between Ajax and Hector, nor is the new Trojan proposition concerning Helen; still both are the unexpected consequence thereof, which breaks forth without warning and without premeditation. The reader is surprised at the sudden change, till he thinks; then he finds that the Greeks and Trojans were also surprised at the result, but had to meet it with some plan of action. Homer makes the same leap in his characters; compare Diomed of the Fifth with Diomed of the Sixth Book.

Now, it is just at these points of transition that the negative critic, unable to find the connecting motive, or bent in advance upon tearing the one garment into many shreds, cries out: Here begins a new song; this is the hand of another poet. He complains that the wall has no connection with the duel; is built in a great hurry; and asks triumphantly, Why was it not thought of before, during the ten-years' stay of the Greeks? All of which is simply a failure to see the motives which lie imbedded in the poet's story. The critic prefers two Diomedes, two or a dozen Homers, two or many fragments of anybody or anything to one entirety. The poetic instinct feels these connecting motives al-

ways; but, when the poetic instinct is dim or lost, these motives must be raised from their unconscious realm into the clear, conscious daylight of thought.

Moreover, these sudden leaps in motivation (if the word be allowed) are found in all the great poets. We see Shakespeare springing at a bound from his real to his ideal world, and the connecting link must be poetically felt or consciously supplied; in fact, it is better to have both ways. Similar leaps in his characters can be often noticed. How different the Cordelia of the First Act of "King Lear" is from the Cordelia of the Fourth Act! Yet it is one character when we reach down to the connecting motives; there are not two Cordelias, nor two Shakespeares. But the poem of earth-defying leaps is "Faust." For this reason many German critics are inclined to dissolve it into a series of scenes, with little outer and no inner connection, and to gaze upon it as so much star-dust scattered through the heavenly spaces. Still we must think there is one "Faust" and one Goethe.

PLATO'S DIALECTIC AND DOCTRINE OF IDEAS.¹

BY W. T. HARRIS.

In the dream of John Bunyan, Christian and Hopeful in the eighth stage of their pilgrimage came to the Delectable Mountains, "which mountains," he tells us, "belong to the Lord of the hill. So they went up to the mountains to behold the gardens and orchards and vineyards and fountains of water; when they also drank and washed themselves, and did freely eat of the vineyards. And they walked together with the shepherds of those mountains, and from the top of a high hill called 'Clear,' by the aid of a perspective glass, lovingly tendered them, they obtained a glimpse of the Celestial City."

For more than two thousand years earnest thinkers, bent on solving the Sphinx-Riddles of life by the light of the intellect, have

¹ Read at the Concord School of Philosophy, July, 1886.

ascended the Delectable Mountains of Philosophy—not, however, without great toil and the utmost requirements of patient perseverance.

Although philosophy is one vast upheaval of the stratum of human knowledge, yet at various heights there jut out separate peaks, and at the highest elevation there is a twin peak called "Plato and Aristotle." Of these two summits, that of Aristotle is broader and less steep, while that of Plato is more picturesque and beautiful. They rise to an equal height; and from either one can obtain, in all seasons of the year, a fine view of the city of Eternal Verities, which is, as you know, always lighted up by its own light, and never shrouded in clouds or mists of any sort. On many of the lower summits of the Delectable Mountains of Philosophy there are very fine views of the Eternal City, but often intermittent, because of fogs and mists that prevail more and more as one descends below the regions that lie perennially above the line of atmospheric changes.

All most serious-minded thinkers prefer to toil on from height to height until they reach the twin peak which I have mentioned, and guide-books as to the best roads and paths to be followed by pilgrims are always in some small demand. It is in fact the object of this paper to furnish a few of the particulars of a survey undertaken by the writer on what he believes to be one of the most accessible routes open in our time.

If anything can be done to make clearer and more comprehensible the Platonic Dialectic and Doctrine of Ideas, all will admit that the ascent to the Platonic vision of the Eternal Verities is thereby essentially aided. The Platonic dialogues set forth everywhere as culminating doctrine the distinction between what is changing and variable, subject to growth and decay, and what is permanent and abiding, above vicissitudes of time and place. To this permanent and abiding belong, first, such practical concerns of human life as virtue and the moral notions; and, secondly, such theoretical notions as furnish the logical framework of thinking and knowing. Plato calls the permanent and abiding beings **IDEAS**. Moral ideas make possible human practical life, the institutions of civilization; theoretical or logical ideas make possible any thinking or knowing whatever. But this is only to define ideas subjectively. These ideas are permanent and abiding, not

merely as subjective laws of human conduct and knowledge, but also as the very logical conditions of all existence whatever. They are laws of the world-order. They are more than laws; they are conditions and causes of the world-order.

A number of the dialogues, mostly known or supposed to be the work of his first ten years after the death of Socrates, have predominantly in view the exhibition of the character and necessity of moral ideas. The *Charmides*, for instance, shows the idea of temperance; the *Lysis*, that of friendship; the *Laches*, fortitude; the *Hippias Minor*, intentional wrong-doing; the *First Alcibiades*, what intellectual and moral qualifications are needed by a statesman; the *Protagoras*, what the moral consequences are that flow from the denial of universal and necessary moral ideas by the Sophists; the *Gorgias*, how to distinguish the idea of virtue from that of the feeling of pleasure, and that of the good from that of the feeling of the agreeable. By some it is supposed that the three great dialogues which have for development the doctrine of theoretic ideas and their dialectic belong to the second ten years, to his period of travel and study of other philosophies. These are the *Theætetus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Parmenides*. The great works of the Academy after his return to Athens are the *Phædrus*, the *Banquet*, the *Phædo*, the *Republic*, the *Philebus*, the *Timæus*, and the *Laws*. In these treatises he has used the highest philosophic insight and applied it in various provinces. Besides these there are great works like the *Meno*, the *Statesman*, and others, making nearly forty in all. For the purposes of this paper, chief use will be made of the *Sophist* and the *Laws*.

The chief object of investigation will of course be the doctrine of Ideas, and an inquiry into what we are to understand by idea in the Platonic sense. Ideas are described in Plato as eternal archetypes of all existence; as the essences of phenomenal beings; as independent and self-existent; as the divine, the immutable, the reasonable, the self-active, the self-moved, the self-identical, the unity, that which is in-and-for-itself. The highest Idea is said to be the *Good*. It is also called God.

Again these eternal archetypes or ideas are said to be not of an abstract nature, not of such a character as to exclude all distinctions, attributes, qualities, modes, and determinations. They are not empty absolutes devoid of difference and distinction, like pure

being, which is reached by abstraction from all particularity. For as such they would be lifeless creations of thought. They are powers or energies of living forces, active causes which produce the world of change or birth and decay. If one wishes to form a provisional notion of a Platonic idea, let him consider a process of nature. It is a series of phases existing in succession, one phase following another. A plant is at first a seed, then a root and stem; it puts forth branches, leaves, flowers; finally it produces seed again, making the cycle complete. It began with seed and ended with seed. Observing this process and combining all into one, man gives it a general name—oak, corn, or something else. The observer sees that all the phases of growth belong to one unity and that each phase is essential to the rest, while all are essential to each. The whole grasped together under the general name is the idea. The actual plant was not the whole idea at once, because it passed through the phases in succession, one after another. All the phases belong to the idea as so many potentialities. The reality in time and space makes real one or a few phases at a time, the others being potential. The total round of reality is the idea, but any given plant does not realize all its reality at once, but only some of its possibilities. Here we have an illustration of an idea, and of what Plato called participation or communion in an idea (*μέθεξις*). The plant participates in an idea because it realizes at any given moment only some of the phases of the idea. On account of its incapacity to realize all the phases of the idea at once, it changes; some of the phases which it has give place to others which it has not as yet—*i. e.*, it grows.

Water is either liquid, fluid, or vapor, but only one of these things at a time. Hence it might be said that water participates in its idea only one third at a time—two thirds of its idea being potential, while one third is realized.

All things in nature are found upon examination to be phases in large cycles of process. These things are changing, more or less rapidly realizing their total spheres of possibility, which constitute their ideas or archetypes. Real existence, as we see it before our senses, is thus whirling round in a circle of possibilities, just as Dante's heavens were moving, impelled by desire. For they desired to realize all the potentialities—*i. e.*, to be in contact with the Empyrean at all points. As they could not do this all at

once, they moved so as to accomplish the desired result successively in time.

Again, consider one of the most important of all points. It is evident enough that the plant—the oak, the corn, or the mushroom—which passed through those cycles of change, was a veritable power or energy. It was able to react on the environment of earth and air and build for itself a body of roots, stem, and leaves, and reproduce itself in seed again. The idea is an energy, therefore, and it is an energy of a universal character. It is called universal because it remains while its phases begin and cease. As energy it is one whether it produces seed, leaves, stem, or root—all flow from its power. The idea is the cause. There was a something which was the energy that produced the visible phases of growth, by reacting on its environment of air and earth.

This is only an illustration. The mind, unused to think on this plane, meets with many difficulties, because it has not yet seen the ontological necessity there is for all things in the universe to be in the form of an idea—that is to say, in the form of an individual energy which has the power of realizing itself in a complete cycle of process. When one gains this insight, he is sure that every phase of existence in the world is a part of a process, which, as a whole, is a self-active being or idea.

But there are self-active beings, which are contained within larger processes of self-activity. And Plato takes pains to show that ideas can have communion with each other, so that one idea is contained within another, and likewise has subordinate ideas within itself. The doctrine of the community of ideas we will consider further under the topic of dialectic. For this community makes possible what he calls dialectic.

It must be kept in mind, however, that nothing is an idea unless it has the form of a self-active energy. Things exist in the world which are not such energies, but no things exist or can exist in the universe unless they are phases of processes caused by ideas. To say otherwise is to say that things exist entirely out of relation, and that they can have changes without any causes of those changes.

Since self-active energies or ideas may contain or be contained, it follows that there may be a *summum genus*, or highest idea which contains all others and causes them—and this idea Plato

calls God, or the idea of the Good. It is evident that an idea that contains other ideas does not constrain their activity, but acts through their freedom; otherwise it would reduce them from ideas to mere things and destroy their self-active energies.

Now, in order to rest from this thought before it becomes too complex, take a fresh start with another train of thought. It is true that every point in a system of philosophy may be reached from every other point, but it requires the greatest effort and skill of thought to pass thus directly from one point to another. Hence philosophic thinking is easier when it makes a new beginning at frequent intervals, and unphilosophic thinking absolutely requires a new beginning at every step, because it cannot follow a train of reasoning at all.

Let us ask ourselves now what is the infinite, and whether we can know it? Let us do this with a view to Plato's doctrine, that ideas are immutable and eternal, and yet are not empty of all qualities, but are self-active energies.

1. Can we know what is infinite? Let us address ourselves at once to the consideration of the question of the infinite. Can we know the infinite? Can we know anything that is infinite? Can we understand the meaning of the word "infinite" as applied to any object that we know to be infinite? By careful thinking we may answer all these questions in the affirmative. This will be for us an ascent of at least one steep grade on our road to the philosophic heights.

As the fundamental condition of the existence of things, we know that space exists. It also exists whether occupied by things or not. Let us consider space, because it is our idea of space that causes our primary difficulty in thinking the infinite, by throwing us off the track. The modern mind can best learn its first lesson by investigating the thought of space, as regards its attribute of infinitude.

Things as objects of experience are limited. In their limits they cease to be and something else begins. Hence we think them all as finite; that is to say, as having environments which they exclude and by which they are in turn excluded. But the finite thing implies or presupposes space to exist in, and so likewise does its environment. Is space finite? Let us see. Think of any finite or limited space, and we see at once that its environment is

space too. An object is finite because it is limited by something else. But a finite space is limited by other space, and hence space itself is continued and not limited by its environment. Pass from one limited space to another and we are still in space; and hence the limited spaces are only parts of space: all spaces make one space. The important insight here is this: Space has such a nature that it is and must be its own environment—its own other or limit. Hence it is continued even by its limit, and is not finite, but infinite.

Attempt to think of space as limited or bounded. We see at once that its limits or bounds or environment requires space to exist in, and hence demonstrate the existence of space beyond space. Thus we make clear to ourselves the fact that space is infinite. But is this a positive knowledge, or only a negative knowledge? Does it rest on our incapacity to conceive it, or do we think it through our positive capacity to know the difference between the finite and the infinite and to recognize the nature of both?

Undoubtedly it is our positive capacity here that enables us to think space as infinite, for we see that it is in its nature to be its own environment, and hence to be always affirmed by its limit, and never negated or bounded by something else than space. It is a complete thought.

On the contrary, the thought of the finite or limited is not a complete thought, but rather the thought of something dependent on something else—namely, dependent on its environment. Hence we cannot think of a finite object without having the dim consciousness of another thought—namely, its environment. And if we were to make our thought of the finite object clear, we should at once perceive the thought of environment involved. More than this, we should perceive the mutual relation of the object and its environment, and we should see that a third idea underlies both as fundamental condition of their existence, and this third idea is the idea of space, upon which they both depend.

Let us notice, too, the nature of these ideas. The first idea, of a finite object, is a sort of mental picture or image in the mind, or at least is accompanied by such a picture or image. The second idea, that of the environment, is likewise partly an image or picture, but its essential part is not a picture, but a thought of a rela-

tion. We think the idea of the environment by a rule, as it were; it is the something else lying beyond the object. The third idea, that of space, as the underlying condition is still further removed from a mental picture or image. An image has boundaries; a picture has a frame, as it were; but the thought of space passes beyond, or transcends, all pictures and images, because it thinks that which includes all bounds and limits within it but is not bounded or limited.

It is most important to notice here that there are elements in our thoughts which we are not conscious of except by reflection. The thought of the environment is a necessary element to every thought of an object of experience, but in ordinary states of mind we do not observe this fact. Again, the idea of space as the fundamental condition is and must be present in all experience, and, although we seldom notice it, it is an essential element without which no object of experience could be conceived at all.

Thus we find ourselves in possession of knowledge which enters experience as an element of it, but is not derived from experience, but is of a higher order because it makes experience possible, and not only this, but it makes possible the objects of experience.

The thought of space differs essentially from the thought of an object of experience, because it is a thought of what is essentially infinite—infinite in its nature. Hence we arrive at this astonishing result: The knowledge of what is infinite underlies and makes possible our knowledge derived from experience, and the infinite makes possible the existence of what is finite. We may find all of these results by considering the nature of Time. While space is the condition of the existence of things, time is the condition of the existence of all events or changes. If there is a change, it demands time for its existence; if there is an event, it demands time for its occurrence.

Again, time is infinite. Any finite time or duration presupposes other time to have existed before it and after it. A limited time presupposes an environment of time before and after it, and is thus continued by the very time that limits it. If we suppose all time to be finite, we see at once that time contradicts this supposition, because if finite it must have begun, and to begin implies a time before it in which it was not. But such a time before it does not limit it, but affirms its existence beyond the boundary

that we had placed to it. Time is of such a nature that its limits or environments all presuppose, posit, or affirm it. Thus time is infinite, and yet it is the condition necessary to the existence of events and changes.

But we cannot image or picture to ourselves time any more than we can imagine space. We think it clearly as the condition of the existence of images and pictures, but not itself as a picture or image.

Now, it is important to stop here and notice that our thoughts of space and time are not baffled thoughts—thoughts that attempt to think something, and fail to grasp it. We think the infinitude of space and time with perfect clearness. The infinitude is seen by the fact that there is self-limit involved—that is to say, space is only limited by space, and is therefore only continued. If space were limited by something else, then it would be finite. But we see that as it can have only itself as its other it is infinite.

Here, too, we reach another important idea of Plato: it is the idea of *quality*. Everything that is limited by another is quality—not a quality, but qualitative being. All quality is essentially finite, but it is also essentially a phase of the infinite, as we may see by and by.

Now, our ordinary common-sense mode of thinking is done in the category of quality. Hence our first thoughts about truly infinite objects seem confusing and baffling. The thoughts of time and space, however, do not lead up to the Platonic Idea, although they lead toward it. Let us take a new start, and consider another item of our commonest every-day experience.

Recalling what we observed while investigating space, we shall observe three attitudes of the mind: *a*. It contemplates the object, without specially attending to the environment; *b*. It contemplates the environment as related to the object; *c*. It contemplates the underlying condition of both object and environment. Thus we had thing or event as object; the first, or feeblest activity of cognition (mere perception), regarded it as independent and self-sufficient, and did not specially note its relativity to the environment. The second stage of cognition (reflecting perception) noted its relations to and dependencies on the environment, and said: "All objects depend on their environment; each thing receives modifying influences from other things, and each event has

its conditions prepared for it by antecedent events." The third stage of cognition (philosophical perception) noted the underlying ground or condition, space or time, necessary for its existence. Thus we have: (*a*) thing, its environment of other things, and space, which is the logical condition of both; (*b*) event, its environment of events antecedent and subsequent, and time, the logical condition of both.

Now we may look upon the object in the second and more important aspect. It receives influences from its environment, and is affected or modified by them. Here we reach the conception of cause and effect. The environment causes some changes in the object (thing or event), and these changes are its effect. The object may react on the environment, and cause, likewise, changes in the latter. In this case the changes in the environment are the effect of the object as cause.

We notice that causality implies a combination of two objects. We think the cause as resident in one thing, and the effect as resident in another thing. But the effect is the modification produced by the causal energy. This causal energy has by its action transferred something from itself to another, which we call effect.

Here is, therefore, the vital underlying idea, which our ordinary notion of cause and effect presupposes. In order that there may be causal action of one thing upon another, there must be a self-separation take place in the energy which we call the cause—in fact, this very energy consists of self-separation. Go over this thought carefully again and again, until it becomes clear, for it is the most important thought in all philosophy.

When we think of cause and effect, there hover before the mind two objects—the one from which energy has proceeded, and a second object, in which a modification has taken place through the action of the energy. It is important to note that our mental image is not the idea or conception of causality, as we think it. Our idea—*i. e.*, conception—is rather a rule or definition, according to which we construct the mental pictures or images. But the images conceal for us the essential thought. They conceal the self-activity of the energy, because images show only dead results and not living activities. It is necessary to remember this fact in order to overcome the difficulty in the way of thinking

self-activity as the basis of the idea of cause. Self-activity is a word necessary to be used in explaining Plato, or indeed Aristotle. Plato uses the expression "self-moved," as we shall see; but as motion is in space and time, and nothing within space and time could be self-moved, the expression is not happy. It brought to him the opposition of Aristotle to his doctrine of ideas. We must not be troubled at our difficulty in imagining self-activity. Strictly speaking, we cannot imagine activity of any kind or motion of any kind. We can think of an object as here and there, but we do not picture it as moving. The ancients expressed this fact by denying motion altogether.

"A thing," said they, "cannot move where it is, and it cannot move where it is not; hence it cannot move." The unwary listener who supposes that he is thinking through the problem of motion when he imagines a thing fixed in place and then in another, finds himself drawn into a conclusion that contradicts all his experience, and, in fact, experience impossible. Take all motion out of the world and there could be no experience, for experience involves motion in the subject that perceives or in the object perceived, one or the other; yet we cannot form a mental image of motion or of change. We can picture different states or conditions of an object in a change, and different positions occupied by a moving thing, but the element of change and motion we do not picture. It is not surprising that we cannot form for ourselves a mental picture of self-activity, being, as we are, unable to picture any sort of activity, motion, or change. But we find the thought of motion and change and activity necessary in order to explain the world of experience—nay, even to perceive or observe it. So, too, the thought of self-activity is necessary in order to explain motion, change, and activity. That which moves, moves either because it is impelled to move by another or because it impels itself to move. In the latter case, that of self-impulsion, we have self-activity at once. In the former case, that of impulsion through another, we have self-activity implied, although indirectly. For if the object moves because impelled by another, this happens either because the other which impels it to move is the originating source of the movement—*i. e.*, is self-active; or else because the other which impels it to move receives and transmits the energy causing the

motion, from another source either directly or through a longer or shorter series of links.

Kant, Sir William Hamilton, and others have tried to show that we stop short of reaching an originating cause because the series may be infinite in extent. But this, like Zeno's paradoxical refutation of motion, is also an appeal to the imagination and not to the thinking reason. It is true, we cannot form a mental image of an infinite series of effects or causes. But this does not matter; it would not help to understand the question involved if we *could* make a mental image of an infinite series. The question, reduced to its lowest terms, is simply this: the object before me is modified through some cause not itself. Being assured of this fact, I am equally sure that the true cause, wherever it is, originated the influence and is self-active, no matter how long the series of links may be down which it transmits the causal influence. It does not affect this certainty to stop me and say: "This effect is caused by that object which is in turn caused by another object, and so on *ad rever.*" For it is easy for me to reply: "If neither the other object nor any of the preceding objects in the series of objects of causation originate any energy, then they all transmit it; the whole infinite series of links or terms only receive and transmit energy and do not originate it, either individually or as a whole. Therefore, the object and the infinite series of causes are all one effect, and there is no origination of energy in it. What then? It follows that it is no effect unless there is an actual efficient cause lying beyond the series. For an effect implies reception of energy from something else; where there is no reception there is no effect.

Hence we must acknowledge that every effect implies true causality—that is to say, actual origination and transmission of energy. We must acknowledge, too, that every true cause is a self-activity, although we have not yet investigated whether there is one supreme cause only or more than one cause in the world. Because we very seldom turn our attention to the essential character of causality, we shall find this thought of self-activity—self-separation of energy—a strange and perhaps absurd conclusion. But if we reject it we are left entirely without a cause, and yet we find ourselves attempting to hold on to an infinite series of effects! If we reject self-activity, then we must reject effects

too, and, to be consistent, must deny the existence of energy or influence as well as of dependence. Hence, too, we must deny all beginning, ceasing, and change, for these presuppose the transference of influence or energy.

This thought of self-activity is the root of our religious idea of God, and this explains how readily Plato's system lent itself to Christian Theology. We see that an infinite that has no properties or qualities is the same as nothing. It is only another way of naming what we call nothing. The absolute idea of ideas is not formless, but self-determined or self-active; in other words, it is an energy that originates its particulars by its own action.

Again let us stop and ask ourselves what is a universal term? What is genus, species? We acknowledge that oak is universal, in the sense that it includes as species all the oaks that ever were, all that are now, and all that ever will be. It is a general name for an idea of species that includes an infinite number of examples. Examining the individual oaks one after the other and finding them all alike in such important characteristics, we should naturally think of a common cause. Without the idea of common cause we should have only a dead empty idea of species founded on classification. Identity of cause alone makes a true idea such as Plato means, for the idea is a cause and not merely an efficient cause, but also a final cause, and, above all, a formal cause. Looking not at the vast range of individual oaks, but studying a particular oak alone by itself, we see again a cause that is more extensive than the effect, and does not exhaust itself in the effect. It puts forth its energy systematically, step by step, and realizes in existence just what is a means for its next step. Each step is end for the previous means, and likewise means for an end that will follow it. This cause that does not exhaust itself in the individual oak comes to produce a crop of acorns from which it may take a new start and develop a forest of oaks. Thus such a cause demonstrates itself a universal because the activity of its energy produces a multiplicity of individuals all of them images or exemplars of the idea oak, and all participating in it, although not exhausting it.

Let us now discuss a passage from Plato's *Laws*,¹ in which he rises to the idea of self-activity, or self-movement, and note care-

¹ "Laws," Book X.

fully the interesting way in which he illustrates the meaning of self-activity by life, soul, thought, etc.

Kleinias, a Cretan (hinting of Crete as founded by Minos, the law-giver), talks about the divine origin of laws with Megillos, a Lacedemonian (representing the country of Lycurgus, the law-giver), and with an Athenian Stranger (from the country of Solon, the law-giver). The discussion of earthly laws and legislation points back to the foundation of Law in the divine (the rational constitution or the divine grounds of human society). Divine form grounds the form of human institutions. (So formlessness in the divine would ground anarchy. Hence this necessity here in the tenth book to consider divine form or Idea as the basis of law.)

Those who find fire and water and earth to be the first principles of the universe (as the Ionic philosophers, Thales, Anaximander and Heracleitos did) consider the soul to be derivative from matter of course. Then matter, and not self-activity, is the first—and they who hold this are impious because our Greek religion holds that the gods are the source of all; and the gods are immortal living (self-active) beings.

Let us, says the Athenian stranger, discuss the argument of those philosophers who invert the true order of the universe and make the self-active soul the last of things—the effect and not the cause—and make that which is last—to wit, inert matter—the first, the generator and destroyer of all that is. They have by this inversion come to deny the gods. They are ignorant, you see, regarding the nature of the Soul and her origin. They do not see that the soul is presupposed as existing before material bodies and as the author of the formation and transformation of bodies. The properties of soul—*i. e.*, its activities—will precede motion and change in matter.

Not natural things, but the soul is the first creative power. As you, Kleinias and Megillos, are not skilled in dialectic and might be unable to answer my questions, I will both ask and answer the questions necessary to probe this subject to the bottom.

1. Are all things at rest, or all in motion, or some in rest and some in motion? It is clear to me that some are in rest and others in motion. There are both rest and motion in the world.

2. Those things that move, move in place, and those things that rest, rest in place. Some move in one place—that is, they revolve,

and others move from one place to another. [Here are (1) revolution and (2) locomotion—mere mechanical motion.]

3. In revolution the greatest motion is at the circumference, and near the centre the least motion, while at the centre there is rest altogether. This is wonderful, that swiftness, slowness, and rest should be conjoined in one moving body.

4. And bodies that have locomotion and move from place to place sometimes have one centre and sometimes several in succession. They also sometimes impinge on each other and are broken to pieces by the shock, and sometimes they unite with other bodies with which they come in contact. [Here are more categories of motion, (3) division, (4) conglomeration or aggregation by impact (quantitative change). Also there is (5) increase or growth and (6) decrease or decay.]

5. All changing and moving is in process of generation, and there is in this process a continual succession of things arising and a constant stream of dissolution of things going on—one thing taking the place of another. The thing is the point of rest in the moving process of generation—[its static equilibrium, so to speak]. [Here are two more categories of motion, viz.: (7) generation and (8) dissolution or death (or individualizing into *things* and dissolution of individuality—qualitative change).]

6. Now we have named eight species of motion—but there are two others: motion that moves others but not itself, and motion that moves itself and also other things. [(9) Causal motion and (10) self-activity or *causa sui*.] The self-motion works in itself—and then in other things; assuming the forms of composition and decomposition, increase and diminution, generation and destruction. So that self-motion is the principle of all other motions and explains them as well as every form of action and passivity, and is the true principle of all that truly exists.

7. Now which of these ten species of motion is the mightiest and most efficient? Will you not say that the tenth one, or the one that can move itself, is superior? [Kleinias the Cretan sees the point and says that self-motion is ten thousand times—a “myriad times” superior.]

8. But, says the Athenian Stranger, we ought not to call self-motion the tenth, but the first, because it alone is the generator; then the ninth, or the motion which moves others, is the second.

If you start with something that is moved by another and proceed from it to the other that moves it, and then to a third that moves the second, and thence to a fourth that moves the third, and so on forever, do you ever reach a true source of motion? Of course not; you never reach a first mover, but always find only a motion that is derived from some other [*i. e.*, you begin with a derivative and end with a derivative].

9. But if, on the other hand, you begin with a self-moved and proceed to another that it moves, and thence to a third, a fourth, and a fifth, and so on to tens and thousands of bodies that are set in motion, you still have with you the first mover as the explanation of all: it is a self-moving principle that is the true first beginning.

10. And if you suppose, like the Materialists, that all things were at rest in one mass, it is clear enough that if any motion ever sprang up in the mass it must originate in the self-moving.

11. Self-moving is, therefore, the cause of motion in things at rest and in things in motion, and is the oldest and mightiest principle of change, all change being secondary to it and an effect of it.

12. Now, at this stage of the argument, let me ask what name we give to self-movement when we see it existing in nature—say, in any earthy substance or in moist or warm substances, whether simple or compound? Your answer is that we call that self-moving power LIFE. Any being that originates motion in itself is a living being.

13. Moreover, we must admit that we name this principle of self-movement SOUL. The definition of soul will be found to contain this idea of self-movement as its essential part. The soul is identified with the origin of all movement, change and generation in the universe.

14. Since body as composed of matter is not self-moved, but has its source of motion in something else, body must be considered inferior to soul, and it should obey soul as its ruler.

15. It is, moreover, true that what appertains to the soul is prior to that which appertains to the body—as, for example, thinking and willing and memory and desire are superior to length and breadth, softness and hardness, strength and elasticity, and such like properties that we find in matter.

16. The soul, too, is the cause of good and evil, of base and honorable, just and unjust, and all other pairs of opposites, since she is the cause of all.

17. And the soul inhabits all things moving, and consequently she orders the movements of the stars.

18. The soul directs and orders everything in heaven and earth by her movements, which are such movements as we call will, consideration, etc., and these become secondary movements in bodies and guide all things to growth and decay, composition and decomposition, and to the qualities that accompany them, such as heat and cold, hardness and softness, blackness and whiteness.

19. The principle of wisdom and virtue alone is that principle that can produce uniformity in nature. An evil soul acting with folly could not produce harmony. Hence we say that a soul of the highest degree of goodness takes care of the world and guides it along the good path.

20. Of what nature is the movement of mind? The answer to this question will be found by looking among the species of motion, and inquiring which among them most resembles mind in its movement. Now there was motion from one place to another, and revolution about a fixed centre like a top. It seems that revolution about a fixed centre is more like the circular movement of mind (which continually returns to itself). Both mind and the motion of revolution, in like manner, move about one point, in relation to it and according to law and order. But motion of the other kind, which does not relate to one point, nor in the same manner, nor after the same order, nor according to rule or proportion—such motion as this seems to be unlike mind and reason, but to be much like that which lacks mind—to wit: folly and unreason.

21. Hence we conclude that the orderly movement of the heavens is effected by a soul, and not by an evil soul but by a good soul.

THE DIALECTIC.

How many, and what are the ideas? Plato answers an indefinite number, for ideas are productive, generative, self-multiplying, as one sees in the case of an oak. But we must not forget that all genera and species of nature only participate in ideas, and

are not pure ideas. Hence the oak as a plant might perish from the earth in the sense that all individual oaks might perish. But there can be no perishing except through the energy of a higher idea in which a subordinate idea is included. Hence neither the oaks, the grains, the mushrooms—nor any other plant—no other thing could perish except through the self-determination of its including idea; and this idea could generate them again upon occasion.

Plato names among the ideas:—being and non-being; likeness and unlikeness; sameness and difference; unity and multiplicity; straight and crooked; quality and quantity; absolute and relative; in and for itself; substance and phenomenon; unlimited and limited; active and passive; rest and motion; subject knowing and object known.

He describes things of sense as many, divisible, unlimited, indeterminate, measureless, the becoming, relative, great and small, and as non-being.

An insight into the nature of an idea is always an insight into its essential distinction or self-determination, and hence into its causal energy to produce distinction; just as an insight into any physical force whatever is an insight into its causal energy to produce effects or distinctions. For example, an insight into the nature of fire is an insight into its power to burn combustible things; so an insight into a universal is an insight into its power to produce individuals: hence the idea of logical division, in a general term, is a feeble illustration of this.

But this insight is therefore an insight into the genesis of subordinate ideas in communion and also in participation with it. Moreover, by presupposition an idea discovers its co-ordinate antithetic species, and thence reveals the underlying higher idea. Thus one can rise from the subordinate idea by presupposition to the highest idea, the *summum genus*, as Plato tells us in *The Republic*.

In Book VII, Chapter xiii, he says: "The dialectic method of pure science, annulling one by one its hypothetical categories or elements borrowed from experience, goes back to its first principle which it presupposes, while geometry and kindred sciences use axioms and fixed hypotheses, and are not able to deduce them all from a first principle."

While the dialectic of Zeno merely demonstrated its propositions by showing contradictions in the opposite view, it did not show that contradictions were not inherent in its own thesis. The true dialectic is not only able to overthrow the opposite to its thesis, but to show at the same time that that opposite itself presupposes the affirmative thesis as its own logical condition.

I now quote and summarize a celebrated passage from Plato's *Sophist*, in which he demonstrates by the Dialectic Method that ideas have energy or power, and that they participate in one another:

IDEAS HAVE ENERGY AND THEY PARTICIPATE IN ONE ANOTHER.

The dialogue called *The Sophist* is between an Eleatic Stranger and Theætetus.

1. The Eleatic Stranger discourses on the definition of true being, and suggests that the aboriginal savages would assert that nothing which they cannot hold in their hands has any existence. But if it is admitted that there is any incorporeal existence whatever, they can be asked to state what there is common to corporeal and incorporeal existence which renders it possible to affirm existence of both.

2. He then investigates what this common element of existence can possibly be. He suggests that anything which possesses any sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by another, has real existence. To exist, then, means power to affect.

3. Now the doctrine of ideas first distinguishes essence, or the eternal, from generation, or the perishable. The body is generated and is perishable, while the soul perceives essence, which is the same and immutable. Hence thought participates in essence which it perceives.

4. Participation is an active or passive energy which takes place between elements. But the doctrine of ideas as held by the Eleatic philosophers denies that ideas have the power of doing or suffering, and holds that activity of this kind appertains only to generated things. Plato here wishes to refute such a doctrine of ideas, and to show that ideas have self-movement or self-activity. So he replies that, since they hold the doctrine that the soul knows and that being or essence is known, they imply that soul is active in knowing, while being is passive in being known. Hence they

must hold that being as passive excludes the active, or the soul, and *vice versa* ; hence they are obliged to deny life and soul and mind to absolute being as known by the soul, and this is a terrible result to reach. For being in that case would be "devoid of life and mind, and remain in awful unmeaningness and everlasting fixture." This cannot be, and we must admit that being has mind and life, and also motion. [The Eleatic, as above mentioned, denied movement of being.] If there is no motion there can be no mind. But, on the other hand, there must be rest as well as motion.

5. There can be no mind if all is in motion, because there can be no sameness and permanence and relation to the same unless there is rest, for all these are attributes of rest. Surely an argument is out of place on the part of a man who asserts that mind does not exist—his argument is ineffective just in proportion to its mental power and to its effect on other minds.

6. Therefore the philosopher will not believe those who say that the totality is at rest or wholly in motion, because he sees that both are necessary.

On the communion of ideas he says :

1. In case you deny all participation of things, then you cannot affirm one of another—you cannot affirm being of motion nor being of rest, and hence they cannot exist. No predication of being is possible unless ideas participate.

2. On the other hand it will not do to affirm communion of all with all, because in that case rest could be predicated of motion, and motion of rest, which would be absurd. It follows that there is communion of some things and exclusion on the part of others.

3. Selecting a few ideas to test this principle of communion upon, he proceeds: The most important of all genera are being, rest, and motion. Rest and motion are incapable of communion, but being is common to both.

4. But each of these is different from the others and is identical with itself. Here are two new categories, same and other, the categories of identity and difference. So here are two new genera holding communion with the categories of *being*, *rest*, and *motion*, the three already considered ; and hence we have five genera, unless *same* and *other* are already included in the first three.

5. But *same* and *other* are not *rest* and *motion*, because that

would make each one the opposite of what it is. Nor can *same* and *other* be either of them *being*; because then *being* could not be predicated of *rest* and *motion*. For then it would follow that *rest* and *motion* are *being* and the *same*.

But, nevertheless, there is participation between *the same* and *the other*.

6. But "other" is always relative of "other," and hence "other" cannot be identical with "being," because "being" is not opposed to *another*, but is identical in both, *the same and the other*. *Being* is a common predicate to all opposites—all opposites *exist*. Therefore "other" is to be added to our four categories as a fifth category.

7. [But the category "other" is what we call the category of *quality*—not a quality, but *qualitative being*—finite being—thing and its environment—each the other of the other.] *Qualitative being* or the category of "other" pervades all classes; for each category—(being, rest, motion, sameness)—is different from every other—hence participates in the idea of "other."

8. The Eleatic Stranger proceeds to show that "motion" as an idea is opposite or "other" to *rest*, and yet is also identical with *rest* in so far as they both are alike *being*. Both motion and rest participate in *other* and in *being*. "Motion" likewise participates in the "same" and also in "not the same" or in the "other." Motion is then other than *being*; or, in other words, participates in *non-being*.

9. [It is a very important point that the Eleatic Stranger points out here that non-being or negation enters all the other categories except *being*, because they all participate in the category of the "other." He sees that qualitative being or finite being participates in both being and non-being.]

"Every class of existences or of ideas has plurality of being and infinity of non-being," says he; or, in other words, it has many aspects in which *being* may be affirmed of it, and likewise an endless variety of aspects in which it is different from other beings.

10. The conclusion is that *Being* differs from every existence of which it may be predicated, and that in general it is the nature of classes, species, ideas, or universals to participate in one another and thus render possible this dialectical journey from one to another through common predicates.

[The dialectic is the process of discovering the self-definitions of Pure Reason. Reason is the absolute first Principle, called *the Good* by Plato, or the *λόγος* by the Platonists, or the *Νοῦς Πουηταιός* by Aristotle. The definition of absolute Reason furnishes the Laws of the natural, the human, and the divine worlds.]

In conclusion, allow me to repeat the demonstration of the existence of what is immutable, demonstrating the same dialectically from the idea of mutable things after the manner of presupposition as described by Plato.

1. All beings are particularized or individualized by means of marks or attributes, variously called qualities, properties, distinctions, differences, characteristics, or determinations. We may say, therefore, that any existence is what it is through these characteristics or determinations. Now we can see clearly that all things get their characteristics or determinations either from some foreign source, or else they originate them themselves.

2. Again, if the characteristics or determinations are derived from a foreign source, the being to which they belong is a dependent being. Dependent beings derive their determinations from others, while independent beings, if there are any, must originate their own determinations. All beings are dependent or independent; if dependent, they imply other beings upon which they depend for the determinations that constitute their existence. A dependent being does not constitute a separate individuality, but forms a part of the being on which it depends. So, too, if a being depends on another dependent being, or on a series of dependent beings, what it derives from the other, or from the series, is transmitted to it from some independent being on which all these depend.

3. If there were several mutually dependent beings, the whole would make one independent being. But in such a case the independent whole would form a unity above the existence of the component parts, just as the mutual dependence of acid and alkali forms a salt—a unity in which the acid and alkali have lost their individuality.

4. All independent being must be self-determined. Here is the important conclusion. If independent, it must originate its characteristics, qualities, and determinations through its own self-activ-

ity. Here we arrive at self-activity again as the source of all being. Our logical ladder to this conclusion has three rounds. (1) All dependent beings belong to others, and with them make up wholes or totalities. (2) All wholes or totalities of being must be independent. (3) All independent being must be self-active, and originate its own qualities, distinctions, or attributes.

5. If there are real effects, there are real causes; if there are dependent beings, there must be independent beings on which they depend. True causes and really independent beings are self-active or self-determined. All limited existence is either self-limited or limited through others, and for this reason dependent. Self-existent being is self-active and self-determined. This result is substantially the same thought as that found by analyzing causality. There must be self-separation, or else no influence can pass over to another object. There must be self-distinction, or else no characteristics or determinations can arise. The cause must first act in itself before its energy causes an effect in something else. Hence the true cause must have within itself both phases, and be effect of itself as well as cause of itself.

6. We must notice another very important consequence of this investigation of presuppositions of experience. It follows that all self-existent beings are unities, and yet not abstract unities. Self-activity implies active subject and passive object in one. It is self-active and self-passive, determiner and determined. As subject or determiner it is not yet any particular characteristic or distinction, but the possibility of all distinctions and characteristics. As determined it is particularized and special. Hence we see that any independent or self-existent being is a self-distinguishing being and not a mere empty "unconditioned," without attributes or qualities. (This is so much in favor of theism and against pantheism.) For theism upholds a "living," self-active God, against pantheism, which holds to a transcendental unity, which pervades all, and yet is nothing special, but only a void in which all characteristics are annulled.

It is, moreover, presumptive in favor of Christian theism, because the latter lays stress on the personality of God. Self-activity is self-distinction, and has many stages or degrees of realization. It may be *life*, as in the plant or animal; or *feeling and locomotion*, as in animals; or *reason*, as in man; or, finally, *Absolute*

Personality, as in God. In the plant we have reaction against environment; the plant takes up its nourishment from without, and transmutes it into vegetable cells and adds them to its substance. In *feeling*, the animal exhibits a higher form of self-activity, inasmuch as it reproduces within itself an impression of its environment, while in locomotion it determines for itself its own space. In *thinking reason*, man reaches a still higher form of self-activity, the pure internality which makes for itself an environment of ideas and institutions. But in these realms of experience we do not find pure self-activity in its complete development.

Philosophy looks beyond for an ultimate presupposition, and finds the perfect self-activity presupposed as the Personal God.

As a fitting conclusion to a discussion of the doctrine of Ideas, I quote from the great Platonic hymn of Wordsworth :

Oh joy ! that in our embers
Is something that doth live,
That nature yet remembers
What was so fugitive !
The thought of our past years in me doth breed
Perpetual benediction : not indeed
For that which is most worthy to be blest :
Delight and liberty, the simple creed
Of childhood, whether busy or at rest,
With new-fledged hope still fluttering in his breast—
Not for these I raise
The song of thanks and praise ;
But for those obstinate questionings
Of sense and outward things,
Fallings from us, vanishings ;
Blank misgivings of a Creature
Moving about in worlds not realized,
High instincts before which our mortal nature
Did tremble like a guilty thing surprised ;
But for those first affections,
Those shadowy recollections
Which, be they what they may,
Are yet the fountain light of all our day,
Are yet a master light of all our seeing ;
Uphold us, cherish, and have power to make
Our noisy years seem moments in the being
Of the eternal Silence ; truths that wake,
To perish never ;
Which neither listlessness, nor mad endeavor,

Nor Man nor Boy,
 Nor all that is at enmity with joy,
 Can utterly abolish or destroy !
 Hence in a season of calm weather
 Though inland far we be,
 Our souls have sight of that immortal sea
 Which brought us hither,
 Can in a moment travel thither,
 And see the children sport upon the shore,
 And hear the mighty waters rolling evermore.

HEGEL'S DOCTRINE OF CONTRADICTION.

TRANSLATED FROM ANTHON BULLINGER, BY ALICE A. GRAVER.

I.

Who has not heard it said, when the Hegelian philosophy has been under discussion, that Hegel has invalidated the so-called fundamental Law of Contradiction and its associated Law of Excluded Middle, and, in consequence of this capital crime against logic, has given his system a wholly illogical basis? The number of those who declare this is legion. It will be sufficient, however, as we here enter the lists in behalf of the Hegelian doctrine, to consider the arguments by which two chief representatives of logic attempt to protect it against this outrage, and confute the sore offender, Hegel. I refer to Trendelenburg in his "Logische Untersuchungen," and Ueberweg in his "System der Logik." The other antagonists of the category of Contradiction bring forward nothing further that is pertinent, and can very excusably be left out of consideration.

It is certainly true that this category is a constituent element in the Hegelian system; that Hegel conceived it as something actual, something freely given in objective thought and reality, as an immanent characteristic of things themselves. He has a very high opinion of this Contradiction, which is, according to him, not to be avoided. "Identity," says he, in the fourth volume of his "Werke," p. 68, "in distinction from Contradiction, is only the characteristic of the simple immediate, of dead Being. Contra-

diction, on the other hand, is the source of all activity and life; only so far as anything has in itself contradiction is it vital, does it show tendency and activity.

It is likewise true that Hegel has not accepted as a genuine law of thought the principle of Excluded Middle, as given in the following formula: "Of two opposed predicates, only one can be assigned to anything; there can be no third." But in that contradiction, which, according to Hegel, is an element of all reality, and in the principle of Excluded Middle which he rejects, are the contradictorily opposed judgments of the logicians—*à la* Trendelenburg and Ueberweg—under consideration? At all events, in the rejected principle, what is spoken of is "two opposed predicates," not two contradictorily opposed predicates. Hegel says elsewhere: "The principle of Excluded Middle is the principle of the definite understanding, which tries to avoid contradiction, but in so doing falls into it. A must be either $+a$, or $-a$. But in the very statement itself there is already the third a , which is neither plus nor minus, but may be either. If $+W$ means six miles to the West, and $-W$ six miles to the East, and plus and minus cancel one another, the six miles of distance remains the same, with or without their opposition. Even the mere plus and minus of abstract distance, or number, have, if you like, zero for a third." We see by this, first of all, that Hegel is not considering contradictory, but contrary propositions, as the illustrations he gives plainly indicate. Ueberweg also makes this plain in referring to Kant ("System der Logik," p. 214), as, for example, the contradictory opposite, the "logical negation"—to use Trendelenburg's expression—of the mathematical $+a$ is by no means $-a$, but *not* $+a$. Indeed, in the very passage quoted—"The principle of Excluded Middle is the principle of the definite Understanding," etc.,—it is further seen that the contradiction designated by Hegel would not be simple subjective contradiction, "pure logical negation," but that he is thinking of contrary propositions and their relations. The coexistence of essentially opposite characteristics in one object, or conception, is what Hegel calls Contradiction. He expressly gives this definition in the note to § 89 of his "Encyclopædia."

In § 119 of the "Encyclopædia," and in the two notes to the same, cited by Trendelenburg and Ueberweg, Hegel gives the fol-

lowing examples of Contradiction: Middle and circumference of a circle, polarity in physics, north and south pole of the magnet, positive and negative electricity, organic and inorganic nature, nature and spirit, colors as regarded in polar opposition to one another, acid and base. Further, he calls the principle under discussion the principle of "Opposition," according to which Difference¹ has not *an* other in general, but *its* other set in opposition to it. He speaks, in passing, with appropriate contempt of the inanity of the opposition between the so-called contradictory notions and the nonsense perpetrated in Logic concerning them—for instance, of blue and not-blue, the latter not to be taken as an affirmative, something yellow, but only as an abstract negation. In the same sense, we might consistently say mind is either yellow or not-yellow.

In general, the categories of the Hegelian Logic must be conceived, not as subjectively formal, but as the constituent elements of objective thought, as the true, rational relations of Reality, including, of course, the categories of "Essential Difference," "Opposition," and "Contradiction." From all this it is clear that the Contradiction discussed in § 119 of the "Encyclopædia" is not the so-called Contradiction of subjective judgment, but should be conceived in the sense of Essential Difference, of Opposition, with which expressions it is interchangeable.

What the logicians have in mind in their defence of the so-called Law of Contradiction is not touched upon generally in the Hegelian Logic. Least of all is it referred to in these passages, where are developed the logical (logico-metaphysical) determinations of the objective, actual relations of Essence to (immediate) Existence. There is no allusion to subjective notions, and their possible misconceptions of immediate reality. Hegel has no interest in those wise and subtle teachings, to the effect that one can not at the same time both name a horse and deny that the animal named is a horse; or that if the exact definition of a horse is given, in case of the question whether one has a horse before him or not, the question must be answered only with Yes or No, and not by any means with "neither Yes nor No." These fine points

¹ The editor allows a profuse use of capitals in this article, most of the words used as categories being thus indicated.—En.

Hegel leaves to the professional logicians, along with Barbara, Celarent, etc., and much other "precious material." He himself has something better and more important to do.

II.

What constitutes for many the difficulty of comprehending the development of the Hegelian conceptions generally, and in particular Hegel's critique of the so-called Laws of Thought, and his own notions of the essential relations of Identity and Difference (contradiction), is the standpoint of abstract thought which they assume. Such thought, according to Hegel, is, indeed, an element of true rational thinking. Ideal differences are, indeed, to be definitely grasped and distinguished from one another. But this is not all that is necessary. To that first element of thought a second and third must be added. The thing itself, the content of the object, does not consist in abstract differences, but is in itself a living unity. The differences which the understanding fastens upon can not be in truth primitive and final. They must rather proceed from one another as the elements of a systematic whole—that is, from the dialectical unfolding of the whole. This is the dialectic element which develops Opposition, to which the speculative element is then added, thereby first making thought positively rational, and bringing it to the recognition of Opposition in Unity—*i. e.*, of the fact that the opposed elements are in truth one.

In rational thinking, the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity, like all other oppositions, is absorbed or cancelled. The Hegelian Logic is not concerned with human thought in abstraction from our spiritual Being, our conscious Ego, conceived as holding a merely subjective, formal relation to its object. It is concerned with the actual, living notion of the thing—the notion which is actual and living, both within us and without us, which is the Essence, the Soul of the Thing. It has its pure conscious existence in intelligent Spirit, and, consequently, so far as we really think in ourselves. It is here Spirit itself, in its innermost activity as that thinking Ego, which, as Aristotle of old recognized, is, before it thinks, all things in potentiality, and by its actual thinking of them becomes, in a higher spiritual manner, all things in reality. The Logic is concerned with the ideas which lie at the basis of all reality conceived by thought, and recognized by the

Spirit. Spirit, conscious of its kinship to all that is in heaven or earth, knowing itself as the truth, the quintessence, the soul, of all outer reality—which is nothing else than externalized Spirit—finds these ideas in itself, and cognizes them as ideas universal both in nature and in application, to which nothing stands abstractly out of relation, or in indissoluble opposition. It knows them as the elements of a concrete, living unity, which is the notion, or considered as notion that at once manifests its objective reality, and is at the same time conscious of itself, is the Idea.

The so-called law of thought concerning the nature of Identity says: "Everything is identical with itself." All things are related, the bond of Identity interlaces itself through the whole Universe. The Essence, which is the basis of all Appearance, is a Unity, comprehends in itself all diversity of definite Being, all differences. It is a unity, despite all Difference, despite all Opposition, which, with the equal value of a so-called law of thought, of an essential relation of all reality, stands opposed to Identity, and is a universal fact. What is true of the Universe, holds also of the individual. Everything—that is, each individual object—is, despite its relation to something else, independently self-identical, has in its relation to others its relation to itself.

But the Understanding does not comprehend Identity in this sense. To it Identity is not a Unity which encompasses Difference—a concrete Identity. If it were, then Understanding would no longer be abstract Understanding, but speculative Reason, and would regard both Identity and Difference as inclusive of one another and existing together. The Understanding applies the principle of Identity only in a trivial sense, as, for instance, "The sun is the sun," "Air is air," "The soul is the soul," "The body is the body." In reference to this, Hegel justly says that the Understanding, while it speaks of Identity, is already considering Difference—the Difference which appertains to entirely external comparisons, and does not proceed beyond these merely external differences in things having no relation to one another.

But if each thing is explicitly only identical with itself, and Difference is something external to it, belonging to a third, used as a comparative, then Difference belongs neither to "something" nor to "all." It constitutes no essential characteristic of this sub-

ject, and it can then not be said that everything contains Difference, which the Understanding persistently says. According to Hegel, one thing is distinguished from another, and thereby related to that other through its own specific character. It is at once related to self (self-identity), and related to another (opposition). This, according to Hegel, is the Contradiction given in the thing itself, and the exact contrary to that which the so-called law of Excluded Middle asserts.

After Hegel has pointed out that his category of "Contradiction" does not deal with contradictory terms, and that he differs from those logicians in his understanding of the principle of Excluded Middle, it is not fair for them to raise these objections. As they themselves best know, they do not agree among themselves as to the meaning of them, and, with the exceptions, perhaps, of Trendelenburg and Ueberweg, are not clear concerning them.

III.

The principle of Excluded Middle, as Hegel understood and rejected it, regards Difference not as difference in Identity, not as the opposition of Identity to itself, but as abstract, external Difference. Things different are regarded as independent of one another. Here it is indeed true that, of two opposed predicates, only one can be attributed to a subject; the other has nothing to do with it, and is external and indifferent, an abstract Identity without relation. In place of this principle of the abstract understanding, Hegel puts the rational principle of essential Difference. According to this principle, a thing does not have *an* other in general, but *its* other, set in opposition to it. Difference is the opposition within itself, of a thing as an identical whole, which, in contradiction to the principle of Excluded Middle, unites in itself opposite and contrary predicates.

Kant in his time did not overlook the necessity of contrary propositions concerning the same subject—the World, his so-called "Antinomies." He satisfied himself, in his own way, by absolving Reality from Contradiction, as "thing-in-itself." While pre-Kantian metaphysics and formal logic generally present, in explanation, their metaphysical view of things, Kant maintains that there can always be opposed, with equal authority and necessity, other assertions of a contrary nature. This inevitable Thesis and

antithesis, this "Antinomy," which Kant recognized, is Hegel's "Contradiction." Hegel perceived not only the four particular cases of antinomy that Kant specified as having their source in the cosmological Idea, namely, the world as both limited and unlimited by space and time; matter as both infinitely divisible and not infinitely divisible; all things in the world conditioned by cause, and yet having Freedom and an absolute beginning of action; the world as having and not having a cause. Hegel sees this contradiction in all objects of whatever kind, in all conceptions, notions, ideas. According to him, this contradiction is in the thing itself, and does not arise from an illusion of the Reason. On the contrary, it is necessary, genuine, and authoritative, the source of all motion and vitality. As Difference which is absorbed within itself, it is the origin of individuality, the principle of self-activity. So far from being an illusion of Reason, it is reason itself that everywhere points to a reconciliation of the opposed and contradictory elements into a higher unity, instead of remaining involved in Contradiction as an insoluble difficulty.

Anything is essentially different, has its own definite characteristics which separate it from another, only as this difference implies its very dependence upon that other; as, on the other hand, the latter only separates itself from the former, is its negation, in so far as it depends upon it. Each has in the other its antithesis, as spirit has its antithesis in nature, the north pole of the magnet in the south pole; positive electricity in negative, and *vice versa*. Each is thus referred to the other, has an essential, inner relation to the other, is identical with the other. Thus essential Difference is the contradiction of two forms of thought: Identity (with another) and Difference (from another). The abstract understanding abstracts from Identity when it considers Difference. It does not conceive it as a difference which implies difference, as the dialectic of two opposed characteristics (categories) bound up into unity. The understanding does not comprehend that the same subject may unite within itself two opposed, contradictory elements, as celestial mechanism unites the centripetal and centrifugal forces. It does not concern itself with such conceptions. To it, centripetal force is centripetal force—that is, is identical with itself. And the centrifugal force has the same self-identity, the two coming into only external, chance relations. According to this

conception, the celestial bodies would all rush to the centre if it were not that some hand or other had given them an impulse outward. Absolute mechanism, which sustains itself through its contradictory elements, does not exist to the understanding, just as the latter does not comprehend the dialectic of the one and the many. One is to the understanding simply one, and the many simply many. The understanding remains in this attitude of abstraction. But we can not consistently maintain this attitude. That anything in likeness to self is at the same time in opposition to self, is just as true as that there is no contradiction if there is only self-relation. It is not simply one thing distinguished from another thing, but it contains within itself difference, opposition, contradiction. The absolute unity of divine spirit posits itself as twofold, and so is the negation of itself its own contradiction. It does this in the double sense that God absolutely, from all eternity, as pure Thought, as pure spiritual Reality, is in objective relation to Himself, discloses the element of Difference from self. At the same time, out of His very unity (God's power belongs to God, to the absolute spiritual unity, which is God) the creation of definite Being appears as Difference. Thus, also, finite, subjective spirit is not a simple unity, but, notwithstanding its self-identity, is manifold in powers and capabilities, and, without losing its individuality, its pure ideality, manifests itself in an endless diversity of ideas and notions, of Difference posited in its very simplicity. In the same way the unity of the animal life manifests itself as a manifold diversity of members and organs, which is still reflected in the Unity, continually returns into it, and is continually new-created from it. This Unity of animal life, the soul, is fundamentally the same as Spirit, is implicit spirit, which in man first becomes explicit. . . . Spirit still involved in the processes of Nature, dependent on its bodily manifestations, as yet having no comprehension of itself, is Natural Spirit—immediate, made known through nature. If any one takes exceptions to this characterization, and, referring to Hegel's definition of Nature as the Other-Being of Spirit, would object that Natural Spirit is unspiritualized spirit, it would only be one proof more that the opposers of Hegel's category of Contradiction are not in a position to understand what he says regarding it, because they attach more importance to the mere analytical understanding than to Reason. This abstract

understanding conceives that Other-Being as something absolute, excluding all Identity ; it places spirit and nature, soul and body, in opposition as absolutely self-dependent, without reflecting that on this presumption their reciprocal relations, and the elements which they actually have in common, would not only be incomprehensible, but also impossible. This is not what Hegel means when he calls Nature the Other-Being of Spirit. Spirit does not act independently of nature, but freely as to Nature. It has absorbed Nature in itself, and Nature is not an abstract something else, absolutely separated from Spirit. It is rather Spirit external to itself. Nature is the Other-Being of Spirit, in the sense that Spirit itself has a twofold nature. It is within itself another, external, and alien to itself as pure and absolute Spirit. This Other-Being is not to be understood as other-being generally, but as the *Other-Being of Spirit*. Nature as opposed to Spirit is not something else existing for itself independently. Rather Nature has its being from Spirit, is only spirit externalized. In the relation of spirit to nature, soul to body, we have only the opposition of what is in itself identical. The soul in its relation to the body is not to be regarded as a separate abstract element, but as the Essence, which, notwithstanding its unity with the body, is yet distinguished from it, and rises above the sphere of its external expression to pure spiritual existence.

From what has been said, it should be clear that it is no "contradiction in terms" when Hegel designates soul as immediate, natural spirit. The "contradiction in terms" lies rather with the abstract understanding itself, meeting everything with "contradiction in terms!" It brings on its own dead abstractions, and believes that through them it will be able to comprehend this concrete, living Reality, and criticise rational conceptions of it. This concrete, living Reality has in itself Contradiction, and is in proportion concrete and living—admitting, however, that it undergoes and conquers contradiction, and out of it returns to unity with itself.

Says Hegel ("Encyc.," § 119, note 2): "Instead of speaking according to the principle of Excluded Middle, we should rather say 'Everything is in opposition.' There is, in fact, nowhere in Heaven or Earth, in the spiritual or in the natural world, an abstract 'Either-or' such as the understanding asserts. What-

ever is, is concrete, with Difference and Opposition in itself. The finitude of things consists in this: that their immediate Being does not correspond with what they implicitly are. For example: in the inorganic world an acid is at the same time a base; that is, its Being is plainly in reference to its other, a base. The acid does not remain in a quiet, inert opposition, but is always striving to realize what it is implicitly. Contradiction is what moves the world, and it is absurd to say that it is inconceivable. What can be correctly asserted is just this: that Contradiction can not end the matter, but through itself cancels itself. Even then this cancelled Contradiction is not abstract Identity, for this is itself only one side of the opposition."

Is not this comprehensible? And when Hegel thus explains Contradiction as a logico-metaphysical category, and cites such examples of it as he does, must we necessarily think of anything so nonsensical as "wooden iron," "iron which is not iron," "a donkey which is not a donkey," and the like? It certainly is not necessary, and the logicians have only half considered what Hegel wished to say, and really has said very plainly.

Ueberweg admits: "These teachings of Hegel (concerning the Laws of Thought) are, so far as contrary propositions are concerned, not without truth. The conception (or insight into the fact) that the separation of indifferent elements in opposition and their mediation to a higher unity is the form of all development in the life of Nature and Spirit, must be considered as a permanent result of Hegel's and Schelling's speculation" ("System der Logik," p. 204-218). Yet Ueberweg believed (p. 204) that "the application of this doctrine to the relation of contradictory propositions rests upon a confusion of logical negation with real opposition. Trendelenburg has proved this so clearly in his 'Logische Untersuchungen' that I here need only to refer to his work."

The "proof" of which Ueberweg speaks is merely imaginary. Trendelenburg has not once made the attempt to demonstrate such a confusion on Hegel's part. But to Hegel's Dialectic, beginning with pure Being and proceeding, "via negationis," to the more comprehensive logical categories, he has opposed the purely supposititious dilemma that the negation conditioning their development must be either "pure logical negation" or "real opposition" ("Log. Unters.," i, p. 43). But logical negation

“which originates so entirely in thought alone that it nowhere really discloses itself in Nature, could not condition any such development of thought as that a new conception should arise, in which there would be positively united a negation and affirmation reciprocally related, for there can be no third, neither between nor beyond the members” (in logical negation). “Therefore it follows,” he goes on to say, “that it is emphatically declared to be a misunderstanding when the Dialectic Negation is taken for contradictory negation” (44); and he can and will raise so little objection to it that he even makes the following additional observation: Hegel says (“Encyc.,” § 81): “The Dialectic element is the self-annulling element belonging to these categories, by which they pass into their opposites (thus opposition, not mere negation).” That it was not Trendelenburg’s intention to give that “proof” of which Ueberweg dreamed, appears from another remark on the same page, where he says: “If Dialectic should also attack the ‘principle of Excluded Middle between two contradictories,’ we could find nowhere else a principle upon which to rest indirect proof. Geometry, which has so often employed it, would have to mourn a delusion of two thousand years’ duration.” “If it should attack!” So Trendelenburg is not certain whether Hegel intended such a “*crimen læsæ logices*” or not; and he concedes in the passages cited that Dialectic Negation is not contradictory negation, but “real opposition.” But further on he actually wants to prove that Dialectic thought reaches this opposition only by means of suppositions and conceptions borrowed from experience. This is an accusation which leads us to remark that Trendelenburg entirely misconceived the “freedom from presuppositions” which Hegel required in the derivation of the categories from the Immanence of pure thought. Thought which does not comprehend the absolute notion, which goes outside of all experience, is aimlessly looking into mere vacancy, cannot develop the categories of Logic. The Hegelian “freedom from presuppositions” is not thought of in this sense.

The philosophers who represent the subjective attitude naturally presuppose the acceptance of all possible experience in consciousness, and the psychologico-logical interpretation of the same. In the same sense Hegel presupposes all—the complete Notion, the Idea, Absolute Spirit; he does not begin with it. But in

objective relation there can be no presupposition made in the presentation if the categories of the Notion are not arbitrary, but to be developed with logico-dialectic necessity. In methodical development the categories proceed from the simple and universal to the particular and concrete. Whatever is made the beginning must be comprehensible in itself, and all that follows is explained through the development of the Notion in proper order. Should I begin with the "Notion," or "Ego," or "God," there would be implied in such a beginning a multitude of presuppositions—namely, whatever constitutes the Notion, Ego, or God. I must begin the development with an element of the Notion which presupposes nothing, and is given as absolutely intelligible to every thinking person; and since this, and all the following elements, are dialectically absorbed in their higher truth and become integral elements of the Notion as a whole, nothing must be omitted; the process of development must be by degrees. In this sense alone would the Hegelian Dialectic of the Notion be "free from presuppositions." It is not based on magic.

It is only the systematic presentation of philosophy that begins with the pure thought of the Logic, and its starting-point of pure Being. The subjective consciousness of the individual, however, must first work its way up from the immediacy of sensible perception through the different stages of phenomena to pure Thought and comprehending knowledge. It must assimilate the substance of truth, let it gradually reveal itself, and, in the process of getting rid of these incomplete attitudes of thought, it must place itself subjectively in sympathy with them, in order to gain the adequate Notion of the Thing and its development, its own Dialectic, and the negativity given in it. With this idea in mind, Hegel refers, in the Introduction to Logic, to his phenomenology of Spirit as explaining the beginning of philosophic knowledge. God and the World, then, could not be brought forth by magic, by one incapable of thought, out of hypothetical, abstract Being. Here the presupposition is Thought, a thinking Ego, with an experience of Reality, for which this Reality, in the sphere of phenomena and appearance, is transformed into pure Thought in the innermost Spirit, as in the region of fully revealed Essence and Truth. From such pure Thought the philosopher makes his deductions; he lets the complete Notion unfold itself through its own

immanent Dialectic. Dialectic thought needs to resort to no suppositions, needs no outside borrowing from experience. The Notion has effected a spiritual transformation of experience, is nothing else than experience fully grasped. So the Notion has the approving consciousness of having only taken possession of its own, and not in any sense of having committed robbery.

This external Reality of experience itself, indeed, depends upon thought, is only comprehended as proceeding from Spirit, from the eternally real and absolute thought of explicit Being, which, before and above all external experience, is in God. That empirical consciousness which rises through the process of phenomena to pure thought is indeed at bottom thought, only thought involved in an incomplete phase of its life of appearance, out of which it works its way upward at last to its true complete absolute existence—to pure thought. Dialectic Negation can—without subterfuge and without robbery—be “real Opposition”; and this it is, and by no means the “logical negation” of Trendelenburg. With such, Hegel’s Logic has nothing to do. It does not deal with merely formal thought separated from its object. It is at the same time Ontology and Metaphysics, and the categories of the Logic are the categories of objective thought, characteristics of Reality conceived by thinking Spirit. “My thought is nothing separated from its object, and the object is nothing separated from my thought,” writes Hegel in a letter to Pfaff. Hegel’s Logic, then, deals only with real Opposition, proceeding from the thing itself, and not with the “contradiction” of the logicians.

Opposition in its abstract aspect as Being and Nought (as presented in the first part of the Logic) is real Opposition, in which Difference is not yet determined, is not yet specific difference. It is real Opposition, and not that Nought which by a merely subjective conception is placed in contrast with objectively given Being, as a merely formal negation. Pure Being posits itself as Nought, in opposition to itself; it shows itself, on a nearer view, to coincide with Nought, and, *vice versa*, Nought is changed to Being, as can be analyzed out of the notion of Becoming by any one. The transition from Nought to Being—Becoming—is a phase of the Absolute, without the Absolute itself ever being transformed into mere Becoming. The immediacy of pure Being—which, ab-

stracting in thought from all specific character, we comprehend through thinking Spirit—is, as indeterminate Being, identical with Nought in God, and from him proceeds as definite, finite Being—so far as God is really Creator of the World.

This is the Becoming from Nought which Alexander von Humboldt could not comprehend (“Kosmos,” 1, p. 87), but it was only because he, like so many others, falsely conceived it. “Out of nothing comes nothing”; certainly a “nothing” posited by my subjective thought, imagined by me, *is* nothing, and nothing will come from it. The Nought from which the world proceeds is the abstraction of Being given in divine thought, through which God manifests, the fulness of his kingdom in finite existence.

IV.

There is so much clearly proved: that our two logicians, when Hegel claimed actuality, reality for his Contradiction, had a strong misgiving that he could not have duly considered their Contradiction, their negation, which has its origin in subjective thought alone. So Hegel must be properly instructed. We shall see how they succeed in doing it.

Contradiction, so the logicians dictate, is the contradictory opposition given in “pure logical negation.” A thing is either blue or not-blue. The logicians appeal to Aristotle, the Father of Logic, who in his time had accurately formulated the Law of Contradiction, and that of Excluded Middle as well. Now, what Aristotle says, it is well known, was asserted in opposition to the “flux of all things,” of Heraclitus. Contrary to him, Aristotle, in the first place, emphasized, as Plato did before him, that there is a sphere of the eternal exalted above all temporary beginnings and endings, above all transition; and, in the second place, he emphasized (referring to what is mutable) that something actually existing in reality could not at the same time be man and not-man, blue and not-blue. That it might have contradiction within itself, as potentiality, that by such potentiality it might unite within itself the opposition of Being and not-Being, he did not deny; he even emphatically stated as much (“Metaph.,” iv, 5, 1009, a 33, 88). On this point Aristotle, as well as Trendelenburg, agrees with Hegel. Trendelenburg knows too that the principle of Contradiction (of formal logic) cannot be ap-

plied to the dynamic force which conditions and produces the objects of its application" ("Logisch. Unters.," ii, 154). But, says Trendelenburg, so soon as anything has *once become*, the Law of Contradiction comes into play. Ueberweg naturally says the same, and does not see the concession to Hegel's Contradiction which Trendelenburg has made in the passage cited. They both believed they had said something against Hegel.

Now, what did Hegel believe? Is a man—who certainly in his essence unites the self-contradictory elements of soul and body, nature and spirit, at the same time—to him—not a man? Or is acid, as actually existing acid, at the same time not an acid? That would indeed be mere nonsense. It is not the negation of itself as to its external, transient reality, but as to its inner potentiality, its essence. So long as a substance is in reality an acid, it is not in reality at the same time not an acid. If I should declare it not to be an acid, this contradiction would be in my subjective thought, and would, of course, have no objective value. To such a contradiction belongs the famous principle of Excluded Middle. Such a contradiction is indeed to be excluded, and the logicians may insist upon it as often as necessary. Hegel entirely agrees with them.

Let us now consider the subject of such a merely subjective judgment and contradiction, not simply taking a superficial view of its momentary existence, its external, transient reality, and its accidental properties, but also considering the Essence lying as the basis of its appearance, of its external reality. Let us reflect upon its inner nature, its soul, through which its external, definite Being is mediated, thus considering the subject fundamentally with its very root. We can certainly say that it is more than it appeared to be from a first superficial view. Acid is now no longer merely acid. It is merely acid for the apothecary, who sells it as such at a certain price. It is now, for us, according to its inner, essential nature, the negation of itself as acid, implicitly related to, dependent upon a base, and identical with it. Each has implicitly an identical Essence, now this, now that characteristic predominating. Each phase of existence is itself an opposition and difference, the contradiction being one that actually exists in the reality presented, not merely postulated in subjective thought. Each is so related to the other that they mutually embody one another, and are es-

essentially inseparable. The north pole of the magnet can not be so separated from the south pole that there is no longer any opposition in the divided parts. As any one can see how far each pole of the magnet extends after this division, so it is very easily comprehended that, when an acid and base come into contact and mutually absorb one another in a higher, more complete mode of existence, these two elements, though externally distinguished as two different phenomena, are yet essentially never set free from one another. They have such a reciprocal affinity that each, even at the time of external separation, was its own opposite.

This opposition, this contradiction, develops these finite existences whose immediate reality does not correspond to their Notion, to what they implicitly are. It carries them beyond themselves to a higher unity, in which Contradiction disappears; and what they were implicitly, they explicitly become. The latent Contradiction, veiled as it were in immediate existence, manifests itself under given conditions. An activity begins in which the form of immediate existence as such is sacrificed, but as to its implicit nature its essence is preserved, and finds its summation in a higher aspect of Reality—as, for example, an acid and base are absorbed in a salt.

Trendelenburg discerns that in this transition, this process of Becoming, Contradiction appears as objective and actual, and that the so-called Law of Contradiction has nothing to do with this activity. He and Hegel can shake hands so soon as Trendelenburg concedes, what indeed he must concede—namely, that this Contradiction, vindicating itself in activity, has been implicit and latent in that which was changed before its transition. There must have been present already the elements of variance, as the very notion of transition implies.

When Trendelenburg reflects that in that part of Hegel's Logic where he discusses the categories of Identity, Essential Difference, and the Ground, he is dealing with the relation of Essence to immediate existence, and not with directions for reckoning up and schematizing outer, immediate Reality—as in the so-called Laws of Thought; when he considers, further, that Hegel accepts these Laws of Thought in their proper place—that is, in their application to finite relations and immediate, external Reality; when Trendelenburg reflects on all this, he can, at least

V.

. . . . An objector to the Hegelian category of Contradiction says, in allusion to Lotze's "Geschichte der *Æsthetik*": "The Notion itself does not change with things, but only its applicability to a definite sphere of existence. The same Notion continues true only as it is related to a thing, depends upon it, changes with it." Certainly such a notion of the understanding as is ready-made, fixed, unchangeable. Only it is a pity that in Reality (not abstract, dead Reality, but concrete and living) there is nothing to correspond to it; it is not the real, living Notion of the Thing. Another objector to Contradiction wrote in 1877: "No one doubts that every concrete thing is made up of different elements. But it is to be just as little disputed that the thinking subject must accept the object of thought as it is presented in the outset of the thought-process. The *real object* is subject to change and development, but the *logical subject* must be accepted at one time the same as at another." This amounts to saying that thought must hold fast to what was in the past, in a vanished moment of time, yet which was there not as a complete existence, but only half-way developed. Hegel, however, has nothing to say about the permanence in thought of a Reality which is itself not permanent. The Hegelian Notion is the Notion of the Thing, takes the Thing as it is and trusts to its own dialectic. "If the Thing changes, if the real object is subject to transition and development," then this constituent activity of the real object must be included in the Notion, if it is to be the concrete Notion of a concrete object. But what causes this continuing diversity in objects is Contradiction, which in its abstract aspect is the passing from Being to Nought, and *vice versa*—that is, Becoming. This abstract Contradiction is an element of the Notion of all concrete, living Reality. The logicians concede that contrary propositions can be united, and thereby—unless they wish to be guilty themselves of their own logical contradiction—they concede as a fact the Contradiction of (qualitative) Being and not-Being. The Difference of Being and Nought is the ground of all Differences. . . . The unity of Being and Nought, and their immediate passage into Becoming as is set forth in the beginning of the Logic, should not be conceived as concrete. It is not that the Being of

this concrete thing is immediately the not-Being of the same, as though it were continually destroyed and continually recreated; but that in it, so far as it is living, Being is continually passing into not-Being, and *vice versa*. The object holds out through this activity of Being and not-Being for a certain length of time, and at last its immediate sensible existence falls asunder and disappears in the current of Becoming. Only Spirit is superior to this current; in Spirit only is Reality adequate to the Notion.

"All must fall into Nought if it would continue in Being"—that is, in finite Being, which is indebted to Contradiction for its existence, and through the dialectic of which it is further developed.

Nevertheless, despite the sway of Contradiction and Negation, all is preserved, the preservation of which Aristotle wished to be assured. . . . Blue remains always blue. Flower, ox, cow, man himself—all these phases of existence remain always the same, are not destroyed by Contradiction, though many individuals among them fall into Nought. "Everything is transitory, but a cow's tail is always long," I hear a famous man often say. In other words, the intelligible world of (Platonic) Ideas, or, what is the same thing, the all-ruling Dialectic of the Notion, is untouched by destruction. The Absolute, with its Contradiction always arising and always overcome, does not contradict itself. . . .

In order to be more certain of at last effecting a reconciliation between Hegel and the logicians, and to be able to ask the opposers of Contradiction to allow the "Father of Life" to live, I make a final concession. It is this: that when we are dealing with purely external relations, with the abstractions of externality, direction in space, and the limitations in time of historical facts, according to Hegel himself, we are to apply the logic of the understanding, divested of dialectic and rational features, with its finite limitations, and especially with its Laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle. . . . Trendelenburg need have no fear for Geometry, for Hegel, in the preface to "Phenomenology of Spirit," has explained his position in detail. He states, in substance, that, by reason of its content, the methods of analytic and synthetic cognition are pre-eminently adapted to Geometry, as in it the inflexible categories of the understanding and their applications of formal Identity are entirely in place.

So there need be no apprehension that the dialectic method will infringe upon the rights of the finite. We leave to Geometry its categories of the understanding, and to Michel his two *Groschen*—so long as he can keep them together—and admit that his reckoning must be based on these much-famed laws of logic. To the question whether Cæsar died on the Ides of March, 44 B. C., we certainly cannot answer Yes and No at the same time, nor can we say “neither Yes nor No”; the logicians are in the right here. This is either a shilling or else it is not a shilling; I have either paid my shoe-bill or I have not paid it; in all these cases the fundamental laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle must be appealed to. Only such logic should modestly keep within its sphere, and not try to deal with subjects not to be measured by its standards. It should not announce its finite categories and abstractions as though they were all-inclusive, and hence infinite and absolute.

MARTINEAU'S IDIOPSYCHOLOGICAL ETHICS.¹

BY S. W. DYDE.

The subject-matter of this article is included under two heads: I, a statement in Mr. Martineau's own language of his ethical views; and II, a criticism of two of his fundamental conceptions—namely, his understanding of what is meant by a spring of action, and his view of volition. An estimate of his conception of volition must embrace some reference to his theory of conscience. Indirectly I aim to show that the difference between Utilitarian ethics on the one hand and on the other hand the ethics of intuition, as represented by Mr. Martineau's “Idiopsychological Ethics,” is not really radical, and that a possible reconciliation between these two conflicting theories is indicated now and then by Mr. Martineau himself. Although I dwell perforce upon the views of Mr. Martineau, with which I cannot completely agree, I do so in order to empha-

¹ “Types of Ethical Theory,” by James Martineau, D. D., LL. D., Principal of Manchester New College, London. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1855. The theory discussed in this article covers pp. 1–279 of vol. ii. The references are to the first edition.

size those features of his theory which seem to me to point to better things. Indeed, it may be I only direct attention to another aspect of the basal principle of ethics, and try to show that this second aspect, united with the aspect rendered prominent by Mr. Martineau, makes the true foundation of moral science.

I. What is the essence of a psychological method? (1) It not only assumes reflective self-knowledge to be possible, but gives it precedence in ethical relations over other knowledge, and proceeds thence into the scene around; and (2) it not only begins from the self-conscious man, as the better known, and treats the phenomena so found as genuine phenomena, but accepts also whatever these phenomena carry; and if they imply in their very nature certain objective assumptions, these reports, as contained within the known phenomena, it trusts as knowledge; in other words, it believes in the inner experiences not simply as appearances within us, but where they offer testimony as witnesses of realities without us. Both these positions require to be emphasized. An egoistic doctrine such as Fichte's Idealism misses the true ethical conditions, as it reduces moral obligation to a mere modification of Self. Without objective conditions the idea of *Duty* involves a contradiction. Conscience does not *frame* the law; it simply *reveals* the law that holds us; and to make everything of the *disclosure* and nothing of the *thing disclosed* is to affirm and to deny the revelation in the same breath. Further, our psychology must be dualistic in its results, recognizing, as in its doctrine of perception, so in its doctrine of conscience, a *Self* and an *other than self*. In perception it is *Self and Nature*; in morals it is *Self and God*. Psychological *self*-knowledge is possible, for, as we are continually telling our own thoughts and feelings and purposes, is it not ridiculous to assert that we *can not know them*? Moreover, of these phenomena of the mind there must be an inner mental order, legible to the same eye that deciphers the mental classes. We psychologically know more than ourselves, for the first function of intelligence is to construe not itself, but the scene in which it is placed. Yet subjective knowledge and objective are correlative. On the simple testimony of our perceptive faculty we believe in both the perceived object and the perceiving self. To the implicit beliefs secreted within our moral consciousness let precisely so much be conceded as we readily grant to the testimony of percep-

tion, and it will appear that, in learning ourselves, we discover also what is beyond and above ourselves.

The fundamental ethical fact is this: that we have an irresistible tendency to *approve and disapprove*, to pass judgments of right and wrong. *What is it* that we judge? Self-evidently it is *persons* and not *things*. The approbation or disapprobation which we feel toward human actions is directed upon them as *personal phenomena*. Consequently we always judge the *inner spring* of an act, as distinguished from its outward operation. For, whatever else may be implied in the fact that an act is a personal phenomenon, this at least is involved: that it is issued by the mind, and has its dynamic source there. Accepting James Mill's analysis of an act into (1) the sentiment whence it springs, (2) the muscular movement in which it visibly consists, and (3) the consequences in which it issues, if we cut off the first, then the other two lose all their moral quality, but, though we cut off the other two, the moral quality is wholly preserved in the first. The personal record contains a new act, if only the inner mandate has been issued, and the moment which completes the mental antecedents touches the character with a clearer purity or a fresh stain.

Whom do we first judge? Contrary to the verdict of the great majority of English moralists, the answer must be made that we judge ourselves first, and others only second. The inner spring of action is not apprehensible by external observation, but can be known in the first instance only by internal self-consciousness. This does not mean that a solitary human being could be possessed of moral estimates, for doubtless the presence of others is indispensable to the development of this part of our nature, not less than external physical objects are requisite to the unfolding of our perceptive power. Without material things around us we should not detect the Ego of Sense, nor, without human persons before us, the Ego of Conscience. But in perception the two discoveries—of *ourselves* and of our *objects*—are simultaneous, while in the moral case there is a difference which gives a clear preponderance to the subjective side. In perception the sensations of the self and the properties of the body are *heterogeneous*; it is otherwise when I learn my own moral or human affection in the mirror of a kindred nature.

But, to return to the inner spring of action, it is conceivable that we might be self-conscious of such a spring without ability to judge it. If it were a *mere spontaneity*, wholly occupying us and propelling us upon some activity, we might pronounce upon it no sentence of estimation, for a force, even a vital force, simply as such, is no moral object at all. Accordingly we never judge our *spontaneities*, but only our *volitions*. The spontaneous state differs from the voluntary, in this at least, that in the former a single impulse is present, but in the latter not less than two. The conditions of the former are fulfilled by any sort of inner propulsion from behind urging the living being forward on a track of which he has no foresight. Volition, on the other hand, implies *an end in view*, which cannot be contemplated except in relation to other ends in view. That there may be volition there must be comparison, and comparison is impossible without a plurality of impulses. Our mind could attach no attribute to a spring of action did we not see it side by side with something dissimilar, which is nothing else than *some other spring of action*. It needs to be observed that these impulses or springs of action must be simultaneous *inter se*, for, did they not present themselves together, the first to enter would have a clear stage and take effect at once; that it hangs fire is because another claimant tries to seize the match, and nothing can be done till some superior decides *which* piece has the best directed aim. It must also be observed that these impulses must be *possible to us*. We must not conceive ourselves to be the arena on which these incompatible phenomena of suggestion try their strength, but must feel conscious of being their master, and of having them at *our bar*. We evidently feel the solicitations which visit us to be mere *phenomena*, brought before a personality that is more than a phenomenon or than any string of phenomena—a free and judicial Ego. Moral judgment, then, postulates moral freedom; and by this we mean not the absence of foreign constraint, but the presence of personal power of preference in relation to the inner suggestions and springs of action that present their claims. The objects of moral judgment are, originally, our own inner principles of self-conscious action as freely preferred or excluded by our will.

In the discussion of the objects of moral judgment tacit reference has been made to the mode of moral judgment. The one

great condition which raises the spontaneous into the self-conscious life is the simultaneous presence and collision of the forces which check and exclude each other. Without the encounter of bodies, the dream of sensation would not wake into perception. Without the answering face of other men, the sense of personal existence would remain dim. And without the appearance in us of two incompatible impulses at once, or the interruption of one by the invasion of the other, the moral self-consciousness would sleep. It is not *difference only*; it is the *difference which amounts to strife* that completes the passage from spontaneity to self-consciousness. But the moment this condition is realized we are sensible of a contrast between the impulses which is other than that of mere intensity or of qualitative variety, and is expressed in the statement that one impulse is higher than the other. This apprehension is no mediate discovery of ours, of which we can give an account, but a revelation inseparable from the appearance of the principles side by side. It is in virtue of a sense of *Duty* or a feeling of *Moral Worth*, excited in us by the presence of these springs of action, that we are able to pronounce them higher and lower; and this sense or feeling is excited in us because the springs of action are possessed of the unique and unanalyzable quality of moral worth. When the cycle of original experience has completed itself, when all the natural springs of action have had their mutual play, there will be material for forming an entire ethical scale of principles. Owing to modifications in the constitution of the individual and to the maturing of society, this scale cannot be looked upon as finished, but it, so far as it is finished, coincides with the systematic code of Divine law. The whole ground of ethical procedure consists in this: that we are sensible of a *graduated scale of excellence* among our natural principles quite distinct from the order of their intensity and irrespective of the range of their external effects. The sensibility of the mind to the gradations of this scale—a sensibility which varies greatly in different individuals—is precisely what we call *Conscience*. The fact that different persons, as they have had different experiences and been surrounded by different circumstances, have had before them, in consequence, different sections of this moral scale, accounts for the fact that these persons differ in their moral estimates.

For the sake of greater clearness, moral judgment may be briefly contrasted with prudential. While the objects of *moral* preference are the *springs of action within us*, the objects of *prudential* judgment are the *effects of action upon us*. In the counsels of prudence is sought, not the affection it is good to *start from*, but the result it is pleasant to *tend to*; in other words, it is sentient good which in this case attracts the eye and directs the will. Prudence is therefore an affair of *foresight*; moral judgment, of *insight*. For want of experience we may *blunder*, but not *sin*. The man's *duty* consists in acting *from the right affection*, about which he is never left in doubt; it is his *wisdom* only that consists in *pursuing the right end*; and this perhaps grows none the less for the discipline of a few painful but guiltless errors. The *effects of action*, in the foresight of which Prudence consists, are of two kinds. First, there is the direct gratification of the impulse whence the action proceeds; and, secondly, there are the indirect and collateral consequences reflected back upon us from the world around on which the act is thrown, and where it sets new agencies at work. The first of these, being the direct fruit of our own nature, is constant and inevitable, repeating itself each time that the same spring of action has its way. Of what kind the gratification will be we do not know beforehand. It is the characteristic of impulse to drive us *blindly* forward on what it is commissioned to obtain; and the thirst that first sends us to the draught gives no prescience of the water's taste and feel. As the gratification is the more keen, the more intense is the impulse; Prudence is self-surrender to the strongest impulse, whereas Duty is self-surrender to the highest. But the advantage of yielding to a vehement impulse may be dearly purchased at the cost of the second class, of external and ulterior effects—the consequences entailed by the order of the world and the sentiments of mankind, including our own. These corrective consequences of precipitate action turn out to be no mere phenomena of our *natural history*, but creations, direct or indirect, of our *moral constitution*. These secondary results may, for example, consist in anguish or self-contempt, indignation of our fellow-men, or loss of fortune or health.

Where the order of strength among the springs of action is at variance with the order of their excellence, inclination will often stand in the way of duty. The vehemence of the temptation will

be proportioned to the extent of discrepancy between the two scales. As the force of temptation operates to relieve the shade of guilt, the life of widest visible aberration from a Divine standard of perfection is not necessarily the most wicked. The measure of our repugnance to low character is different from the measure of our moral condemnation; we recoil from it, as we should from any deformity, in proportion to its visible departure from our ideal of humanity; we condemn it in proportion as it has arisen in full sight of what is higher, and taken only paltry bribes from suborning interests or passions. Where the discrepancy is greatest between the moral and the prudential order of principles the guilt is least; and where the discrepancy is least the sin is greatest. But the two scales may agree. If, when this agreement takes place, the prudential order becomes paramount, the individual gives way more and more easily to the uppermost desire, till the autocracy of inclination becomes complete. When this occurs, the *human* element has disappeared, and there remains either *brute* or *devil*. When the moral order becomes paramount, a perfect harmony ensues in the end between the order of strength and the gradations of excellence. This is the true saints' rest and the ultimate reconciliation between our personality and God's. To God the *idea* of the sinful course of conduct cannot be denied without a limitation of His view of possibilities; but He freely prefers the right. Yet, since to him we cannot attribute conflict, it is possible for all conflict finally to cease for a human being likewise.

It may be well to consider here some inadequate interpretations of the simple feeling of authority. (1) Bentham denounces all appeals to a moral faculty as sheer "*ipse dixitism*"; but the fact that the feeling of authority is a constant characteristic of human nature tells against any such view. I cannot accept the inference that, because the authority first turns up in my own consciousness, it carries no weight but that of personal whim, for consciousness distinctly announces a law over me not of my own making. The power that creates law is adequate to alter law; yet we can pretend to no such prerogative with respect to the claims of the moral consciousness. It may, however, be contended that the authority which I feel is binding on myself, but that it must have no application in the estimate of others.

But no one who feels the authority at all can at the same time believe that it is an egoistic peculiarity. Mr. Sidgwick speaks of the "cognition of objective rightness as the cognition of a dictate of Reason." I would venture a little further than this "impersonal conception" and assert that the cognition of an authority *higher than we* means the cognition of a personal authority, for "higher than I" no "thing" assuredly—no mere phenomenon—can be. (2) Paley denies that conscience has any authority even over the individual, for the individual may set it at defiance. Paley would fall back on the proclamation of future punishment and reward. This view involves a contradiction, for Paley first supposes a man *to have a moral sense*, and then supposes him to put up with the stings of conscience as so much sentient uneasiness—a thing possible only on condition of his *having no moral sense*. The truth underlying Paley's view is that without the *award* of retributory happiness and suffering the authority of the moral law would be curtailed of its adequate supports. With our reflective knowledge of the better and the worse are connected *secret* auguries of joy and anguish, the failure and falsehood of which would throw discredit on the whole announcement of the *inner oracle*.

The nature of obligation may be looked at from two points of view—from the point of view of man's relation to God, and from the point of view of man's relation to man. God's claim upon us is not determined by His personal and absolute ideal, but by His communicated and relative ideal. But, inasmuch as the specks and films of many an unfaithfulness have injured our moral eyesight, our own image of right cannot be even that pure and full-proportioned vision which God had rendered possible. So we have a third or actual ideal, some removes from the communicated ideal. This fact at once takes away from man all ground of self-reliance in his dealings with God. But when, on the other hand, man deals with man, the measure of duty is *the mutually understood ideal*, which cannot in all cases be accurately determined. With regard to the claims of God, it is true that even the man who is strenuously conscientious cannot be said to have obtained a complete peace, but he may have entirely satisfied himself with regard to the claims of man. Moral authority extends over the prudential system, for we consider rashness

or recklessness as wrong, even though no interests are visibly affected but the offender's own. This result arises from the fact that this world is not a hedonist world, but a world in which the constitution of things includes a higher law and a divine rule.

As the fundamental principles of the theory have now been examined, there remains to be discussed the nature of the various springs of action. These impelling principles may be distinguished into two sets—the PRIMARY springs of action, which urge a man, in the way of unreflecting instinct, to appropriate objects or natural expression; and the SECONDARY, which supervene upon self-knowledge and experience, and in which the preconception is present of an end gratifying to some recognized feeling. These secondary feelings are not something entirely new, but the primary over again, metamorphosed by the operation of self-consciousness. The distinction between primary and secondary principles is based upon the fact that man is conscious before he is self-conscious, and has active tendencies in both stages. A portion of human action is due to instinctive impulses, putting us in the right way for natural but unexperienced ends. Man is distinguished from the lower animals, not by having a different mode of action throughout his whole nature and entire life, but by having a *self* with additional functions which act by laws of their own, and modify, during the maturer periods of his existence, the results of his instinctive powers. Instinctive impulse is that which spontaneously institutes means to an end not preconceived. The primary impulses may be divided into four classes, each of which, again, may be subdivided into three. Thus there are (1) the Propensions—namely, the organic appetites relative to food and sex, and Animal Spontaneity; (2) the Passions: Antipathy, Fear, and Anger; (3) the Affections: Parental, Social, and Compassionate; and (4) the Sentiments: Wonder, Admiration, and Reverence. Objection may be taken to placing the Sentiments among the primary springs, on the ground that we cannot admire or revere unless we distinguish ourselves from the object of admiration or reverence, and so must have a knowledge of ourselves. Chronologically, this is perfectly true; but, in the exercise of these sentiments, the Self which had been discovered is again lost; they carry us into self-forgetfulness, though they are posterior to our self-knowledge. The Propensions bear the char-

acter of subjective appetency. They are not unrelated to external objects, but require from them the minimum of importunity to move response. They carry us simply out of ourselves, we know not whither; the Passions repel from us our uncongenials, be they things or persons; the Affections draw us to our congenials, who can be only persons, unequal or equal; the Sentiments pass out by aspiration to what is higher than ourselves, whether recognized as personal or not. Thus the psychological order of the primary impulses may be based upon the nature of the object to which each is related.

But these twelve Primary principles play their part on the theatre of a self-conscious nature, and each of them, in the attainment of its end, yields us a distinct kind of satisfaction. These satisfactions may themselves become *ends*, a taste for realizing which will constitute new springs of action, added on to the former, variously mingling with them, often quite ascendent over them. These are the *Secondary* principles, characterized by their *interested* nature or invariable aim to produce certain *states of ourselves*. These Secondary principles are but *the self-conscious counterpart* of the primary. Thus, in arranging the Secondary principles, we may adopt in the main the method of classification made use of in connection with the primary impulses. We have, consequently, (1) Secondary Propensions: Love of Pleasure, Love of Money, Love of Power; (2) Secondary Passions: Malice, Vindictiveness, Suspiciousness; (3) Secondary Affection: Sentimentality; and (4) Secondary Sentiments: Self-culture, *Æstheticism*, Interest in Religion. In addition to the preceding simple springs of action there are several compound principles, such as Emulation, Love of Praise, etc. It is plain that Prudence is confined in its judicial function to the Secondary principles, while Conscience has a discriminating voice over the whole.

A consideration of the moral value of the principles of action, both primary and secondary, will result in the following table:

Lowest.

1. Secondary Passions: Censoriousness, Vindictiveness, Suspiciousness.
2. Secondary Organic Propensions: Love of Ease and Sensual Pleasure.

3. Primary Organic Propensions: Appetites.
4. Primary Animal Propension: Spontaneous Activity (unselective).
5. Love of Gain (reflective, derivative from appetite).
6. Secondary Affections (sentimental indulgence of sympathetic feelings).
7. Primary Passions: Antipathy, Fear, Resentment.
8. Causal Energy: Love of Power, or Ambition; Love of Liberty.
9. Secondary Sentiments: Love of Culture.
10. Primary Sentiments of Wonder and Admiration.
11. Primary Affections, Parental and Social, with (approximately) Generosity and Gratitude.
12. Primary Affection of Compassion.
13. Primary Sentiment of Reverence.

Highest.

In the moral scale the Secondary Passions, which constitute in us a truly diabolic element, are alone inadmissible. All others have a relative moral value; these only are bad without qualification. The lowest of the remaining—namely, the love of ease and pleasure—may present itself at a time when the field is fairly disengaged, and then it may have innocent way. But it must yield the palm to even the primary organic propensions, for it is surely meaner to eat for the palate's sake than to appease the simple hunger. The third primary propension, Vital Spontaneity, which is a paroxysm of unselecting movement, is lower than the Love of Gain. This in turn, implying a certain gravitation toward ease and pleasure, is lower than the Love of Power. Nothing is more difficult than to determine the controversy of the claims of the love of gain and the Primary Passions. As for Antipathy, it seems plain that we would look with aversion upon the man who, though having an intense horror of blood, entered upon the business of butcher; Fear, again, cannot be appraised without reference to the worth of the object feared, and so has no definite place in the moral scale; while, in the third place, we would think a boy who controlled his resentment for the sake of money had given way to the less noble impulse. Consequently the love of gain must, on the whole, occupy a place inferior to the primary

passions. In the next place, as true sympathy is spoiled by antipathy; secondly, as it is guilty and degrading to drown legitimate fear in ghastly festivities; thirdly, as it is impossible to do away with an injury because it is unpleasant to deal with it—the Secondary Affections also must give way before the primary passions. Still, where an injury is not a wrong, and springs from no malignity, the amiable temper rises above natural resentment. Finally, though energy is *per se* morally neutral, yet, as the Love of Power is the expression of a strong and capacious nature, which implies a prompt understanding and a versatile sympathy with men, it is consequently essentially active, and so superior to the passions, which are essentially passive. There are, however, abuses of the love of power, though, when it is duly subordinated, it has a legitimate sphere neither narrow nor ignoble. This may be seen more clearly if it be considered that the love of power is the essence of the Love of Liberty—a resistance of power *that is* in the name of power *that ought to be*. But as the liberal-minded man would rather *teach* his fellow men than *rule* them, the Love of Culture should be placed above the love of power. Since personality is beyond doubt the culminating fact of the world, crowning the universe and transcending it, the impulses which imply personality—viz., the Affections—must be supreme amongst the springs of action. As for the Sentiments of Wonder and Admiration, there seems no reason for assigning to either an authority superior to that of the other, though they may have different places relative to their value to mankind. With regard to the Primary Affections, it is clear that if I am a father I have no right to beggar my children for the sake of a friend; so that attachment is lower than parental affection. As parental affection is limited in time, it must *during its season* be more imperative than Compassion; but Compassion must, on the whole, be granted the higher place owing to its *keenness* and *universal scope*. The highest position is occupied by *Reverence toward goodness*, which, when adequately interpreted, proves to be identical with devotion to God.

A spring of action may be considered from the point of view either of its binding force or of its goodness. He who estimates springs of action from the point of view of their binding force may be said to be of that type of mind known as dry conscientious-

ness, the conclusions of which are governed by the catalogue of the external contents of life. But when two springs conflict, one is not simply right relatively to the other, but the right is also the dictate of perfect mind. To actualize a tendency, not merely because it is right, but rather because it is the expression of a perfect character, adds to the act a fresh glory and a new light—call it poetic, or call it Divine. Those who actualize an impulse because it is the dictate of perfect mind are they who realize the spring of Reverence. If it be objected that I have distributed the sentiment of reverence all along the gradations of worth, and yet retained it as one of the gradations, the reply is that a *feeling*—unlike a localized physical object—may be in two *psychological places* at once. In the incipient stage of ethical life I have assumed no more than the co-presence of two competing impulses with an unnamed feeling or simple consciousness that one is better than the other. Not till these cases and others like them have been repeated do they organize themselves into a *conscience*. Similarly, at first, when choice is made the preference of the better may be properly referred to the love of right or virtue. But this love of right is as yet only a simple feeling. Not until later do we become conscious of it, and so make it a conception which in turn may become the basis for a new feeling—viz., Reverence.

Besides these simple impulses there are various compound ones, whose moral nature depends upon the moral value of their elements. In the consideration of these I admit that it is not possible so plainly to keep on the line of intuition, for, as many of the composite incentives involve general conceptions, our first estimate of these incentives is subject to reflective correction in a way which is not observable with the simpler impulses. Yet there is a quasi-intuitive consciousness attending even the compound springs. Of these, one of the most familiar appears under the names of *Vanity, Love of Praise, Love of Fame* (or *Glory*). This incentive has a great latitude according as it is more or less qualified by social affection. It can scarcely be recognized as the same feeling in the æsthetic fop and the saintly recluse, but it readily discloses its place in its broadest forms. *Generosity*, again, is rather a certain intensity in the primary social affection—Attachment—than a new compound, yet, owing to its indefi-

niteness, it cannot be given an invariable moral value. *Gratitude* is a variety of *generosity*, or rather generosity made definite. The *Love of Justice*, or the *preference for worth*, is a higher figure of the original sense of right, and might be called the *enthusiasm of conscience for its own estimation of character*. Lastly, whoever commits a breach of *Veracity* has spoken against the nature of things and the course of the world. *Veracity*, therefore, wields the authority of *reverence* as well as of social affection. But it is not, as a consequence, *unconditionally* obligatory; for it is binding only toward those who are within the "common understanding." Outside this region plainly lie robbers, madmen, and armed enemies. But the permissible cases of resort to falsehood cannot be determined without careful attention to the canon of consequences. Though I feel an unutterable repugnance to telling a deliberate lie, I should probably act, at one of the crises demanding such, rather as I think than as I feel, without, however, being able to escape the secret wound of a long humiliation.

The moral scale exhibits the duty of the agent at each crisis. It requires to be further observed that the agent, who is aware of the worth of a spring of action, can, to some extent, determine whether it should or should not present itself; but his power depends upon his usually limited command of favoring circumstances and surroundings. An exact definition of Right and Wrong will consequently assume this form: *Every action is RIGHT which, in presence of a lower principle, follows a higher; every action is WRONG which, in presence of a higher principle, follows a lower.*

II. It is necessary at the outset to understand what Mr. Martineau means by a spring of action. A spring of action is firstly a personal phenomenon. Spinoza has remarked that toward a being supposed to be free, affection is far more intense than toward one under necessity. Commenting upon this remark, Mr. Martineau says that "a being supposed to be free" he would designate as a person. In this statement he implies that, as it was merely Spinoza's rigid determinism which caused him to make use of the phrase "supposed to be," free agency is, from the practical point of view, the essence of personality. Consequently a spring of action is a phenomenon of a free agent; in other words,

it is "issued by the mind, and has its dynamic source there." But, secondly, we might be aware of a spring of action without being able to assign to it any moral value. Such a spring would be simply an "inner propulsion from behind" urging the living being forward on a track of which he had no foresight. A living thing is blindly propelled whenever a spring of action, of whatever nature it may be, is present alone in the individual. This solitary spring is a mere spontaneity the nature of which does not require treatment in a work devoted to ethics. As an animal or a lunatic may be actuated by a mere spontaneity, such a spring of action is not necessarily a phenomenon of a free agent. Again, in contrast with the spontaneous state stands the volitional, in which there are always found two or more springs of action. As a volition consists in the choice of one spring of action and the rejection of the others, a spring of action cannot be a volition. While there could be no volition without a spring of action, there can be a spring of action without volition. Finally, any of the following terms may be applied to a single spring of action, namely: "impulse," "tendency," "incentive," "impelling principle," "inner propulsion," or "inner suggestion," in addition to which Mr. Martineau has on several occasions made use of the term "motive."

It is manifest that the above statements contain two very different accounts of a spring of action. While, on the one hand, as a personal phenomenon it must be the expression of a free agent, on the other hand, as a mere spontaneity common to man, with animals it need not be the expression of a free agent. Although these accounts appear to be flatly contradictory of each other, there is a sense in which each is true. It may be true, *e. g.*, that an animal is urged by a mere spontaneity in a direction unknown to itself—*i. e.*, an animal does not act as a free agent acts. It may be true, further, that man, even the mature man, is actuated at times by such a spontaneity. At the same time it is true that not until we have an act as the product of a free agent do we enter the field of ethical discussion. Until a free act is analyzed no content can be found for the fact that we approve or disapprove, nor can it be said that the causality has been "not with the springs of action, to do with us according to their dynamics, but with us to express by their just subordination the symmetry and energy of our will." Consequently, to obliterate the distinction

between a spring of action from the standpoint of a free agent and a spring of action from the standpoint of a mere animal is to make ethics a branch of physiology, and would be false to the "idiopsychological" point of view.

On the other hand, while these seemingly contradictory estimates of a spring of action may both be true, as viewed from the side of the history of the individual or the race, both cannot be correct descriptions of a spring of action for the self-conscious agent; for the spring of action for a self-conscious agent has its dynamic source in the agent's mind or will, and is therefore the free identification of himself with any possibility of an act. Notwithstanding this fact, Mr. Martineau, throughout his presentation of his own ethical views, considers a spring of action for a free agent to be at one time a mere spontaneity and at another time the outcome of free will, and by means of these opposing principles is able to conceal from himself the fact that his theory is not an organic union, but simply a combination of two opposite ethical positions. It will presently be seen that these contradictory accounts of a spring of action may be reconciled if they are taken to be descriptions of aspects of a single spring of action and not descriptions of different springs. But nowhere does Mr. Martineau effect that reconciliation. Afterward it will be pointed out that the dualism which he establishes between the theory of Conscience and the theory of Prudence, and again between Primary and Secondary springs of action, rests upon the conception that the above conflicting views of a spring of action are both ethically sound.

In the introduction to the second volume Mr. Martineau, speaking of the different faculties of man's nature, says that by them he does not mean any separate agents, though he is unavoidably led at times into language of personification, and so attributes to them "conflict," "strife," and "authority." This language, nevertheless, he applies not only to faculties but to springs of action also, as when, for example, he says that "two incompatible impulses appear in our consciousness and contest the field." But this current coin of the ordinary sermon needs to be rung on the counter of a purely ethical discussion. Manifestly, if the language of personification is not in the strictest sense accurate, it should not be used, and, further, if it continues to be used after it

is admitted to be unequal to its place, any confession of its incapacity must come from the lips and not from the heart. Consequently it is not a surprise to find that Mr. Martineau generalizes the figure contained in the terms "contest," "strife," etc., and permits himself to speak of the impulses as "forces," and of the "dynamics" of a spring of action. But it has been already noticed that for him each spring of action has its dynamic source in the mind of the agent. So that underneath this figurative language he is able to speak of will as the source of moral action, and again of the spring of action as the moral source. When he is thus able to transfer the essence of an act from the spring of action, as in indissoluble union with the mind to the spring of action as it is in itself, he can easily ignore the fact that the essence of an act of a free agent consists in the identification of himself with a preconceived end or, in Mr. Martineau's language, with a particular spring of action. As a result, he is led to consider as the act of a moral agent that occurrence in which a single impulse has undisputed right, and with which the agent has no more to do than to watch its progress as an interested spectator. Once more, therefore, it is evident that the above figurative language conceals the radical distinction between a spring of action as the identification of a free agent with a certain tendency and a spring of action as simply that tendency. If a man does not identify himself with a certain course of conduct, no movements made because of his muscular and nervous organization can be called moral acts. Nor are they made moral acts by the supposition that the individual has the capacity to observe their nature and register their effects.

The same oversight on the part of Mr. Martineau is found in a note at the foot of page 156, where he remarks that "the one condition under which felt action may take place without self-appropriation of it by the subject is where it is put forth by a solitary instinct running an unimpeded course." Here may be found two different conceptions of the nature of action depending on the two different conceptions of the nature of a spring of action. If a single impulse or a solitary instinct be called a spring of action, the changes in the individual, which are the result of the operation of the impulse, must be considered as acts, and the subject of the influences must be an agent. But, on the other hand, if the spring of action

receives its real content only when it is appropriated by the agent, then only that can be considered as a true act which includes an effort of will on the part of the agent. If the solitary instinct be a spring of action, we have the startling consequence that the so-called agent has nothing to do with its workings except that it has chosen him as the arena for its gymnastics. It is surely absurd to call that being an agent who has no part in the formation of the act. The difficulty is not met by the assertion that such a state of affairs is found only in the most rudimentary humanity. The trouble lies in the view that the physical or mental changes of these rudimentary human beings, however much or little these changes may be "felt," are acts in the same sense in which that is an act which consists in a free agent's appropriation of a possible course of conduct.

Thus Mr. Martineau, magnifying the fact that both animals and men have instincts, and partially ignoring the fact that for a free agent any act must be the identification of himself with such instinct, is able to transport into his ethical theory a view of a spring of action which could be true only of those beings not strictly entitled to the name of agents. So he states that the natures of men and animals proceed for some distance in company, and again that in man are found certain impulses which are truly instinctive and in no wise distinguished from the instincts of animals. It does not need to be repeated that, though this be granted, such instinctive portion of man's nature must fall outside of the province of ethics, unless we are to deny Mr. Martineau's proposition that the fundamental fact is that we approve and disapprove. We cannot approve a mere instinct in at all the same way as we approve the conduct of a free agent.

Although Mr. Martineau holds that a solitary instinct runs an unimpeded course in only the most rudimentary humanity, he has given what he believes to be fair examples of impulses which, when sole occupants, carry the person unreflectingly and unreluctantly to their end: a child, not above the seductions of the jam closet, finding himself alone in that too trying place, makes hurried inroads upon the sweetmeats within tempting reach; a passionate boy splits his unsuccessful peg-top; the thirsty traveller seizes instinctively and without thought the draught from the spring he has found at last. The first illustration condemns itself, for the words

“trying” and “tempting” can have no meaning except for one to whom are possible two courses of conduct. In the second case, if a boy is passionate he, to speak popularly, usually gives way to his temper, and so is capable of acting from habit. But “habit” is a term without signification from the point of view of a being affected by a solitary instinct. Such a being may frequently go through the same movements, but cannot be said really to act. A giving way to passion has no meaning if it excludes the operation of will. The third case gains some credit from the fact that when a man is thirsty he does not usually need to consider any reason to abstain from drinking. But it is surely likely that if two men found themselves at the spring at the same time, the first to reach the cup would pass it to the other before drinking himself. Yet such an ordinary act of courtesy is not the same with the uninterrupted course of a social instinct. A customary act cannot be intuitive, for it is implied in the meaning of custom that the act was originally done voluntarily and has been repeated voluntarily.

Mr. Martineau, following James Mill, divides an act into (1) the sentiments whence it springs, (2) the muscular movements in which it visibly consists, and (3) the consequences in which it issues. In this connection Mr. Martineau says of an act that the first stir of origination takes place in the agent’s mind. This cannot mean simply that the initial step in action consists in the examination of a number of springs, because it is impossible to reflect on several springs of action without the adoption of any one of them. The first stir of origination must mean the actual adoption of a particular spring. If so, then no doubt such voluntary adoption has a moral quality, even though the act is never realized in the external world. But, on the other hand, if the sentiment whence an act springs be taken to mean simply any single spring of action or solitary instinct, then no process of examination will detect in it a moral quality, as there is nothing in it to show that it need be the expression of a personality. Nevertheless, in the subsequent expansion of his theory, Mr. Martineau makes the sentiment whence an act proceeds, which is here said to originate in the mind of the agent, equal in all respects to a spring of action which may be found full-grown as well in the mere animal as in man.

Let us then understand that there are two ways of looking at

incentives. We may consider an incentive on the one hand from the standpoint of its origin and history, and on the other hand from the point of view of its nature as found in a free agent, for it is plainly one matter to estimate the value of tendencies which are found either in all living things, including plants, or in all animals, or in all or many men, and totally another matter to estimate the value of a tendency as adopted and carried into act by a conscious agent. The difference between these two inquiries is as wide as the difference between biology or sociology and ethics. It is clear that there is no question of responsibility or duty, or right and wrong, or approval and disapproval in the fact that men and plants need food and water, any more than in the fact that material particles are attracted toward one another at a definite rate. The possibility of right and wrong is introduced only when between the movements, which constitute the entrance of the natural tendency, and the subsequent movements there has arisen before the agent a more or less clearly defined ideal into which is fitted the acceptance or the dismissal of the present possibility of an act. And it is only because of this ideal that these subsequent and, in a sense, consequent movements can be treated as component elements in an act. The use of the word "ideal" entails one other distinction. It is necessary to notice that the recognition of the nature of any tendency, as compared with other tendencies systematically united, is not of equal length and breadth with the adoption of that tendency. A creature may or may not exist, I do not know, to whom may come a tendency and in whom may be the capacity to estimate the tendency, without at the same time his being able freely either to accept or reject it. Such a creature would not be a plant or a normal human being. At any rate, ignoring this creature, we may safely say that in the life-size act of a rational being it is possible to distinguish between the intellectual investiture of the ideal and the determined realization of it. Therefore, between the entrance of a tendency and the identification of the agent with his ideal there is distinguishable an intermediate step—namely, the recognition of the tendency's character. It is not to our purpose to insist that the first of these three stages may actually exist independently of the others, or that the first and second may exist independently of the third. It is enough to maintain that the first

does not involve the second any more than it does the third, and that the fundamental problem of ethics is the explanation of that which incorporates all three—namely, the full-formed act of a conscious agent. That is to say, if ethics is to be limited to the investigation of right conduct, a radical separation must be made between a mere tendency, incentive, spontaneity, or spring of action, and an adopted spring of action or motive.

It is one of the decisive merits of Mr. Martineau's theory that he does recognize the difference between mere spontaneity and consciously adopted spontaneity. But, instead of relegating the mere spontaneities to pre-ethical or sub-ethical positions, he gives to them an inordinate prominence. Now it is palpable that what he calls a mere drift of nature, physical, mental, or moral, cannot as such claim valid recognition in a theory which must firstly and all through discuss the significance of conduct. Thus it is that he is unconsciously led to insert into the drift of nature all the characteristics of a complete motive. In the same breath he both makes the distinction between spontaneity and motive and does away with it; and it is this skilful right-about-face which enables him to make so hard and fast a distinction between primary and secondary springs of action.

As Mr. Martineau's view of primary and secondary impulses may be found in the detailed analysis which made the first portion of this article, there need now be given only the briefest summary. The primary springs of action are said to urge a man in the way of unreflecting instinct, the secondary to supervene upon self-knowledge and experience, and to imply a conception of an end gratifying to some recognized feeling. Further, the secondary feelings are characterized by their interested nature and invariable aim to produce *states of ourselves*. The distinction between these two sets of impelling principles is based upon the fact that man is conscious before he is self-conscious.

That the real distinction between primary and secondary impelling principles is not where Mr. Martineau is most inclined to place it may be understood by reference to his discussion of two of these principles—the need of food and the instinct of fear. First of all he describes the state of hunger as bearing in the highest degree the character of subjective appetency and mere drift of nature, and therefore as found in plants as well as ani-

mals.¹ Evidently the occurrence of such a tendency cannot imply a knowledge of its nature. But again he considers this mere drift of nature to be identical with a desire for food. He says that a hungry child should beware of fancying that it *wants* because it *likes*;² and thus he properly distinguishes between the desire to satisfy hunger and the desire for the pleasures of taste. Yet the want or desire to satisfy hunger is here considered to be the mere bodily condition or, in Mr. Martineau's own language, the primary propension with reference to food. But if the mere appetency is equivalent to a desire for food, then of course the occurrence of the appetency implies not only a knowledge of its nature and a knowledge of its having reference to food, but also a knowledge of one's self as distinct from the tendency and a conscious appropriation of that tendency. In that case it is impossible that it should be common to man, animals, and plants. Thus Mr. Martineau, when treating of the primary springs of action, looks upon the incentive of hunger as a mere tendency of man as physical, and when treating of the opposition between primary and secondary springs of action, looks upon it as a full-formed desire; and this desire has been shown to imply a knowledge of the nature of the objects in which the tendency finds its natural fulfilment. He therefore makes the objective aspect of a motive equivalent to a motive in its concrete completeness.

If we turn now to the primary impulse of fear, we shall find it first of all declared by Mr. Martineau that instinctive fear obviously goes before any experimental knowledge of harmful or disagreeable things. Immediately afterward it is declared that this instinct is, in its rudimentary stage, "a truly prophetic premonition of danger not clearly in view." This means that he who fears may not know the exact nature of the danger, but is aware at least that there is danger; so Mr. Martineau maintains³ that fear as a true instinct "arises from some real evil apparently impending." Further, a landsman is said to have this instinct who has the kind of dread of the sea that prevails in some tribes;⁴ so that the instinct is here made to embrace within it a knowledge that the sea is a place of danger. While, again, when in a plague-tainted city panic-stricken men and women herd together to drive

¹ P. 130.² P. 180.³ P. 183.⁴ P. 184.

away terror by drunken carousal and ribald song, not only is the true instinct of fear made in this instance to involve a knowledge of its nature, knowledge of the danger of a plague, and knowledge of the objects to actualize which will affect the removal of the fear, but is also made identical with a desire to effect that removal through carousal and song. Quite generally, therefore, such fear is considered by Mr. Martineau to be identical with a desire for its removal, and a knowledge of the means to effect that removal. Thus the instinct, which is at first said to be in all respects the same in animals and man, is finally placed on the same level with its appropriation by the individual or a desire for self-protection. Once more, then, along with an instinct taken to be a mere spontaneity, propelling the individual along an unknown path, is introduced a knowledge of its nature, a knowledge which can come only from the forewarning of others, or his own experience of its actualization. And once more the blind instinct is said to be at par with an open-eyed desire.

Mr. Martineau has said that his distinction between primary and secondary springs of action rests upon the fact that "man is conscious before he is self-conscious, and has active tendencies in both stages." The question turns upon the significance in the above quotation of the word "man." If it is meant by "man" that which is at one time only potentially existent and then successively an embryo, an infant, a youth, and a mature man, Mr. Martineau is undoubtedly correct. An examination into these different states might result in a history of the most highly organized mammal; a discussion of its physical and mental states would be but a portion of that history, and would comprise the physiology and psychology of the mammal. Further, an interesting object of inquiry would be the connection between these physical and mental states. The result of the examination would be summed up in a classification of the relations between internal and external conditions. As both sets of conditions are continually changing, though changing most markedly at particular times, different tables of relations would need to be drawn up for different periods. There would require to be a table of embryonic principles and tendencies, of the principles of infancy, youth, and manhood. The whole work would be composed of observed facts and deductions from these facts, and would differ funda-

mentally from no other special science. But such a work would have little or nothing to do with the province of ethics, for ethics is based not upon the history of the individual but upon self-consciousness. The foundation stone of ethics is the fact of the self as acting—that is, as freely willing certain ends, or, in a word, the fact of motive. Now, Mr. Martineau confuses between these two very different points of view the psychological and the ethical. At one moment he occupies the point of view of a scientific observer, and is engaged in chronicling what he believes, and probably rightly believes, to be scientific facts—*e. g.*, that man is conscious before he is self-conscious; at another time he is examining into the nature of man as possessed of purpose. While, therefore, the statement that man is conscious before he is self-conscious is in one aspect true, it is not true of man as a self-conscious agent, and so not true from the standpoint of ethics. Consequently the distinction between primary and secondary springs of action is one which falls outside of and not within the sphere of moral science.

But Mr. Martineau has something else to say regarding these two sets of impelling principles. After having made the unqualified statement that the differences between primary and secondary tendencies were based upon the fact that man is conscious before he is self-conscious, he has no hesitation in saying that the primary equally with the secondary impulses have to do with self-consciousness, and that the only real difference between them is a difference merely in the extent of our knowledge or experience in each case. He says: "The self-consciousness which distinguishes the secondary springs of action is limited to the knowledge of what they do to us, of what experience they bring in their train. I am far from saying that it is reserved for them to give us the first idea of a Self. To *this*, I conceive, the Primaries are competent so soon as ever a plurality of them compete for our activity; *then* we cannot but be aware of them as objects, and of ourselves as subjects, of more or less attentive thought; only, what we know about them is their immediate relative intensity and relative worth, and not their future sensible effects, if indulged."¹ In this statement Mr. Martineau has admitted too much and too

¹ P. 156, note.

little, for a knowledge of the intensity and moral value of a spring of action can mean nothing but the conception which the individual has of the results of its actualization. If a man knows he is being driven by the impulse of love, he knows he is being driven toward a beloved object. If he knows he is being driven by the desire for food, he surely knows that food will satisfy his hunger. In fine, if Mr. Martineau admits sufficient experience to distinguish tendencies, he also tacitly admits an experience of their complementary objects. Of course it is true that the individual's conception of the consequences of an act does not coincide wholly with the real consequences, for the actual consequences are infinite. Even after frequently experiencing what a tendency does with him, his knowledge of the consequences is far from complete. Yet he has obtained a clear conception of the leading and pertinent consequences in contrast with the numerous consequences of inferior moment, and it is just that conception which Mr. Martineau incloses within the knowledge of any particular tendency. So his absolute contrast between the two sets of impulses has sunk into a contrast between greater and less experience. It is clear that this difference, although it may be valid, is too slight a basis on which to build two distinct kinds of impulses. Any table of impulses applicable for one time would fail of valid application at another time.

We have quoted one sentence of Mr. Martineau's to which we would like to refer again. In comparing primary with secondary springs of action he said that what we know about primary springs of action is their relative intensity and relative worth, but not their future sensible effects. This comparison implies that it is possible for an agent to know the "intensity" and "worth" of a certain spring of action without knowing also the results of his adoption of it. No allusion is made to a single spontaneity, for, as we have seen, the characteristics of a mere spontaneity is that it carries the living being along a track of which he has no foresight. This limitation Mr. Martineau would himself make, as he affirms that no knowledge of the intensity or moral worth of a spring of action can be gained unless two springs compete for our activity. He has further said that we reach the ethical region not when considering spontaneities, but only when considering volitions. If, then, we are to count as ethically relevant the dis-

cussion of the difference between primary and secondary springs of action, we must plainly treat of them as of motives or volitions, not as of mere tendencies. And, as a matter of fact, Mr. Martineau, throughout his analysis of the moral value of the principles of action, has looked upon them as embodiments of the agent's will. This is manifest from his account of the appetite of hunger and the instinct of fear—two principles whose treatment by Mr. Martineau we selected for examination. Thus a primary spring of action must be the adoption by the agent of a certain natural tendency. Now, there are, says Mr. Martineau, two main features of motive or volition—namely, that it involves the simultaneous presence of two mere impulses, and that it implies an end in view. The first of these, asserting the necessity in volition for a mental combat between two impulses, we shall return to soon. Our question as to the relation between the character of the impulse and the nature of its "future sensible effects" has to do with the second—namely, that volition is essentially purposive.

What is meant by an act being purposive or an agent's having an end in view? This, at least, is involved, that the agent conceives beforehand of consequences which seem to him necessarily to follow from his intended act, and conceives of them as good. The end in view is the attainment of a state of things looked upon as desirable, in contrast with another possible, though less desirable, or even undesirable, state of things. The words of the foregoing statement are chosen because of their generality, as I am anxious that no cross-scent should prevent our keeping before ourselves only one thing at a time. This one thing is that the phrase "an end in view" becomes meaningless if deprived of all reference to conceived consequences of an act. It is doubtless true that the agent may be mistaken in his view of the consequences through a more or less remediable ignorance. It is also true that, since consequences ramify from the initial consequence, as branches of a tree ramify from the stem, and twigs from the branches, he could not be aware of all the consequences of an act. Yet there are consequences which may be called leading or definitive—those, for instance, which move amongst conscious beings, rather than those which affect material things. These essential results of volition come in time to be regarded as really involved in the nature of the mere tendency of the individual. And Mr. Martineau, when

he speaks of actualizing a tendency, though he believes himself to be shutting the doors against all possible results, has unconsciously given welcome to all the results which have any reasonable claim to kinship with the tendency.

Gradually, therefore, Mr. Martineau has been passing, though perhaps not quite consciously, from a rigid and narrow to a fluent and broad estimate of a motive or true spring of action. If springs of action are mere natural tendencies, the language of moral science is alien to them. If the being who is the subject of these tendencies has a knowledge of their nature, he knows also what will be the result if the tendency makes its way across or through its sphere of existence. When the tendencies are said to compete, conflict, or strive with one another, it is meant that the being, who is their arena, is no longer merely conscious of them, but is an agent who decides upon the tendency which he shall adopt. If the agent in acting voluntarily is admittedly striving to attain a preconceived end, then free identification with a tendency coincides with the desire to bring to pass certain results.

All these inferences come naturally from one aspect of Mr. Martineau's theory, and they lead inevitably toward establishing a harmony between intuitional and utilitarian ethics. It would therefore be almost a surprise to the reader, who was not already familiar with the explicit statements contained in the "Types of Ethical Theory," to discover the depth of the dualism made by Mr. Martineau between his theory of morals and the view called by him the theory of prudence. The objects of moral preference are, in his own words, the springs of action within us, and moral preference is opposed to prudential judgment whose objects are the effects of action upon us. In the counsels of prudence are sought not the affection it is good to start from, but the result it is pleasant to tend to. The man's duty consists in his acting from the right affection about which he is never left in doubt; it is his wisdom only that consists in pursuing the right end. The gulf fixed by Mr. Martineau between these two views cannot be better bridged than by showing what is involved in the higher elements of his own theory.

Our attention has hitherto been directed to the fact that volition implies an end in view; but now we turn for a moment to what Mr. Martineau thinks to be the main feature of volition—namely,

that it involves the competition of two hostile impulses. Already the observation has been made that, if the impulses are mere spontaneities, ethics can have nothing to do with them, whether they are disposed to be friends or enemies of each other. Indeed, it must be admitted that there is no cause why impulses should compete rather than enter into partnership. But setting aside the fact that the idea underlying the term "competition" or "strife" is one which fails of application in ethics, we must raise a second objection, just as fatal as the first, to the view that an act is reached only after two tendencies have had a conflict. This objection is that even though the word "conflict" be denuded of its metaphorical dress and be taken to mean only that an act is in some sense a choice, yet the full signification of motive is not gained unless it be remembered that the agent before acting reckons how the contemplated act is to affect his life. Whether the agent decides to adopt or not to adopt a certain tendency, he decides because the adoption of the tendency is or is not in keeping with what he conceives to be for him the best life. No tendency is rejected or received in naked isolation. It is taken up and set into a more or less clearly defined scheme. If it fits well with this scheme, it is welcomed; if it does not fit with the scheme, it is set aside. More is implied in an act than any comparison of alternatives. In every act is to be found a more or less clear conception of what is meant by a good life. Consequently we do not reach the last essential of motive if we describe tendencies as necessarily conflicting. Every tendency has its place lowly or lofty in the agent's scheme.

This criticism, again, is only a turning of Mr. Martineau's artillery upon his own ranks. He, however, gets beyond the competition of impulses by supposing that, when two springs of action strive, there always arises a third—namely, the incentive of reverence. This incentive of reverence is in his hands made to comprehend the form of a graduated scale of impulses or the articulated conception of a complete life. This view contains nearly all that is wanted in any system of moral science, but it is not given its due dignity by Mr. Martineau. If the incentive of reverence were, as he thinks it to be, only another spring of action, the competition of springs would merely assume larger proportions. He asserts that the spring of reverence is unlike any other incentive

in this, that reverence occupies two psychological places, while all others must be satisfied with one place. Reverence has a unique place as the crowning impulse of human nature, while also it appears in the background when any two springs of action "contest the field." The statement that reverence can occupy two psychological places is almost calculated to provoke a smile. If Mr. Martineau would but severely analyze what his ethical breadth has enabled him to admit, he would see that the truth underlying the omnipresence of reverence does away with the view that strife of springs of action is a cardinal point in a theory of moral worth. First of all, tendencies cannot conflict; secondly, if they could conflict, they would not in that way reveal their nature. It is only when impulses are, in Mrs. Browning's fine words, "driven past themselves" and given their place in a conscious purpose or ideal, that their value is disclosed.

Perhaps it may not be quite useless to refer briefly to a view to which Mr. Martineau, in spite of the higher elements of his theory, has lent his sanction—namely, the intuitionist's conception of conscience. So soon, we have already been apprised, as two incompatible impulses appear in our consciousness and contest the field, we are sensible of the fact that one is higher or worthier than the other. This fact is no mediate discovery of ours, of which we can give an account, but a revelation inseparable from the appearance of the impulses side by side. The sensibility of the mind to the gradations of the moral scale is Conscience. Conscience, the Introduction says,¹ does not frame, but simply reveals the law; it is the critical perception of the relative authority of the principles of action.² This authority is none other than a simple feeling, admitting of little analysis or explanation.³

It is perhaps only a verbal criticism that, if authority is a simple "unanalyzable feeling," and conscience is the sensibility of the mind to such feeling, conscience is a feeling of a feeling. Conscience would thus be subjective with a vengeance. But Mr. Martineau does not mean that authority is a mere feeling, but that the sense of authority or conscience is a mere feeling. Now as, according to him, every one has been more or less unfaithful to his ideal, so every one must have a conscience more or less perverted. The result is that every one will have a feeling, more or less

¹ P. 4.² P. 50.³ P. 92.

different from the feelings of others, upon every question of right and wrong. Manifestly no person's simple feeling can be considered as yielding a standard of action for any other person, for in that case every one would have as many standards as there were different feelings. The standards would be as numerous as the individuals, which is absurd. Any other man's conception of right and wrong must be as important to the individual as his own. The only rule would be, in the words of bibulous King Stephano, "Every man shift for all the rest, and let no man take care for himself, for all is but fortune." Not only so, but, as each person is subject to fluctuations in feeling, he would have, though limited to himself, as many standards of action as changes in his sensitive nature; and this is equally absurd.

But in another place¹ Mr. Martineau, not satisfied with calling conscience a mere feeling, gives it a judicial function, which enables it to pronounce upon the moral value of every spring of action, primary or secondary. Yet, even so, the subjective nature of conscience is admitted by him in the explanation² of how it happens that men, though of uniform moral nature, do actually differ in their moral judgments. The explanation of this intuitional anomaly is that different individuals have different natures, and have had different experiences, and so have before them a different section of the scale of inner principles. Further, Mr. Martineau affirms that had we all the same segment of the series under our cognizance, we would be everywhere and always unanimous in our moral estimates. But this assertion means simply that if men were identical in all their inherited tendencies—physical, mental, and moral, and also in all their circumstances—they would decide alike upon moral questions. In other words, if men were all the same, there would be no differences. Yet, inasmuch as there must be wide hereditary differences, and wide differences in circumstances, differences in the verdicts on the question of right and wrong are necessary. In that case it is inevitable that one man may think to be right what another may think to be wrong. The Indian, *e. g.*, held revenge to be a duty. We read in the annals of the ancient Hebrews of the avenger of blood. Green, in his "A Short History of the English People," writes of the social life of the early Englishmen that "Justice had to spring from each man's personal action;

¹ P. 178.² P. 56.

and every freeman was his own avenger." On the confines of civilization there still prevails the custom of lynch-law. If each man's conscience reveals the law, then the Indian, the early Hebrew or Englishman, and the rough-and-ready pioneer must be as transparent mediums for the divine light as the most pious saint or profound moral philosopher. It is palpably beside the mark to urge that the Indian is not as capable of judging as is the cultured European, for that would be giving to the revelation of the man of culture a privilege denied to the revelation of the man of the woods. To make that statement would be the same as saying that the Indian's conscience did not reveal the true law; and this would be contrary to the assumption of the intuitionist that each man judges infallibly concerning right and wrong. The fence is not overleaped by the declaration that the Indian's conscience must be his judge while the white man's conscience must be *his* judge, for that is equivalent to the assertion that no universal moral law is possible. It is the admission of inherent weakness to reply that these men would announce the same law had they been in the same circumstances, for that can mean only that a moral law is the height of absurdity. It is a mere subterfuge to hold, as some moralists have held, that all differences and mistakes must be laid at the door of judgment and not of conscience. That theory saves conscience by cutting off its head. If judgment decides what is right and what is wrong, it must, in deciding, reveal the decision; if conscience is still thought to reveal the decision, it only feebly seconds what has been done by judgment. One may well exclaim with Socrates in the "Euthydemus": "Why, here is iteration." If it be objected that the difference between the savage and the civilized man is only a difference of less and greater experience, then once more conscience is limited in its judicial function to that which has already been judged. And again the duty of judging is in every point twice done, and then done double. The only reply which Mr. Martineau has made to the above is that "no man who feels the authority at all can at the same time believe that it is an egoistic peculiarity."¹ This simply means that no man can believe in a bald and logical intuitionism.

Perhaps another reply is intended in the following statement: "In the incipient stage of the ethical life I have assumed no more

¹ P. 95.

than the co-presence of some two competing impulses, with a simple consciousness of one as better than the other; and not till these cases, repeated with variation of the terms compared, gather together fresh judgments in adequate number, do they organize themselves into a *conscience*, able to reflect upon moral relations as a system under the one idea of obligation or right."¹ If by this is meant that the wider is our moral experience the more complete is the supervision of conscience, conscience must be considered as waiting upon experience. But if Mr. Martineau means that the "simple consciousness" of one spring of action as better than the other is not a verdict of conscience, since conscience is as yet non-existent, then he gets rid of the difficulty by an absolute denial of his theory. If this "simple consciousness" is not conscience, it is possible at one and the same time to know the morally higher and lower, and yet to be without a conscience; and that means that conscience does not reveal the distinction between the more and less worthy spring of action. If it is meant that a free agent is capable, before any experience whatever, of deciding upon the right course of conduct, it is not conceivable, for, as a free agent must, in acting, have an end in view, he must likewise be conscious of the results of his act. This is the solution of the difficulty. The mystery which pervades the intuitional doctrine of conscience is explained away when a knowledge of the more or less worthy incentive is seen to be a knowledge of the better or worse results which accrue upon the actualization of the incentive. And this more excellent way also may be traced in Mr. Martineau's ethical views.

We have been taking a long journey. Yet we are only now at the open door of ethics. Almost wholly unanswered is the question "What is implied in an end in view?" We have said that it implies a knowledge of results. But when the end is gained, is all gained? Or are other acts to be done? What is a true end? What is a systematized ideal? Or, as those of old times would have asked, what is the good? It may be ill-advised in a critic to confess ignorance of anything, yet I ought to confess that to that question I cannot give an answer such as I would like to be able to give. Even an inadequate answer would carry us beyond the limits of this review.

¹ P. 211.

LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY ALFRED G. LANGLEY.
NEW ESSAYS ON THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

BOOK II.—IDEAS.

CHAPTER IV.

Of Solidity.

§ 1. *Philaletes*. You will doubtless agree that the idea of solidity is caused by the resistance we find in a body to the entrance of another body into the place it occupies until it has left it. That which thus hinders the approach of two bodies when they are moved one toward another I call solidity. If any one finds it more to the purpose to call it *impenetrability*, I give my consent. But I believe that the term solidity bears a more positive character. This idea seems most essential and most intimately connected with body, and can be found only in matter.

Theophilus. It is true that we find resistance in touch when another body reluctantly gives place to our own, and it is also true that bodies dislike to occupy the same place. Many, however, doubt whether this repugnance is invincible, and it is well also to consider that the resistance which is found in matter is, moreover, derived in a way and by means of reasons quite different. A body resists another either when it should leave the place which it has already occupied, or when it fails to enter the place where it should enter, because the other tries to enter also, in which case it may happen that, the one not yielding to the other, they stop or mutually repel each other. Resistance is seen in the change of that (body) to which resistance is offered, whether it loses its force, changes its direction, or both happen at once. Now you can say in general that this resistance arises from that repugnance which two bodies have of being in the same place, called impenetrability. Thus when one (body) makes an effort to enter, it at the same time forces the other to attempt to leave or to prevent its entrance. But that kind of incompatibility which makes one or the other, or both together, yield, being once assumed, there are several reasons besides the one named which make one body

resist another which endeavors to compel its departure. They are either in it or in the neighboring bodies. There are two which are in itself; one is passive and constant, the other active and variable. The first is what I call inertia,¹ after Kepler and Descartes, which impels matter to resist motion, and which it is necessary to destroy by force in order to move a body, supposing that there were neither gravity nor adhesion. Thus a body which undertakes to drive forward another, experiences for the time being this resistance. The other cause, which is active and variable, consists in the impetuosity of the body itself, which does not yield without resistance when its own impetuosity carries it into a place. The same reasons reappear in the neighboring bodies when the body which resists is unable to yield without causing the others to yield also. But here comes in a new consideration—viz.: compactness (*fermeté*) or the adhesion of one body to another. This adhesion² makes it impossible to move one body without at the same time moving the other to which it adheres, which causes a kind of *traction* in reference to this other. This adhesion so acts that, even should you put aside inertia and manifest impetuosity, there would be resistance; for if space is conceived as filled with matter perfectly fluid, and if a single hard body were placed within it, this hard body (supposing there were in the fluid neither inertia nor impetuosity) will be moved without finding any resistance; but if space be full of little cubes, the resistance which the hard body would find, should it be moved among the cubes, would come from the fact that the little hard cubes, on account of their hardness or because of the adhesion of their parts one to another, would with difficulty be divided so long as it were necessary to make a circular movement, and to fill up the place of the body moved at the moment it departs. But if two bodies should enter at the same time by the two ends into an open tube from two sides, and should fill it to its capacity, the matter in this tube, be it fluid or anything else, would resist by its impenetrability alone. Thus, in the resistance of which we are here treating, we have to consider impenetrability of bodies, inertia, impetuosity, and adhesion. It is

¹ Gerhardt reads *inertie*; evidently a slip of the pen in the original MS., or a typographical error of the printer.—Tr.

² Erdmann and Jacques add *souvent*, often.—Tr.

true that, in my opinion, this adhesion of bodies arises from a more subtile motion of one body toward another; but, as this is a point which may be disputed, it should not be assumed at first. And for the same reason we should only assume at first an original, essential solidity, which makes the place always equal to the body—*i. e.*, the incompatibility, or, to speak more accurately, the *non-consistence*¹ of bodies in the same place is a perfect impenetrability which receives neither more nor less, since many maintain that *sensible solidity* can arise from a repugnance on the part of bodies to be found in the same place, but which will not prove to be an invincible repugnance. For all the ordinary Peripatetics and many others believe that the same matter can fill more or less space, which phenomenon they call rarefaction or condensation, not in appearance only (as when water is squeezed from a sponge), but rigorously, like the Scholastic conception of the air. I am not of this opinion; but I do not think that I ought at first to assume the opposite opinion, the senses, apart from the reasoning faculty, not sufficing to establish this perfect impenetrability, which I hold to be true in the order of nature, but which is not learned by sensation alone. And some one may claim that the resistance of bodies to compression arises from an effort of the parts to spread themselves when they have not their entire liberty. For the rest the eyes aid greatly in proving these qualities, coming to the assistance of touch. And at bottom solidity, so long as it presents a distinct idea, is conceived by pure reason, although the senses furnish the reasoning faculty with the proof of it contained in nature.

§ 4. *Ph.* We are at least agreed that the *solidity* of a body carries with it the filling of the space it occupies in such a way as absolutely to exclude every other body [if a space can be found in which there was none before], while *hardness* [or the consistence rather, which some call compactness (*fermeté*)], is a strong union of certain portions of matter, which make up masses of a sensible size, so that the whole mass does not easily change its form.

Th. [This consistence, as I have already remarked, is what makes it difficult to move one part of a body without the other,

¹ Leibnitz's word is "l'inconsistence," and, as it is apparently technical, I have decided to transfer it, merely changing the form of the negative *in-* to *non-* to avoid ambiguity of meaning, rather than translate by a paraphrase, which would otherwise be necessary, as there seems to be no single equivalent English word or phrase.—Tr.

so that when one part is pushed, the other, which is not pushed, and which does not fall within the line of tendency, is nevertheless induced to go from that side by a kind of *traction*; and, further, if this last part finds any obstacle which holds or pushes it back, it draws it along, or holds back, also, the first part; and this action is always reciprocal. The same thing sometimes happens in the case of two bodies which do not touch and which do not form a continuous body whose parts are contiguous. However, the one pushed compels the other to go without pushing it, so far as the senses can give us knowledge. Of this the animant,¹ electrical attraction, and that which is sometimes ascribed to the fear of a vacuum, furnish examples.]

Ph. It seems that, in general, hard and soft are names which we give to things solely as related to the particular constitution of our bodies.

Th. [But then many philosophers would not ascribe hardness to their atoms. The notion of *hardness* does not depend upon the senses, and its possibility can be conceived by the reason, although we are further convinced by the senses that it is actually found in nature. I should, however, prefer the word *compactness—fermeté* (if I were allowed to use the word in this sense)—to that of *hardness*, for there is some compactness even in soft bodies. I seek even a more suitable and general term, like *consistence* or *cohesion*. Thus I would oppose hard to soft, solid to fluid, for wax is soft, but, unless melted by heat, it is not fluid and preserves its

¹ See Krauth-Fleming, "Vocab. Philos. Sciences," pp. 28, 29, and 571, edition of 1877. Sheldon & Co., New York, 1883. The *animant* = that which possesses and imparts life. Together with its cognates *animality*, *animalish*, *animalist*, used frequently by Cudworth. See "Intell. Syst.," 514, *Ut sit Animans*, that it be Animant, or endued with Life, Sense, and Understanding." *Ibid.*, 198. "But no Atheist ever acknowledged conscious *animality* to be a first principle in the universe; nor that the whole was governed by any *animalist*, sentient, and understanding nature, presiding over it as the head of it." The term being technical, and, with its cognates, more or less current in the seventeenth century, it seemed best to retain it, defining and illustrating as above. Its meaning is, I think, sufficiently evident. It is to be noticed, however, that Erdmann, in his "Errors Typographicæ," prefixed to his edition, reads *aimant* instead of *animant*. Jacques's text also has *aimant*. The translation would then be: The loadstone or magnet. As I translate on the basis of Gerhardt's text I retain his reading and its translation, with the note explaining the term, although at the present writing the reading of Erdmann and Jacques seems more congruous with the context, and so more likely to be the true one.—Tr.

bounds; and in fluids even there is ordinarily cohesion, as is shown in drops of water and of mercury. I am also of opinion that all bodies have some degree of *cohesion*, as I also believe that there are none which do not have some *fluidity*, and whose cohesion is not capable of being overcome; so that, in my opinion, the atoms of Epicurus, whose hardness is supposed to be invincible, cannot have any more authority than the subtile, perfectly fluid matter of the Cartesians. But this is not the place to justify this opinion or to explain the rationale of cohesion.

Ph. The perfect solidity of bodies seems to be justified by experiment. For example, water incapable of yielding, passed through the pores of a hollow globe of gold, in which it was shut up, when this globe was put under pressure in Florence.

Th. [There is something to be said as to the inference which you have drawn from this experiment, and from what happened in the case of the water. The air as well as the water is a body, which is compressible at least *ad sensum*, and those who would maintain a complete rarefaction and condensation will say that water is already too compressed to yield to our machines, as air very much compressed would resist also a further compression. I admit, however, on the other hand, that if any slight change should be noticed in the volume of the water, it might be ascribed to the air which is enclosed in it. Without entering now into the discussion whether pure water is not itself compressible, as it is found that it is dilatable when it evaporates, I am, nevertheless, decidedly of the opinion of those who believe that bodies are perfectly impenetrable, and that there is, save in appearance, neither condensation nor rarefaction. But this kind of experiment is as little capable of proving this as the tube of Torricelli or the machine of Gherike are sufficient to prove a perfect vacuum.

§ 5. *Ph.* If the body were strictly capable of rarefaction and compression, it might change in volume or extension, but, that not being so, it will be always equal to the same space; and, moreover, its extension will be always distinct from that of space.

Th. [The body might have its own extension, but it does not thereby follow that it will be always determined or equal to the same space. However, although it may be true that in the conception of body something besides space is conceived of, it does not thereby follow that there are two extensions—that of space

and that of body; for it is as when in conceiving several things at once, one conceives something besides the number, viz.: *res numeratas*; and, moreover, there are not two multitudes, the one abstract—*i. e.*, that of number; the other concrete—*i. e.*, that of the things enumerated. Likewise one can say that it is not necessary to think of two extensions—the one abstract, of space, the other concrete, of body, the concrete existing as such only through the abstract. And as bodies pass from one part of space to another—*i. e.*, change order among themselves—things also pass from one part of the order or of a number to the other, when, for example, the first becomes the second and the second the third, etc. In fact, time and space are only kinds of order, and in these orders the vacant place (which in relation to space is called vacuum), if there were any, would show the possibility only of that which is lacking together with its relation to the actual.

Ph. I am nevertheless very glad that you agree with me that matter does not change in volume. But you seem to go too far, Sir, in not recognizing two extensions, and you resemble the Cartesians, who do not distinguish space from matter. Now it seems to me that if a class is found who, not having these distinct ideas (of space and of solidity which fills it), blends them and makes of the two one only, we cannot see how these persons can converse with others. They are in that condition of a blind man with respect to another man who should speak to him of scarlet, whilst this blind man would believe that it resembles the sound of a trumpet.

Th. [But I hold at the same time that the ideas of extension and solidity, like that of scarlet-color, do not consist in a *I know not what*.¹ I distinguish extension and matter, contrary to the

¹ Leibnitz's expression is "un *je ne say quoi*." It seems to be equivalent to an indefinite somewhat which is the ultimate essence of things, and which is the cause of, and by differentiation becomes, the particular. Leibnitz, then, means to say that the ideas of extension and solidity are distinct. Cf. "Leibnitz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding. A Critical Exposition." By John Dewey, Ph. D., Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co., 1888, p. 134. As applied to personal beings, it seems to be equivalent to the "unconscious representations"—*i. e.*, "the dark side of the soul-life," "the proper basis of Individuality." "Genius, disposition, feeling, are the terms by which a later time has designated what Leibnitz calls the *je ne sais quoi*, whereby every one is preformed by Nature to something Particular" ("Ganz wie bei dem blossen Monaden ihre individuelle Beschaffenheit in dem Momente der Schranke, der *materia prima*, lag, ganz so werden hier diese unbewussten Vorstellungen, d. h. wird die dunkle Seite des

view of the Cartesians. Still I do not believe that there are two extensions; and since those who dispute over the difference between extension and solidity are agreed on several truths upon this subject and have some distinct notions, they can find therein the means of extricating themselves from their disagreement; thus the assumed difference upon ideas ought not to serve as a pretext for eternal disputes, although I know that certain Cartesians, otherwise very able, are accustomed to intrench themselves in the ideas which they pretend to have. But if they would avail themselves of the means which I have before given for recognizing ideas true and false, and of which we shall speak also in the sequel, they would retire from a position which is not tenable.

CHAPTER V.

Of Simple Ideas which come by Different Senses.

Ph. The ideas, the perception of which comes to us from more than one sense, are those of Space, or Extension, or Figure, of Motion and Rest.

Th. [The ideas which are said to come from more than one sense, like those of space, figure, motion, rest, are rather from common-sense—*i. e.*, from the mind itself, for they are ideas of pure understanding, but related to externality, and of which the senses make us conscious; they are also capable of definition and demonstration.]

CHAPTER VI.

Of Simple Ideas which come by Reflection.

Ph. The simple ideas which come by reflection are the ideas of the understanding and of the will [for we ourselves are conscious of them in reflecting upon ourselves.]

Th. [It is doubtful if all these ideas are simple, for it is clear, for example, that the idea of the will includes that of the understanding, and the idea of motion contains that of figure.]

Seelenlebens, als der eigentliche Grund der Individualität bestimmt. Genius, Gemüth, Gefühl sind die Worte, mit denen eine spätere Zeit das bezeichnet hat, was *Leibnitz* das *je ne sais quoi* nennt, wodurch Jeder von Natur zu etwas Besonderem präformirt ist." Erdmann, "Grundriss d. Gesch. d. Philos.," 3te. Auflage 2te. Bd. s. 161. Berlin, 1978.) Cf. also Leibnitz, "Nouveaux Essais," Preface, pp. 46 sq. Gerhardt; 197, a, Erdmann; Book II, Ch. I, § 15. Th., sq., and Erdmann's exposition of the same, *op. cit.*, s. 160, 161. Also Prof. Dewey's most excellent work cited above.—Ta.

CHAPTER VII.

Of Ideas which come by Sensation and Reflection.

§ 1. *Ph.* There are some simple ideas which make themselves perceived in the mind by all the avenues of sensation and by reflection also—viz.: pleasure, pain, power, existence, unity.

Th. [It seems that the senses cannot convince us of *the existence* of sensible things without the aid of the reason. Thus I should think that the idea¹ of existence comes from reflection. That of power also and of unity come from the same source, and are of a wholly different nature from the perceptions of pleasure and pain.]

CHAPTER VIII.

Other Considerations upon Simple Ideas.

§ 2. *Ph.* What shall we say of ideas of privative qualities? It seems to me that the ideas of rest, darkness, and cold are as positive as those of motion, light, and heat. However, in proposing these privations as the causes of privative ideas I follow the common view; but in the main it will be difficult to determine whether there is really any idea which arises from a privative cause until it has been determined whether rest any more than motion is a privation.

Th. [I have never believed that you could have reason to doubt the privative nature of rest. It suffices it to deny motion in the body, but it does not suffice for motion to deny rest, and it is necessary to add something more to determine the degree of motion, since it receives materially more or less, while all rest is equal. It is another thing when you speak of the cause of rest, which should be positive in the second matter or mass. I should furthermore regard the idea itself of rest as privative—*i. e.*, that it consists only in negation. It is true that the act of denial is positive.]

§ 9. *Ph.* The qualities of things being the faculties they have of producing in us perception of ideas, it is well to distinguish these qualities. They are primary and secondary. Extension, solidity, figure, number, mobility are the original qualities inseparable from body which I call primary. § 10. But I call second-

¹ French is "la consideration de l'existence."

ary qualities the faculties or powers of bodies to produce certain sensations in us, or certain effects in other bodies, as the fire, for example, produces some effect in the wax when melting it.

Th. [I think you can say that when the power is intelligible, and can be distinctly explained, it should be reckoned among the primary qualities; but when it is only sensed and gives only a confused idea, it should be put among the secondary qualities.]

§ 11. *Ph.* These primary qualities show how bodies act upon one another. Now, bodies act only by impulse, at least so far as we can conceive the process, for it is impossible to understand how bodies can act upon what they do not touch, which is equivalent to imagining that they can act where they are not.

Th. [I am also of the opinion that bodies act only by impulse. However, there is some difficulty in proving what I have just heard; for attraction is not always without contact, and you can touch and draw without any visible impulse, as I have shown above in speaking of hardness. In the case of the atoms of Epicurus, the one part pushed would draw the other with it, and would touch it in putting it in motion without impulse. And in the case of attraction between contiguous things you cannot say that the one which draws with itself acts where it is not. This reason would militate only against attractions from a distance, as would be the case in reference to what are called *vires centripetas*, advanced by some scholars.]

§ 13. *Ph.* Now, certain particles, striking our organs in a certain way, cause in us certain sensations of colors or tastes or other secondary qualities which have the power of producing these sensations. And it is no more difficult to conceive that God can attach such ideas (as that of heat) to motions, with which these have no resemblance, than it is difficult to conceive that he has attached the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of iron which divides our flesh; which motion the pain in no manner resembles.

Th. [It is not necessary to suppose that ideas like those of color or of pain are arbitrary and without relation or natural connection with their causes; it is not the custom of God to act with so little order and reason. I should rather say that there is a kind of resemblance, not complete and, so to speak, *in terminis*, but expressive, or a kind of orderly relation, as an ellipse, and even a parabola or hyperbola resemble in some sense a circle of which

they are a projection upon a plane, since there is a certain exact and natural relation between what is projected and the projection which is made, each point of the one corresponding by a certain relation to each point of the other. This the Cartesians do not sufficiently consider, and for once you have deferred to them more than has been customary with you, and without reason for so doing.]

§ 15. *Ph.* I tell you how it appears to me, and the appearances are that the ideas of the primary qualities of bodies resemble these qualities, but the ideas produced in us by the secondary qualities resemble them in no way.

Th. [I have just shown how there is resemblance or exact relation in respect to the secondary as well as the primary qualities. It is certainly reasonable that the effect correspond to its cause; and how assert the contrary, since you know distinctly neither the sensation of blue (for example) nor the motions which produce it? It is true that pain does not resemble the motion of a pin, but it may very well resemble the motions which this pin causes in our body, and represent these motions in the soul, as I have no doubt it does. It is also on that account that we say that the pain is in our body and not that it is in the pin; but we say that the light is the fire, because there are in the fire motions which are not distinctly sensible apart from it, but whose confusion or conjunction becomes sensible, and is represented to us by the idea of light.

§ 21. *Ph.* But if the relation between the object and the sensation be natural, how can it be, as we notice in fact, that the same water may appear warm to one hand and cold to the other? which shows that the heat is no more in the water than the pain is in the pin.

Th. [That proves all the more that heat is not a quality of sense or power of making itself felt absolutely all at once, but that it is relative to the suitable organs; for a motion proper in the hand may be there mixed and change in appearance. Light, furthermore, does not make itself evident to badly constituted eyes, and when they are themselves filled with a great light, a less is not sensed by them. Even the primary qualities (according to our classification)—for example, unity and number—may not appear as they should; for, as Descartes has already stated, a globe touched by the fingers in a certain way appears double, and mir-

rors or glasses cut in facets multiply the object. It does not then follow that what does not always appear the same is not a quality of the object, and that its image does not resemble it. And as for the heat, when our hand is very warm, the medium heat of the water does not make itself felt, and modifies rather that of the hand, and consequently the water appears to us cold; as the salt water of the Baltic Sea mixed with the water of the Sea of Portugal would lessen its specific saline quality, although the former would be itself salt. Thus, in any case, you can say that the heat belongs to the water of a bath, although it may appear cold to any one, as honey is called absolutely sweet, and silver white, although the one appears bitter, the other yellow to some diseased persons, for the classification is made upon the basis of the most common (conditions); and it remains true, however, that, when the organ and the medium are constituted as they should be, the internal motions and the ideas which represent them to the soul resemble the motions of the object which cause color, heat, pain, etc., or, what is the same thing, the experience by means of a relation sufficiently exact, although this relation does not distinctly appear to us, because we cannot disentangle this multitude of small impressions either in our soul or our body or in what is without.

§ 24. *Ph.* We consider the qualities which the sun has of blanching or melting wax or hardening mud only as simple powers, without thinking of anything in the sun corresponding to this blanching, softness, or hardness; but heat and light are commonly regarded as real qualities of the sun. Properly considered, however, these qualities of light and heat which in me are perceptions are not in the sun in any other manner than the changes produced in the wax when it is blanched or melted.

Th. [Some have pushed this doctrine so far that they have desired to persuade us that if any one could touch the sun he would find there no heat. The imitated sun which makes itself felt in the focus of a mirror or a burning-glass may disabuse us of this notion. But as to the comparison between the power of heating and that of melting, I dare affirm that if the melted or blanched wax had feeling, it would feel something similar to what we feel when the sun warms us, and would say, if it could, that the sun is warm, not because its whiteress resembles the sun—for when

faces are tanned in the sun their brown color should likewise resemble it—but because there are in the wax motions which are related to those in the sun which cause them ; its whiteness may come from another cause, but not the motions which it has had in receiving it (whiteness) from the sun.

CHAPTER IX.

Of Perception.

§ 1. *Ph.* Come we now to the ideas of Reflection in particular. Perception is the first faculty of the soul which is occupied with our ideas. It is also the first and simplest idea which we receive by Reflection. Thought signifies often the mind's working upon its own ideas, when it acts and considers a thing with a certain degree of voluntary attention : but in what we call perception the mind is ordinarily purely passive, not being able to avoid perceiving what it actually perceives.

Th. [You might perhaps add that the animals have perception, and that it is not necessary that they have thought—*i. e.*, that they have reflection or what may be its object. We also have little perceptions in ourselves of which we are not conscious in our present state. It is true that we might very well perceive them in ourselves, and reflect upon them, if we were not hindered by their multitude, which divides our mind, or if they were not effaced, or rather obscured, by greater ones.

§ 4. *Ph.* I admit that when the mind is strongly occupied in contemplating certain objects it does not perceive in any way the impression which certain bodies make upon the organ of hearing, although the impression may be quite strong ; but no perception arises therefrom if the soul takes no cognizance thereof.

Th. [I prefer to distinguish between perception and consciousness.¹ The perception of light and color, for example, of which we are conscious, is composed of a quantity of small perceptions, of which we are not conscious ; and a noise which we perceive, but of which we take no notice, becomes a matter of consciousness by a little addition or increase ; for if what precedes made no impression upon the soul, this little addition would make no more, and

¹ Krauth-Fleming, "Vocab. Philos.," pp. 88, 874, 807.—Tr.

the whole would make none either. I have already touched upon this point (Ch. II¹ of this book, §§ 11, 12, 15, etc.).

§ 8. *Ph.* It is proper to remark here that the ideas which arise from sensation are often altered by the mental judgment of grown persons without their perceiving the fact. The idea of a globe of uniform color represents a flat circle with various light and shade. But, as we are accustomed to distinguish the images of bodies and the changes of the reflections of light according to the figures of their surfaces, we put in the place of what appears to us the cause the image itself, and confuse the judgment with the appearance.

Th. Nothing is truer, and this it is which gives to painting the means of deceiving us by the artifice of a very extended perspective. When bodies have flat surfaces, they can be represented without employing shadows by giving only their contours and by simply making pictures after the fashion of the Chinese, but better proportioned than theirs. The same custom is observed in designing medals, in order that the draughtsman may be less likely to depart from the precise form of the antique. But you could not distinguish exactly by means of the design the interior of a circle from the interior of a spherical surface bounded by this circle without the aid of shadows, the interior of each having neither points distinguished nor distinguishing features, although there is, however, a great difference which ought to be indicated. Des Argues has accordingly given precepts upon the force of tints and shades. When, then, a painting deceives us there is a double error in our judgments; for first we put the cause for the effect, and think we see immediately the cause of the image, in which we resemble a little a dog who barks at a mirror; for, properly speaking, we see only the image, and we are affected only by the rays of light. And since the rays of light require time (however little it be), it is possible for the object to be destroyed in this interval, and for it no longer to exist when the ray reaches the eye, and that which no longer exists cannot be the object present to the sight. In the second place, we further deceive ourselves when we put one cause for another, and think that what comes only from a flat picture is derived from a body, so that in this

¹ This should be Chap. I, I think.—Tr.

case there is in our judgments all at once a metonymy and a metaphor; for even the figures of Rhetoric pass into sophisms when they impose on us. This confusion of the effect with the cause, whether true or false, often enters into our judgments, moreover, from other causes. Thus it is that we feel our bodies, or what touches them, and that we move our arms by means of an immediate physical influence, which we think constitutes the connection of the soul with the body, while in truth we do not feel and do not change in that way what is in us.

Ph. I will at this time propose to you a problem which the learned Mr. Molineux, who employs so profitably his excellent genius in the promotion of the sciences, communicated to the illustrious Mr. Locke. Here it is nearly in his own terms: Suppose a man blind from birth, now grown up, who has learned to distinguish by touch a cube from a globe of the same metal, and almost of the same size, so that when he touches the one or the other he can tell which is the cube and which the globe. Suppose that the cube and the globe being placed upon the table, this blind man comes to enjoy his sight. The question is, if in seeing them without touching them he could distinguish them, and tell which is the cube and which the globe. I pray you, Sir, tell me what is your opinion upon the matter.

Th. I ought to give some time to thought upon this question, which appears to me quite curious: but since you press me for an immediate reply, I would venture to say between ourselves that I think that supposing the blind man knows that these two figures which he sees are those of the cube and the globe, he could distinguish them and say, without touching, This one is the globe, this the cube.

Ph. I fear lest it may be necessary to put you in the crowd of those who have failed to answer Mr. Molineux; for he sent word in the letter which contained this question, that, having proposed it upon the occasion of Mr. Locke's "Essay upon Understanding" to different persons of very penetrating minds, he had found scarcely one among them who at once gave such a reply upon that point as he thinks should be made, although they were convinced of their error after having heard his reasons. The reply of this penetrating and judicious author is negative; for (he adds) while this blind man has learned by experience of some kind the globe

and the cube as they affect his touch, he does not, however, yet know that what affects the touch in such or such manner ought to strike the eyes in such or such manner, nor that the projecting angle of the cube, which presses his hand in an unequal manner, ought to appear to his eyes as it appears in the cube. The author of the essay declares himself at once of the same opinion.

Th. Perhaps Mr. Molineux and the author of the essay are not so far from my opinion as at first appears, and the reasons for their view, contained apparently in the letter of the former, which have been used with success in convincing men of their error have been expressly left out by the second in order to give the reader's mind more exercise. If you wish to weigh my reply, you will find, Sir, that I have placed there a condition which can be considered as comprised in the question—viz.: that the question is not that of distinguishing alone, and that the blind man knows that the two figured bodies, which he should distinguish, are there, and that thus each of the appearances which he sees is that of the cube or the globe. In this case it appears to me indubitable that the blind man who has just ceased to be such can distinguish them by the principles of reason, united with that sense-knowledge with which touch has before furnished him. For I do not speak of that which he will do in fact and immediately, dazzled and confused by the novelty, or from some other cause little accustomed to draw inferences. The basis of my view is that in the globe there are no points distinguished by the side of the globe itself, the whole being even (smooth) and without angles, while in the cube there are eight points distinguished from all the others. If there were not this means of discerning figures, a blind man could not learn the rudiments of geometry by touch. But we see that those born blind are capable of learning geometry, and have indeed always certain rudiments of a natural geometry, and that most often geometry is learned by sight alone, without the use of touch, as indeed could and should be the case with a paralytic or other person to whom touch was almost forbidden. And these two geometries—that of the blind man and that of the paralytic—meet and agree, and indeed recur to the same ideas, although there are no common images. It further becomes evident how necessary it is to distinguish images from exact ideas, which consist in definitions. It would really be very curious and

instructive to make a complete examination of the ideas of a man born blind, to understand the descriptions he makes of figures. For he may happen upon, and he may even understand, optical doctrine, so far as it is dependent upon distinct and mathematical ideas, although he might not attain to the conception of *clair-confus*—i. e., the image of light and colors. This is why a certain one born blind, after having attended lessons in optics, which he appeared fully to understand, replied to some one who asked him what he thought light was, that he thought it was something pleasant like sugar. It would likewise be very important to examine the ideas which a man born deaf and dumb may have of things not figured, whose description we usually have in words, and which he must have in a manner wholly different from though it may be equivalent to ours, as Chinese writing is in fact equivalent to our alphabet, although it may be infinitely different, and might appear to have been invented by a deaf man. I learn, by the favor of a great prince, of one born deaf and dumb in Paris, whose ears have at last attained to the performance of their function, that he has now learned the French language (for it is from the court of France that he was summoned not long since), and that he could say very curious things about the conceptions he had of his former condition and about the change of his ideas when he commenced to exercise the sense of hearing. These persons born deaf and dumb can go farther than you think. There was one in Oldenburg in the time of the last Count who became a good painter, and showed himself very rational in other respects. A very learned man, Breton by nation, told me that at Blainville, about ten leagues from Nantes, belonging to the Duke of Rohan, there was, about 1690, a poor man, who lived in a hut near the castle outside of the town, who was born deaf and dumb, and who carried letters and other things to the town and found the houses, following some signs which the persons accustomed to employ him made him. Finally the poor man became blind also, but did not give up rendering some service and carrying letters into the town to whatever place they indicated to him by touch. He had a board in his hut which, extending from the door to the place where his feet were, informed him by its motion when any one entered his house. Men are very negligent in taking exact knowledge of the modes of thought of such persons. If

he no longer lives, there is probably some one in the vicinity who could still give some information respecting him, and make us understand how they showed him the things he was to do. But to return to what the man born blind, who begins to see, would think of the globe and the cube, seeing them without touching them, I reply that he will distinguish them, as I have just said, if any one informs him that the one or the other of the appearances or perceptions which he will have belongs to the cube or to the globe; but, without this previous instruction, I admit that he will not at first venture to think that the kinds of pictures which they will make of themselves in the depths of his eyes, and which might come from a flat picture upon the table, represent the bodies, until touch convinces him of the fact, or until, by force of reasoning upon the rays of light according to optics, he understands by the lights and shades that there is a something which arrests these rays of light, and that it is exactly what remains for him in touch, which result he will finally reach when he sees this globe and this cube revolve, and change the shadows and the appearances in accordance with the motion, or even when, these two bodies remaining at rest, the light which illumines them changes its place, or his eyes change their position. For these are about the means we have of distinguishing from afar a picture or a perspective, which represents a body, from the body itself.

§ 11. *Ph.* [Let us return to perception in general.] It distinguishes animals from inferior beings.

Th. [I am inclined to the belief that there is some perception and appetite also in the plants, because of the great analogy which exists between plants and animals; and if, as is commonly supposed, there is a vegetable soul, it of necessity has perception. Moreover, I do not allow myself to attribute to mechanism all that is done in the bodies of plants and animals, excepting their first formation. Thus I agree that the motion of the plant which is called sensitive arises from mechanism, and I do not approve of the recourse to the soul when the question is that of explaining the detail of the phenomena of plants and animals].

§ 14. *Ph.* It is true that for myself, indeed, I cannot help believing that even in those kinds of animals which are like the oysters and mussels there is not some feeble perception; for quick sensations would serve only to discommode an animal which is

constrained to live aways in the place where chance has put it, where it is watered with water, cold or warm, pure or salt, according as it comes to it.

Th. [Very well, I also believe that you can say almost as much of plants; but in man's case, his perceptions are accompanied with the power of reflection, which passes to the act when there is any. But when he is reduced to a state where he is as it were in a lethargy and almost without feeling, reflection and consciousness cease, and he does not think of universal truths. But the faculties and the dispositions, innate and acquired, and even the impressions which one receives in this state of confusion, do not cease on that account, and are not effaced, though they are forgotten. They will indeed have their turn one day in contributing to some notable result, for nothing is useless in nature; all confusion must develop itself. The animals themselves, having attained to a condition of stupidity, ought some day to return to perceptions more elevated, and, since simple substances always endure, it is not necessary to judge of eternity by a few years.]

CHAPTER X.

Of Retention.

§§ 1, 2. *Ph.* The other faculty of the mind, by which it advances toward the knowledge of things more than by simple perception, is that which I call Retention, which conserves the knowledge received by the senses or by reflection. Retention works in two ways: in actually conserving the present idea, which I call Contemplation; and in preserving the power to bring them again before the mind, and this is what is called Memory.

Th. [One retains also and contemplates innate knowledge, and very often one cannot distinguish the innate from the acquired. There is also a perception of images—either those which have already existed for some time, or those which are formed anew in us.]

§ 2. *Ph.* But you believe with us that these images or ideas cease to be anything as soon as they are not actually matters of consciousness; and that to say that there are ideas reserved in the memory means at bottom only that the soul has in some instances the power of reviving the perceptions it has already had with a

feeling which at the same time convinces it that it has previously had these kinds of perceptions.

Th. [If ideas were only forms or modes of thoughts, they would cease with them; but you have yourself admitted, Sir, that they are internal objects, and in this way can subsist. And I am astonished that you can always be satisfied with these powers or naked faculties, which you would apparently reject in the Scholastic philosophers. It would be necessary to explain a little more distinctly in what this faculty consists and how it is exercised; and that would make you know that there are dispositions which are the remains of past impressions in the soul as well as in the body, but of which we are conscious only when the memory finds some occasion for them. And if nothing restored past thoughts, as soon as you no longer think of them, it would be impossible to explain how the memory can preserve them; and to recur for this purpose to this naked faculty is to speak nowise intelligibly.]

CHAPTER XI.

Of Discernment or the Faculty of distinguishing Ideas.

§ 1. *Ph.* Upon the faculty of distinguishing ideas depends the evidence and certainty of several propositions which pass for innate truths.

Th. I admit that to think of these innate truths and to unravel them discernment is necessary; but they do not on that account cease to be innate.]

§ 2. *Ph.* Now, vivacity of mind consists in recalling promptly ideas; but judgment in representing them clearly and distinguishing them exactly.

Th. [Perhaps each is vivacity of imagination, and judgment consists in the examination of propositions according to reason.]

Ph. [I am not averse to this distinction of mind and judgment. And sometimes there is judgment in not employing it too much. For example: to examine certain witty thoughts by the severe rules of truth and good reasoning is in a certain sense an insult.]

Th. [This remark is a good one; it is necessary that witty thoughts have at least some apparent foundation in reason, but it is not necessary to examine them minutely with too much scrupulousness, as it is not necessary to look at a picture from a position

too near it. It is in this, it seems to me, that P. Bouhours fails more than once in his "Art de penser dans les ouvrages d'esprit,"¹ as when he despises this sally of Lucan²: *Victrix causa diis placuit, sed victa Catoni.*

§ 4. *Ph.* Another operation of the mind in respect to its ideas is the comparison which it makes of one idea with another as regards extension, degrees, time, place, or some other circumstance; it is upon this that the great number of ideas comprised under the term Relation depends.

Th. [According to my view, Relation is more general than comparison, for relations are either of comparison or of concurrence. The first concern the congruity or incongruity (I take these terms in a less extended sense) which comprises resemblance, equality, inequality, etc. The second comprise some connection, as that of cause and effect, of whole and parts, of position and order, etc.]

§ 6. *Ph.* The composition of simple ideas, for the purpose of making complex ideas, is also an operation of our mind. You can refer to this faculty the extension of ideas by uniting those of the same kind, as in forming a dozen from several units.

Th. [The one is doubtless as much composition as the other; but composition of similar ideas is simpler than that of different ideas.]

§ 7. *Ph.* A dog will nurse young foxes, will play with them, and will have for them the same fondness as for her own puppies, if they can be made to suck her so long as is needful for the milk to spread through their entire body. And it does not appear that animals, who have a large number of young at once, have any knowledge of their number.

Th. [The love of animals arises from a pleasure which is increased by habit. But as for the precise multitude, men even can know the numbers of things only by some skill, as in using numerical names in order to count, or figural arrangements which make them know at once without counting if anything is wanting.]

§ 10. *Ph.* Animals do not form abstract thoughts.

Th. [I agree. They apparently recognize whiteness, and notice

¹ Gerhardt's text. Erdmann has "Manière de bien penser dans les ouvrages d'esprit." Which is the correct title I have no means of ascertaining.—Tr.

² 1 : 126.

it in the chalk or the snow; but this is not yet abstraction, for that demands a consideration of the common (attribute), separated from the particular (case), and consequently there enters into it the knowledge of universal truths, which is not given to the animals. It is well said also that the animals which speak do not use words to express general ideas, and that men deprived of the use of speech and of words do not cease to make use of other general signs. And I am pleased to see that you here and elsewhere so well observe the advantages of human nature.]

§ 11. *Ph.* If animals have some ideas, and are not pure machines, as some maintain, we cannot deny that they have reasons in a certain degree, and, for myself, it appears as evident that they reason as that they feel. But it is only upon particular ideas that they reason according as their senses represent these ideas to them.

Th. [Animals pass from one idea to another by the connection which they sometimes feel; for example, when his master takes a stick, the dog fears a whipping. And in a multitude of instances children with the rest of mankind proceed nowise differently in their passages from thought to thought. One might call that consequence and reasoning in a very broad sense. But I prefer to conform to the received usages in consecrating these terms to man and in limiting them to the knowledge of some reason of the connection of perceptions, which sensations alone cannot give, their effect being only to cause you to attend at another time to this same connection which you have noticed before, although perhaps the reasons are no longer the same, which fact often deceives those who are governed only by the senses.]

§ 13. *Ph.* Idiots lack vivacity, activity, and movement in the intellectual faculties, whence they are deprived of the use of reason. Madmen seem to be at the opposite extreme, for it does not appear to me that these latter have lost the power to reason, but having wrongly united certain ideas, they take them for truths, and deceive themselves in the same way as those who reason justly upon false principles. Thus you will see a madman who thinks he is king maintaining by a just consequence that he should be served, honored, and obeyed according to his rank.

Th. Idiots do not exercise reason, and they differ from some stupid persons who have good judgment, but, not having prompt conception, they are despised and disturbed as he would be who

wished to play ombre with persons of distinction and thought too long and too often of the part he must take. I remember a learned man who, having lost his memory by the use of certain drugs, was reduced to this condition, but his judgment always appeared. A man wholly mad lacks judgment on nearly every occasion ; but the vivacity of his imagination may make him agreeable. But there are particular madmen who make a false supposition at an important point in their lives, and reason justly thereupon, as you have well said. There is such a man, well known at a certain court, who believes himself destined to redress the affairs of the Protestants and to bring France to reason, for which purpose God caused the greatest personages to pass through his body in order to ennoble it ; he desires to marry all the princesses which he sees to be marriageable, but, after having made them holy in order to have a holy progeny who should rule the land, he attributes all the misfortunes of war to the little deference he had for their advice. In speaking with a certain sovereign, he took every necessary measure not to lower his dignity. And when they began to reason with him, he defended himself so well that I have doubted more than once whether his madness is not a feint, for he is not uncomfortable on account of it. However, those who know him more intimately assure me that his madness is wholly genuine.]

THE SPECTRUM-SPREAD OF OUR SENSATIONS.

BY PAYTON SPENCE.

The white light of the sunbeam is apparently simple and homogeneous, although it is, in reality, a compound of many colors. Each color of which it is composed occupies the whole of the beam, and hence no one of them has position in the beam ; and therefore the colors themselves have no relative positions to each other. Each color, occupying the whole of the beam, has a modifying effect upon all the others, and all the others have a modifying effect upon it ; consequently they are all equally modified

giving us, as a result, homogeneous white light, in which no one of its separate colors is recognized or suspected. By means of a prism we decompose the sunbeam, so that the elementary colors which constitute it, and which, in it, have neither positions nor relative positions, are spread apart and given positions and relative positions in the solar spectrum upon the screen. This simple illustration is introduced here, in the outset, not as a proof of anything, but merely as an illustration which, if kept before the mind, will enable the reader to understand more readily than he might otherwise do the nature of those relations of sensations to each other and to external objects, which it is our purpose to try to explain in this article.

Consciousness is non-extended; and as every state of consciousness occupies the whole of consciousness just as every color of the sunbeam occupies the whole of the beam, it has therefore neither position nor extension in consciousness. Now, if a state of consciousness has no position in consciousness, states of consciousness can have no relative positions to each other, for their mere relation to each other cannot give them that which, in their essential nature, they have not—namely, position. Hence, in speaking of states of consciousness, we cannot say that one is to the right or to the left of another, above or below another, or that one is in the centre and another in the circumference. All that we can say of related states of consciousness is that each one occupies the whole of consciousness either simultaneously or in succession with the others. But succession must somehow become converted into, or be interpreted by, simultaneousness, or else it has no meaning to the mind. In simple succession, when one state has come the other has gone; and consciousness holding only one at a time, they are in no way consciously related to each other even as being in succession. For instance, if two states of consciousness arise one after the other, and if the first one has wholly vanished (so that it cannot be recalled or reproduced) before the second one appears, they can have no effect upon each other; they cannot modify each other; they are as nothing to each other, the second simply existing as though the first had not existed, and *vice versa*. But if the second one appears before the first one has entirely vanished, or if the first one is reproduced while the second one endures, then to that extent they are simultaneous, and

overlap, or rather *interpenetrate*, each other; and only by such mutual, simultaneous interpenetration can they at all modify each other, and to that extent be consciously related to each other even as being in succession the one to the other.¹

It is no part of my present purpose, however, to explain how successive states of consciousness are known to us as successive only by being made simultaneous. I simply call attention to the very obvious fact that such is the case; and that, therefore, to that extent, all related states of consciousness are simultaneous so far as related; and, as the relation of states of consciousness is but another name for their mutual, simultaneous *interpenetration*, such interpenetration is seen to be the very *sine qua non* of the connected continuity of all conscious life and of personal identity, the interpreter of that unity of apperception over which the illustrious Kant so writhes and agonizes, and a clew to the labyrinths of memory and the intricacies of the association of ideas.

Now, suppose that two sensations are somehow awakened simultaneously in my consciousness, what must happen to them if we consider them, in their essential nature, as simple states of consciousness, disregarding or abstracting from all the effects of our past experience upon them, and the intrusion (by spontaneous reproduction or otherwise) of foreign elements that would confuse and complicate a result which otherwise might be quite simple? My two sensations, being simultaneous, and each one occupying the whole of consciousness, cannot appear to me as two distinct states; but the two are blended into one, and seem to be a single, simple, homogeneous sensation—as simple and as homogeneous as the white light of the sunbeam. Let this state endure ever so long, it cannot analyze itself or sort out the different elements that compose it. And this must be the case even if the two sensations are ever so different from each other—as, for instance, those of a color and a sound. Of course, what is true of two simultaneous sensations must be equally true of any number. Were there a hundred such, they would be known to consciousness only as an apparently single, homogeneous sensation—the result of the

¹ The conclusion which I here reach—that states of consciousness can only be related to each other by mutually *interpenetrating* each other—I also reached by a somewhat different process of reasoning in my "New Theory of Consciousness." See "Journal of Spec. Phil.," July, 1880.

modification of each one upon all the rest, and all the rest upon each one. So much for mere sensations and merely related sensations. They can do nothing more for us. They can modify each other, but they can never lift us out of the sphere of mere sensation—*feeling*—into that of *perception*.

On the other hand, I look out upon the external world, and what do I *perceive*? Did I perceive nothing but my sensations, nothing but colors, sounds, tastes, smells, feels, I could not be said to *perceive* at all, for I would still only be able to *feel* related, simultaneous sensations; and that very simultaneous relation would, as already shown, fuse them into an apparently single, homogeneous sensation, varying in character according to the variety of the actual and reproduced impressions that are simultaneously made upon me. I have but to open my senses, however, to perceive all around, above, and beneath me this vast spectrum-spread of my sensations, seemingly projected, painted, and panoramaed everywhere upon the whole external world, like the rainbow colors that are spread by the prism upon the screen, which is there expressly to receive and reveal them, and without which they could neither be received nor revealed.

Then, on the one hand, we have consciousness whose sensations—feelings—can have neither positions nor relative positions, and in which, consequently, one color, one feel, one sound cannot be either to the right or to the left of another, above or below another, in front of or behind another, or in the centre of another which occupies the circumference. On the other hand, we have before us that vast panorama called the external world, in which those very sensations—colors, feels, sounds, etc.—seem to occupy the very positions and relative positions which, as we have seen, consciousness alone cannot give them, any more than the sunbeam can unfold itself from a state of unity and homogeneous whiteness and spread its component colors—red, blue, green, etc.—in positions and relative positions upon the screen. In the case of the sunbeam, however, we know that it is a foreign element—the prism—which decomposes its white light, throws its elements apart, and gives them their spectrum-spread upon the screen. But, in the case of a compound though homogeneous sensation, what element is there, or can there be, which can at all be related to it, and so related to it as to decompose it into its elements, throw them

apart, and, projecting them upon the external world as upon a screen, give them that spectrum-spread which they undoubtedly have, whether we can explain it or not? Consciousness *alone* cannot do that. On the contrary, consciousness is the very thing that fuses our sensations into unity and homogeneity, and therefore we cannot expect it to turn upon its own work and undo that which it is its special province and function to do. Consequently, as in the case of the sunbeam, so here, in the case of that unity and homogeneity of our sensations, we must look for something foreign to—outside of consciousness, but, nevertheless, related to it—if we wish to ascertain what it is that undoes the work which it is the function of consciousness to do, and always to do.

It may be thought, however, that I have been hasty and inconsiderate in saying that only something which is foreign to, and outside of, consciousness can give our sensations that spectrum-spread which is so manifest a fact in our every-day experience. The followers of Kant will remind me of that subjective element, space, that *a priori* form which, they say, is wholly in consciousness, and is there for the express purpose of doing what I have said can only be done by something foreign to consciousness. I have not overlooked this claim of Kant's, however, but have carefully considered it, and find myself compelled to reject it as invalid, because I find space utterly incompetent to do the work assigned it, even admitting, which I do not, that it exists *a priori* in the mind.

Space as a subjective form is but a collapsed potentiality until filled with the matter of which it is a mere form. It cannot be realized, even as a form, until actual sensation has entered it and given it meaning. In other words, it is indeterminate until determined by sensation. Now, if, as we have shown, our sensations in their essential nature have neither positions nor relative positions in consciousness, how can they enter a mere collapsed potentiality and expand or determine it into an actuality that shall have both positions and relative positions? and how shall those very positions and relative positions, thus realized in space through sensations which have neither, then reflect themselves back upon those sensations and thus impart to them the very positions and relative positions which they (the sensations) imparted to space without really having them to impart? That would be as though one mirror, without having the image of an apple in it, nevertheless

reflects an apple into a second mirror, and then the second mirror reflects the apple into the first, and now both mirrors have the image of an apple in them. This would be creation, not the realization or determination of form by matter and matter by form. But this point will receive further consideration as we progress.

It may be said, however, that *a priori* space does already, from the very outset, contain positions and relative positions, not merely potentially, but actually; and that these are thrown into or reflected upon our sensations as soon as they arise in consciousness. It is immaterial to me, *at present*, whether this be a correct interpretation of Kant or not; and, inasmuch as there are differences of opinion as to what his *a priori* space really is, I am perfectly willing that the reader shall substitute his own interpretation of Kant on this point for the one which I have given; and, furthermore, if the reader is of the opinion that a *a priori* space is really different from that which any, even the most elastic and pliable, interpretation of Kant can make of it, I am also perfectly willing that he shall substitute his own conception of it for that of Kant. The reader may thus fortify himself with his own interpretation of Kant's *a priori* space; or with his own conception of a *a priori* space, if it differs from that of Kant; or with every and all conceptions and interpretations of it; so that if, in his hour of need, one fails him, he can fall back upon another, simply remembering all the while that what I shall now undertake to show is, that a *a priori* space, even if admitted to contain actual positions and relative positions from the first, is not the element, the mental prism, which does, or can, decompose our compound, homogeneous sensations, and give them that spectrum-spread of which we are seeking an explanation; and that the same will be found to be true of any other kind of *a priori* space that the reader may prefer; and indeed of any other kind of subjective space, and, I will say, objective space also, to which the reader may choose to apply our facts and reasonings.

All the elements which Kant claims for the production of external perception are sense, time, space, and categories. The thing-in-itself is entirely foreign to his machinery,¹ which engen-

¹ This word machinery, or machine, I shall have occasion to use very often, not in derision, however, but because, as a single word, it is more easily handled than the three or four words which it stands for.

ders cognitions only—the cognitions of sense and the cognitions of the understanding—with which mere speculations and conjectural inferences about the thing-in-itself can in no wise co-operate. Such speculations and inferences are neither wheels, nor cogs, nor shafts, nor even grease to the axles. Sensation, as it arises in the mind, no matter what its source may be, whether something internal or something external, brings with it no *knowledge* of that source, and no knowledge even that it has a source. It is freighted with itself only; and it itself, in co-operation with time, space, and categories, is not, and cannot be, converted into anything other than its simple self. Consequently the outcome of the workings of Kant's machinery—that is, the results which it produces—are produced by the mutual relations and interactions of sensation, time, space, and categories, in which the thing-in-itself takes no more part than if it did not exist; consequently those results cannot be, and must not be supposed to be, either tintured, modified, defined, shaped, or determined by anything pertaining to the thing-in-itself, or by any cognition or supposed cognition of the thing-in-itself. Hence, if the machinery alone does not operate, or, if operating, does not produce the results which it should produce and for the very production of which it was invented, then its friends have no right to call to its assistance either the thing-in-itself or the faintest, feeblest shadow of a reflection or epigenesis from the thing-in-itself, for the purpose of modifying those results so as to make them conform to such as are perceived in our every-day experience. To Kant's *machinery*, then, the thing-in-itself is wholly and forever *transcendent*; and any appeal for help, by him, actually or impliedly made to the thing-in-itself, or to any influence, somehow or in any way supposed to be imparted by the thing-in-itself, to either sensation, time, space, or category, while it might be, and undoubtedly would be, an appeal to the right source for help, yet to grant such help to him would be to grant him that which he himself expressly repudiates, and which, if granted, could not be used by his machinery; and which, furthermore, if granted, would be found, as we shall see, fully competent to produce, without his machinery, those very results for which his machinery is supposed to be absolutely necessary and fully competent. Any appeal, then, by Kant, to anything outside of his machinery, is an acknowledgment of its incompe-

tency; and as the only thing outside of his machinery to which he can appeal is the thing-in-itself, we have here, in the outset—at a greater length, perhaps, than was necessary—endeavored to show that such an appeal can in no wise be granted. Nevertheless, while thus emphasizing the fact that Kant is hopelessly and forever cut off from the thing-in-itself, it is our main purpose in this article to show that the thing-in-itself is the foreign element—the prison—which gives our sensations that spectrum-spread which stands so much in need of an explanation.

If we follow Kant himself in his vague and indefinite way of presenting the structure, claims, and workings of his machinery, and if we are satisfied with a merely general, hazy view of it, we are apt to be deluded into the admission that its elements contain the possibility of doing all that the actualities of experience require it to do. For instance, in reference to the matter before us—the spectrum-spread of our sensations—if we merely take a general view of the subject, we are apt to say to ourselves: “Yes, it matters very little whether space is outside or inside of us, provided only that it be really space—that is, provided we grant it just the properties and appearances of this our every-day space with which we are familiar. And that much we can readily grant to *a priori* space; and then, if we project our sensations into such space, it is easy enough to imagine how each sensation assumes, on entering it, a definite form and size, a definite place, and a definite relation to other sensations.” But, by and by, we become surfeited with vagueness and generalities, and suspicious of the conclusions to which they have led us, and, taking the machinery of Kant into our own hands, we subject it to an actual practical test; and, now, we are amazed to find that it is utterly incompetent to do the simplest things that are required of it. In putting it to such a practical test, all that we have to do is to give it all the mechanism that is claimed for it—sense, time, space, categories—and all the materials, sensations, which it can get to work upon, and then see whether it can produce the results that are accredited to it, and that it must produce, or be pronounced a failure. This I shall now do.

I now have before me one of Kant's psychical machines, perfect in all its parts, and all its parts—sense, time, space, categories—duly adjusted to each other. It is entirely new and untried; and,

having had no previous experience, none of the results of experience have been caught up into it or entangled with it, so as to assist or oppose it in its workings, or in any way influence or modify, mar or improve the results which it may produce. It has everything to learn. I lay before it a sheet of white paper on which there are a round blue spot and a round red spot, six inches apart—the blue spot, which is to the right, being one inch in diameter, and the red spot, which is to the left, being two inches in diameter. Now, what will Kant's machinery make out of all that ?

But stop a moment. I now see that I was hasty in giving all those materials, or any part of them, to Kant's machine to be worked up into results or products. Those materials are already products—products of my psychical machinery, working on crude materials—and therefore I must not hand over to Kant's machine the very products which it is its business to produce also. I must simply give it the crude materials themselves, and see if it can work them up into the self-same products. If Kant's machine were a brick-machine, I would not feed it with bricks to see if it can make bricks, for in that case no machinery would be necessary. I would simply feed it with shapeless clay, and if it worked that up into bricks, I would admit that it is a brick-machine, and accomplishes what it was made for. Now, that red spot, with a radius of two inches and a well-defined circumference, with positions and relative positions and with the red spread all over its surface, is already a finished brick—is already a finished product—a perception. The same is true of the blue spot, and of the very paper upon which they are drawn. Therefore I must not hand these products over to Kant's machine, but I must feed it with crude, amorphous, shapeless sensations, and see whether it can work them up into such definite red and blue spots, six inches apart, upon a sheet of white paper. With this justification of what I shall do, I remove the white paper, spots and all, from before the machine where I had thoughtlessly placed them ; and I, moreover, remove everything else from before it, including the things-in-themselves.

Perhaps Kant would say : "Then how is my machine to get its materials, its sensations, if you remove their very source or cause ?" To which I reply : "It is of no consequence to you how it gets

them, particularly as you do not really *know* how it gets them, or whence it gets them. And, if you did know, that knowledge, as you admit, can in no wise, either in whole or in part, be ingrafted upon those sensations so as to produce the faintest, feeblest shadow of a difference in the ultimate products into which they are worked up by your machinery. I have, however, been talking wide of the mark, and not at all to the point; but I have done so for the very purpose of isolating the point, when I do present it, from all subterfuges, shams, and mists that might otherwise obscure it. You yourself *do claim*, if not to *know*, at least to strongly suspect that you know the whence of those sensations—namely, that they are caused by the things-in-themselves; and you yourself *do claim to know*, because you claim to have actually *demonstrated* (by, as you say, the only demonstration which is possible), the existence of the things-in-themselves. But the question now is, not what *you* know, or suspect that you know, about anything, but whether any or all of the *elements* (sense, time, space, and categories) which you have allowed your *machine*, do know or can know anything about the things-in-themselves, or their relations to sensations. And to that question you are compelled to answer with me that they know nothing—absolutely and forever nothing—about them. Then you must admit that it will be just as well if I myself furnish your machine (*grant* your machine), as I shall presently do, all the crude, amorphous, shapeless sensations that the case requires, so that you need give yourself no further worry upon that point; and if this leaves you any other cause of worry (as it undoubtedly will), it is not my fault, but the fault of your machinery, as we shall presently see.”

Then, to begin with, I give (*grant*) Kant's machine, which is before me, a sensation, called blue, of a given intensity. Now, as *a priori* space is, according to Kant, the “necessary” and “invariable” form of our sensations, that blue, the moment it is awakened in consciousness, at once enters space, and, taking on that necessary and invariable form, determines it, and is determined by it. But how are that entrance and that determination effected? The blue, as a sensation, occupying the whole of consciousness, has neither position nor relative positions in it, and, therefore, neither length, breadth, nor thickness. Thus situated and constituted, what position does it, or can it, assume in space?

Where is it in space? Space—the collapsed, unrealized space of our new and untried machine—has as yet neither centre nor circumference; and, therefore, a sensation which is merely in it is really nowhere in it—in no determinate position in it—is neither in the centre nor the circumference, neither on the right hand nor the left, neither up nor down, neither north, south, east, nor west. Space, simply with the blue in it, is just as indeterminate as it was before the blue entered it; and the blue, after entering it, is just as indeterminate—shapeless, formless, positionless—as it was before its entrance; hence they have not determined each other, and therefore space is not yet consciously realized in any of its positions or dimensions. If space is related to the blue, consciousness does not yet know it; or if space is something different from the blue, consciousness is not yet aware of it. So far as the blue is concerned, it might just as well be out of space as to be *thus* in it. The relation, therefore, of the blue to space and of space to the blue is null and void; and we are utterly without any reason for saying that they are related, or even for saying that there is such a thing as space. And were space objective, as I believe it to be, we would be no better situated with regard to it. Then the blue has not got into, and cannot get into, our *a priori* space, but is simply supposable in it, though consciousness is not aware of it; and the blue is in no wise influenced, modified, defined, or determined by its “necessary” and “invariable” form—space—but is still the same crude, shapeless, positionless, non-extended feeling that it was in the beginning when I fed it to Kant’s machine.

It is very obvious that, whether we regard *a priori* space as having either actual or potential positions and relative positions already in it, from the first, the blue cannot enter any one of them rather than another, and cannot fill or occupy any number of them definitely related into a particular form and size, rather than a different number definitely related into a different form and size. There is nothing in the nature of the shapeless, positionless sensation that can determine it to occupy any particular position, or any number of related positions, that shall mould it into any particular form and size rather than another, or into any form and size whatever; nor is there anything in the nature of space itself, even granting it positions and relative positions, that can

determine such matters for the sensation; and hence did we imagine it to determine them, such determination could only be an arbitrary one, wholly without reason, cause, or rule; and therefore the same sensation, similarly situated, could never be determined twice alike—could never have the same form and size which it once had except by accident. But that blue which Kant's machinery is so incompetent to handle, and which, in fact, cannot even be got into his machinery, is the very same sensation which my psychical machinery has somehow spread apart and determined into a round spot one inch in diameter. How this is done it is not necessary for me to say now. It is sufficient for us to know that my psychical machinery—every one's psychical machinery—can work that crude, shapeless feeling into that finished product, while Kant's does not and cannot.

The addition of one or more sensations to the one already given cannot make any difference in the result. If now I give (grant) the machine another sensation, say a red color, its relations to *a priori* space cannot be any different from those of the blue; nor can their relations to each other, which would still leave them positionless and shapeless—make any difference in the result. The red has neither position nor relative positions in consciousness, nor can it acquire them from any conceivable *natural* relation to space. There is no reason, cause, or rule why the red, in entering space, should take on any particular form or size rather than another, or even any form or size whatever; nor is there any reason, cause, or rule why the red should part from the blue and assume any relative position either to the right or to the left of it, above or below it. Yet my psychical machinery, whatever it may be, has done what Kant's cannot do, having placed the red six inches to the right of the blue, given it a definite form, and spread it over a surface two inches in diameter.

It may be said that my psychical machinery, whatever it may be, has different materials to operate upon from those (sensations only) which I have allowed Kant's; and hence the difference in the results. This will be found to be true in a certain sense; but it will also be found that those different materials, while they cause the very great difference in the results obtained, nevertheless cannot possibly be granted to Kant's machine, and are expressly repudiated and rejected by him as something which, not

only cannot be obtained or granted, but, if granted or obtained, cannot possibly be used by his machine. It cannot be said by Kant, without a surrender of his *a priori* space and of the whole question under discussion, that sensations, though wholly subjective and mere shapeless, positionless feelings, yet, as they are caused by the things-in-themselves, must be freighted, branded, marked, or stamped somehow, with something, by the things-in-themselves, which something causes the sensations, when projected into space, to assume each its own special position and its own peculiar form, size, and relation of parts.

Dr. Stirling, in endeavoring to help Kant out of the very difficulty here under discussion, finds himself necessitated to assume for him the very defence which, as above stated, and, as heretofore and hereafter shown, cannot be allowed him, and from which he is forever hopelessly cut off. Dr. Stirling says: "In asserting, too, that all objects of *a posteriori* knowledge must submit themselves to these forms" (time and space), "it does not follow that the special form of each individual object is also to be considered as so due. How it is that a mountain has this shape, and a tree that one, does not depend on space, for example, but on the object-in-itself. That object-in-itself, however, we never can know; we only know that, be its special form what it may, or, in obedience to its own *transcendent* or absolute nature (and transcendent is easily seen to be capable of being allowably replaced there by *transcendental*), let the special form it produces in us be what it may, that special form must still present itself as in subjection to the general laws of space. It is no objection, then, to say, This brick and that stone have each a shape of its own, which shape they cannot receive from space, for the answer is easy. We do not say that the special empirical form is due to space; there is something in the object-in-itself which says the empirical form shall be this only, and not another. Still, the special empirical production must obey the universal conditions of space and become—but only in its own way—spatial" (Text-book to Kant, pp. 45, 46). This defence, which is perhaps the only one that can be made for Kant, is by no means admitted by Dr. Stirling to be valid, but, on the contrary, is rejected by him as insufficient. And I believe that no one but an incorrigible Kantist, determined to hold on to a hopeless case, can ever be quieted while there rests upon his con-

science the responsibility of adjusting that defence to the defenceless and indefensible position occupied by Kant.

What has already been said in the course of this article is a sufficient reply to the above defence of Kant. Kant's objects, whether categorized or uncategorized, are, after all, only bundles of sensations, which, as we have seen, have neither position, form, nor size; and hence his objects can have no "special form," no "empirical form" whatever. But, waiving this consideration for the present, I take it for granted that Kant must either accept Dr. Stirling's defence of him, or let the case go by default. If he accepts it, however, he must admit either (1) that the thing-in-itself *is endowed*, or (2) that it *is not endowed*, with a special position, form, and size—to each of which admissions I shall devote a few words.

1. If Kant admits that the thing-in-itself *is endowed* with position, form, and size, then he must say that it somehow imparts or stamps them upon our sensations, thus blocking the latter out in consciousness as feelings having position, form, and size—extension—and then the explanation of extension would be reduced to the *naïve* explanation of Hamilton—namely, that we just open our eyes and see it—thus giving us extension independently of *a priori* space, and therefore jeopardizing Kant's *a priori* space and with it his whole *a priori* system; and then also extension, in the realistic sense, is actually admitted into consciousness *from without*, and consciousness becomes an extended something. To this point, however, I shall presently return, although I have already said enough, perhaps, to show that this first admission of Kant's lands him in the same quagmire as that from which Hamilton struggled in vain to extricate himself while carrying two kinds of space at the same time—that is, his own objective, realistic space, and the subjective, *a priori* space of Kant. One kind of space, however, is more than the most of us can handle.

2. If Kant admits that the thing-in-itself *is not endowed* with position, form, and size, then he must say that it only awakens, in some mysterious and unknown way, a special position, form, and size for each sensation, just as it awakens the sensation itself in an equally mysterious and unknown way. But to say that the thing-in-itself has neither position, form, nor size would be simply a saying without a shadow of possible proof or pretence of proof;

whereas I show that such position, form, and size are, in every act of perception, actually demonstrated to pertain to the thing-in-itself. And to say that the thing-in-itself does, in some *mysterious* way, give each sensation a special position, form, and size is the same as to say that he himself cannot explain that which, if true, gives us extension independently of *a priori* space, and thus again jeopardizes his *a priori* space, and with it his entire *a priori* system; and which, moreover, if true, most needs an explanation at all risks and hazards; but, as it is not true, the *mystery* is introduced to account for what is not a fact; for, as I have shown, it is not a fact that our sensations have, in reality, any such attributes. But the moment we get form and size—extension—as something outside of consciousness by the first admission, or *from* something outside of consciousness, by the second admission, and hence, in both cases, independently of *a priori* space: or the moment we get sensation with extension stamped upon it by the thing-in-itself, and hence also independently of *a priori* space, our *a priori* space becomes a useless appendage, a mere make-believe, which, instead of being the very condition of the possibility of our sensations, is itself derivable from the very extension which the things-in-themselves have stamped upon those sensations.

Moreover, whether Kant admits that the thing-in-itself *is* or *is not* endowed with position, form, and size, I think that I conclusively show in this article that he ought to admit that it is so endowed. The thing-in-itself, then, really having such attributes, the only way in which we can know them, according to Kant (and many others who are not Kantists), would be by *intuition*, just as we know our sensations. Now, if we know a thing by intuition, we know it *just as it is*—that is, it lies directly and immediately upon consciousness, with nothing interposed between it and consciousness. Hence, if the thing-in-itself is really extended, and if we know its extension by intuition, we know it just as it is, and it—the extension—lies directly and immediately upon consciousness, and consciousness must be an extended something. On the contrary, if we do not know such extension of the thing-in-itself *just as it is*, then we do not know it by intuition, but only know something that is not like it—something, therefore, which is not it—and hence we do not know it at all.

Finally, Kant's situation is rendered still more embarrassing by

the fact that he is, as we have already shown in the outset of this discussion, and as he himself admits, wholly and forever cut off from all the foregoing trafficking with the thing-in-itself, no matter what he may believe or disbelieve, admit or not admit, with regard to its attributes or properties. To Kant, then, every position is untenable, with quicksands and quagmires all around him.

The foregoing facts and inferences of this article, if applied to any kind of subjective space, or even to any kind of objective *space merely*, will show that space alone, whether subjective or objective, cannot be the element, the prism, which gives our sensations that spectrum-spread of our every-day perceptions; and the reason, in brief, is because sensations and mere space can have no natural relation to each other, but only an arbitrarily assumed relation, which is really no relation at all.

I think, therefore, that I have said enough to warrant the conclusion that Kant's *a priori* space is a pillar of sand which the slightest breath levels to the ground, and, with it, the entire *a priori* edifice of transcendental idealism that rests upon it, tumbles into ruins.

It may finally be said in Kant's defence that, while his theory cannot account for that spectrum-spread of our sensations which is so obvious a fact in our every-day experience, and which all theories, therefore, must admit, yet, as no theory can explain it any better than his, they and his are upon a par with each other in that respect; and therefore their relative value must be determined by their relative merits in all other respects. It may be said, for instance, that, if the extension, real or apparent, of our sensations cannot be imparted to them by *a priori* space or anything subjective, then it must be imparted to them by something outside of consciousness, and hence by the things-in-themselves, which must be supposed to have extension to impart, else they could not impart it; but if *a priori* space, even when granted positions and relative positions—extension—cannot possibly be so related or adjusted to sensations as to impart to them such positions and relative positions, how can the things-in-themselves, even granting them also positions and relative positions, impart such to our sensations? To this I make the following reply, which will at the same time contain my own views of external perception so far as they pertain to the matter under discussion.

The question, in brief, is this: Granting that space has positions and relative positions, and granting the same to the thing-in-itself, how can the latter, which is apparently no better equipped for the task than space, nevertheless do what space evidently cannot do—namely, give sensations, positions, and relative positions, real or apparent? Sensation, of course, must ever remain what it really is—namely, shapeless, positionless, non-extended feeling, which, consequently, neither space nor the thing-in-itself can ever really change into a thing of position and extension, form and size. Then, in this respect, space and the thing-in-itself are on a par—both being equally impotent. Neither of them, therefore, can be called upon for the genesis of anything but an *apparent* position, form, and size of our sensations.

We have already shown that *a priori* space cannot account for such apparent extension of our sensations, owing to the fact that there can be no *natural relation* between the two—space and sensations—but only *an arbitrarily assumed relation* for which there can be found, not only no cause or reason, but for which there actually is none; and hence there is no rule which will enable us to say that the relation which is now assumed to exist will ever exist again even under similar circumstances, unless we again arbitrarily assume it to exist. In other words, a given sensation—say a red color—having no natural relation to any part of space more than to another, or to any particular length or breadth of space more than to another, it can occupy a definite position in space and a particular length and breadth in space only by our arbitrarily assuming that it so does, although we not only do not know how or why, but although we do know that there is no how or why about it except our bare assumption that it does. Yet the very failure to give that how and why is a confession of the failure of *a priori* space to explain that which most needs an explanation, and which no other element or elements of Kant's machinery can explain.

On the other hand, as we shall presently show, a natural relation is, in the act of perception, *demonstrated*¹ (not intuited or felt) to exist between a sensation, say a red color, and a certain

¹ I use the term "demonstrated" in its mathematical sense; and in that sense I define *demonstration* to be a process of obtaining, by means of two or more intuitions, knowledge which cannot be obtained by one intuition alone.

part as well as a certain extent—length and breadth—of a thing-in-itself, an object; and, as a result of that demonstrated relation, the red assumes unavoidably the position, length and breadth of those parts of the thing-in-itself to which it is related, and thus determines and makes perceivable such position, length and breadth of the thing-in-itself; and at the same time the red, which is only shapeless, positionless, indeterminate, and non-perceivable feeling, by assuming the position, length and breadth of the thing-in-itself to which it is related, is also thus determined by them, and becomes perceivable with them; and now the two—the sensation and the thing-in-itself—are perceived as a red, extended object.

For instance, I now have a sensation called red—a mere amorphous, shapeless feeling—which, occupying, as it does, the whole of consciousness, has neither position nor relative positions. That it exists as it is I know by intuition. This much I *know* therefore. But, even if it has its source or origin in a thing-in-itself, I do not know it, and it itself—the sensation—can never tell me. And, more than that, it can never cause me to imagine, suspect, or conjecture that it has such a relation, or any relation whatever, to a thing-in-itself. Moreover, if it did cause *that*, such imagination, suspicion, or conjecture could never be so incorporated with the sensation as to cause either the sensation or the thing-in-itself to be perceived in the way that they are perceived in our everyday experience. Such imagined, suspected, or conjectured relation to a thing-in-itself would be as helpless, in that respect, as we have shown the relation of space and sensation to be. It would not be a *known* (either *intuited* or *demonstrated*) relation, but merely a suspected one, no better than an arbitrarily assumed one, which would be as helpless and as useless as we have shown such to be in the case of space.

Now, with my positionless and shapeless red feeling in consciousness, I, with my hand, trace it to *definite relations* (not arbitrarily assumed ones), to something upon which both sight and touch—both the red and the touch—are converged—something to which they are both related at the same time that they are related to each other—*something without which they could not be related to each other in the manner in which they are unless they were also related to it in the manner in which they are.* With my

touch and my feeling of red in this double relation, the demonstration is obvious to me that they are related to something; and also that they are related to a definite part of that something—a part which has a definite size and shape, or, in other words, which is round and two inches in diameter. I thus get by means of two intuitions (as in geometry) what I could not get by means of one alone—namely, *demonstrated knowledge*—demonstrated knowledge of the relation of my red feeling to definite positions of that something, a definite part of that something—object—and hence my red feeling seems round, like the portion of the object to which it is related; two inches in diameter—that is, as large as the extent of that relation; and spread upon the surface of the object to which it is related; and now the red is known to me as something *perceived*, whereas before it was only known to me as something *felt*.

The whole difficulty is centred right at this point of the double relation of the sensations of two or more of the senses to each other, *and to the object*; and, when we see our way clearly out of this difficulty, we have solved the great problem of our perception—our demonstrated knowledge—of the existence and the extension of objects, and, of course, of the positions and the extension—the spectrum-spread—of our sensations. At the risk, therefore, of being somewhat tedious, I beg leave to say a word or two more in further detail, although it is, perhaps, unnecessary. Let us now suppose that our red and our blue sensations are simultaneously in consciousness, and are, as a consequence, blended into one homogeneous sensation. How is consciousness ever to know either the red or the blue, how distinguish them as differing from each other, and how perceive them as separated from each other and as having each a particular position, form, and size? Only through the help of the object and by the aid of another sense—that of touch, for instance, with which I trace the red, not to a relation to the whole surface of the paper, but to a limited part of it, which is round and two inches in diameter; and with which I similarly trace the blue, not to a relation to the whole surface of the paper, but to a limited part of it, which is round and one inch in diameter; and also with which I trace the red to a position, or a part of the paper, which is to the right of, and six inches distant from, that part to which I trace the blue.

So far, then, as our sensations do take on the appearance of extension and position, they owe such appearance, not to space, but to the object—the matter—to whose extension and positions they are related. Consequently, space has been handicapped with more than it can carry, both by those philosophers who regard it as subjective and those who regard it as objective, our ideas of extension and position being primarily derived neither from sensation nor from space, subjective or objective, but from matter; and hence space has extension and positions only because it is the negation of matter.

It is evident, from what has already been said, that the spectrum-spread of our sensations, whether it be real or apparent, is not only fatal to the Transcendental Idealism of Kant, as already shown, but is also equally fatal to all other forms of idealism under whatever name known, as well as to every other attempted or conceivable explanation of what is called the external world, which either denies, or evades, or merely postulates the existence of a real external world, and which, moreover, does not admit and prove that that external world is in fact known to us by a method as valid and as irresistibly convincing as that of intuition, and which, finally, does not admit and prove that that external world is really perceived, and is, together with our sensations, actually combined into an object perceived and known in the manner which I have more fully explained in an article entitled "The Facts about External Perception," in the "Journal of Speculative Philosophy," October, 1885.

In this and in my previous discussion of external perception in the "Journal of Speculative Philosophy" I have not attempted to give more than a skeleton outline of the subject, trusting to the reader to fill up the details. This I have done for the reason that I have had but one single object in view, which I did not wish to mix up or complicate with the discussion of other matters incidentally connected with it, the discussion of which might divert the reader's attention from the single point to which I wished to hold it. That point is this—namely, that the existence of the external object as an extended something outside of consciousness is demonstrated to us, in the mathematical sense of the term, by the simultaneous convergence upon it of the sensations of two or more of the senses, such demonstration making us just as certain of the

existence of the extended object as we would be did we know it by intuition. If I have gained that point, I can well afford to let everything else that I have said go for naught; and if I have failed to gain that point, all that I have written in the attempt must necessarily go for naught. It is for this reason that I have not gone into the details of the genesis of the ideas of extension of space, and of the outward projection of objects. It is for this reason also that, in my illustrations of the demonstration of the extended object, I have endeavored to get along with the convergence of only two sensations upon the object. If, however, the reader thinks that more than two are required, I shall not oppose him at present in his opinion; for the main question which I desire settled now is this: Does *convergence* do the business—does the simultaneous convergence of two or more sensations upon the external object *demonstrate* its *existence* and its *extension*? If this question is settled in the negative, I need say no more upon the subject. If, however, it is decided in the affirmative, it will be time enough then to take up minor questions that may arise in connection with it—such as the question whether the demonstration of the extended object requires the convergence of two, or of three, or of more sensations upon it. Hence, in my law of the object, I did not pretend to determine that matter, but left it open by saying “the convergence of two or more sensations.”

It may seem like an unnecessary reference to a very obvious truth if I remind the reader that we explain the unknown by the known; and that, therefore, correct classification is correct explanation. Now, the question is: How do we know the external, extended object of our perception? My explanation is that we know it by the simultaneous convergence of two or more sensations upon it. Then the further question arises: Since our sensations alone give us no knowledge of the object, but only an intuitive knowledge of themselves, how can we be any better off with two or more such subjective intuitions than with one? Of course, two or more such intuitions are not necessarily any better than one in helping us to a knowledge of the extended object. And did we pry and peer into such intuitions for any other *intuitive* knowledge than that which each one of them gives us, whether it be isolated or in relation to others, we should pry and peer forever in vain. But when I show that, in perception, two or more

sensations are so related to each other and to the external object as to give us, not a new, or a better, or a different *intuition*, but another *method of knowing* the object—namely, a *demonstration*—then I classify our hitherto unknown, unexplained process of perceiving extended objects with a known process called demonstration. So far, then, I have explained the unknown by the known; and if, in classifying the process by which we perceive extended objects with the process of demonstration, I have classified it correctly, then I have correctly explained it.

THE PLATONIC DIALECTIC.

BY MRS. ELLEN M. MITCHELL.

Dialectic, in the higher sense of the word, is the science of true Being, the inquiry into Ideas. The Idea for Plato is the true Universal, the essence of things—that which abides uniform and self-identical amid all finite changes and contradictions. It is apprehended not by the senses, but by reason alone. All that the senses perceive is constantly changing, becoming; no single material thing exists truly, for it depends on another and is self-contradictory; the true is not the sensible, but the intelligible world. "There are two sorts of things," says the *Timæus*—"one that always is and becomes not, and one that always becomes and never is. The former—that, namely, which is always in the same state—is apprehended through reflection, by means of reason; the other, again, which comes to be and ceases to be, but properly never is, is apprehended through opinion by means of perception, and without reason." One is the archetypal Idea, the other is its imperfect copy. We are led to the first when we look for the ultimate end of the second; that which is fair and good in the finite world can only become so through participation in Infinite Beauty and Goodness. This particular rose with its bloom and fragrance is a transitory image of the universal rose that never fades. Everything points to the Idea as the cause of its existence; the Ideal is the only Real.

Hegel distinguishes between the higher form of dialectic employed by Plato and that which he used in common with Socrates and the Sophists. In some of the dialogues dialectic is apparently an art of proceeding against the common notions of men by showing what contradictions they contain, and how inadequate they are as scientific knowledge. Its purpose is to direct men to search for what *is* instead of what *appears*; but its result is negative and destructive. That Plato appreciated the danger involved in this use of dialectic is evident from the advice given in the *Republic*, that citizens should not be initiated into the art before they had completed their thirtieth year. But there is a positive side even to this form of dialectic, which consists in bringing to consciousness the Universal by a classification of the notions analyzed under one general view. Plato frequently seems a little tedious to modern thought in this procedure, because the abstractions at which he arrives are part of our intellectual inheritance. "The dialectic as speculative is the Platonic dialectic proper," says Hegel, as translated by a recent writer; "it does not end with a negative result, but presents the union of antithetic sides which have annulled each other. . . . What Plato seeks in the dialectic is the pure thought of the reason, from which he very carefully discriminates the understanding. One can have thought concerning many things if he has thought at all; but Plato does not mean this sort of thoughts. The true speculative greatness of Plato—that through which he makes an epoch in the history of philosophy, and consequently in the world-history in general—is the more definite comprehension of the Idea; an insight which some centuries later constitutes the fundamental element in the ferment of the world-history and in the new organic form of the human spirit."

Plato's dialectic starts from that of Socrates, but he unites in his thought all the principles of the earlier philosophers, dissolving their contradictions by means of that higher insight into truth contained in his theory of Ideas. He derives from Heraclitus the doctrine that sensuous things are perpetually changing; to the Eleatics he owes the conception of absolute being; from Socrates he learns to seek the universal in the determination of concepts, and comes to the conclusion, as Aristotle says, that this procedure must refer to something different from sense, "for sensible things

being always liable to change, cannot be universally defined." That which exists absolutely and which is alone the object of knowledge he calls Ideas. The sensuous manifold which we perceive is what it is by virtue of participation in Ideas. The visible is but an adumbration of the invisible; sense reflects imperfectly the reality of thought. Ideas are the eternal prototypes of Being; from them all other things are copied. They belong to the spiritual and not to the material world; they are accessible to reason alone, and can neither be seen nor apprehended by sense and understanding. In the *Symposium* Plato defines the Idea of the Beautiful, and shows how one may be guided from the love of its imperfect copies in the world of sense, on and on, with increasing apprehension of the truth, until at last, purified of earthly leaven, he sees what the essence of Beauty is, and beholds its divine Idea, the Infinite Cause of all that is fair and lovely in earth or heaven. "But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty—the divine beauty I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality, and all the colors and vanities of human life—thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty divine and simple, and bringing into being and educating true creations of virtue and not idols only? Do you not see that in that communion only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities; for he has hold not of an image, but of a reality, and bringing forth and educating true virtue to become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man may?"

Ideas are present in the mind of every individual, but few are aware of their existence or know anything of their nature and character. The special function of dialectic is to make us conscious of their presence, and to purify our thinking by directing it toward the true aim of human activity—the spiritual rather than the material. Education is not only useful information, but an illumination and purification of the soul.

In the Second Book of the "Republic" Plato explains the nature of dialectic, and the training that is necessary to draw the soul upward. Arithmetic and geometry prepare the mind for true science by teaching it how to deal with abstractions apart from sensible objects. Yet mathematics is but a dream and an hypothesis, never analyzing its own principles in order to attain true knowl-

edge. Dialectic, and dialectic alone, is the only science which does away with hypothesis in order to establish them, and teaches the eye of the soul, buried in the slough of ignorance, to look upward, using as handmaids in the work of conversion the other sciences. Dialectic may be further defined as the science which explains the essence of each thing, which distinguishes and abstracts the conception of the good, and is ready to disprove all objections, not by appeals to opinion, but to true existence. This is the science without which man apprehends only shadows, and, dreaming and slumbering in this life, reaches its end before he is well awake.

To become conscious that one can not think a sensation without passing beyond it to the Idea which lies at its basis, is a discovery that summons the human intellect to put forth its utmost capacities. To think is to pass from the singular or particular to the Idea or the Universal. Before me lie a rose and a lily, and I apprehend that each is like and unlike the other. But whence comes this apprehension? Can resemblance and difference be seen or touched or perceived by any of the senses? Are they not universal relations which can only be apprehended by the intellect? Are they not laws of thought without which intelligence could not operate? Can we think at all except under the condition of resemblance and difference, of genus and species? Can we know anything of a world that is not constructed in conformity with these Ideas? Are not the laws of thought objective as well as subjective; are they not universal, necessary?

Absolute and universal truth, according to Plato, must address itself to all intellect, and he therefore argues that Ideas are the truest realities, because they are the principles without which there could be neither intelligence nor the object of intelligence. The world of thought is the actual world itself; it alone exists truly, and is capable of being known. It does not lie outside of reality, it is not beyond in heaven or elsewhere, it is here and now, eternal and divine in its nature. To become conscious of its presence we have only to develop our inner capacities, to see with the eye of the mind. "Ideas are to be reached only in and through scientific cognition," says Hegel; "they are immediate intuitions only in so far as they consist of the simple results which scientific cognition arrives at by its processes."

Science, the knowledge of that which is in truth, is, therefore, distinguished from opinion. Plato, in the *Republic*, says that opinion is the middle ground between ignorance and knowledge, and that its content is a mingling of being and nought. The subject-matter of opinion is the world of sensuous objects, the individual which at the same time is and is not, since it only participates in Ideas, and reflects them imperfectly. Can we say of any finite thing that it is absolutely large or small, light or heavy? It is not merely one of these opposites, but also the other; as, for instance, in the "Phædo" Simmias is large in comparison with Socrates, small in comparison with Phædo. But the idea of largeness remains what it is permanently, and is never at the same time identical with smallness. Only the idea can be known; for of that which is constantly changing we may have opinion, but not knowledge. Opinion refers to the material, knowledge to the immaterial. To assume that the two are identical is to become a materialist; to distinguish between them is to acknowledge the existence of Ideas, unchangeable and imperishable.

The nature of knowledge, as opposed to perception and opinion, is considered at length in the "Theætetus." The definition that "knowledge is sensible perception" is first analyzed. This is soon identified with the saying of Protagoras, that "Man is the measure of all things." "Things are to me as they appear to me, and to you as they appear to you." Suppose the same wind blowing in our faces; it is hot or cold, according to your feeling or to mine. Feeling, perception, appearance, are identical with being and knowledge. But if truth is only sensation, and one man's discernment is as good as another's, and every man is his own judge, and everything that he judges is right and true, why should we go for instruction to Protagoras, or know less than he, or refuse to believe the contradictory proposition, that "Every man is *not* the measure of all things?" Would not Protagoras have to contradict himself, and admit the truth of what his opponents advance, if every man perceives and feels correctly? How could there be any difference in the judgments of men about the future? Yet we admit practically that only the wise man knows what is expedient for the future. The farmer is a better judge of the prospective harvest than the man who knows nothing of farming. Protagoras himself is a better judge of the probable effect of a speech

than an indifferent person. Finally, if the objects of sensation are constantly moving and changing, as Protagoras asserts, how is it possible to fix them even for an instant? Is not perception itself annihilated? What can be predicated of that which is in a perpetual flux?

It has been said that Plato interprets Protagoras one-sidedly, but the truth remains that knowledge is something more than sensible perception, or, in Plato's own words, "Knowledge does not consist in impressions of sense, but in reasoning about them; in that only, and not in the mere impression, truth and being can be attained." We cannot apprehend, either through hearing or through sight, that which they have in common. To compare one sensation with another implies a principle which is above sensation. To combine sensations in the unity of self-consciousness is a purely intellectual act. Through what organ of the body would one perceive mathematical and other abstractions, unity and multiplicity, sameness and difference, likeness and unlikeness, and the most universal of all being? We know a thing to be hard or soft by the touch, but the essential being of hardness or softness, their opposition to each other and the nature of the opposition, is slowly learned by reflection and experience.

Knowledge, then, is not perception, and must be sought elsewhere; is it correct opinion? The Greek word for opinion (*δόξα*), like the German *Meinung* and *Vorstellung*, is difficult to translate. It is used in various senses by Plato, and is explained by one commentator as crude conception, feeling, instinctive conviction. But these terms do not exhaust its meaning, as is evident from the following passage: "The Soul when thinking appears to me to be just talking—asking questions of herself and answering them, affirming and denying. And when she has arrived at a decision, either gradually or by a sudden impulse, and has at last agreed, and does not doubt, this is called her opinion." Plato, however, proves that opinion is not knowledge, and the dialogue ends without reaching the definition sought. But the light thrown on the subject, though indirect, is none the less valuable.

The work begun in the *Theætetus* is continued in the *Sophist*, where Plato investigates the ideas of motion and rest, of being and non-being. The Sophist is the imaginary representative of false opinion. But falsehood is that which is not, and therefore

has no existence. If we admit that falsehood exists, we presuppose the conception of non-being; for only that opinion can be named false "which asserts the non-existence of things which are, and the existence of things which are not." The same difficulty occurs if we define the Sophist as the imitator of appearance and not of reality. How can he imitate that which is not? The argument again asserts the existence of non-being, which is positively denied by Parmenides and the Eleatics.

Parmenides affirms that all things are one, that we cannot perceive the many because the many are not, that plurality and change, space and time, are merely illusions of the senses. Plato, on the other hand, seeks to establish the reality of non-being, explaining it as the other of being, both of which belong to all things. Non-being is negation, and is essential to any distinction. It becomes, as it were, positive in relation to that to which it is opposed. The not-large is as real as the large, darkness is as real as light, cold as heat. In relation to itself, light is; in relation to darkness, is not; to know what it is we must know what it is not; negation is as necessary as affirmation. True being contains difference as well as identity, being for others as well as for self. The being of the Eleatics is altogether exclusive; the being of Plato is altogether inclusive.

In opposition to the Eleatics, the Sophists hold fast to non-being, which is the standpoint of sensation, or the many. This view leads to materialism, to the belief of those who, according to Plato, "are dragging down all things from heaven and from the unseen to Earth, and seem determined to grasp in their hands rocks and oaks; of these they lay hold, and are obstinate in maintaining that the things only which can be touched or handled have being or essence, because they define being and body as one; and if any one says that what is not a body exists, they altogether despise him, and will hear of nothing but body." Plato represents their opponents as "cautiously defending themselves from above, out of an unseen world, mightily contending that true essence consists of certain intelligible incorporeal ideas; the bodies which the materialists maintain to be the very truth, they break up into little bits by arguments, and affirm them to be generation not essence." These "friends of ideas," as Plato terms them, that neither motion, nor life, nor soul, nor mind, are pres-

ent with absolute being; that to it belongs neither activity nor passivity. But Plato argues forcibly against this doctrine of an "everlasting fixture in awful unmeaningness," that the Divine Reason could exist nowhere, nor in any one, if it were unmoved, and had neither life, nor soul, nor thought. If we are to participate in being, we must act upon it, or be acted upon by it; if we are to know being, a capacity for becoming known must correspond to our faculty of knowledge. It is as difficult to conceive being as non-being, if the two are held in utter isolation. Non-being is the principle of the other which runs through all things. In spite of Parmenides, who says "Non-being never is, and do thou keep thy thoughts from this way of inquiry," Plato proves that there is "a communion of classes, and that being, and difference or other, traverse all things, and mutually interpenetrate, so that the other partakes of being, and is, by reason of this participation, and yet is not that of which it partakes, but other, and being other than being, is clearly and manifestly not-being. And again being, through partaking of the other, becomes a class other than the remaining classes, and being other than all of them, is not each one of them, and is not all the rest, so that there are thousands and thousands of cases in which being is not as well as is, and all other things, whether regarded individually or collectively, in many respects are, and in many respects are not." The concept of motion, for instance, excludes that of rest, but both participate in being. Each is identical with itself, but the other of the other. So far as concepts are alike, the being denoted by one belongs to the other; so far as they are different, the contrary is the case, and the being of the one is the non-being of the other. The concept, man, for instance, includes all those concepts which distinguish him as an animal, and those also which separate him from other animals, but it excludes an infinite number of concepts which are other and different from man. Thus, in every being there is also a non-being—the difference. He is the master of true dialectic who sees clearly the reciprocal relation of concepts, and knows what classes have and have not communion with one another. But he who is always bringing forward oppositions in argument has got but a little way in the investigation of truth. The attempt at universal separation is the annihilation of reason, for thought consists in the uniting of ideas.

The identity of being and non-being, established in the *Sophist*, constitutes, according to Hegel, the true point of interest in Platonic philosophy. "As for the imagination," he says (in the mentioned translation), "it is well enough to arouse it and animate it with representations of the Beautiful and the Good; but the thinking cognition asks after a definite statement regarding the nature of this Eternal and Divine. And the nature of this Eternal and Divine is, essentially, free determination alone, and the being *determined* does not in any way interfere with its universality—a limitation (for every determination is limitation) which, nevertheless, leaves the Universal in its infinitude free by itself. Freedom exists only in the Return-into-itself; the undistinguished is lifeless; the active, living, concrete Universal is, therefore, that which distinguishes itself within itself, but remains free in this process. This determinateness consists only in this: that the One is self-identical in its other, in the Many, in the Different."

The *Parmenides*, by a more abstract and elaborate dialectic, attains the same result as the *Sophist*. Parmenides is the chief speaker, and his conclusion that the One is not thinkable without the Many, nor the Many without the One, is opposed to the Eleatic doctrine. But Plato may have regarded his theory of Ideas as a development of the Eleatic conception of Beings, and a conciliation of its contradictory elements. In the first part of the discussion, where Parmenides assails the theory, Plato anticipates in the most wonderful way the criticism of after-ages, and touches on the deepest problem of philosophy, the connection between the Ideas in us and the Absolute Idea, between the human and the divine. Concerning the unity of the One and the Many, Socrates says: "I should be surprised to hear that the genera and species had opposite qualities in themselves; but if a person wanted to prove to me that I was many and one, there would be no marvel in that. When he wanted to show that I was many he would say that I have a right and a left side, and a front and a back, and an upper and a lower half, for I cannot deny that I partake of multitude; when, on the other hand, he wants to prove that I am one, he will say that we who are here assembled are seven, and that I am one and partake of the one, and in saying both he speaks truly. . . . If, however, as I was suggesting just now, we were to make an abstraction, I mean of like, unlike, one, many,

rest, motion, and similar ideas, and then to show that these in their abstract form admit of admixture and separation, I should greatly wonder at that." Parmenides admires the noble and divine ardor with which the youthful Socrates pursues philosophy, not holding fast to the sensuous, but to concepts which are seized by thought alone. But he advises Socrates to practise dialectic, and to consider not only what follows from assuming a determination, but what follows from assuming its opposite. This leads to the second and most important part of the dialogue—the dialectical treatment of the One and the Many by Parmenides himself. It is first proved that the One that cannot be Many is not even One, that it is "neither named, nor uttered, nor conceived, nor known," and that the reality of the Many, apart from the One, is also unthinkable. The hypothesis that "The One is not" is equally impossible to thought, and the conclusion is reached that "whether One is or is not, One and the Others in relation to themselves and one another, all of them in every way, are and are not, and appear and appear not." "The One is the Totality—All that *is*—Being and Non-Being—One and Many," to quote the words of Mr. S. H. Emery, in his able exposition of the *Parmenides*, published in the "Journal of Speculative Philosophy."

"The negative series of propositions contains the first negation of a negation," says Professor Jowett. "Two minus signs in arithmetic or algebra make a plus. Two negations destroy each other. This subtle notion is the foundation of the Hegelian logic. The mind must not only admit that determination is negation, but must get through negation into affirmation. . . . That Plato and the most subtle philosopher of the nineteenth century should have lighted upon the same notion is a singular coincidence of ancient and modern thought."

True being must be defined as a unity which includes in itself multiplicity. All things draw their existence from the One and Many, and contain the Finite and Infinite as a part of their nature. The phenomenal world derives its reality from that which shines into it—Ideas. Plato does not deny, but explains actual existence. The plurality of the phenomenon is sustained and comprehended in the unity of the Idea.

In the *Philebus* Plato distinguishes four determinations of

existence—the infinite, or unlimited, the limited, the union of the two, and the cause of the union. To the cause he ascribes reason and wisdom; it is the Divine Providence, everywhere adapting means to ends; the Absolute, comprehending in itself the finite and infinite. “The distinction of the absolute and relative forms the logical groundwork of Plato’s whole system,” says Zeller; “for the Idea exists in and for itself; the phenomenon, and to the fullest extent matter, only in relation to something else.”

But, in bridging the chasm between thought and sense, between Ideas and phenomena, Plato is not always consistent with himself. At one time he describes the outward world as if it were mere subjective appearance; at another he demands that the meanest material existence shall not be left without an Idea. He struggles against this dualism, but does not overcome it wholly. That the essence of things is the same as the divine essence is implied in his speculations, although in the *Timæus*, as Hegel says, “the two appear distinct from each other—God AND the essence of things.”

Plato also expressed the union of the One and the Many by describing the Ideas as numbers. That Ideas are nothing but numbers is a view ascribed to Plato by Aristotle, but not found in the dialogues, and therefore unsubstantiated.

The Platonic Ideas are so related as to form a graduated series and organism, combining, excluding, or participating in one another in all conceivable ways. The lower presuppose the higher, and the highest of all, without presupposition, is the Idea of the Good, which gives to everything whatever worth it possesses. As the sun in the visible world enlightens the eye and reveals things seen, everywhere causing growth and increase, so in the invisible world the Good is the source of truth and of knowledge. It is represented as the goal of human activity, the ultimate end of the world, the source of reality and reason. It is higher than the Idea of Being; everything that is and is knowable has received from God its existence and its ability to be known. Plato clearly asserts in the *Philebus* that the Divine Reason is none other than the Good, and identifies it in the *Timæus* with the Creator and World-builder. But God as a person is not separated in his thought from the Idea of the Good. To attribute

to an Idea the highest active energy and reason is more inconceivable to modern than to ancient thought.

Plato identifies religion with philosophy; God, in an absolute sense, is not distinct from the highest of the Ideas. He recognizes the gods of the popular religion, but places above them One who is all-wise and all-powerful, creating the world because he is good, and ruling it by the supremacy of his reason. From his goodness he deduces his unchangeableness; for that which is perfect can neither be changed by another, nor alter in itself. God is wanting in nothing that is fair and excellent; he is able to do whatever can be done at all; his wisdom is seen in the perfect adaptation of means to ends; he is absolute goodness and justice. To worship God is to seek to be like him, to create in ourselves his image. Philosophy is not mere abstract speculation; it is love and life, the filling of the soul with the true and Infinite. Dialectic, the development of the method by which truth is ascertained, is inseparably united with moral culture. Plato teaches us to open the inward eye and see that which is in reality, turning away the thought and inclination from the sensible to the intelligible world. The discipline of dialectic is moral as well as intellectual; the highest insight that it enables us to attain is the object of religion as well as of philosophy, the Idea of God as Absolute Goodness.

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ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS.

A TRANSLATION OF THE ELEVENTH BOOK, BY THOMAS DAVIDSON.

PREFATORY NOTE.

The eleventh book of the *Metaphysics* forms a treatise by itself, and contains the profoundest doctrines of Aristotle's philosophy—doctrines which have exercised, and are still exercising, an untold influence upon the world. In the following translation, which forms part of a first draft of a complete version of the *Metaphysics*—soon, I hope, to be published—I have sought to make the writer's meaning as clear as I could, without converting my work into a paraphrase. Instead of accompanying it with the commentary, which will necessarily be very extensive, I have added, for the benefit of those not familiar with Aristotle's language, a brief vocabulary, arranged alphabetically, of the more important technical terms occurring in this book. Although, in translating, I have had before me two Latin and two German versions, and several commentaries, including those of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Bonitz, and Schwegler, I am well aware how imperfect my work is, and I shall be thankful to any student of Aristotle who will suggest corrections, or better forms of expression than those I have used.

CHAPTER I.

The subject of theory [or speculative science] is **ESSENCE**. In it are investigated the principles and causes of essences.

The truth is, if the All be regarded as a whole, essence is its first [or highest] part. Also, if we consider the natural order of the categories, essence stands at the head of the list; then comes quality; then quantity. It is true that the other categories, such as qualities and movements, are not in any absolute sense at all, and the same is true of [negatives, such as] not-white or not-straight. Nevertheless, we use such expressions as: "Not-white is."

Moreover, no one of the other categories is separable [or independent]. This is attested by the procedure of the older philosophers; for it was the principles, elements, and causes of essence that were the object of their investigations. The thinkers of the present day, to be sure, are rather inclined to consider universals as essences. For genera are universals, and these they hold to be principles and essences, mainly because their mode of investigation is a logical one. The older philosophers, on the other hand, considered particular things to be essences—*e. g.*, fire and earth, not body in general.

There are three essences. Two of these are sensible, one being eternal and the other transient. The latter is obvious to all, in the forms of plants and animals; with regard to the former, there is room for discussion, as to whether its elements are one or many. The third, differing from the other two, is immutable and is maintained by certain persons to be separable. Some make two divisions of it, whereas others class together, as of one nature, ideas and mathematical entities, and others, again, admit only the latter. The first two essences belong to physical science, for they are subject to change; the last belongs to another science, if there is no principle common to all.

CHAPTER II.

Sensible essence is mutable [or changeable]. If, then, change is between opposites or intermediates, though not between all opposites indiscriminately (for sound is not-white), but between contraries [in the same genus], there must be an underlying

something that changes into contrariety, for the contraries themselves do not change. Further, this underlying something persists in the change, whereas the opposite does not persist. Besides the opposites, therefore, there is a third something—matter.

If, as we have maintained, there are four sorts of changes—in quiddity, quality, quantity, and locality—and if change in quiddity is simple birth and decay; change in quality, mutation; change in quantity, growth, and decay, and change in locality, locomotion, changes will take place into the respective opposites. But if any such change is to take place, the matter must be capable of assuming the opposite attributes.

Since being is twofold, every change is a change from potential being to actual being—*e. g.*, from potential white to actual white, and the same is true of growth and decay. Hence, not only may the accidental spring from non-being, but [from another point of view] all generation is from being—potential being, however, and not actual being. And this [potential being] is the One of Anaxagoras (better than his “all things together”) and the “mixture” of Empedocles and Anaximander. And, as Democritus says, “all things were together in their dynamic, but not in their actual state.” Hence these philosophers had risen to a conception of matter. Everything that changes has matter, though all things not have the same matter. The same is true of those eternal things which, though ungenerated, have locomotion; nevertheless, their matter is not generated, but is conditioned by whence and whether.

One might be in doubt about what sort of non-being it is from which generation takes place; for the phrase “non-being” may be used in three senses. When we say that a thing is potentially, we do not mean that each potentiality is all potentiality. Nor is it proper to say “All things were together.” For things differ in their matter; for how otherwise should they have become boundless in number, and not one? For the Intelligence is one, and if the matter were also one, the result would have been in actuality what the matter was potentially. Three, then, are the causes and three the principles; two of them form opposition—namely, the idea or form and the privation; and the third is matter.

CHAPTER III.

We must next show that neither form nor matter (I mean the primal ones) is generated. All change is of something, by something, to something. That by which change is effected is the Prime Mover; that which is changed is matter; that into which it is changed is form. For we should have to go on to infinity, if not only the bronze became round, but the round or the bronze also became, or were generated. We must certainly stop somewhere.

Next, we must show that every essence is generated by an agency bearing the same appellation as itself. For example, natural essences are due to nature [artificial essences to art], and so on. For essences are due either to art or nature, or else to chance and spontaneity. Art is principle in another; nature is principle in itself. For man begets men. The other causes are privations of these.

There are three essences—(1) matter, which is a *this* [is individualized] by appearing; for the things which exist by mere contact and not by concretion are matter and substance; (2) nature, which is also a *this*, into which things pass, and a sort of having; (3) the result of those, the individual essence, as Callias or Socrates. In the case of some things there is no *this*, or individual, besides the composite essence; for example, there is no form for a house except that due to art. Nor is there any generation or decay in the case of these, but the matterless house, and health, and everything due to art have another mode of being and not-being [than that of things due to nature]. Hence, if there be [any separate forms], they are forms of things due to nature. For this reason, Plato was not far wrong, when he maintained that forms are as numerous as natural products, since indeed it is clear that there are different forms for these things, such as fire, flesh, head. For all these are matter, and the last is the matter of that which is in the highest degree essence. Moving causes, therefore, are like pre-existent entities, whereas the others are like the idea (*λόγος*), which implies no temporal priority. For example, when a man is in health, then health exists, and the form of the brazen sphere coexists with [but does not precede] the sphere itself.

Whether forms survive [their conjunction with matter] is some-

hing demanding consideration. In the case of certain forms there is nothing to prevent this. An example may be the soul—not the whole of it, but the Intellect; for it is impossible that the whole should survive. From this it follows that there is no need for ideas. For man generates man, the individual the particular. The same thing is true in the case of the arts; for example, the physician's art is the rationale or form of health.

CHAPTER IV.

In one respect different things have different causes and principles, and in another respect, if we are speaking universally and analogically, all things have the same. It would be a proper subject for inquiry whether essences and relations have the same principles and elements, and so in the case of the other categories. But it would be strange if all had the same; for then essences and relations would have the same elements. If this were the case, what could that common element be? For, besides essence and the other categories, there is nothing that is common; and an element is prior to that of which it is an element. But, again, neither is essence an element of relation, nor relation of essence. How, then, is it possible that all things should have the same elements, since it is impossible that any element should be identical with that which is composed of elements—*e. g.*, B or A with BA. Nor can any intelligible entity be an element, such as One or Being. For these belong to individual things, even to such as are composite. None of them, therefore, can be either an essence or a relation, and this would be necessary [if they were elements]. It follows that all things have not the same elements. Or, as we have said, they have in one sense the same elements, and in another sense they have not. For example, in the case of sensible bodies, warmth is, in a sense, a form, and, in another way, the privation of it is cold, while the matter is that which in itself was potentially both these, and essences are these, as well as the things composed of these as principles, and whatever out of warm and cold becomes one—*e. g.*, flesh or bone. For that which arises from these must necessarily be something different from these. Of these things, then, such are the elements and principles: some of them have one set, some another; we cannot say absolutely that all things

have the same principles, but only by analogy; and in this way we come to say that there are three principles—form, privation, matter. But each of these is different in the different genera—*e. g.*, in color we have white, black, surface; light, darkness, air; and from these arise day and night. But, since not only indwelling things are causes, but also external things—*e. g.*, that which imparts motion—it is evident that there is a difference between principle and element, although both are causes. And this gives the division of principles [into internal and external]. That which plays the part of inducing motion or rest is a principle and essence. Hence elements, according to analogy, are three, while causes and principles are four. Different causes are in different things, and the first cause, the source of motion, is different for different things. Health, disease, body are three of the principles; the active principle is medical science. Form, the special disorder, bricks; the moving principle is architecture. But since in physical men the moving principle is man, but in ideal men [or men in the abstract], the form or the opposite, in a certain sense there will be three causes, whereas in the particular case we have four. For in a certain sense, medical science is health, and architecture the form of the house, and man generates man; but, further, over and above these is the prime mover of all.

CHAPTER V.

If we adopt the criterion of separateness and inseparateness, separable things will be essences. For this reason they are the causes of all things, that without essences there would be neither affections nor movements. From this point of view our essences will be soul and body, or intellect, appetite, and body.

From another point of view still, and speaking analogically, [all] principles are the same—*viz.*, act and potency. But even these are different for different things, and exist in different ways. In some things, indeed, the same thing is at one time in act, in another in potency, as wine, flesh, man. But even these fall under the causes named. For the form, if it is separable, is in act, and so is the compound of form and matter (privation is like darkness or sickness), whereas the matter is in potency; for this is what has the power to become both. The difference between act

and potency is different in the case of things whose matter is not the same, from what it is in the case of things whose form is not the same but another; for example, the material cause of man is the elements, fire and earth, whereas his form is his particular [character], and that [yet unnamed] exterior cause—namely, his father—and, besides this, the sun and the ecliptic, all of which are neither matter, nor form, nor privation, nor similar, but motors.

Again, we must see that some things must be called universal, others not. Thus, the first principles of all things are (1) the first actual *this*, and (2) something else which exists in potency. The former is not universal. For the particular is the principle of particulars. Man in general, to be sure, is the principle of man; but the truth is, there is no man in general. Peleus is the principle of Achilles, your father is your principle, this particular B is a principle of this BA. At the same time B in general is a principle of BA in general. From this point of view the elements of essences are forms. But, as has been said, different things have different causes and elements, [I mean] things not in the same genus—as colors, sounds, essences, qualities—unless, indeed, we are speaking analogically. And even for things in the same species, there are different causes and elements, different, not, indeed, in species, but because of their individuality—*e. g.*, your matter and moving cause and form are different from mine, although in their general concepts they are the same. If we inquire what are the principles or elements of essences and relations and qualities, whether they be the same or different, it is obvious that, if we consider the different significations in which the terms are used, they are the same for all; but, if we distinguish the significations, they are not the same but different, and only in a certain sense the same for all. By “in a certain sense the same,” I mean by analogy: matter, form, privation, motor, and, in a certain sense, even the causes of essences are the causes of all things, since all things would be annihilated if they were annihilated. Moreover, that which is first is in complete actuality. In another sense the opposites are other firsts, which are neither predicated as genera nor used in different significations, and the same thing is true of matters.

Such, then, are the principles of sensible things, their number and the manner of their identities and their differences.

CHAPTER VI.

Since there are, as we have seen, three essences—two physical and one immovable—we must now speak of the last, and show that there must exist some eternal substance that is immovable. Essences are the first among existences, and if they are all perishable, all things are perishable. But it is impossible that motion should either be generated or destroyed, for it was always. And the same is true of time, since it is impossible that there should be any fore or after without time. Nay, more: motion is continuous in the same way as time; for time is either the same thing as motion, or an affection of it [something to which motion is subject]. But no motion is continuous save the local, and of it the circular. If, however, there be something endowed with power of imparting movement or creative activity, but if it be not in act, then there is no movement. For it is possible for that which has potence not to be in act. It would therefore be of no avail, even if we assume eternal essences, like the ideas which certain philosophers have assumed, unless they contained some principle capable of inducing change. Nay, even this would not be sufficient, nor would any essence alongside the ideas; for, unless the essence were in actual energy, there would be no motion. Yet more, even if it were in actual energy, the result would not follow, if the essence of it were potence; that is, there would be no eternal motion. For that which exists only in potence may conceivably not be. It follows from all this that there must be a principle such that its [very] essence is activity. Such essences, moreover, must be without matter. For, if there is anything at all eternal, these must be so. They must, therefore, be actual.

But here there arises a difficulty. It is generally assumed that, while all the actual is potential, not all the potential is actual; from which it would follow that potence was prior to act. But if this were true, there would be no real existence; for it is possible for a thing to be in potence, and not yet to be. To be sure, if we follow the theologians, who tell us that everything was produced from Night, or the physical philosophers, who tell us that all things were [originally] together [undistinguished], we shall run into the same impossibility. For how shall the movement [from potence to act] begin, unless there be some cause in act.

For the matter of a house does not move itself, but has to wait for the architect's art, and the same is true of the menses, and the earth, which have to wait, respectively, for semen and seeds. Certain philosophers, therefore, assume an everlasting activity—*e. g.*, Leucippus and Plato, maintaining that there is always motion. But why motion exists, what motion it is, how it takes place in each particular instance, and what is its cause, they do not inform us. The truth is that there is no such thing as motion by chance. Every motion must have something behind it; in other words, as we see, some things are moved in a particular way by nature, others in another way by force, by intellect, or by something else.

Then there comes up the question: What is the primal motion? a question of the utmost moment. Even in the case of Plato, it is impossible to tell, in some instances, which principle he considers the self-mover to be; for, as he says, the soul is both subsequent to, and coeval with, the heavens.

The view which places potency before act is in one sense correct, in another incorrect; how this is, has been explained above. But that act is prior, is maintained by Anaxagoras (for his *Nous* is in act); by Empedocles, with his love and hate; and by those who, like Leucippus, assume the eternity of motion. It follows from this that we must reject the notion of a Chaos or Night, existing through indefinite time, and maintain that the present things always existed, either in a state of revolution or in some other way, if it be true that act precedes potency. But, if the same thing is always in a state of revolution, there must be something always abiding which similarly exerts the action of revolution. In like manner, if there is any such thing as production and decay, there must be something which exerts the different actions manifested in all the stages of these processes. It must, therefore, exert *this* particular action with reference to itself on the one hand, and, on the other, *this* particular action with reference to something else; in other words, therefore, either in reference to a third or in reference to the first. Of necessity in reference to the latter; for this again is cause to itself and the other. Wherefore, the first is superior; for it was the cause of the eternally uniform motion, whereas the other was the cause of different motion. To the fact that this difference is eternal, both plainly contribute. In

a similar relation to each other stand the different movements. Why then seek for any other principles?

CHAPTER VII.

Since, now, this is a possible explanation, and there is no other alternative but that all things have sprung from Night, and indistinction, and non-being, we are forced to this conclusion that there is something which always moves with a ceaseless motion, and that this motion is circular. This result becomes plain not only from reasoning, but also from observation. It follows that the first heaven is eternal. It follows also that there is something which imparts movement [or, which it moves]. But, inasmuch as that which moves and imparts motion is a middle [something], it follows that there must be [a beginning], something which imparts motion without itself having motion imparted to it, and this will be eternal, an essence and an act. But [in the sensible world] the object of desire imparts motion in this way, and in the intellectual world, the intelligible imparts motion without itself being moved. These are at bottom the same; for the object of desire is that which *seems* beautiful; the object of will is that which *is* beautiful. It is more correct to say that we desire things because they seem beautiful, than that they seem beautiful because we desire them. For the intellectual act is the principle. The intellect is moved by the intelligible, and self-intelligible is the one series [the positive]; in this series, the first essence, and in the first essence, that which is simple and actual. But we must beware of thinking that the one and the simple are the same. The one signifies measure, while the simple signifies a kind of self-relation or quality.

But both the beautiful and the self-eligible are in the same series; and the first is either the best or analogous to the best. Moreover, that the aim is one of the immovables is shown by the process of division. (For there are two kinds of aim, a "for which" and an "in which." Of these, one is, and the other is not.) The immovable aim moves as a beloved object, and that which is moved moves all other things. If, then, there is something moved, it may be otherwise than it is. It follows that, if the first act be motion, the thing may be otherwise in so far as it is moved—that is, it may be locally, if not essentially, otherwise. But since the [prime]

mover is itself an immovable entity, being in act, this cannot in any respect be otherwise. For the first of changes is locomotion, and, indeed, circular motion. And the prime mover imparts this motion. It is therefore necessarily existent, and in so far as it necessarily exists, it exists well, and in so far it is also a principle. (The term "necessity" is used in several senses: (1) as that which happens violently, as contrary to natural tendency; (2) as that which is the essential condition of the good; (3) that which cannot exist otherwise, but is absolute.) On such a principle, then, depends the whole of heaven and nature. And its free life is altogether equal to our brief best moments. For this is its normal condition (whereas this is impossible for us), because its energy is at the same time joy. It is for this reason that waking, perception, and intellectual activity are the sweetest thing; and hopes and memories on account of these. But thought in itself is thought of that which is in itself, and the supreme thought is thought of the supreme existence [or that which in the highest degree is]. But the intellect thinks itself in seizing the intelligible. For it becomes intelligible by touching and thinking, so that intellect and intelligible are the same thing. For intellect is that which is receptive of the intelligible and of essence. And it is actual through the possession of these. And it is this actuality, rather than the intelligible, that seems to be the divine element in the intellect. And the vision of the divine is the sweetest and best. If, then, God is always as well as we are sometimes, it is wonderful; and if he is more so, it is still more wonderful. And this is what is true. And life is his attribute; for the energy of intellect is life, and he is that energy. And his self-energy [self-act] is life, best and eternal. We say that God is living, eternal, best, so that life, and uniform and eternal existence belong to God; for God is this.

Those thinkers, like the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, who maintain that the fairest and best is not in the principle, because, while the principles of plants and animals are causes, the beautiful and perfect belongs to what springs from them, do not think correctly. For the seed comes from previous plants and animals which are perfect, and the first is not the seed, but the perfect. For example, we might say that the man is prior to the seed, not the man that comes from the seed, but the man from whom the seed comes.

It is clear, then, from what has been said, that there exists an essence, eternal, immovable, and separate from sensible things. It has been further shown that the essence cannot have any bulk, but that it is without parts or divisions. For it imparts motion through infinite time, and nothing finite has infinite power. Since, now, every magnitude is either infinite or finite, for the reason given it cannot have a finite magnitude; and it cannot have an infinite magnitude, because such a magnitude has no existence.

It has been still further shown that it is exempt from all affection and qualitative change. The reason is that all other movements are subsequent to local movement. How these things are as they are, is now clear.

CHAPTER VIII.

Whether we are to assume one or more such essences, and, if more, how many, is a question that must not be left unsettled. We must even call to mind the statements of other philosophers, observing that they have laid down nothing definite on the subject of the number of essences. In the first place, the Doctrine of Ideas contains no special inquiry into this subject. The adherents of this doctrine call their ideas numbers, indeed; but they speak of these numbers sometimes as if they were infinite, at other times as if they were limited to ten; but for what reason the number of numbers is just this, they do not show with any apodictic cogency. We, on the contrary, must determine this from the foundations and definitions already laid down.

The principle and the first of beings is immovable, both in itself and in its accidents [both absolutely and relatively], moving [imparting] the first eternal and one motion. But, since that which is in motion must be moved by something, and the prime mover must be in itself immovable, and the eternal motion must be due to an Eternal, and the one motion to a One, we find, alongside the one simple motion of the All, which we hold to be due to the first and immovable essence, that there are other eternal motions—namely, those of the planets (for the body that moves in a circle is eternal and unresting, as has been proved in the *Physics*)—it follows of necessity that each of these motions is due to an essence in itself immovable and eternal. For, inasmuch as

the nature of the stars is an eternal essence, and that which moves must be eternal and prior to that which is moved, and that which is prior to an essence must be itself an essence, it follows that such essences must exist—eternal, and in themselves immovable and without bulk—and this for the cause assigned above. It is thus plain that there are [these] essences, and which is the first, and which the second among them, in an order corresponding to the movements of the stars. As regards the number of these movements, we must have recourse to that mathematical science which is most akin to philosophy—namely, astrology, whose aim it is to construct a theory in regard to that essence which is at once sensible and eternal. The other mathematical sciences—*e. g.*, arithmetic and geometry—deal with no essence. That the motions of moving bodies, then, are several, must be clear even to those who have but a moderate grasp of the subject; for every one of the wandering stars moves with more than one motion.

How many these movements are, is a question in regard to which we shall now state the views of certain mathematicians, for the sake of affording a basis on which, by reasoning, to arrive at a definite number. At the same time, we must investigate some matters ourselves, and draw information with regard to others from other inquirers; and, if specialists in these matters arrive at conclusions different from ours, we must love both parties, but follow the more accurate.

Eudoxus laid it down that the motion of the sun and moon are each in three spheres. The first of these, he says, is that of the fixed stars, the second passes through the middle of the zodiac, and the third passes obliquely across the breadth of the zodiac. He further says that the path of the moon passes across the breadth of the zodiac more obliquely than that of the sun. With regard to the planets, he says that the motion of each is in four spheres, and that the first and second of these motions are the same as those of the sun and moon, the sphere of these being that which carries all the others, and the one which comes next in order to it and passes through the middle of the zodiac being common to all. With respect to the third motion, he says that the poles of all the planets lie in the diameter of the zodiac, and that the motion of the fourth sphere is in a circle inclined obliquely to the centre of the third sphere. In the case of the third sphere,

while each of the other planets has its own poles distinct, Venus and Mars have the same poles.

Callippus laid down the same arrangement of the spheres as Eudoxus—that is, the order of their distances—and assigned to Jupiter and Saturn the same number of spheres, whereas he thought that, in the case of the sun and moon, two more spheres had to be added, if the phenomena were to be explained, and one to each of the other planets.

The fact is, if all the spheres put together are to explain the phenomena, there must for each of the planets be other spheres, fewer in number by one, to roll back and restore to its [original] position the first sphere of the planet which in each case is next in order below it. Only in this way is it possible for the entire motion of the planets to take place. Since, then, the spheres in which the planets move are eight and twenty-five, and among these those alone do not require to be brought back in which the lowest planet is moved, those that roll back the spheres of the first two will be six, and those that roll back those of the other four will be sixteen, and thus the number of all the spheres taken together, both of those that bear forward and those that roll back, will be fifty-five. If, however, those movements of which we have spoken be not added to the sun and moon, the whole number of the spheres will be forty-seven.

Admitting, then, that the number of the spheres is so great, it will be fair to assume that the essences and principles which are at once immovable and yet sensible are of the same number. The task of showing the necessity of this, we will leave to stronger men. And, if it is impossible that there should be any motion which does not tend toward the motion of a star (constellation), and if, further, we are forced to think that every nature and every essence which is free from affection and self-existent has attained the highest end, there can be no other nature besides these, but this must be the number of the essences. For, if there were others besides these, they would have to impart motion, as being ends of motion. But it is impossible that there should be any motions besides those mentioned; this truth we may derive from the consideration of moving bodies. For, if every mover exists for the sake of that which is moved, and every motion implies a something that is moved, there can be no motion which

exists for its own sake or for the sake of another motion, but all must exist for the sake of the stars. For, if one motion existed for the sake of another, that other would exist for the sake of a third, and so on. But, since it is impossible that there should be any *regressus in infinitum*, the end of all motion must be some one of the divine bodies which move in the heaven.

That there is but one heaven, is obvious. For, if there were several heavens, in the same sense that there are several men, the principle connected with each would be one in form and many in number. But whatever is many in number has matter; for the concept of many things—*e.g.*, the concept man—is the same, but Socrates is one. But the primal self-realizing idea has no matter, for it is self-end. Hence the prime immovable mover is one in concept and one in number; that, likewise, which is moved always and continuously is but one. It follows that there is but one heaven.

There has been handed down to us a tradition from our forefathers and from men of primitive ages, in the form of a myth, that the movers are gods, and that the divine embraces the whole of nature. The remaining stories about them have been added in subsequent times, in the form of myths, for the management of the multitude, and for the sake of law and expediency. Human forms and forms of other living things are ascribed to them, and so likewise other things following from these, and similar to these. If, now, we separate the first assertion from the rest, and take it by itself—namely, that the primal essences are gods—we must consider this statement divinely made, and, inasmuch as it is probable that every art and every science has been, to the extent possible at a given time, repeatedly discovered and again been lost, we must look upon these views as remnants of those that have survived to the present time. To this extent only is the opinion of our fathers and of the primeval world obvious to us.

CHAPTER IX.

With regard to the Intellect certain questions arise. It is indeed usually held to be the divinest of phenomena; but what this implies with regard to its nature, is a question that presents some difficulties. For, if it thinks nothing, but is in the condition of

one who sleeps, what dignity can it have? If, on the other hand, it thinks, and this thinking is conditioned by something else besides itself (in which case that which is its essence will not be thinking, but the power of thinking), then it will not be the best essence, for its dignity comes to it through thinking. Further, granting that its essence is intellect or intelligence, what is the object of that intelligence? Its object must either be itself or something else. And if it is something else, it must be either always the same, or it must be different. Does it, then, make any or no difference whether it thinks the beautiful, or anything indifferently? Is it not rather an absurdity to say that it thinks discursively about a plurality of things? It is clear, therefore, that it thinks that which is most divine and worthy, and that it does not change; for change would be a change to worse, and such a thing would be already a motion.

In the first place, then, if intellect is not thought, but the power of thought, it is intelligible enough that the continuity of thought should be painful to it. Further, it is clear that there would be something else worthier than the intellect—viz., the object of thought. For intellect and the act of intellect would belong to him who thinks that even which is lowest. Hence, if the worst is to be avoided (and it is better not to see some things than to see them), thought would not be the best thing. It follows from this that the intellect, if it is to think the noblest thing, thinks itself, and thus thought is a thought of thought. Science, on the other hand, and perception, and opinion, and reasoning seem always to have an object different from themselves, and to have themselves only as a kind of accessory.

Again, if to think and to be thought are different, to which of the two does the intellect owe its worth? It is plain, indeed, that thinking-ness and being-thought-ness are not the same. The fact is, that in some cases science and the thing known are the same. In the case of the creative sciences, the essence and the self-realizing end, without the matter, are the object; in that of the theoretic sciences, the object and the thinking. Since, then, in all things that have no matter there is no difference between the object of the intellect and the intellect itself, the two must be the same, and thinking is one with its object.

Finally, there remains one other difficulty, as to whether the

object of thought is compound. If it were, then change from part to part of the whole might take place. But the fact is that everything which has no matter is indivisible. For, just as the human intellect, which is an intelligence of compound things, is related to a certain time (for it has not its good in this or that particular time, but its best in a whole time, which good is something different from itself), so likewise this self-intelligence is related to the whole of eternity.

CHAPTER X.

We must now consider in which of the two (possible) ways the nature of the universe contains the Good and the Best, whether as something separate (transcendent) and self-existent, or as order. The answer is, it must possess it in both ways, as an army does. The truth is, that in an army the Good lies in order and in the general, and more in the latter than in the former. For the general is not due to the order, but the order to the general. But all things are ordered together in a certain way, but not all in the same way—fishes, birds, plants—and the arrangement is not such that one has no relation to another, but there is some relation. For all things are ordered with reference to one. But, just as in a household the free members are least permitted to do as they please, their sphere of action being completely or nearly systematized, whereas the slaves and domestic animals have but a small share in the system, and a great deal is left to their individual pleasure (for their nature is just such an individual principle—I mean a principle such as must segregate each of them from other things in all ways), so there are some things in which all things share, in order to constitute a whole.

We must now pass on to consider the impossibilities and absurdities in which those involve themselves who profess different views—first, those who put forward somewhat specious arguments, and, second, those who involve themselves in the lesser difficulties.

All [these men of divergent views] construct all things out of contraries. But [they fail in three respects]: they neither define the term “all things,” nor the phrase “out of contraries” correctly, nor do they tell us just in what things contraries exist, nor do they define the manner in which things arise from contraries. The

truth is that contraries are not affected by each other. This difficulty *we* get over successfully by positing a third something. Some philosophers [hold that this third thing is unnecessary and] make one of the contraries matter [to the other]—*e. g.*, the uneven to the even, the many to the one. But this objection is answered in the same way. The one [primal] matter has no contrary; and furthermore [if all things were composed of contraires], everything would share in the evil, except the one. For the evil, as such, is one of the elements. The others hold that the good and evil are not principles; nevertheless, in all things the good is a principle more truly than anything else. Others, again, admit correctly that the Good is a principle, but do not tell us how it is so, whether it be final, efficient, or formal. The view of Empedocles is also absurd, for he makes the good to be friendship. And it is a principle both as moving (for it brings things together), and as matter (for it is a part of the mixture). But even if it does happen that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as moving, still their ideal essence is not the same. In which respect, then, is it friendship? Absurd, furthermore, is the notion that strife should be incorruptible; for it is this very thing that is the nature of the evil.

Anaxagoras sets down the good as principle in the sense of a moving power. The intellect [he says] imparts motion; but it does so for the sake of something, and this is, therefore, something different from it—unless he holds the same view that we do; for the art of medicine is, in a certain sense, health. It is absurd, however, to have assumed no contrary to the Good and to Intellect.

But all those thinkers who assume contraries as first principles neglect to make use of these contraries, unless they are reminded of them. And why some things are corruptible, and others incorruptible, none of them informs us, for they make all things that are out of the same principles.

There is still another class of thinkers that make all existent things out of the non-existent; while others, in order that they may not be forced to do this, make all things one.

Again, why generation is eternal, and what is the cause of generation, no one tells us. And for those who assume two principles, it is necessary to admit that one of these is superior to the other, and for those who assume ideas, to place another principle

above them. Otherwise, how is it that things did or do participate in them? The others also are forced to admit that to wisdom and the noblest science there must be some contrary, while we are forced to no such admission. For there is nothing contrary to the First. For all contraries have matter, and exist as potentialities. Hence ignorance, which is a contrary [to wisdom], goes over into its contrary. But to the first there is no opposite.

If, now, there exist nothing else beside the things of sense, there will be neither principle, nor order, nor generation, nor heavenly things, but every principle will have another principle behind it, as is the belief of all the theologians and physical philosophers. And, even if the existence of ideas or numbers be admitted, they will not be the causes of anything, or, at all events, not of motion.

Further still, how out of unextended elements can we get the extended and the continuous? For number will produce nothing continuous, either as moving or as formal principle. But the same thing is true of opposites, even if we grant them formative and moving power; for they might possibly not be. It is not necessary to remark that action is subsequent to power. According to this, existences would not be eternal; but they are. One of these must therefore be cancelled. The manner of this has been already stated.

Furthermore, no one tells us whereby the numbers are one, why the soul is one with the body, and, generally, why the form is one with the thing; and, indeed, it is impossible to tell, without holding, as we do, that the moving cause is form-giving. Those, however, who lay down mathematical number as their first principle, and thus have one essence always following another, and different principles for each, make the essence of the whole episodic (for the one exerts no influence upon the other, either by its existence or non-existence), and the principles many. But the commonwealth of existences refuses to be misgoverned:

“Never a good is the rule of the many; let One be the ruler!”

VOCABULARY.

CAUSE (*αἰτιον, αιτια*).—“By cause is meant: (1) That internal (matter) of which anything is made. For example, bronze is the cause of the statue. . . . (2) The form and the model. And this is the concept of the self-realizing end and all its genera. For ex-

ample, the cause of the octave is the relation of 2 to 1. . . . (3) The first principle of change or rest. For example, the man who gives counsel is a cause; the father is the cause of the child. . . . (4) The end or aim. And this is the purpose for which anything is done. For example, the purpose of walking is health." These causes are called, respectively, (1) MATERIAL (*ύλη, τὸ ἐξ οὗ*); (2) FORMAL (*εἶδος, τὸ εἰς ὃ*); (3) EFFICIENT (*ὄθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, τὸ κινῶν, τὸ ὑφ' οὗ*); (4) FINAL (*τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα*). In God, the last three are one. He is the Form of forms, the Prime Mover, and the Good, and all three in the same sense. (Cf. *Metaph.*, iv, [4] 2.) See PRINCIPLE.

"By CONTRARIES (*ἐναντία*) is meant (1) the things different in genus which cannot coexist in the same subject; (2) the things most widely different in the same genus; (3) the things most widely different in the same receptive subject; (4) the things most widely different under the same potentiality; (5) the things whose difference is greatest, either absolutely, or in genus, or in species; (6) of other things (*a*) some are said to be contraries because they contain these, (*b*) others because they are capable of admitting them, (*c*) others because they are capable of making or undergoing them, (*d*) others because they do make or undergo them, (*e*) others because they are losings or gainings, possessions or privations of them; (7) since ONE and BEING are used in many senses, it necessarily follows that the same must be true of what is used in reference to them, as 'same,' 'other,' contrary; so that each of these must be different for each category." (*Metaph.*, iv, 10). Cf. OPPOSITES.

By ESSENCE (*οὐσία*) is meant—

"(1) The simple bodies, as fire, earth, water, and the like, and, generally, bodies and their compounds—animals, demons, and the parts of these.

"(2) Whatever is the cause of being, because immanent in such things as are not predicated of a subject; *e. g.*, the soul is the essence of the living thing.

"(3) Those immanent parts of such things which define them and mark them as individuals, and whose removal removes the whole. For example, as some say, the solid (body) is the essence of the surface, and the surface of the line. And, indeed, number generally is held by some to be an essence in this sense.

"(4) The self-realizing end, the concept of which is the definition, and this is called the essence of the individual.

"It thus appears that ESSENCE is used in two senses (a) as the ultimate substratum, which is not predicated of anything else, and (b) as that which is individual and separable, such as are the form and species of the particular." (*Metaph.*, iv, 8.)

ETERNAL (*αἰδιος*).—Synonyms of this word are IMMOVABLE, IMMUTABLE (*ἀκίνητος*), SEPARABLE OR SEPARATE (*χωριστός*), UNGENERATED (*ἀγέννητος*), and INDISSOLUBLE (*ἄφθαρτος*). Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of eternal things: (1) Those which are purely intellectual (*νοητά*) and which are entirely independent of time; (2) those which are sensible (*αἰσθητά*) and whose action measures time. They might be distinguished as the *Sempiternal* and the *Everlasting*. To the former belongs God, and to it all intellects tend; to the latter belong the stars or movers of the different heavens, whose number he estimates at 47 (see chapter viii). God does not move, though he is the cause of all motion; the stars move, but with a perfectly changeless motion, which the circular is. Though these may be said to have matter, it is different from all other matter, being subject to no change save locomotion (*πόθεν ποῖ*), which, when perfectly uniform, may be called changeless. The opposite of eternal is, of course, TRANSIENT (*κινητός*).

FORM AND MATTER (*εἶδος καὶ ὕλη*).—These terms may be considered together, since they are, for the most part, correlatives. Matter never exists without form, and, in sensible things, form never exists without matter. Indeed, matter, taken as a whole, contains potentially all forms (except one, as we shall see), although in any particular case only a minimum of them may be actualized. At the same time it is not true that every portion of matter contains every form. Aristotle is so well aware of the qualitative difference between matter and matter that he makes matter the principle of individuation. (See chapter iii, *ad fin.* Cf. Dante, *Parad.*, i, 109, *sqq.*) Form is the principle of all the phenomena that distinguish one material thing from another. It is actuality and, therefore, something divine. Thomas Aquinas says: "Forma nihil aliud est quam divina similitudo participata in rebus." (*Contra Gent.*, i, 3, 97.) Matter is the same thing, only in potentiality. Thus matter is related to form as potentiality to actuality. Matter cannot actualize its own forms, but must wait

for the action of some essence already actualized. This, in the first instance, is God, the Prime Mover; but when he has actualized one such essence, it can actualize others like it. "Man begets man." This doctrine furnishes Aristotle with his chief argument for the existence of a Prime Mover in complete actuality, and supports the dogma of the Incarnation. The doctrine that forms are originally immanent in matter, and inseparable from it, is diametrically opposed to that of Plato, as Aristotle well knows. Plato holds that unindividualized forms have a separate existence, and are imparted to matter, like external spirits, by God. This view Aristotle vigorously combats, except in the case of one form—namely, the intellect (*νοῦς*), which he admits to be altogether external to matter. (See INTELLECT.) It is needless to say that both FORM and MATTER are ungenerated. (See GENERATION.)

For a clear discussion of Form and Matter, see Knauer, *Grundlinien der aristotelisch-thomistischen Philosophie* (Wien, 1885). Curiously enough, Zeller has entirely misunderstood Aristotle's doctrine with regard to them, and so quite gratuitously charged him with self-contradiction. (*Philos. der Griechen*, Bd. iii, S. 802, sq.). There is not the shadow of truth in the assertion that Aristotle "places form and matter, as originally different, in opposition to each other, without deriving them from a common ground; in more nearly determining these two principles he involves himself in a contradiction by maintaining, on the one hand, that form is the essence and substance (!!) of things, and, on the other, that it is at the same time a universal, while the ground of the particular, and therefore also of substantiality, must lie in the matter." It is sufficient to say that all forms are potentially immanent in matter from its origin. It is from matter that the Prime Mover educes them. (Compare *Genesis*, i.)

GENERATION, GENERABLE, OR GENERATED (*γένεσις, γενητός*), and their contraries, DISSOLUTION and DISSOLUBLE (*φθορά, φθαρτός*), are applied to those things whose forms may pass from potentiality to actuality and from actuality to potentiality. *Γένεσις* never means Creation, *φθορά* never means Annihilation. These are processes of which Aristotle knows nothing. Form and Matter being eternal, all Generation is Evolution, all Dissolution the opposite. The terms UNGENERATED and INDISSOLUBLE (*ἀγένητος, ἀφθαρτος*) are applied to those things which underlie Generation and Dissolution,

viz. : (1) Matter, (2) Form, (3) Intellect. These cannot be generated, because they are the conditions of Generation. If it be asked in what relation the Intellect stands to Form and Matter, we may fairly answer that it is the source of both, though not in a temporal sense. Inasmuch as matter cannot exist without a certain minimum of actualized form, and all actuality is due to the Intellect or Prime Mover, this conclusion follows directly. (See Dante, *Parad.*, xxix, 16, *sqq.*) Matter and Form are dependent, and determined from without ; Intellect alone is self-determined (*χωριστός*). If it be asked whether Intellect could annihilate Form and Matter, the answer must be, No. And the reason is that Intellect, being essentially in actuality (*ἐνεργεία*), by that very fact holds them in being. Aristotle, as is well known, held the world to be eternal. See the subtle way in which Thomas Aquinas tries to reconcile this with the Christian view of a creation in time. (*Sum. Theol.*, i, 46, 1.)

INTELLECT OF INTELLIGENCE, INTELLECTIVE, INTELLIGIBLE (*νοῦς, νοητικός, νοητός*).—To discuss fully the "Intellect" of Aristotle, which carries us into the deepest depths of his thought, would require a volume, and, indeed, more than one volume have been written on it. Only the barest and most necessary explanation can be given here.

In the universe things exist in two conditions—one potential (*δυνάμει*), the other actual (*ἐνεργεία*). As potential, they are matter (*ὕλη*) ; as actual, they are form (*εἶδος*). Nothing can ever be *purely* potential or material ; but things may be purely actual. This is the case with the Supreme Intellect, the Prime Mover. He is essentially actual and Act, and it is his Act that holds the universe in being (see chap. vii, *ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις*). His Intellect is the Form of forms (*εἶδος εἰδῶν*), the Form which combines into a unity all other forms, and makes them a system. It is God, in whom all forms are actual, and who is therefore SEPARATE OR INDEPENDENT OR SELF-DETERMINING (*χωριστός*). But what is actual in God is more or less potential in the world ; and the Act of God utters itself in raising what is potential to actuality. It does so as a beloved object acts upon a lover (see chap. vii). This process, which, as such, takes place in the potential, is *Motion* (*q. v.*), which is always a mark of imperfection. The forms which exist potentially in matter are actualized,

first into the forms of sense, then into the forms of fancy, and finally, it may be, into pure forms. The first are still confined to particular kinds of matter; the second to matter in general, and the third are independent of matter (*χωριστά*). This independence must not to be taken, in any Platonic sense, to mean that pure forms stand *unrelated* to matter. It means only that they stand in a relation of pure activity (excluding passivity) to it—a relation of freedom and self-determination. This is a cardinal doctrine with Aristotle. So long as forms are not completely actualized—that is, actualized in their purity—they are still liable to revert to potentiality, as we see in the case of plants and animals (“which live in fancies and memories,” Bk. i, 1). No sooner, however, do they become so actualized than they are a self-determining Intelligence (*ἐνεργεῖ δι’ αὐτοῦ*, *De An.*, iii, 4). This is the way in which the lower intelligences come into actuality. So long as forms are in either of the lower stages of actuality, they can pass from matter to matter, so to speak, and this explains the generation of the animal soul. But the fully actualized form, the Intellect, being no longer bound to matter, cannot be so transmitted. Hence every intellect owes its actuality directly to the Prime Mover, and therefore, as actual, is rightly said to come from without (*λείπεται τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι*, *De Gen. An.*, ii, 3). Before it is actual, it is not at all (*οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργεῖα τῶν δυνατῶν πρὶν νοεῖν*, *De An.*, iii, 4), for the reason that its being is Act, immanent act, not transient activity, which is a very different thing. When an intellect is first actualized, as such, when it “energizes through itself,” it is still in a sense potential. It can, indeed, “think itself,” which is what is meant by self-determination, but it does so only formally, abstractly, ideally. The forms whose actualized unity compose it have still to be filled, through actual experience, with the fullness which belongs to them. This experience it gains, not through passivity (*πάσχειν*) but through action (*ἐνεργεῖν*), in which it “becomes individual things” (*ἕκαστα*, *De An.*, iii, 4), that is, descends more and more into the actual essences (*οὐσίαι*) which are implicit in its universal forms. Such an intellect “when separated, is only that which is and this alone is immortal and eternal. And we have no memory, because this is impassive, whereas the passive (*i. e.*, sensitive) intellect is dissoluble, and without this thinks nothing” (*De An.*, iii, 5 *ad fin.*). In

other words, the imperfect which moves and is sensible (see SENSE) is cognized by an intellect which moves and is sensitive, whereas the eternal and immovable, of which there can be no memory, is cognized by something that is eternal; or, we may say, the eternal cognizes itself, and this self-cognition is "that which is." Dante has paraphrased this passage:

"By reason that, approaching its desire,
Our intellect so dives into itself
That after it the memory cannot go."

PARAD., i, 7, *sqq.*

We can thus see why Aristotle holds the divine energy to be a thinking of thinking, and the highest life to consist in the vision of divine things (*θεωρία*, see chap. vii).

MOTION OR MOVEMENT (*κίνησις*).—To explain all that is meant by this word would require a small volume. Space permits only a bare outline. Motion, in its most general sense, is the action (*ἐνέργεια*, *ἐντελέχεια*) of the potential, as such. Such action is incomplete (*ἀτελής*), and belongs to what is incomplete. All motion expresses a tendency away from potentiality and incompleteness, to actuality and completeness. It implies two things: (1) an actual by which the motion is aroused, and which is always an individual and complete (*τέλειον*); (2) a potential which, as such, is capable of being actualized. The former puts forth an act (*ἐνέργεια*), which results as motion in the latter. The potential and imperfect by itself is incapable of action, and can only be roused to imperfect action (*κίνησις*) by an actual. It follows that the mover and the moved (*τὸ κινῶν καὶ τὸ κινούμενον*) can never be one being; in other words, that nothing can move itself, except accidentally, as a rower rows himself in a boat. It follows, further, that the **PRIME MOVER** (*τὸ πρῶτον κινῶν*) cannot be in motion. The power to exert energy and cause motion is the mark of the perfect being. A condition of all motion is contact between the mover and the moved. Even the Prime Mover is in contact with the world. That which moves may be regarded as form (*εἶδος*), that which is moved as matter (*ὕλη*); and, since the two are eternal (*αἰδία*) and in contact, motion is eternal. Hence the world is eternal. Motion and rest are the characteristics of the physical, just as immobility

is characteristic of the metaphysical. In enumerating the kinds of motion, Aristotle is not always consistent with himself. Sometimes he makes motion synonymous with change (*μεταβολή*), sometimes he gives the latter the wider signification. In the former case he admits four kinds of motion: (1) *essential* (*ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν* or *κατὰ τὸ τί*), origination and destruction; (2) *quantitative* (*ἢ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος* or *τὸ ποσόν*), increase and diminution; (3) *qualitative* (*ἢ κατὰ τὸ πάθος* or *τὸ ποιόν*), transmutation; (4) *local* (*ἢ κατὰ τὸν τόπον* or *τὸ πῶ*), locomotion. In the latter case he omits the first of these, and calls it change, of which he admits three kinds: (1) from an existent to an existent, (2) from an existent to a non-existent, (3) from a non-existent to an existent (*ὑποκείμενον*). The primitive form of motion is the local, from which all the others, except, to some extent, the first, are derivative. The perfect local motion is the circular, because it is uniform and complete, that is, it returns upon itself. We might sum up Aristotle's view of motion thus: All movement is evolution.

"NATURE (*φύσις*), in its primal and proper signification, is the essence of things which have in themselves a principle of movement, as being what they are. The material is called nature, because it is receptive of this essence, while developments and growth are so called because they are movements proceeding from it. And this is the principle of movement in all natural products, being somehow immanent in them, either potentially or actually (*ἐντελεχεία*) (*Metap.*, iv, 4). Aristotle distinguishes five meanings of nature: (1) the development of things that grow (*φύσις*); (2) the first immanent matter out of which that which grows grows; (3) the first moving cause in any individual product of nature, in so far as it is what it is; (4) that first something out of which any product of nature is made, and which is incapable of being shaped or changed by any power of its own; (5) the essence of natural products." (*Ibid.*)

"OPPOSITES (*ἀντικείμενα*) is used to mean: (1) Contradiction (*ἀντίφασις*), (2) contraries (*ἐναντία*), (3) correlatives (*τὰ πρὸς τι*), (4) privation and possession (*στέρησις καὶ ἔξις*), (5) the ultimate From-what and To-what of certain processes—*e. g.*, generation and dissolution, (6) things that cannot coexist in a subject capable of admitting either by itself. Not only these are said to be opposites, but also the things from which they are. White and gray cannot

coexist in the same thing, hence the things from which they are are opposites." (*Metaph.*, iv [Δ], 10.)

PRINCIPLE, BEGINNING, AUTHORITY (*ἀρχή*).—"By 'principle,' etc., is meant (1) that part of a thing from which one would set out to move along it. . . . (2) That from which any particular thing can best arise. Even in the case of learning, for example, we have sometimes to begin, not with what is first and with the beginning of the subject, but with that from which we can most easily acquire knowledge. (3) The internal groundwork upon which anything is built up—*e. g.*, the keel of a ship. . . . (4) That external source from which a thing first derives its origin, and from which motion and change naturally first begin. Father and mother stand in this relation to their child, and so does insult to battle. (5) That according to whose choice the things that move move, and the things that change change—as, for example, in states the authorities (*ἀρχαί*). . . . (6) That from which a thing is first known . . . for example, the presuppositions upon which demonstrations are based. The term 'cause' is used in all the above significations; for all causes are principles. The common element in all principles is that they are the first source from which anything is, becomes, or is known. Some of them are internal, others external. Hence nature is a principle, and so are element, thought, choice, essence, and atm. In many cases, indeed, the Good and the Beautiful are the principles of knowing and moving." (*Metaph.*, iv [Δ], 1.)

SENSE OF SENSATION, SENSITIVE, SENSIBLE (*αἰσθησις, αἰσθητικός, αἰσθητός*).—Sense stands opposed to Intellect, as the Transient does to the Eternal. It is conversant with what is in motion or change, and is itself essentially movable and changeable. And, just as Intellect is essentially active (*ποιητικός, ἐνεργεῖα*), so Sense is essentially passive (*παθητική, δυνάμει*)—passive to the sensible. All sensation consists of particulars, not particular things (*οὐσίαι*), but particular affections. These are felt by different organs, and meet in a common SENSORIUM (*αἰσθητήριον*), where, to use a modern expression, they form a "cluster." This cluster Aristotle calls once the passive or possible Intellect (*νοῦς παθητικός, νοῦς δυνάμει*), meaning that it is that which, when actualized and "separated" by the act of the Divine Intellect, becomes an intellect proper (*νοῦς ἐνεργεῖα*). Until this takes place, the intellect "thinks nothing"

(οὐδὲν νοεῖ)—that is, knows no universal—by which it can rise above time and place. (As to the limits of Sense, see chap. x, third paragraph from the end.)

THEORY (*θεωρία*) is used in two senses by Aristotle: (1) as investigation, inquiry, in which case it is always followed by a limiting genitive or its equivalent (*ἡ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας θεωρία*, etc.). Cf. Bonitz, *Metaph.* ii, 127; Trendelenburg, *Elementa Log. Aristot.*, p. 82; (2) in its literal sense, as the vision of divine things (*τὸ ὄραν τὰ θεῖα*, Alex.), and then has no limiting word or words. It is used in this sense in chap. vii of this book, and in *Eth. Nicom.*, x, 8, and in both cases is identified with the supreme happiness. That Aristotle held this happiness to consist in the contemplation of essences, there can be no doubt. It is somewhat difficult to say which meaning it bears in the opening words of this book, and I know that, in rendering it as I have done, I am departing from the opinion of Bonitz, Schwegler, and others. I think the context justifies my version.

UNIVERSAL (*τὸ καθόλου*).—"I mean by 'universal' that which is capable of being predicated of more than one; by PARTICULAR that which is not—*e. g.*, man is a universal; Callias, a particular" (*De Interp.*, vi). According to Aristotle, universals have no separate existence; they are always combined with matter and particularized by it. Only first essences have a separate existence, universals (genera and species) are second essences (*δεύτεραι οὐσίαι*, *Categ.*, v). God, of course, is the farthest of all beings from being universal, as well as from being particular (*καθ' ἑκάστων*). He is the source of both universality and particularity. Zeller (*Die Philosophie der Griechen*, Bd. iii, S. 309, *sqq.*, 802, *sqq.*) seems to me to have entirely misunderstood Aristotle's doctrine of the relation of the universal to the particular, when he thinks that Aristotle contradicts himself in maintaining that all actual existence is particular, and yet all knowledge of the universal. The statements are entirely compatible, and, indeed, are both true. The universal, as universal—that is, as something capable of being predicated of many particulars—exists only in the mind, and is by it used as a *means* of knowing. Outside the mind it exists only as particular, as which it is an *object* of knowing. There is no contradiction in saying that particulars are known by a means which is universal, that the *quo cognoscimus* differs from

the *quod cognoscimus*. Of course, Aristotle holds that the first to us is the universal, while the first in nature (and last known to us) is the particular, which is *ἄπειρον*.

THE RELIGION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF G. W. F. HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION" BY J. MACBRIDE STERRETT.*

The Religion of Sublimity.

There is one element which this religion has in common with the religion of the Beautiful [that of Greece]. That is, the subjection of the merely natural to the spiritual. Mere nature is idealized, deprived of its merely quantitative or external valuation, and considered the rather as plastic material for the divine artificer or artist. In both these religions God is known as free Spirit, as Spirit with rational and ethical attributes. In the religion of the Beautiful, however, God does not appear in full independent absolute Being. He is manifested as having definite limited content. The beautiful, in which this divine manifestation is made, in which the ethical and spiritual attributes of the Divine appear, is that of sensuous material and form. At most, the plane on which this manifestation is made is that of pictorial thought, of imagination, and fantasy. The idealization of the natural is thus not yet complete. This can only take place where the ground of the Divine revelation is spiritual thought.

The delightful, friendly forms of the Greek deities lacked that absolute and independent character which is essential to the eternal Divine existence. Religion must rise to sublimer conceptions. These specialized forms of the Divine must be seen to be phases of the One Divine life. An absolute spiritual unity is the ultimatum for thought. This the Greeks did not reach, but the Jews did. Such a unity, too, must be fully concrete, containing all particular ethical and spiritual forms in itself. It is only thus

* The translator frequently resorts to paraphrasing in order to avoid the continuous abstruse technique of the original.

concrete subjectivity. This is really attained only in the Christian religion. It is held by the Jews in an abstract form. This in turn is mediated by the specialized forms of the Divine in the Greek religion, an apostasy which is to be reconciled in the absolute religion.

The plane upon which the revelation of the Divine unity can alone be made is that of thought freed from all sensuous and pictorial elements. Thus we have its first abstract form of pure independent subjective unity in pure thought. Here we have this pure subjectivity entirely free from all elements of the merely natural in the form of either sensuous or mental representation. Here for the first time is reached the conception which is worthy of the name of God.

This subjective unity is far more than substance. It is absolute power, before which the natural appears in its true light as something created (*Gesetztes*) and not independent. It finds its congenial instrument of revelation not in nature but in thought.

Absolute power, however, is not its only characteristic. That is also found in the East Indian religion. The chief point here is that it is characterized as concrete and not as abstract power. Hence it is absolute wisdom. The rational characteristics of freedom unite in this one—that is, in an end or aim. Hence holiness is the chief characteristic of this subjective unity.

The higher truth of the subjectivity of God is not to be found in the characteristic of beauty, where the absolute content is scattered in particular forms, but it is found in this characteristic of holiness. The difference between the two is like that between animals and man. Animals have particular characters, while the character of universality is human. The truest subjectivity is that of self-characterization as rational freedom. This is wisdom and holiness. The Grecian gods were not holy, because they were limited and separate.

A. The General Characteristic of the Idea (Begriff).

God as the absolute is characterized as the One pure subjectivity, and hence as universal. Or, to put it the other way, this subjectivity which is in itself universal, is absolutely only One. It is not enough that bare unity be shown as the ground, as in the Indian and Chinese religions. In these God is not posited as infinite

subjectivity, since His unity is only implicit and is not explicitly known as subjectivity. In these pantheistic forms of religion God is known only as a neutral unconscious one. In the religion of sublimity He is known as The personal One. All merely natural forms vanish, even that of light, in which the Persian religion placed Him. Here God is form-less, as to external form, and image-less, as to picturable conception. He is only for thought. Infinite subjectivity is the activity of thought, and hence it exists only for thought.

(a) God is characterized as the absolute power which is wisdom. Power as wisdom is primarily reflected into itself as subject. Hence it is abstract. It is through this undifferentiated subjectivity that God is characterized as the One. All particularity is suppressed. Hence before it all natural things lose their immediate independence and validity. Only One is independent; all else is dependent upon Him.

(b) The next is the characteristic of His aim. On the one hand, He is his own end and aim. He is wisdom. The primary demand is only that this wisdom be equal to the power.

(c) But the aim of God must also pass from mere idea into concrete universality. At first the aim is limited. It is directed to one man, one family, and at length to one nation.

We are so accustomed to the conception of God as One that we cannot appreciate the weighty significance of its first apprehension. Even though the conception among the Jews was formal and limited, it was yet infinitely weighty and is the root of all subjectivity, of the intellectual world, and the road to all truth. It is the beginning of truth as truth, needing only development out of its abstract form of unity. The One is pure power, before which everything particular and finite appears as uncongenial and unworthy. All the natural forms of this power that we see in the Nature-religions as Light, the Sky, Ocean, etc., are here far surpassed. No natural object nor mental picture is adequate to represent it. Only thought, spirit, can apprehend it.

But it is only the root, the beginning of the full concrete self-consciousness. For it does not matter how many spiritual predicates (as goodness, mercy, etc.) be ascribed to the One. It is what He does and what He really is that reveals Him. If the activity is not yet of the kind to reveal the nature of spirit, we

may have a picture-thought of spirit, but not yet true spirit. The activity whose fundamental characteristic is power does not yield full formative reality, but rather only a negative sort of relation to other things.

B. The Concrete Conception (Vorstellung).

(a) The character of the Divine self-separation (*Besonderung*).

First Characteristic.—In the assertion that God is wisdom is contained His self-determination, His self-separation, His act of creation. Spirit is that which is absolutely self-mediating. It is pure self-activity. This activity is one of self-separation. The world is something posited externally by spirit, made out of its nothingness. But the negative of the world is the affirmative, the Creator. In Him the natural is the nothing. In its nothingness the world arises out of the absolute fulness of the power of the good. It is created out of the nothingness of itself—that is, out of God. Wisdom contains its own aim, and is self-determining. But, as this subjectivity is primarily abstract, the self-separation in the Divine takes primarily the form of an immediate external other. The higher conception is that of the *Actus Purus*, where the creation is within God himself, so that the beginning and the end, and consequently the phase of movement which is there posited as external, is within His own being.

If wisdom should cease to be abstract and become concrete and God become self-determining of himself, containing within himself his own creation as his Son, then would He be known as concrete God or as true Spirit.

But as, at this stage, wisdom is yet abstract, the separation takes the form of a posited external existence. Still, it has only the form of existence, for God has created it out of nothing. He alone is the existent, the positive. But He contains at the same time the setting forth of His power. It is this necessity of God's manifesting his power that is the birthplace of all creating. This necessity is the material out of which God creates. This is God himself, hence he creates out of nothing material. He is not a One as opposed to another something already present. But this other is Himself as his self-determination. But as He is yet the abstract one, this determination falls without Himself as his negative activity. The positing of Nature occurs necessarily in the

conception of spiritual life, but is, as it were, the fall of intelligence into sleep. Since power is pictured as primarily absolute negativity, before which all else vanishes, the essence—*i. e.*, that which is identical with itself—appears to be eternal stillness and reserve. But then this solitariness is only a part, not the whole of power. Power includes at the same time negative relation to itself. And this setting aside of abstract identity is the positing of difference of determination—*i. e.*, the creation of the world. But the nothing out of which the world is created is the identity where power was thought as the essence. The material is the formless, the essence the power identical with itself. But this is only a phase of the essence, and therefore another than the absolute power or what is called matter. The creation of the world therefore signifies the negative relation of the power to itself, in so far as it is primarily characterized as self-identical.

This conception of God's creating is utterly different from that of emanation. The fundamental category in all other cosmogonies is that of procession or emanation, not of creation. The gods emanate from Brahm. In the cosmogonies of the Greeks, the highest and most spiritual gods are the last of the emanations.

But here this category of emanation vanishes, for the Good as the absolute power is the subject.

In emanation, that which has emanated is the existent, the actual, while the ground whence it emanated becomes null and unessential. Thus, too, that which has emanated is less dependent than that which has been created.

This, then, is the form of the divine self-determination or separation. It cannot fail, for wisdom is necessarily in the *Idea*. As yet it is not, however, a self-separation of God within Himself. For then God would be known as concrete spirit as He is in Christianity. But here the separation falls without, because God is as yet One. This separation is primarily the divine determination, and thus the creation. This is not merely transitory, though it retains the character of dependent existence. It has stamped upon it, as its fundamental characteristic, the lack of independence because God is the one infinite power.

Second Characteristic.—This is that God is presupposed as a subject. Otherwise creation would be an indefinite conception, reminding one of the handicraft of men. God's creating is eter-

nal creating. In it He is not the result, but the cause. When the higher conception of God as concrete (Triune) spirit is reached, we have the eternal creation going on within the depths of the Divine being, instead of falling outside of it, as it does in the Jewish conception of His unity. Here creation differs from the work of human artisans, working with external material given at hand. The worker and the thing worked upon are two distinct things. But God creates absolutely out of nothing—that is, nothing besides Himself.

The creation, then, in which He is subject is infinite contemplative activity. When the artisan produces something, he has an aim and also materials. He thus stands in relation to an external other, whereas in intuitive creation, creation comes rather under the category of life. It is an inner activity and not activity upon a given object. It is life eternally begetting nature, a something that falls outside of itself, while life remains the eternal cause. God is forever related to his total creation as the Subject, which is always the absolute First. It was otherwise with the most spiritual gods of the Greeks. They appear as the last result of a long procession, and hence are conditioned by finiteness.

Third Characteristic of God, His Relation to the World.—This concerns what we term the attributes of God. These are his character, proceeding indeed out of his relation to the world he has created. It is false to say that we know only this relation of God to the world and do not know Him himself. His relation to the world is an essential one and reveals his attributes.

It is only according to external sensuous conceptions that we speak of anything being for itself, and thus distinguished from its relations to others or its qualities. In truth, it is these that really constitute its peculiar nature. It is the nature of man to relate himself to his fellows. It is the nature of the acid to relate itself to the base. Without such relation it is nothing. So our knowledge of the relation of objects to ourselves is a knowledge of the objects themselves. Thus, too, the relation of God to the world expresses his real nature. His attributes reveal his being. His absolute might and wisdom are immanent distinctions, and of these goodness and righteousness are phases. It is of goodness that the world exists. Being does not belong to it, except as borrowed from its creator. This separation or self-sacrifice of God is the eternal

goodness of God. The world has no right to exist. It is outside of the One, a manifold, limited finite thing whose vocation is not to be. That it does exist, however, comes from the goodness of God. Being, true actuality is God. Any being outside of God has no title.

God can be creator in the truest sense only as He is infinite subjectivity. Thus only is He free, and only the free can create the free.

The being of the world, however, is only the being of the divine power. In relation to this power the world must be represented as something shattered.

The manifestation of the nothingness, of the ideality of the finite world—that is, of its non-independence—this manifestation as power is justice or righteousness. Goodness and justice are not to be found in substance as a first principle. Here, however, we have the unity not as substance but as the personal One, or as Subject. Here we have the characteristic of purpose, the peculiar character of the *idea*. The world must be. So, too, it must change and vanish away. In this we have justice as the characteristic of the Subject.

Creation, preservation, and passing away—these three phases of the world are represented as quite distinct. But in the *idea* they are essentially only the phases of a process—that is, of the process of power. The self-identity of the power is the nothing out of which the world is created, and is also the very subsistence of the world and the abrogation of this subsistence. In goodness the world is justified only as not being independent, and hence, as containing its own death warrant, which is posited in justice.

These characteristics all belong to the *idea*, and yet do not belong to the essential nature of the absolute Being as conceived in the Jewish religion. God is still conceived as independent of them. If they were essential attributes we should have the fulfilled form of such religion—that is, Christianity. But in the Jewish religion these characteristics of goodness and justice are not apprehended as eternal and necessary elements of the one power. This still remains absolutely undetermined—at least as having arbitrary power to change goodness and justice, which are opposites, into each other. They are attributes which depend upon his

relation to the world—economical rather than immanent essential attributes.

(b) The form of the world.

The world to us of to-day is a very prosaic affair, a mere collection of things in an external unity. In the Orient, and especially in Greece, the brightness and cheerfulness of life was largely enhanced by the consciousness that in relating themselves to nature men were holding communion with the Divine. The divine generosity ensoiled and spiritualized nature.

Such an unity of the Divine and the natural, an identity of the ideal and the real, however, is quite an abstract one of easy acquisition. But the true identity is that which is only found in infinite subjectivity, which is apprehended not as a mere neutralization of contradictories, but as that which itself creates the differences, and lets them go freely forth from itself, as non-independent, and hence not divine, but merely objects of nature.

The highest of the Greek gods, which were essentially ethical, had only formal independence, because they had only particular limited content. Hence, the categories of the understanding are applicable to them. Quality, quantity, measure, cause and effect—these are the categories we apply to the world of prosaic things.

In the Jewish religion nature is undeified. All natural objects are viewed as subordinate, and all the Divine is wholly in the One. It may seem a pity that in a religion nature should be thus undeified and receive the character of profaneness. We hear many sentimentalists praise the days when nature was looked upon as divine, and a god peeped out from every object. This identity of the ideal and the real, however, is only to be found within the being of the Idea, of the self-determining God. To find it elsewhere is to cheapen, degrade, and nullify it. Natural things are really opposed to the Spirit. Even the Spirit as finite, as external life, is opposed to the Spirit. Not only external life, but also the abstract self-consciousness of man is finite, and thus opposed to the Spirit. The whole circle of finite things is within the category of externality. When thus considered under this measure of externality they are set in their proper place, according to the *idea*. Those who complain of this place being assigned to nature must at least grant that the beautiful unity of nature and God can be held only by the imagination, not by reason. They may complain

of the undeifying of nature, and yet they would find it impossible themselves to worship the Ganges, a cow, an ass, or the ocean as God. The view of nature of which they complain is the only one which affords a basis for an intelligent observation of nature and its unity. It is not here the place to note further the theoretical cultivation of this standpoint, resulting, as it does, in natural science. This requires a concrete interest in objects of nature which looks beyond their common essence to their particular characteristics. When the regnant conception is that of abstract wisdom, and when purpose is restricted to the One, there can no such development of science take place.

In the phase of religion which we have characterized as that of sublimity, the act of God relating himself to the world takes the form of His immediate appearance in an individual form for a definite purpose within a limited sphere. With this comes miracles. In previous religions there were no miracles. In the Indian religion everything in nature is in thorough disorder. A miracle demands a fixed order of nature as a background. This order need not be scientifically formulated. Only a general consciousness of the connection of natural objects is requisite.

The most real miracle in nature is the appearance of spirit, and the truest appearance of spirit is in the profound form of the spirit of man and his consciousness of the rationality of nature. In the Jewish religion, however, the world appears as a complex of natural things, which react upon each other in a natural way. The need of miracle is felt so long as this intelligible connection of things is not taken as the objective nature of things—that is, so long as the laws of nature are not looked upon as the eternal and universal laws set by God Himself. But, even with the Jews, miracles were looked upon as casual manifestations of God, while His universal absolute relation to the world is that of transcendent eminence. Holy rather than sublime is the characteristic that man attributes to God. Sublimity rather expresses his relation to the external world, transcending it and yet lending it some reflected worth. Sublimity is thus the chief characteristic of God's manifestation in the world. In the religion of Beauty there is a reconciliation of the thing signified with the sensuous material. The outer sensuous form reveals the inner spiritual significance. In the Jewish religion even the most sublime aspects of nature

only point to something far transcending their capacity to reveal. Their incapacity is expressly known. For sublimity it is not sufficient that the content be higher than the form, but it must manifest itself as transcendent power over the form. In the Indian religion the images are measureless but not sublime. They are distortions; or, where they are not distorted, as in the image of the cow or the ass, they express merely natural powers. Even here incongruity between the form and the thing signified is the chief characteristic. Religion demands at least that the power over all such sensuous forms be transcendent.

Our consciousness may be filled with natural objects, but our spirit is above their measure. To look upon things around us does not awaken the emotion of the sublime. That demands the upward glance to the heavens. God's relation to all natural things is especially that of the sublime. The Scriptures of the Old Testament are renowned for this element. "God said, Let there be light, and there was light." This is one of the most sublime of human utterances. The word is the lightest of all things. This breath is here at the same time the light, the world of light, the infinite outpouring of light, which, however, is humbled to so transitory a thing as a word. God is further represented as making the wind and the lightning his servants, so obedient is nature. "He maketh the clouds his chariot, and walketh upon the wings of the wind." All powers of nature and beasts of the field come into being at the breath of His word. "Thou openest thine hand, and they are filled with good. Thou hidest thy face, and they are troubled; thou takest away their breath, and they die and return to the dust." (Psalm, civ.) This is sublimity, where nature is so wholly subjected and represented as transitory.

(c) God's design for the world.

First Characteristic.—The essential characteristic of design here is that God is wise, and primarily that He is wise in nature. Nature is his creation, and He vouchsafes to make his power recognized in it, and not only his power, but also his wisdom. This is made known in the products of nature through their designed arrangement. Nor is this design merely indefinite, superficial, and external. "Thou givest to the beasts their food." The truest end and its realization, however, do not occur in nature as such, but in consciousness. God manifests himself in nature, but his essential

epiphany is in consciousness as the reflection of Himself; thus it appears in His self-consciousness that this is his purpose.

The first conception of power is that of sublimity, not of purpose. This purpose cannot really be a single one. The purpose of God can only be Himself. His idea must become objective, and He find Himself in its realization. This constitutes the generic idea of purpose. As regards the world or nature from the Jewish standpoint, however, the purpose of God seems primarily to manifest only his power, while wisdom sits quite apart from it. If we speak of a design, however, it must have a further characteristic than that of power. The place where it can occur is in spirit in general. As God is in spirit as consciousness, in created spirit as His reflection, it is in finite spirit as such that design is present and is recognized. God has here finite spirit as his reflection which is not yet returned absolutely back to Him. Finite spirit is essentially consciousness. God must, therefore, be the object of consciousness as its essence. He thus recognizes that He will be glorified. The glory or honor of God is His primary aim. [“The chief end of man is to glorify God.”] Full knowledge of God, however, is not to be looked for in this phase. That requires the more concrete conception of self-begotten and self-contained difference, as stated in the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. Purpose is of the essence of religion. God must be known in self-consciousness, as having affirmative relation to Himself. As God, He is infinite power and subjectivity. But it is also essential for religion that He appear essentially in other spirits. It is thus that the reverence of God appears. This honor is universal. Not only the Jews, but all nations must praise the Lord. This purpose, however, is primarily only theoretical. The further determination of it is the practical, the peculiarly real purpose which is realized in the world—that is, in the hearts of men.

Second Characteristic.—This essential purpose is ethical. Whatever man does he must have the lawful, the right before his eyes. This right is divine, and so far as it finds entrance into finite consciousness it is a law of God.

God is the universal. The man who determines himself in accordance with this universal is free, not following his own will, but the universal will. Right-doing is here the fundamental

thing, the walking before the Lord, the freedom from self-seeking aims, righteousness which avails before God.

Man does this right on account of his relation to God, for the honor of God. This right has its seat in the innermost being of man—in his will. Over against this will, willing God's will stand the natural conditions of temporal existence—the secular life. Here we find an opposition to be overcome similar to that between God and nature. On the one hand is the right as such, on the other is the natural side of man's life. This latter is to be subjected by the spiritual activity of the will as nature is to God.

The natural conditions of man's life are placed in relation to the inner condition of will. If this will be pure and his activity be right-doing, then the external conditions must correspond with it. Good must come to man only according to his deed. He must always act in an ethical manner, let come what will. And yet with this imperative there enters also the demand that he who does the right also fares well.

The demand is that external conditions correspond and be subjected to the inner condition—to right. This follows from the supremé relation of God to these conditions of nature. There is here a purpose which must be fulfilled. Harmony must ensue upon this discord, so that the natural conditions of man's life be seen to be ruled by essentially spiritual conditions.

In this way the temporal well-being of man becomes sacred. But it has this title only so far as it is conformable to the ethical, divine law. This is the bond of necessity which is no longer blind as in other religions. There it was an empty, indeterminate necessity devoid of ethical significance, and yet subjecting even the gods to its blind will. In this religion, however, necessity is concrete. It gives an absolute law, wills the right which has, as a result, a correspondent affirmative in well-being. Temporal well-being is the necessary consequent of right doing in the religion of the Jews. This is the harmony which man has reached in this sphere.

That it will—nay, must—go well with the Israelite alone is founded upon the purpose of God. He knows that God is the bond of necessity, the unity which joins well-being with well-doing. This confidence, this fundamental conviction of the Jew-

ish people, is a most wonderful trait. The Old Testament scriptures, especially the Psalms, are full of it.

This is also the trend of the whole book of Job. Job boasts of his innocence, and complains of his fortune as being unjust. His consciousness of rectitude, which is absolute, and his incommensurate fortune, is an enigma to him. He knows that it is God's purpose that it shall go well with the righteous.

The denouement is that this discontent be changed into pure confidence.

Job cries out: "What reward does God give from on high? Shall not the unjust be cast down?" His friends turn his question upon himself, saying that because he is unfortunate he must be unrighteous, and needs God's affliction to preserve him from arrogance. Finally God Himself speaks: "Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge? Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?" Then follows a grand description of God's power. Job finally acknowledges that he is the man without understanding. Submission follows. This resignation following upon his recognition of the power of the Lord brings to him again his former good fortune. It is, however, recognized that man shall not demand this from God as a right. This confidence, this consciousness of the harmony between the power and the wisdom and justice of God, is founded in the recognition of purpose in God.

It remains to note the inner spiritual process to this result. Man must do right. That is the categorical imperative. Right-doing has its seat in the will. Man is thereby turned inward upon himself, and must busy himself with introspective questions as to whether his will is really good or not.

This self-scrutiny and the grief on account of unrighteousness, this crying of the soul after God, this humbling of one's self in the depths of the spirit, this longing of the soul after righteousness, after conformity to the will of God, is a most wonderful characteristic of the Jewish religion.

But now we have to note the limitation of this purpose of God that men know Him and do whatever they do for his honor's sake. Where, then, does its limitation come in? Is it in the idea or conception of God, producing itself in the consciousness of men? Certainly it does not belong to the absolute *Idea*, to the being of

God as revealed in Christianity. But it comes from the undeveloped form of his wisdom as revealed in the Jewish religion. Wisdom and purpose are still general and abstract, lacking the concrete development seen in the Christian religion, where God is fully revealed. The *Idea*, God, as known in the Jewish religion, lacks the element of eternal self-differentiation in the process of His unity. So the attribute of wisdom is an undeveloped attribute. It is general and abstract. So, too, of purpose. Purpose in man implies unity. Man must be an individual, and know and maintain himself as a unit to be free. This consciousness of free-individuality is the first form of purpose. The ethical life developed from this therefore concerns the individual, his family, his connections. Thus it takes the form of exclusiveness. Thus, too, the primary form of the divine purpose as known by man is limited, when it passes out of its abstract form into the realm of practical details.

On the one hand God is the Lord of heaven and earth, and on the other hand His purpose is limited to one family, one people. All peoples, indeed, must recognize Him, but yet He is practically only the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and Jacob, the God who has led Israel out of Egypt. From the conception of the abstract unity of God springs the conception of His being with one family. The religion is at first patriarchal. The family widens into the nation, a natural distinction in humanity. And so God's purpose is still limited by natural conditions.

The five books of Moses begin with the creation of the world. Then comes the fall of man, which refers to generic man. But these universal conceptions seem to have no influence upon the Jewish religion. The people of Israel never seemed to comprehend these universal elements. God is the God of Israel, not of all men. This limitation of the universal purpose of God may be illustrated in pictorial way by the manner in which man specializes and limits his pure good-will to some petty wilful course of action. Universal good-will and purpose contain all particulars. But, when it enters the sphere of external action, some definite one of the particulars must be singled out. All at once is beyond man's power; at best he can take only one after another. Thus the particular is wrenched, abstracted from the concrete total of good purpose, and becomes unconsecrated because it is thus abstracted.

Thus in politics, when universal laws are to be regnant, we find the rule turn into the supremacy, or the arbitrary despotism of one man. It is thus that universal law first particularizes itself in the realm of practical reality.

Thus other people are excluded from the Divine purpose in the Jewish religion. Connection with this people, and consequently relation with God, depends upon the natural relation of birth. Hence, too, the necessity for a particular polity, laws, and cult.

This exclusiveness is further developed so as to demand the possession of a particular promised land, to be parcelled out to particular tribes for inalienable possession. However, this exclusiveness is not at first polemical. It is rather the steadfast holding on to an assured possession of an immediate relation to an all-powerful and an all-wise God. No denial is made that other people can be brought into the same relation, to this honoring of the Lord. All nations must magnify the Lord, but only in an indefinite sort of a way. The divine purpose does not seem to really embrace more than the Jewish people in demanding this unconditional reverence. Such it becomes first with Mohammedanism, where this special purpose is applied in an abstract way to all nations. Hence the fanaticism of Mohammedan Deism.

Fanaticism is also to be found among the Jews, but only where their possessions or their religion is attacked. Both their possessions and their religion are peculiar and exclusive, permitting of no intercourse with others. *Pro aris et focis* they were fiercely fanatical.

Third Characteristic.—Of all the creation, man is the most sublime. He is the intelligent, thinking part of it. He is the image of God in a far higher sense than this can be asserted of nature. What is found in this religion is God who is spirit, and only in spirit can He be revered. In the religion of the Parsees we have found a dualism. We have this opposition, too, in the Jewish religion, but it is found in man, not in God. God is spirit, and His creation is also in a sense spiritual, in so far as He finds himself his reflection in it. But finitude implies that all difference is discord. God is at home in His creation. It is good, for the nothing out of which He made it is his own absolute self. The opposition occurs, then, in other finite spirits. This is the battle-field of good and evil, the place where this battle must be fought

out. All these characteristics spring out of the nature of the *idea*. This conflict is a most difficult point, for it constitutes the contradiction. The good is never self-contradictory, but the contradiction comes only through the evil. But the question occurs: How has evil entered the world? In the Parsee religion this question raises no difficulty, for both evil and good are postulated as characteristics of the indefinite absolute. But here, where we have God as the one power and subject from whom all creation proceeds, evil is a contradiction, for God is wholly good. The Bible preserves for us an old conception of the fall of man. This representation of the way in which evil entered the world is in the form of a myth or parable. When we seek the speculative truth in this figurative narrative, we find some incongruous elements. In the same way Plato mingles incongruous traits in his attempted description of ideas in sensuous form.

The narrative informs us that, after the creation of Adam and Eve, God forbade them to eat of the fruit of a certain tree of the garden. The serpent, however, seduced them, saying: "Ye shall become as gods." God punishes them severely, but says: "Adam is become as one of us, to know good and evil." Thus we have God's word for it that man has become god-like in this respect, though He drives him out of Paradise.

This simple narrative may be understood in the following way: God gave a command to man, which he disobeyed, being incited by an infinite haughty ambition to become as God, this thought, however, coming to him from without. For this pitiable, foolish presumption he is severely punished. God gave him the formal prohibition in order to test his obedience. God, at least, forbade the evil. His command was quite other than a forbidding to eat the literal fruit of a tree. The command is given so that man cannot complain that he is punished for the fault of another person. In the whole narrative there is a profound speculative meaning. It is Adam, or generic human nature, that figures in this story. The tree, moreover, is called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thus stripping it of literal childish import. Man eats of it, and comes to a knowledge of good and evil which he did not have before. The difficulty, however, is that God is said to have forbidden this knowledge to man, for it is this which constitutes the character of spirit. Spirit is only spirit through con-

sciousness, and the highest form of consciousness is this knowledge of good and evil. How, then, could it be forbidden to man? Knowledge is indeed a double-sided and perilous thing. The spirit is free. This freedom leaves one with choice between good and evil. Thus it contains the possible phase of wilfulness to choose the evil. The story represents man as at first in a state of innocence. But this is the general condition of natural consciousness, which must be abrogated with the entrance into spiritual consciousness. This is the eternal history and nature of man—rising out of mere nature into the spiritual. Man is first natural and innocent, incapable of responsibility. There is no freedom in childhood, and yet it is the destiny of man to attain again to innocence. What is thus man's ultimate attainment—harmony with the good—is here represented as his primitive condition. This is the defect in the biblical picture, that this harmony is an immediate condition given, not attained. This immediate condition of naturalness has to be transcended, but the discord thus arising is to be harmonized again. The narrative represents this harmony as a primitive condition which ought not to be left. Thus in the whole representation there is a mingling of the sensuous and the spiritual, of necessary and of accidental elements. The serpent promises Adam that he shall become as a god, and God confirms this view that knowledge constitutes Godlike-ness. This profound truth is firmly imbedded in the whole story.

But, further, punishment follows the acquisition of this knowledge. Man is driven out of Paradise, and God says: "Cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life; thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field; in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread until thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken; for dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou return."

We have to recognize that this condition is the consequence of finitude. But, on the other hand, the very nobility of man comes from his thus gaining his bread, from his toil, and his understanding the art of living. Nature gives the beasts their food at hand. What is nature to them, man elevates into an art. But the art of living is not the highest phase of his freedom. The art of living well, of knowing and willing the good—this is the highest. How-

ever, these two phases of man's free activity are closely knit together. The sweat of his brow is an essential element in all his spiritual acquisitions. Taken by itself, this natural side seems sad enough. To him who does not know the higher destiny of the spirit, it is a sad thought that man must thus toil and die. But the destiny of man as spirit is immortality. However, this lofty destination is not contained in the narrative, for it is written: "God said and now, lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life and eat and live forever"; and, further: "Till thou return unto the ground . . . for dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou return."

Throughout this narrative of the fall of man we find these incongruous elements present. The necessity of passing out of the natural state of innocence in order to know good and evil is clearly shown. But the fault of the narrative is that it presents no consolation in view of death. The fundamental thought, however, is that man should not remain a merely natural creature. This implies what has always been maintained by profound theology—that man is by nature evil. Evil is the remaining in this condition of mere natural, animal life. Man must pass out of it through freedom, through intelligent will. But, further, man must overcome the discord arising from this step. His spirit must attain to reconciliation, to absolute unity with itself or harmony with the good. This is the full content of man's real freedom. But this phase is lacking here. The discord is not shown as abrogated in God's own nature. The abstraction of evil is not yet overcome.

It is noteworthy that this narrative slumbered, as it were, in the Jewish literature, and receive no further development. Only in the later apocryphal books do we find some allusions to it. In Christianity it is taken up again and receives its true significance. Yet we do find this conflict of man with himself an element of the religious consciousness of the Jews. But it is not grasped by them in its speculative significance of the necessity of the birth-throes of the spiritual man out of the natural man. It is presented rather in the practical form of individuals striving against sin. Along with this is given the conception of the righteous man—one who does God's will and remains in the service of Jehovah by observing the ethical laws of his people, both ritual and civil. Yet the inner conflict of man with himself constantly appears,

especially in the Psalms. Out of the depths of his soul the Psalmist cries out against the pain of the consciousness of sin and beseeches pardon and reconciliation. But this depth of sorrow for sin appears as the experience of individuals, and is not known as an eternal phase in the life of spirit.

These are the chief characteristics of the religion of The One so far as relates to the creative self-separation and purpose of The One. This last characteristic of purpose leads us to the *cultus* of the religion.

C. The Cultus.

☞ The relation which God has to self-consciousness is a very essential one. It is only within the province of self-consciousness that he can reveal his purpose. Nature must be superseded by the spirit in man before this manifestation can be made. Let us now note the religious state of mind in this self-consciousness. It is a mediating activity, bringing out into objective manifestation the relation with God already implicit in it. It is a manifestation of the innermost heart of self-consciousness.

(1) The primary phase of this self-conscious relation to The One is that of intuition or the pure thought of the pure essence—that which is pure power shrivelling up all before it. This, too, is the primary phase of freedom, devoid as yet of all concrete content. This self-consciousness is thus distinguished from empirical consciousness, which has always definite objects before it. But this phase of self-consciousness has not yet taken up into itself all the concrete qualities of the natural and the spiritual life. All this real part of life falls as yet outside of it. And thus this secular side of consciousness does not yet gain its due and appear as rational and sacred.

As pure thinking, then, self-consciousness lacks an object, and thus lacks the definiteness which belongs to consciousness. It is simply the Ego in immediate unity with itself, or the abstract individual. Such self-consciousness is God considered as abstract power. There is no definite existence with which it can essentially relate itself. It is all as yet undeveloped in the abstract One, as mere almighty power. On the other hand, the self-consciousness of man in relation to this abstract Power is also formless and empty, and thus easily perverted into absolute un-free-

dom. His self-consciousness becomes that of the slave before his master. The "fear of the Lord" thus becomes the fundamental characteristic or his religious disposition in relation to The One. Fear is that state of consciousness which comes from the conception of a transcendent Power, which annihilates all my worth, whether this consists of internal or external possessions. I am fearless when, in possession of inalienable freedom, I do not mind that power and am conscious of being so strong that it cannot overcome me. But I am also fearless when I do not care for those things which the power is able to destroy. My crown and throne may perish, and yet, if I have not set my heart upon them, I may remain fearless and uninjured. But the fear which we have to do with here is not that of finite power. Mere external finite power is an accidental thing, which, without fear, may come and destroy me. But fear here is that of the invisible and absolute, of an infinite which is opposed to me as a finite self. In the consciousness of such a Power all earthly power and existence vanishes as smoke. Such an annihilating fear as this it is which raises one into the pure thought of the absolute power of The One. And this "fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom," which consists in refusing to esteem any particular finite thing as independent. Everything that can stand before it can do so only as a phase of the unitary organism, which is the abrogation of everything finite. Such fear is really an essential moment of freedom. This consists in freeing one's self from all accidental and temporal interests, in the consciousness that man is more than all his conditions and possessions. Such fear frees one from fear. It is not merely the feeling of dependence, but rather the stripping free from everything dependent—the pure exaltation of self unto the absolute Self, before which and in which the empirical self vanishes away like mist.

But in this process there is also an affirmative element at work. This self-renunciation contains self-exaltation. In this way fear is transformed into absolute confidence, infinite faith. But this form differs from that of Stoical independence or freedom in bonds. For it lacks this phase of Stoical subjectivity. It has rather to lose itself in the One to attain its self-confidence. It does attain to this self-justification through this relation to the One. And thus the slavish consciousness rests obstinately upon his

own individuality because it has been taken up into union with the One. Thus it becomes exclusive, and God becomes—

(2) The exclusive Lord God of the Jewish people. It can cause no surprise to find an oriental people thus limiting religion to itself. This is the common characteristic of all oriental peoples. The Greeks and Romans were the first people to have foreign gods. With the Romans all religions came to be accepted, and thus deprived of their exclusive national character. The Chinese and the Persians had their exclusive national religions. In India the caste and the relation of every individual was determined by birth. There was no demand that others should accept their religion. However, this exclusiveness is more surprising in the Jewish religion, for it contradicts their conception that God can only be apprehended in universal thought and not in any particular definite form. Among the Persians God is the Good. This is also a universal attribute; but with the Persians it is as yet abstract, and hence is identified with light—a particular empirical thing. The Jewish God, however, is only for thought, for the universal which abrogates all particularity. Hence the contradiction of its exclusiveness. It is true that in many places we find its consciousness transcending this contradiction. The Psalmist exclaims: "Praise the Lord, all ye nations; praise him, all ye people, for his merciful kindness is great toward us and the truth of the Lord endureth from everlasting to everlasting." Reverence for God is looked for among all people. Especially with the later prophets do we find this elevation to an appreciation of the universal character of their religion. God declares through the mouth of Jeremiah: "I will make priests and Levites of the heathen who honor my name"; "He that feareth God and does the right among all people shall be acceptable to me." But all this belongs to a later period. According to the prevailing idea, the Jewish people are the elect of God, and thus His universality is reduced to a particular form. We have previously noted, in the development of the divine purpose, how its limitation lies in the abstract self-determination of God. Here we have noted it on its subjective side, as it springs from the slavish self-consciousness in the presence of absolute power. To these slaves this recognition and this honoring of Jehovah seem to be peculiarly their own. This is also connected with the his-

tory of the Jewish people. The God of the Jews is the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and Jacob, who led them out of Egypt. There does not seem to be any suspicion that God has been similarly related to any other people. This exclusiveness also enters from this subjective side into the cult. God is the Lord of those who honor Him as the Jews alone do. There are some traces of a perversion of this idea in the way in which Jehovah is sometimes referred to as being more powerful than other gods, as if there were also other gods. At most, however, they were to the Jews false gods.

God is known as Creator of the heavens and the earth, giving to all things and all men their peculiar nature and their definite limits and rights. He is the giver of all laws to his chosen people. The Ten Commandments, which are universal and ethical principles of all civil and moral life, are given, not as laws of reason, but are prescribed by the Lord. Moses is called the Law-giver of the Jews. But it was in a very different way from what Solon and Lycurgus were law-givers to the Greeks. These men gave their own human laws. But Moses gave God's laws. Jehovah himself wrote them on tables of stone. "Thus saith the Lord" stands before even the most insignificant details of the ceremonial law. All their laws were ordained by divine statute, and thus had a formal absolute authority. The details of their civil code were not developed from the general purpose of the polity. Nothing was left to man's judgment. Human caprice and reason alike were interdicted by the transcendent divine Unity, and any political change was looked upon as an apostasy from God, while the most trifling detail as given by God was considered to be eternally obligatory, being thus placed upon the same plane as the moral laws. This forms a strong contrast with the conception which we have of God. The Jewish *cultus* is the service of the Lord. The good, righteous man is the one who observes the ceremonial as well as the moral laws enjoined upon his people.

This people of God is accepted through a bond and covenant. This is a great advance upon Nature-religions, in which there is only a superficial distinction between the natural and the Divine. But here we have the Divine as absolutely transcending the natural, and so coming into relation with man only so far as he has

renounced his finite empirical self. Here the relation of man's self-consciousness is that to his absolute essence. Yet it is not the universal-human, or man as man, that is brought into this relationship. Hence the feature of exclusiveness in the *cultus*. Nor is this communion an original essential one. Neither does it spring from the love of God. But it is established in an external form through a compact. In the Christian religion we find this crude form completed in the doctrine of redemption and reconciliation.

This adoption of the Jews implies, on the other hand, that they have given themselves unreservedly to God's service. They held to this adoption with a wonderful inflexibility of conviction. This took the form of the fanaticism of stiff-neckedness, while that of the Mohammedans, which was freed from natural limits and recognized belief as the bond of unity, took the form of fanatical zeal for proselyting. Only an occasional wavering appears, when there is a conflict of interest or various courses open for choice. But even here the authority of the One absolute power forbids the use of human judgment. There is no freedom of choice before this absolute authority. While the Greeks esteemed certain of their institutions divine, they at the same time recognized their human origin. But the Jews made no distinction between the divine and the human elements in their polity and cult. All alike was ordained by God. It was this lack of freedom that caused their want of belief in immortality. The slight traces of this belief that appears in their literature had no practical influence upon their moral and religious life. The highest duty is the service of Jehovah. Temporal possessions are the reward of this service of Jehovah, and a man's highest aim is that he and his family may live long in the enjoyment of them. Soul-consciousness was not yet awakened. Man had no inner room, no inner extension of soul, which could draw back upon itself for satisfaction. The great reality for him was always in some form of temporal welfare. According to the law, each family received a piece of ground which he dared not alienate from his family. His aim in life was to keep this and thus preserve the existence of his family. Thus the possession of land was connected with his consciousness of God. Thus was the absolute surrender of the Jew to the absolute power changed back into assured temporal existence and possessions. This people and this possession were inseparable. God's people were given the land

dom. His self-consciousness becomes that of the slave before his master. The "fear of the Lord" thus becomes the fundamental characteristic or his religious disposition in relation to The One. Fear is that state of consciousness which comes from the conception of a transcendent Power, which annihilates all my worth, whether this consists of internal or external possessions. I am fearless when, in possession of inalienable freedom, I do not mind that power and am conscious of being so strong that it cannot overcome me. But I am also fearless when I do not care for those things which the power is able to destroy. My crown and throne may perish, and yet, if I have not set my heart upon them, I may remain fearless and uninjured. But the fear which we have to do with here is not that of finite power. Mere external finite power is an accidental thing, which, without fear, may come and destroy me. But fear here is that of the invisible and absolute, of an infinite which is opposed to me as a finite self. In the consciousness of such a Power all earthly power and existence vanishes as smoke. Such an annihilating fear as this it is which raises one into the pure thought of the absolute power of The One. And this "fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom," which consists in refusing to esteem any particular finite thing as independent. Everything that can stand before it can do so only as a phase of the unitary organism, which is the abrogation of everything finite. Such fear is really an essential moment of freedom. This consists in freeing one's self from all accidental and temporal interests, in the consciousness that man is more than all his conditions and possessions. Such fear frees one from fear. It is not merely the feeling of dependence, but rather the stripping free from everything dependent—the pure exaltation of self unto the absolute Self, before which and in which the empirical self vanishes away like mist.

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longs to the finite subject. Thus there is a conflict within him, and there comes the crushing pain of knowing that the good is only a "must."

(3) The third side of the *cultus* is the atonement. It can concern properly only the particular sins of individuals, and is made through sacrifices. The sacrifice has here the significance of man's acknowledgment of the Lord, of a declaration of fear of Him, and, finally, of thereby redeeming what he had already forfeited. Everything must be, as it were, purchased from the Lord. One tenth of all the increase is offered to the Lord, and the first-born of every family is ransomed from Him. The expiation for sins takes place under the conception that the deserved punishment can be transferred to the offered victim. This is the sacrifice proper. The individual thus manifests his own worthlessness, but finds his worth, his righteousness, restored through God's recognition of his sacrifice. Punishment is conceived, not as being a moral purification, but a saving from damage. Blood must be shed and sprinkled upon the altar. For life is the highest of all possessions, and the sacrifice of that of the animal returns as a bonus to the one who offers it. The blood of the victim is esteemed sacred, and cannot even be tasted. Man has not the consciousness of his freedom, in comparison to which the blood of animals is entirely a subordinate thing.

Transition to the next Stage—that of the Religion of Beauty.

In the religion of sublimity we are in the sphere of free subjectivity. God is the free subject. But the element of power is made the transcendent one. Creation proceeds from the self-separation of this power, but it then becomes a subordinate vassal and does not fully reflect the divine image. Further advance is now to be made by conceiving creation as going freely forth from God and becoming free, so that God is the God of men who are free even in their obedience. Abstractly considered, this sphere contains the following phases: God is free absolute spirit, and manifests only Himself in all that he does. His creation is his image. Only as He recognizes Himself in His creation is He free. But this implies that the creature be no longer merely a servant, but that in this service he finds his real freedom.

This phase of freedom appears first in the creature, while God

seems to remain unchanged. The entrance of freedom here implies that in finite spirits all contradiction to God is annulled and thus transmuted into the divine. Renunciation and flight are merely the negative side of freedom, leading to its positive characteristic, to that of transcendence over the merely natural. Such transcendence implies that the finite spirit is free. "God is the God of free men." Freedom thus appears first in man. But the development occurs also in the conception of God. God can be the God of free men only in so far as He finds himself, his image in his creatures. But this implies that humanity is an essential element in God. Man, recognizing this, is free in his relation to God. For that to which he relates himself is his own essence, or at least contains it as an element. Generic human nature is conceived as something divine. All that is of highest worth in human life is looked upon as having divine significance. Man creates God in his own spiritual image. Self-consciousness recognizes these spiritual powers of man as its own object, and hence is free in relation to them. But it is not these powers of any one subjective individual which is thus recognized. The rather it is, that of generic man—of the universal human. This elevates the self-consciousness above the care for any immediate subjective aims, and finds its essential satisfaction in substantial objective spheres, of social morals and institutions. These are the generic-rational forms of human activity. And the freedom of the individual consists in his harmony with this ethical environment. The sum and substance of the conception in this phase of religion is that God is conceived as being Himself the mediation between Himself and his creation. It is the human element in God which constitutes the mediation. Man as man knows himself as in God, and God and man mutually say of each other: "He is spirit of my spirit." Man is spirit like God. He is, it is true, environed with finite limitations, but in his religion he transcends them all.

We thus come to the religion of humanity and freedom. But the first form of this religion (that of the Greeks) is still weighted down with a load of sensuous natural elements. Thus the human element in God still takes the form of natural objects. Hence this religion, as to its fundamental basis, belongs yet to the class of finite religions. Like all others, it can find its fulfilment only in the fully revealed religion of Christianity. But yet it deserves

the name of a religion of spirituality, as it represents the synthetic totality of previous stages out of nature into the human in religion.

GOETHE'S MÄRCHEN : *

A POLITICO-NATIONAL CONFESSION OF FAITH OF THE POET.

BY DR. HERMANN BAUMGART.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY ISAAC N. JUDSON.

CHAPTER I.

Goethe composed the Märchen in the latter part of the summer of 1795, and it was published in the August and September numbers of the first issue of the "Horen."

Immediately upon its first appearance, in spite of the disturbed condition of the times, it not only aroused great interest, but was subjected to manifold interpretations.

"In matters of this sort, the imagination itself does not invent so much as the folly of men discovers; and I am convinced that the interpretations already at hand will surpass all expectation," writes Schiller to Goethe on December 25th. To this the latter answers: "I thank you for your contribution to the interpretation of the Märchen; we will wait a little longer, however. I still hope for a favorable turn in my affairs, so as to be able to have such fun as I choose over it in the 'Unterhaltungen.'"

Of this intended continuation Goethe writes on November 21st: "The new Märchen can scarcely be ready in December; indeed, I do not venture to pass on to it till I have said something in one way or another about the meaning of the first. If I can offer some-

* From "The Diversions (Unterhaltungen) of German Emigrants" (see translation in Bohn's Library). These emigrants were the French nobility (émigrés) fleeing from the French Revolution. The reader of this Journal will remember the interpretation of this Märchen ("The Story of the Snake") by Rosenkranz, published in Volume V, and will welcome this explanation of Baumgart, which seems to hit the very thoughts of Goethe himself. Of course every one has read the marvellous rendering of "The Tale," by Thomas Carlyle. It is one of those literary works which should be read once a year, through life.—EDITOR.

thing neat of this kind in December, I shall be glad to take part in this way in the first number of the new year."

Again in February, 1797, and still again in February, 1798, Goethe mentions this purpose of a continuation of the "Unterhaltungen" in a series of projected Märchen; but he did not carry it out.

He therefore failed to leave a definite hint for the interpretation of the Märchen; also from Schiller we learn nothing of the kind, and are thus thrown upon our own conjectures and upon a few chance and not very clear hints. From that time on a great many attempts at interpretation have been made, especially in the thirties and forties and even later, which are all to a greater or less degree inconsistent with one another, and no one of which has stood before criticism. In this one point all the later editors and commentators are agreed, but in every other respect their opinions are divided. Some consider the matter as not yet settled, and still look for the solution of the question under different conditions; others think that a satisfactory interpretation is altogether impossible. One of our most meritorious historians of literature, Carl Goedeke, in his recently published book, "Goethe's Life and Writings," concludes the paragraph upon the Märchen in the following manner: "In view of the praiseworthy habit of learned men, to seek for method even in madness, there is no doubt that there will still be no lack of attempts at interpretation, some of a very bold nature." He is of the opinion that the Märchen is merely designed to provoke the interpreter with its "motley and droll" inventions.

Opposed to this opinion stand the extraordinary praise and the great interest that the Märchen has aroused from its first appearance to the present day. William von Humboldt, as well as Körner, felt himself attracted not only by the form, but especially by the thoughtful and soul-satisfying contents; and Schiller, after reading the first half, expressed the opinion that Goethe had laid upon himself the obligation to make the whole symbolic.

He finds the idea of the Märchen expressed in the Märchen itself, and the majority of commentators also have followed him in this opinion; he finds it in the help which the faculties render one another and in their mutual dependence.

"An individual helps not," says the man with the lamp, "but

he who combines with many at the right time," and shortly after: "We are assembled at the propitious hour; let each perform his task, let each do his duty; and a universal happiness will swallow up individual sorrows, as a universal grief consumes individual joys."

There is no doubt that the idea of the Märchen, which becomes clearer as the narrative advances, is to be sought for in this direction; but the working out of the idea is much too general and is thoroughly obscure. It must be remembered, however, that Goethe was by no means the man to talk about "forces," "ideas," "developments," etc., *in general* (let alone to enter thus upon a detailed treatment), without thinking of *particular, concrete forces*, without starting out from *actual conditions, or at least from conditions which are present to his conception*; or to base abstraction upon these general ideas, to think of them in reciprocal action and then deduce from them his observations and conclusions. I think that I do not mistake when I say that precisely to this fact is owing the truth, attained by no other, and the vigor of his shortest expressions as well as of his greatest creations. And is it possible that he thought of nothing further than the general ideas of wisdom, force, the whole, and the educating love, which by their joint influence make possible a salutary sovereignty? It requires no effort to answer this question. Goethe no more sought in his poems, be it in the long or the short ones, to bring to view a single so-called "idea," than did Homer, Sophocles, and Shakespeare. On the other hand, his poems are so constructed (as is true of all true poetry) that, while they contain a concentrated view of life and present it in higher truth, so in each part and at each step quickening and determining ideas spring to light. Thus each of his poems contains a wealth of ideas, each of which by itself is capable of further development. Thus life presents itself to the spiritual observer, and thus the artist copies it in his works. And further: Is it possible that the other numerous and important characters of the Märchen are without real participation in the setting forth of these "ideas"? are invented solely for the amusement of a thoroughly arbitrary, playful fancy? are designed to provoke and lead astray the lovers of riddles? This would be the work of a mediocre poet, or rather of a dull mind; it may not be charged against a Goethe.

Let us consider the nature and scope of a Märchen. No doubt the objection will quickly be raised that with the nature of the genuine Volksmärchen men were not yet acquainted at that time; that the Märchen of Goethe is a "manufactured" affair, imitated from a French example. Very true! But how manufactured? So that it fascinated the greatest and finest minds, and still to-day charms every one by its grace. Compare it with the best productions of the romantic school, and its true Märchen-character is recognized by an unmistakable sign in contrast with the false and corrupt character of the romantic Märchen. The imagination which creates in a thoroughly arbitrary manner, confusing all contrasts, and harassing the mind like a bad dream, as it prevails, for example, in the Phantasus-Märchen, or, indeed, the strange spectre of Hoffmann's inventions, releases the reader the more deeply affected with a stifling sensation of depression and bewilderment according as he has the more completely surrendered himself to its influence. On the other hand, the Märchen of Goethe (in this altogether like the true Märchen) possesses not only a pleasing grace, but also a sound pragmatism, which, without detriment to the many wonder-working powers, even in the Märchen world, has its unassailable rights.

The question how this has come about, upon what this influence rests, I might answer in general by another question, which suggests itself at the same time. It is this: How can an altogether allegorical Märchen stand before æsthetic criticism? By the rules of art, is not allegory excluded from the realm of art, and by no less a critic than Lessing himself? The answer is, Yes, and very rightly; yet, in spite of this unassailable judgment of Lessing, it has happened more than once that poems of the highest rank, which satisfy the demands of the highest æsthetic criticism, have been considered altogether allegorical, and been made dependent in every detail upon an allegorical interpretation. The truth is, that Lessing pronounces judgment against nothing but the abuse of allegory, against a cold, repellent "Allegoristerei," and against this especially in so far as it has done harm in the art of painting. True allegory, on the other hand, is in the highest degree poetic. The allegorical manner of representation causes that which it wishes to present to be recognized by the presentation of another, similar thing. Thus it does nothing more than every figurative

method of expression does. However, it does not content itself (as its name would indicate, meaning a narrative method of presentation) with putting a similar, concrete thing to represent a single idea; but it understands how to present the relations and mutual influences of ideas by means of objects and beings set in action. In this manner of treatment two very serious faults can be committed in opposite ways, and they have been regularly committed by minds of the lesser order as soon as they have ventured upon allegory. It is well known to be a very troublesome matter to employ good figures in speech, but the carrying out of good figures in allegory is infinitely more difficult, for a close resemblance has here to be kept up; and so the majority of writers have attained to a half resemblance only, or to a resemblance corresponding in position merely, and in consequence have become unintelligible—that is, the means employed come into conflict with the abstract aim, and thus the result is inartistic. But it happens more frequently that writers allow the meaning which they wish to present to so dominate the concrete means of presentation that the characters and objects which make the action lose their freedom—that is, do not speak, act, and conduct themselves according to their nature and the conditions in which they are placed, but as is dictated by a law lying entirely outside themselves: namely, that of the abstract purpose which exists in the poet's intention. For this reason this whole class of poems is completely shut out from the sphere of art. The beautiful arises only in the realm of perfect freedom and of the highest internal justice and truth. The *discordant*, heterogeneous *intention* of the would-be poet rules everywhere in these faulty allegories.

It is evident, however, that there remains a third case: it is when figure and meaning always completely conceal themselves in the details and in the whole by means of a perfect resemblance. The poet so *chooses* or *invents* his objects and beings and their changes, which make the action, that they are and continue to be in perfect harmony with themselves and with one another, and, what is more, that they are beautiful in themselves, or at least that the reader attains to a perception of the beautiful through what is brought to pass by them. What the poet offers must in itself completely satisfy in form and content all the demands of art. There is, moreover, a second point to be noticed. At every

point and at every forward step of the action there has moved before him a parallel, but higher, ideal thing. The close resemblance which is everywhere present cannot but immediately disclose itself to the reader, so that henceforth he enjoys a double pleasure; he is delighted with the grace of the objects presented, and at the same time with an ever-growing sympathy; he becomes conscious in a truly poetic manner—that is, through the observing perception of an inner connection with a significant series of thoughts. I say that the highest aim of poetry is thus reached when in the beauty of objects which appear to the senses we recognize in easy riddles the higher order of the spiritual world.

The distinction might be expressed thus: *The allegory which is forbidden in art*, according to the explanation of Quintillian and Lessing, *does not say what the words seem to say, but something which is similar*; on the other hand, *the artistic allegory says before all what the words imply, but by means of a perfect resemblance lets another general and thus higher thing be recognized in them*. Goethe seems to me to have had precisely this in mind in one of his prose sayings, but he uses the word allegory *in the narrow sense of the faulty allegory*. "It makes a great difference," he says, "whether the poet seeks the particular for the sake of the general, or sees the general in the particular. Out of the former springs allegory, in which the particular is merely the type and illustration of the general; but the latter is truly the nature of poetry; it expresses the particular without thinking of or referring to the general; but he who really grasps this particular, at the same time, without being aware of it, obtains the general also, or at least he obtains it subsequently."

What I have here sought to unfold is nothing hypothetical, but may be easily read in a great number of the most beautiful poems of our greatest poets.

Let us call to mind, in the first place, Lessing's splendid parable of the palace with its many entrances and the guards, who, in the supposed danger of fire, think only of the ground plan of the palace. Here is that perfect resemblance in every point, even in what seems to be the most unessential word of the narrative, for no word is superfluous or chosen for mere ornament.

But the narrator, with his fine perceptions and unerring judg-

ment, did well to give us this composition in unpretentious prose, since the external incident had not in itself enough significance and sensuous beauty to present itself as a work of art. But let us open Goethe. What a beautiful and perfect composition is that majestic picture of the river from its source to the ocean in "Mahomed's Gesang," or that picture of the brave sailor from the first bright morning of his setting sail to his struggle with the unfettered storm in the "Seefahrt"! I omit to point out in detail how what was said above is here carried out in every particular, how the fascination with which we follow the birth and growth of the young stream increases with every word, if we recognize ever more clearly and surely therein the noble and eloquent image of the spirit who is born to be the leader of humanity; or if the "Seefahrt" lets us behold, in a figure surpassingly beautiful and full of meaning, the poet himself in his days of storm and stress. Such truly artistic creations have this characteristic: that they are not satisfied with the mere setting forth of a more or less strained resemblance; but their wealth, like that of all true beauty, is inexhaustible. At every step they lead us to new and wider views on all sides into the realm of the spirit; therefore their charm is indestructible.

In Schiller, also, we find many poems of a similar character. With their perfect freedom they can also assume the tone of humor and satire, as the "Theilung der Erde" and "Pegasus im Joche." I mention, further, Uhland's "Märchen vom Dornröschen," which unfolds in a most graceful manner an allegorical presentation of the development of German poetry.

No end could be found, should one wish to recount the examples of such true and successful allegories in our best poets. And now let us put the question again in a different form: *How far is allegory a defensible and artistic manner of representation?* The law may be simply stated: *In so far as a sensuously beautiful treatment, by means of a perfect resemblance of its separate parts and of the whole to certain ideas and their connection in a series, brings these ideas and their connection before the observing consciousness.* All myths and legends, in so far as they owe their origin and form to ethical or any other logical perceptions (and of such there is a great number), are in no wise different. However, it is here to be observed and carefully distinguished how far an

invention, *fashioning itself freely and unconsciously* upon the foundation of a given resemblance to special sensible forms, *has in its details departed from this foundation*. It is here important to restrict one's self in interpretation with a delicate sense of discrimination, and not to fall into the same faults in expounding as do unskilful writers of allegory in composing.

After all this exposition, who does not see that no kind of composition allows freer scope to artistic allegory than the Märchen? For, if the writer can seldom make so happy a choice from objects in the actual world that, while they remain fully themselves, they still lend themselves readily to his higher intentions, the Märchen allows him to broaden infinitely this circle of objects through his own free invention. And now I have reached the point where I am able to answer that first question: How does the Art-Märchen contrive to become like the Volksmärchen, and how does it lose this excellence?

The genuine Märchen is everywhere most closely connected with the earliest traditions of a people, with its myths and legends, and penetrates them in many ways. Thus the Grecian and the German mythologies abound in Märchen features, and the same is true of the Grecian and the German heroic legends. It is precisely these Märchen features that remain firmly implanted in the memory of the people, if other circumstances are favorable, after the decay of the real body of the myth, and furnish the motives for manifold and varied narratives. These bear the same relation to the myth as the fable about animal to the original animal-legend. So, therefore, the way in which in these narratives the limitations of nature are broken through depends by no means upon arbitrary invention (and this is true also of the *miraculous* in the Märchen); but it owes its origin and existence everywhere to those primitive ideas in accordance with which a naïve time attributes *the appearances and impressions of nature* to the power of supernatural beings—such as water sprites and elves, giants and dwarfs, mountain spirits and goblins—or gives a palpable form to its wishes and longings, to its observations, and even to its reflections, which concern ordinary life, so as to isolate them and condense them, so to speak, in marvellous forms and incidents. These last, as soon as simple faith is lost on account of their contrast with reality, easily assume an ironical, sometimes an intensely satirical, charac-

ter. The stories of the "Island of the Blest," of the "Lotus-Eaters," or of the "Magic Garden of Circe," had they belonged to the Germans, would have certainly received this coloring in after-time, as the stories of "Tischchen deck' dich," of "Scharaffenland," of "Glückssechel," of "Wünschelrute," and so many others have done. In this latter sphere the future will still be fruitful through imitation and modification. Since, now, the miraculous enters into the Volksmärchen only to open the way to a *clear, uninterrupted view*, but otherwise the usual order of things is observed, the miraculous may thus be sometimes entirely omitted, and its absence compensated for by means of a corresponding play of arbitrary chance. The unusual then performs the same service as the miraculous. Here, on the outermost limit, stand the Märchen, in which the miraculous is employed with intentional irony, as in that of the man who wished to learn how to fear, in that of the bold little tailor, or that of the seven Swabians. If, therefore, giants and dragons, dwarfs and elfs play a part, if animals speak and stones and plants are endowed with miraculous powers, if the ideas of time and space are broken through at pleasure, and if evil sorcerers and good fays are busy—all these things are introduced to bring ideal energies to view; and I do not hesitate to class them, *mutatis mutandis*, with the figures of the Grecian mythology. With these exceptions, the Märchen comprehends perfect reality and the whole wealth of the world of nature; but, within the fixed limits thus marked out, it allows the imagination full liberty to display its most graceful fancies.

But to invent such Märchen is as impossible as to compose legends; at best a happy imitation only can be attained. Success is only possible in that later-formed border-land where the Märchen has already begun to be ironical. Andersen has succeeded in this sphere, and sometimes Hauff also.

Where they have sought to treat the Märchen earnestly—that is, naïvely—both have failed, though they keep much nearer to the character of the Märchen than the writers of the romantic school and their imitators. The impossibility of adding newly invented Märchen to the genuine ones is owing to this fact: that the greatest poetical power succeeds, it is true, in forming pictures somewhat analogous to the Märchen wonders, but no genius is able to attain in original inventions to the *simplicity of those primitive*

conditions amidst which those figures first took shape. I will not speak of the writers of the romantic school, of whom Rosenkranz says so pertinently that many of them seemed to seek for the Märchen spirit by dishonoring and debasing nature; in all of them the imaginative degenerates into the fantastic, and, since they were not willing to recognize a law governing the imagination, nothing could be more acceptable to them than the theory of a kind of poetry whose character rests upon the fact that the imagination is without law. The better modern writers of Märchen also have fallen into two faults, which are, I think, inseparable from such attempts: their serious Märchen are either *fantastic* or *sentimental*. They become fantastic—that is, arbitrary, and therefore inartistic—as soon as they connect the miraculous with the conditions of daily modern life; and when every now and then they break through well-known and familiar relations they put their entire consistency in question. The more earnestly they persist in this, so much the more do they produce disagreeable and offensive impressions. *Sentimentality* results in them as soon as they apply modern modes of thought and feeling to objects in nature, which Andersen understands how to do so skilfully; they arouse then a feeling of sadness, which is also foreign to the Volksmärchen. In either case, they are for no class of readers less suitable than for children. If both faults are avoided, there remains only the direct imitation and repetition of the old motives, or the Märchen must open up for itself an entirely new region; and good modern Märchen, even those of the above-mentioned writers, have, in fact, done this. The imagination must accept the law indispensable to it, which leads it through a *definite connection of ideas*; this the writer brings to view with the abundant means which the imagination offers; in a word, *the Art Märchen attains artistic perfection in its kind only in so far as it is in a strict sense allegorical.*

Some one will ask: How about Goethe's tale for boys and his "New Melusina"? The latter is simple imitation, while the former falls into precisely the same fault as Tieck's "Elfen," in that it permits a rioting imagination to break into real life. It rests upon the charm of boyish dreaming, which beguiles the undefined longing for pleasure with a highly colored and richly embodied satisfaction. Although the Märchen of the "New Paris"

is always counted among the works of the poet's later acquired art, according to my opinion, Goethe is to be believed when he gives it out as a work of his early boyhood.

As has been said already, it is absolutely impossible to put new inventions of like art and equal birth by the side of those pictures which the faith of a people in its years of childhood has fashioned for itself *in and out of life*; the ground on which they can rest will always fail them. But in the infinitely wide realm which the modern world has acquired as its possession the poet may display to us the creative power of his imagination: he may not become weary in presenting to the senses in character and action the thousand-fold relations of thought, and in thus bringing them before the consciousness. Surely he will most often employ the simplest means to bring to view the ideas which govern life or which should serve as its guides—by the imitation of life itself. If, however, it should occur to him to seek for a connection of ideas from a higher standpoint than is afforded by the observation and representation of actual life, where everything proceeds step by step, if he should present to himself from any point of view whatsoever the development of things to the present time in a few great strokes, and upon this foundation build for himself a perspective reaching out into the distant future—should he not then venture to allow his enkindled imagination to give body and form to the spiritual powers, which show themselves to him in activity and reciprocal relation, to furnish them with corresponding qualities, and set them together in action, if only he is sure that this fruitful imagination of his will bear him beauties and not changelings? Here, then, he may deal with time and space according to his pleasure, he may place himself as master with miraculous power over all the laws of nature; and if he otherwise enjoys communion with the Muses, so much more successful will he be in creating as an individual as peoples have created, and in combining the beautiful with the momentous. Or he may turn back to the narrow circle of actual life; but it may please him to exhibit the spiritual powers which govern life not *in the individuality of the separate instance, but in the typical universality of the law*: why should he not in the same way embody these and make them perform their functions as living beings in action? In both cases the thoughts which determined the imagination to invent these forms

and set them in activity do not prevent it from communicating to them all the objective reality and truth of poetry and the full vigor of the poetic spirit, which belong to all true art; rather will a graceful freshness and a wealth of objective relations stream upon the narrative from the animating purport of the characters.

Even that unrestrained invention must have within it an impelling motive.

This is also the reason why in modern Märchen-literature, next to the allegorical, the satirical Märchen claim the first place. A careful examination of Andersen's stories will, I think, confirm this statement. Moreover, antiquity has also examples of allegorical Märchen to show, as, for example, the story of Amor and Psyche; and if many of the Socratic-Platonic fictions, as those in the Phædrus and the Symposium, cannot be regarded as such in the strictest sense—as is true also of Lessing's narrative of the three rings in "Nathan"—it is owing to the fact that these stories are episodic and not independent, and for this reason renounce epical fulness for the sake of a more striking illustration of the thoughts. The allegorical Märchen proceeds differently: when it has firmly fixed its characters, their principal relations to one another, and their developments in accordance with the leading ideas, then it creates for them a special world, in which they move freely, living, working, and creating, not so much as mere ideal functions, but with the serene grace and fulness of the whole poetical apparatus which poetry everywhere employs.

Goethe's Märchen in the "Unterhaltungen" seems to me the most perfect example of the class thus described. And therefore I think that it must be laid down as a determining test by which a correct interpretation of the same would have to establish itself—that its special Märchen charm must not be destroyed by the interpretation, that the least strain in interpretation must be avoided, that motives must be given for the existence of each character and his principal sayings, and, above all, that the poetic pleasure that the Märchen in itself affords in so high degree be enhanced by the right interpretation, both as regards the whole and each separate part.

CHAPTER II.

If none of the existing interpretations satisfies the requirements thus laid down, it is, in my opinion, owing to the fact that they all

alike err in the one point on which they are all to a greater or less extent agreed: namely, that they make the Märchen refer to the French Revolution, with which even those who find in it no political idea at least indirectly connect it. This view has seemed relevant from the circumstances of the time as well as from the introduction of the "Unterhaltungen."

If we wish to understand the state of mind in which Goethe faced the upheaval of those days, there is no better means to this end than the perusal of the writings in which, three years later to be sure, but still from notes taken at the time, he presents his experiences of it: namely, "Die Campagne in Frankreich" and "Die Belagerung von Mainz." The preliminary sketch of the "Unterhaltungen," which, as is well known, was begun as early as 1793, dates from the time in which these journals were written.

The subject of Goethe's lack of patriotism has been discussed *ad nauseam*. Of what aspersions and misconstructions in this respect he has been made the victim! To be sure, this no longer happens with the bitterness bordering on fanaticism which was displayed toward him in the thirties and forties by the prominent literary men of young Germany. Börne furnishes the most amusing illustrations of this.

A Viennese scholar had written to him of Goethe: "This man is a model of iniquity. . . . Goethe is as much worse than Voltaire as Rousseau is greater than Schiller. . . . This Goethe is a cancer on the German body, and the worst of it is that everybody regards the disease as the most exuberant health, puts Mephistopheles on the altar, and names him prince of poets. Rather would he be rightly called poet of princes and despots." In regard to this Börne makes the following remarks:

"How true, how true is all this! and how salutary it would be not to spread this opinion abroad—it is spread widely enough already—but to spread the courage to express it, that Goethe is the king of his people; cast him down, and how easily the people might be brought to reason! This man of a century has an immense power to obstruct; he is a gray cataract on the German eye, less nothing, a little piece of horn, but let it be removed, and a world is thrown open. . . . Since I began to feel, I have hated Goethe; since I began to think, I have known the reason." And in another place: "Goethe, who,

more timid than a mouse, dives into the earth at the slightest noise, and gives up everything—air, light, freedom, yea, the fullness of life, for which even inanimate stones yearn, that he may be able to gnaw at the stolen scrap of bacon, undisturbed in his hole." Scherr and Wolfg. Menzel, in order to 'proclaim their own love of freedom, sometimes speak of Goethe in a similar tone. The former, for example, calls "Tasso" an offensively servile production, the Solomon's Song of German sycophancy; and in the "Buchlein von Goethe" the following language is used: "Let twenty or thirty years pass over the land, let all the fermenting elements be sundered and held apart, let us Germans attain still more to the consciousness of our being, and then see whose favorite he still is, and what one of his forty volumes is still read."

The prophecy has not been fulfilled; but a large part of the German public, and even of the learned, still take pleasure in censuring Goethe's *political course*. There is, firstly, his lack of enthusiasm for the ideas of 1789; secondly, his acknowledgment of Napoleon; and, thirdly (the most serious reproach of all), his indifference during the war for freedom. Even Schiller does not escape these carpers; but from him the German people has a number of patriotic verses which are fitted to arouse and enkindle, and to be the decorations of the banner of the national movement, while in Goethe one seeks in vain for such pathetic summons to patriotic enthusiasm. It is true, they are not found; but if he be read, I will not say with piety, which he deserves, but only without prejudice, another thing which is more than a compensation will be found in abundance.

Before all, Goethe was not, like Schiller, of an *emotional* nature, and yet he makes out enthusiasm to be the basis of his character. From him comes the saying: "The best thing we learn from history is enthusiasm." But while with Schiller the declamatory pathos of his youth was with advancing years continually giving place to the calm serenity of a superior contemplation of the world, by Goethe the maturity requisite to this serenity was attained at a surprisingly early age. His natural disposition and his education, as well as the circumstances of his life, co-operated to this end. Schiller retained, even in his latest years, the tendency, whose exaggerated predominance is the fault of the work

of his youth, to let himself be carried away, when directly kindled with ardor for ideals abstractly conceived, and thus to give them the expression which could lay hold of them best precisely in so far as it was one-sided.

It is well known with what resistance Goethe, at the beginning of his intimate correspondence with Schiller, consented to acknowledge that he too could not do with speculative ideas; but he always returned anew to observation and experience. "Your observing gaze, which rests upon objects so quietly and clearly, never puts you in danger of going astray in the by-paths in which both speculation and arbitrary imagination, obeying itself alone, so willingly lose themselves," wrote Schiller in that celebrated letter to his new-made friend. To such a nature, what modern liberalism styles "*politische Gesinnungstuchtigkeit*" (political sentimentalism) must have been extremely odious, both in its spirit and in all its manifestations, especially as he was himself a practical and energetic statesman; that the sphere of his activity was a circumscribed one does not alter the case in the least. I mean that he held the mere sentimental longing for ideals of freedom and the angry strife over political theories to be of no value; rather did he deem them harmful in so far as they arouse the semblance of an effectual agency, which still accomplishes nothing. He once remarked against Chancellor von Müller that every opposition which did not aim at some immediate and positive result seemed to him absurd. He valued only the effectual activity. Nothing was worse to him than "to go roving about in the dark circle of endless censure of the existing order." He laid down against the Chancellor a formal theory of discontent: "What we nourish in ourselves grows; this is an eternal law of nature. There is in us an organ of ill-will and discontent, as there is one of opposition and scepticism. The more we nourish and exercise it, the greater it becomes, until at last it changes from an organ into a diseased tumor, and destroys and devours what is near it. Then, if repentance, reproach, and other absurd feelings ensue, we become unjust to others and to ourselves. Happiness in our own and others' achievements and success is lost; in despair we seek at last the cause of all evil outside ourselves, instead of finding it in our own perverseness. We should regard all men and all events in their true significance: we should

go out of ourselves in order that we may so much the more freely return to ourselves."

Naturally, therefore, we do not find in his writings philippics against tyrants and declamation in praise of freedom, and *least of all do we find summons to action in matters which do not lie within the sphere of his own work*. Nevertheless, he was in the highest sense a politician, not only on account of his quiet work in the management of the State of Weimar, but because, *with the powerful means at his command, he devoted himself incessantly and unweariedly to the immediate organic development and improvement of the existing order*. His means, however, as well as his work, were of a spiritual character. "When a poet wishes to work in politics," he says to Eckermann, "he must surrender himself to a party, and when he does that he is lost as a poet; he must say farewell to a free spirit and an unbiased judgment, and draw down over his ears the cap of prejudice and blind hate."

"The poet will *love his fatherland as a man and a citizen*; but the fatherland of his *poetic* powers and work is the good, the noble, and the beautiful, which are restricted to no particular province and no particular land, and which he grasps and fashions wherever he finds them. In this he is like the eagle which hovers over the earth with free gaze, and to which it is all the same if the hare upon which he swoops down *is running in Prussia or in Saxony*." From this quotation it is clear that Goethe meant nothing else by the narrow patriotism of which he disapproves than what we in like manner condemn under the name of "particularismus."

"And what is the meaning," he continues, "of loving one's fatherland and of working for one's country? If a poet were to make it his lifelong care to fight against harmful prejudices, to remove narrow views, to refine the spirit of the people, to purify its tastes, and to ennoble its ways of feeling and thinking, how could he be better employed? How could he work more patriotically? To make demands on a poet so improper and so inconceivable would be like requiring of the commander of a regiment that, in order to be a true patriot, he must involve himself in political innovations, and thereby neglect his proper occupation. The fatherland of the commander of a regiment is his regiment, and he will be a thoroughly good patriot if he gives no care to

political affairs, except so far as they concern himself; and if, on the other hand, he devotes all his thought and care to the battalions intrusted to him, and seeks to exercise them and keep them in good order and discipline, so that, if the fatherland come into danger, they may play their part as capable men."

"I hate all dabbling as a sin, especially dabbling in the affairs of state, from which nothing but harm results to thousands and millions."

In another passage, in which he proclaims himself a friend of the *established order*, but only so far as it is *excellent, good, and just*, he says: "Only that is good for a nation which has come forth out of its own heart and its own general need, without mimicking another. . . . All attempts to introduce any foreign innovations whatsoever, for which there is not a deeply rooted need in the nation's own heart, are therefore foolish, and all proposed revolutions of this sort are without success; for they are without God, who holds himself aloof from such bungling. If, however, there is present in a nation the genuine need of a great reform, God is with it, and it succeeds. He was plainly with Christ and his first followers; for the appearance of the new Gospel of Love was a need of the nations. He was plainly with Luther also, for the purification of this Gospel, which had been corrupted by priestcraft, was no less a need. Both of these great movements, however, were unfriendly to the existing order; both were eagerly pushed through, that the old leaven might be thrown away and that falsehood, injustice, and imperfection might be able no longer to remain and grow."

He expresses himself against Kanzler in regard to the reactionary movements of the twenties as follows: "In the principle of maintaining the present order and preventing revolutions, I am in perfect agreement with you; in the means to this end I am not; for you call to aid stupidity and darkness; I, reason and light."

And so he finds Germany's hopes for a realization of union in efforts to promote commerce and economic union. He finds its greatness and its hope "in the wonderful popular culture (*Volkscultur*) which has penetrated uniformly all parts of the Empire."

Therefore he consecrated his whole life to the promotion of this culture.

Thus his patriotism was to serve the fatherland with his abilities as poet. The passionless calm which enabled him to view with wonderful serenity the disturbed spectacle around him came to him early in life, and it arose from this: that from his early youth he had sunk the firm roots of his strength deep down in the fruitful soil of a genuine activity, consecrated to the fatherland. Not that he lacked loving enthusiasm (who was richer in it than he?), but the peculiar endowment of his nature, and the peculiar strength and patience with which he developed it, enabled him to look, with gaze directed into the future, beyond the passionate arguments of the restricted strife of the day, and to preserve his equipoise in the justice of his feeling and thinking. Thus there grew up in him the nobly superior and truly impartial temper with which he dared to face the world-events.

Is this an easy, self-indulgent remissness, a haughty withdrawal from the duties of a citizen? Thus forsooth it has been styled by those modern prophets of freedom whose power has its beginning and end in frothy phrases. Let him who does not find the refutation in each of his works consider the daily, laborious activity of the man; let him regard him when before Mayence he throws himself into the midst of an excited mob and saves from it the victims ordained to certain death.

That calm in view of the events of the time, which appears in the "Campagne in Frankreich," in the "Belagerung von Mainz," and in so many of his other works, and which procured for him bitter enemies, is not the calm of remissness, but that of power, which may have been for him very often the fruit of severe internal conflict. He thus expresses himself at the close of the "Campagne" in the unpretentious manner peculiar to him: "Moreover, let it here be remarked that, in all important political events, those spectators who side with a party are always best off: what is really favorable to them they seize upon with joy; the unfavorable they ignore, set aside, or interpret altogether to their advantage. But the poet, who in accordance with his nature must continue to be neutral, seeks to thoroughly understand the circumstances of both contending parties, in which position he must make up his mind to end tragically, if mediation is impossible. And with what a cycle of tragedies did we see ourselves threatened by that raging commotion of the world!"

And thus he stood in relation to the events in France: "That which busied me inwardly always appeared to me in dramatic form; and as the story of the necklace struck me as a melancholy prophecy, so did the Revolution itself much more strike me as a most frightful fulfilment; I saw the throne pulled down and dashed to pieces, first a great nation, and, after our unfortunate campaign, plainly the world itself pushed from its grooves.

"While all this was oppressing and harassing my mind, I was grieved to see that in the fatherland men were amusing themselves with ideas which prepared for us a similar fate.

"I knew men of very noble nature who gave themselves up in imagination to certain opinions and hopes without comprehending either themselves or the facts, while thoroughly bad persons were endeavoring to arouse, increase, and take advantage of a bitter depression."

And further: "The portrayal of the state of public feeling continued to be to me a kind of gently consoling occupation. 'Die Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten,' a fragmentary effort, the unfinished sketch, 'Die Aufgeregten,' are confessions of what was then going on in my bosom; as also later 'Hermann und Dorothea' flowed from the same source, which then at last dried up."

That neutral standpoint of the poet is shown in a conspicuous manner in the "Unterhaltungen." A German family of the Transrhenane aristocracy, driven into exile by the wars of the Revolution, enters into social relations on assured German soil with the heavy manners of the fatherland. The many different opinions entertained of the Revolution and its meaning for the world are given an expression, and by mutual provocation the company become more and more discourteous in their remarks, so that at last an intercourse which was desired by all, and which in the disturbed state of the times seemed to be doubly demanded through mutual forbearance and assistance, is irreparably broken off. No more favorable situation could have been found to bring into clear view the ground-principle of Goethe's political ideas; the strife of words impedes and destroys; only unselfish action brings growth and advancement. The Baroness thus expresses herself in the very beginning: "As the travelling Englishman is never without his tea-kettle in the four quarters of the globe, so is the rest of

mankind everywhere attended with proud pretences, vanity, unreasonableness, impatience, obstinacy, perverseness in judgment, and the desire to do their neighbors some injury. . . . How seldom do we see a man of pure virtue who is impelled to live and sacrifice himself for others!" It does not check the disposition to hector one another that the privy-chancellor joins the circle: "A man to whom the business engaged in from youth had become a need, who deserved and possessed the confidence of his prince. He held strenuously to principles and had his peculiar ways of thinking on many matters. He was exact in speech and act, and demanded the same from others. Consistency in action seemed to him the highest virtue. His prince, the land, and he himself had suffered much from the invasion of the French. He had learned the capriciousness of the nation which only talked of law, he had learned the tyranny of those who always had the word freedom on the tongue; he had seen that even in this case the great multitude remained true to themselves, and took the word for the deed, the appearance for the possession, with the greatest ardor."

Opposed to him is Carl, the nephew of the Baroness, an enthusiastic friend of the new French, "whose sentiments he judged from the public speech and expressions of individuals," and greeted with indiscriminate praise. The strife rages with the greatest vehemence in passing judgment on the clubs of Mayence, for the attempt to transfer the innovations to German soil is here in question. The discussion takes the same course that Goethe had so often, to his great disgust, seen it take about him—the course to which, as if in accordance with an inherent law of nature, political controversies are at all times exposed, though circumstances may be only approximately related; it ends in violent dissension.

The unpleasantness which takes possession of the disturbed circle is gradually removed by the wise and potent influence of the Baroness, who pleads eloquently for an intercourse ennobled by spiritual culture and maintained by self-control. They hit upon the expedient of confining the necessary expression of warmly cherished opinions to the restricted intercourse with those of like opinions, while the conversation of the larger social circle shall consist of pleasant interchange of ideas upon what is worthy

of knowledge, upon the beautiful, and upon subjects interesting to mankind in general. Thus the introduction to the "Unterhaltung" does much more than merely make the frame for the following stories; by the excellent way in which it presents Goethe's opinion upon the unendurableness of so-called "political" discussion and upon the worth of real and genuine conversation, it permits us to recognize in a decisive manner his attitude toward the French Revolution. Through what has reason in the fiery language of Carl, he pays full recognition to the just impulses and demands of the Revolution, while at the same time its errors are pointed out in the clearest manner in the arguments of the privy-counsellor, and the attempts to transplant to Germany the Revolution which had become unavoidable in France are most emphatically condemned.

Now, after the ghost stories and the fictitious narratives with which the old man entertains the company, follows the Märchen, the unmistakably political features of which have led the commentators to the conclusion that Goethe has in a droll fashion introduced anew the subject of the Revolution, which had been particularly forbidden. I think that they are right who will not impute to Goethe such an act, as not being in good taste. Moreover, I am convinced that Goethe was as heartily disgusted with this subject as were the characters of his imaginary conversations. But if disagreeable discussion of the burning topics of the day had been forbidden, where is it written in the introduction to the "Unterhaltungen" that all reflections upon the great historical events of ancient and modern times, of their own country and of foreign lands, were also interdicted? On the other hand, should not these, in so far as they did not stir up passionate strife, be regarded as included among the most desirable subjects of a lively and agreeable conversation? This is precisely what the Baroness says: "How long it is, dear Carl, since you have told us anything of distant lands and kingdoms, of whose condition, inhabitants, manners, and customs you have such interesting information! How long it is (she addresses the chancellor) since you ceased to speak of ancient and modern history, comparing century with century, individual with individual!"

Again, just before the beginning of the Märchen, when the clergyman introduces this rule of life as containing the moral of

the preceding narrative: "Truly, every one should vow to practise, not always, but at the proper time, both abstinence as regards himself and obedience to others," the Baroness answers with the following general political observation: "Thus in a state also everything should depend upon the executive power; let the legislative power be as wise as you will, it profits the state nothing if the executive is not strong."

To speak briefly, a careful examination of the whole subject, and especially of the *Märchen*, has led me to this conclusion: that the *Märchen* has nothing whatever to do with the Revolution, but that it is political through and through; *it is concerned with the German fatherland*; it represents how, amidst the unsatisfactory and hopeless conditions of the Empire, the forces of the nation, awakened by movements of the highest consequence, begin to arouse themselves to an ever increasingly significant activity; how, with a consciousness which continually becomes clearer, they all in unison devote themselves ever more earnestly to a great task; in a truly prophetic vision it makes all these forces by their united action bring the work of the redemption and new birth of the nation to a glorious consummation.

When the bridge is built and the temple stands at the river, then will the nation be established in internal union and externally armed strength. The following expression of Goethe's, in his letter to Schiller of September 25, 1795, has also for me this meaning: "Blessed are they who write *Märchen*, for *Märchen* are the order of the day. The Landgrave of Darmstadt has arrived in Eisenach with two hundred horse, and the exiles there threaten to move their quarters thither. The Elector of Aschaffenburg is expected in Erfurth.

"Ah, why does not the temple stand at the river?"

Ah, why is the bridge not built?"

"In the mean time, since we continue to be men and authors in spite of all, I hope that my new production may not displease you. I have this time experienced again how serious every trifle becomes when it is handled according to the rules of art. I hope that the eighteen figures of this drama will be welcome to the lovers of riddles as so many riddles."

This is the only time that Goethe lifts the veil.

It was the time when, after the treaty of Basel, the Empire was

torn asunder through the efforts of Prussia to bring the individual states to separate treaties of peace, and of Austria to hold them in her policy. But when, at the reopening of the campaign, the French pushed over the Rhine in swift advance, disorder reached its height. When the victors themselves were seen to take refuge in timid anxiety behind the protecting neutral line, when now it became evident to all the world that the Empire had ceased to exist even in name, then Goethe wrote those resigned lines. In accordance with his character, it was only for a moment that he permitted his inward feelings in regard to the world's events to be seen; his connection with the Duke had made his firm self-suppression from the first in these matters a habit not to be broken. In his correspondence with his friend he returns immediately to æsthetic interests. But it is not to be misunderstood when precisely in this connection he designates the characters of his Märchen as riddles.

The one expression of Schiller's which permits us to draw a conclusion as to his opinion of the Märchen shows that he also gave to it a political meaning: "By your manner of treatment you have laid upon yourself the obligation to make the whole symbolic. One cannot help looking for a meaning in every point," he writes on August 29th. And on October 16th: "It is indeed a pleasure to me to know that you are far from the affairs on the Maine. The *shadow of the Giant* might easily touch them somewhat roughly. It often strikes me as strange, when I think of you as thus cast out into the world, while I sit between my paper window-panes and have only paper before me, and that we can still be near each other and understand each other."

It seems to me unquestionable that Schiller explained to himself the other figures of the Märchen also in a political sense. However, I am convinced that Goethe never gave to him or to any other a connected explanation; no, he is very willing to be his own interpreter, and least of all may the poet undertake this office with regard to the pictures of his own imagination.

Everybody might try to understand it, and he who did not understand it might take it for a meaningless play of the imagination. Very often may Goethe have entrenched himself behind such a position in view of pressing questions and friendly insinuations. Or is it to be taken as the truth rather than as a clever

and delicately ironical evasion, when he writes to W. von Humboldt: "It was a really hard task to express myself at once in a significant and in an insignificant manner"? An intended mystification, then, treated, as he says to Schiller, earnestly and according to the rules of art! I would not believe it even if I did not see in the *Märchen* itself the clear proof to the contrary. The following sentences of Goethe's to Riemer, in 1809, also speak to the contrary: "The *Märchen* seems to me precisely like the Revelation of Saint John, which is still made to refer to Napoleon. Everybody feels that there is something contained in it, but knows not what."

Surely there was no course open to him but to renounce interpretation, *and the fact that he had composed no ordinary allegory, but a Märchen, enabled him to do this and provided him with a justification sufficient for all time.* Thus is the Xenion to be understood:

"More than twenty characters take part in the *Märchen*.

'And what, then, do they all make?'

'The *Märchen*, my friend!'

The play of the artistic imagination cannot dispense with an earnest significance, but the rational meaning must be so completely melted in the fire of beauty that it dwells in the characters of the narrative as their own spirit; the extraneous spirit of the poet must not from the outside and in a distinct manner determine them. Goethe wrote to Schiller on February 4, 1797, with precisely this idea in mind: "Perhaps the idea which has come to me will develop into a *Märchen*. It is now altogether too rational and distinct; therefore it does not quite please me; but if I can drive the little boat around well on the ocean of the imagination, there will still perhaps result an indifferent composition, which will please people more than if it were better." And just so I understand the above-mentioned letter to Humboldt, in which with the finest irony he deduces precisely what he (Humboldt) had not been able to find in the *Märchen*. "It is truly a difficult task to be at the same time significant and insignificant. I have another *Märchen* in mind, which, however, will become entirely allegorical when taken inversely; it would therefore have to be a very subordinate work of art if I did hope by a very lively treatment to banish at each moment the thought of allegory." Finally,

I find precisely the same thought in the words of the "Unterhaltungen" which immediately precedes the Märchen. "The imagination," says Carl to the old man, "is a fine faculty; yet I like not when she works on what has actually happened; the airy forms she creates are welcome as things of their own kind; but, uniting with truth, she produces oftenest nothing but monsters, and seems to me, in such cases, to fly into direct variance with reason and common sense. She ought, you might say, to hang upon no object, to force no object upon us; she must, if she is to produce works of art, play like a sort of music upon us; move us within ourselves, and this in such a way that we forget that there is anything without us producing the movement."

This extreme view, which Goethe puts into the mouth of one of his characters—the same which the writers of the romantic school subsequently seized upon—he modifies in the reply of the old man.

"Proceed no further with your conditionings! To enjoy a product of the imagination, this also is a condition, that we enjoy it unconditionally; for Imagination cannot condition and bargain; she must await what shall be given her. She forms no plans, prescribes for herself no path, but is borne and guided by her own opinions; and, hovering hither and thither, marks out the strangest courses, which in their direction are ever altering. Let me but on my evening walk call up again to life within me some wondrous figures I was wont to play with in earlier years. This night I promise you a tale which shall remind you of nothing and of all."

And now I have reached the point where I may announce my conclusion.

Goethe's production is a *true Märchen*; his characters act as real beings, endowed with *individual, independent* life, and placed in *effectual* activity by an *unfettered imagination*. What Schlegel says of the Märchen is perfectly true: "A series of the most lovely pictures lead us on; sometimes they display an amusing and then again a serious character. Never was grief more touching than that of the fair Lily; indeed, she arouses a sensation as when one breathes the fragrance of the flower whose name she bears."

Though the tale is a true Märchen, its figures, however, are not

the result of mere caprice, but are fashioned upon the basis of reality by the magic power of the imagination; and, even so, their unconstrained acts and movements are no motley "play of flourishes and arabesques," but are imperceptibly governed by the same law that breathed life into them. Nevertheless, it is allegorical through and through, for these figures in their acts and movements permit us to recognize a grand series of thoughts in most significant connection. Since, however, these ideas and figures always conceal themselves perfectly by means of perfect resemblance, this allegory becomes a perfect poem, as every truly artistic allegory becomes a true work of art.

Goethe could find no more wholesome means to counteract successfully the harassing influence of the unavoidable events of the time than, perceiving the distress of the fatherland, to turn his gaze upon the powerful forces which had been already long engaged in strife, but which promised to him in the far-off glorious future a sure and beautiful victory.

The *Märchen* contains the prediction of this future, which rests upon the success of *the work* to which Goethe devoted the best part of his powers.

Precisely for this reason mention of the redemption could never come from him.

The open secret was closed for the people of that time, and it concealed itself also from those who came after, until the partial fulfilment of that vision made it easier to lift the veil.

But the question whether the interpretation which I shall seek to carry out on the foundation specified is correct when taken as a whole, and also satisfactory in its details, must be answered by another question, whether it meets the demands laid down by me above—viz., "that the *Märchen* charm must not be destroyed by the interpretation, that all strained explanations must be avoided, and, above all, that the poetic pleasure must become richer, deeper, and more lively as regards the whole and the separate parts."

CHAPTER III.

When, four years ago, through the mighty events of the war, the dream of the German people had become a reality with wonderful quickness, one might say over night, then, however, in the midst of the immeasurable rejoicing of those days men began very

soon to look backward with the question: How did so great a result become possible? How is the unprecedented to be understood? And though the wonder of so great blessings cannot be reckoned and explained, still the survey of the past throws a clearer light upon the present, and if by this means success is attained in understanding present relations with clearer consciousness, it opens also a wider and surer view into the future.

Among the many voices which were then raised to remind our people of the duty of self-examination, a work of Herinnann Baumgarten, "How we have again become a People," justly won especial attention and general acceptance, on account of the depth of the thoughts, the clearness and fervor of the style, and the high and wide sweep of its national enthusiasm.

The forces to whose divided but still incessantly working activity the author herein attributes the maintenance and regeneration of our national existence, to whose final union and inseparable fellowship he ascribes the victory and the hope of the future—these are precisely the forces, as I think, which disclosed themselves to the inward-gazing eye of Goethe in the main features of their being and activity—the powers whose disconnected development and final union he symbolically represented in the fictions of the Märchen, which at first seemed so singular. The resemblance is so exact as to extend sometimes in the details even, I might say, to the verbal expression.

The writer of this essay starts out with the assertion that we Germans, who may be the most learned people in the most different branches of knowledge, know less of our own history than most civilized nations. After the Staufen-time there yawns a broad chasm. "Luther would be a man in whom the knowledge and sympathy of the Germans might meet again, if it had not been written in the book of our fate that the same great movement which should first disclose the superiority of the Germans in those characteristics which most lend to nations the condition of permanence—viz. : conscientiousness, earnest recognition of the truth, unselfish submission to the pure forces of the inward life—that even this reformatory movement should separate us more widely than any earlier dissension had done."

Two forces were needed to raise the German people out of the abyss of weakness, incapacity, and self-contempt in which they

were sunk in the seventeenth century ; besides that spirit-building there was needed a state-building force. " We had to be saved from that miserable ruin which was called the German Empire ; from the demoralizing, land-destroying imposture of the decayed institutions of the Empire." " We had to win again what till then had been a matter of course for all nations, since it alone makes national existence possible—viz., the political organism which holds together the limbs of the nation, which orders, educates, and protects."

The author then shows how against the injurious influence of the Jesuitical-Ultramontane policy of the Hapsburger and Wittelsbacher houses, and also, on the other hand, against the narrow zeal of ultra-Lutheranism, the first savior arose in the Brandenburg-Prussian state, which had become strong in long and hard strifes : it was Frederick William, the great Elector. How a century later all Germany greeted with joy the Great Frederick, " who with a mighty impulse threw open for us the long-closed doors of national power." " Even then our whole existence came under the determining influence of the Prussian leadership. The example set by Frederick of a statesmanship enlightened, conscientious, absolutely free from all dependence upon the confessional, and yet warmed by the breath of religion, carried forward with it everything that among us was capable of life. First Austria felt the salutary necessity, in the presence of such an enemy, of casting off the stupid traditions of the good old Jesuit times and of striving after something of Prussian order and activity in finances, military affairs, and education. In the North and the South the small German states were irresistibly pushed into the Prussian path, which, indeed, to a certain extent, all Europe was obliged to follow. *It became clear among us !*"

When thus the state-forming germs began to develop so mightily, the spirit-forming forces were engaged in a similar development, which was rich in results. But they still stood almost without touching each other, almost, like enemies, opposed to each other. " This German people, which in its youth had given itself so unreservedly to the ideals of mediæval life that in them it completely forgot its national needs ; which afterward, at the coming of the new time, embraced with an altogether similar idealism the most bigoted features of the Reformation, the world-forgetting life of

faith; this people, in fine, which had been bitterly tried by the weakness of the state's authority, but was only so much the more accustomed to the charms of a cosmopolitan individuality—could be brought again only by degrees to the rigid discipline and the practical rigor of political existence. It might be said that the genuine German temper had become hostile to the state." The great German king and the great German literature of the eighteenth century were strangers to each other, and so much the more so as the former avowed himself a pupil of the French literature of enlightenment, against which our German criticism, though greatly indebted to it, had immediately declared war.

"He was travelling the rough, stony way of his 'great policy, while we were languishing in the first love of youth for all that was beautiful, ennobling, and moving, and were abiding in the tearful ecstasy of a people awakened out of tedious, commonplace prose to the first presentiments of poetry." "At such a time the German spirit naturally took its boldest flight into the pure realm of eternal truth and beauty, and utterly despised what it considered the restricted efforts of statesmen, who are always tied down to a given work, and have scarcely in the dark background of their endeavors the sublime aims of humanity."

Moreover, our great literature did not spring from an impulse of the united forces of the nation, as the literature of most peoples has done, but its development was internal, independent, and restricted to itself. "The whole foundation of this spiritual building was laid in arduous and preponderantly learned labor. Our poetry of the last century proceeded in its beginnings not from joyous observation, but in a preponderant degree from study; not from large experience of life, but from careful investigations or internal reflection. This characteristic of it was first pushed into the background with the appearance of Goethe. But even in him, and still more in Schiller, *the realm of ideas* was a source of poetical inspiration." "As this literature had worked its way upward independently of all national activity, so it continued to keep in view the highest ideal sphere, the purely human." "The realm of ideas in which they lived and labored lay too high above small earthly affairs."

But at this point I must turn aside somewhat from the presentation which I have followed so long.

The author goes on to say in greater detail that, though the nation had never seen such an abundance of genial forces active in the spiritual realm, it still could not escape the great humiliation under the yoke of Napoleon. He makes it a reproach against those great masters in the domain of the spirit, even against a Goethe, though in the mildest way, that they did not recognize "that a harmonious human culture cannot be won without political activity." That striving after the beautiful, great and rich in results as it was, that æsthetic culture was too exclusive, too aristocratic. "The great majority of mankind receive the most important ideas in religious form, and their most powerful incentives through a soundly developed popular and national life." That is, indeed, a true and profound remark; and what follows is also true—viz., that the sword must speak in order to make certain facts and certain ideas intelligible to the nations, that it is a fatal error of the idea to trust in its own independent excellence, that it only becomes powerful in the actual world when it conquers the moral sphere of self-sacrificing action. This is undoubtedly true, and in the presentation under consideration altogether in place; but I do object to the reproach that is here made against our poets and thinkers who sought for exact justice in what they did, and also attained to it. Before all Goethe. I have said before that the fatherland was by no means a matter of indifference to him, which he thought he could do without; that, on the contrary, he had a deep conviction that all his work was bound up with the fatherland and conditioned upon it. But an individual is of no avail; he must combine with many at the right time. Let each do his duty in the widest and fullest sense, and complete success cannot fail to be the result.

That which was still wanting to our people to enable it to attain to a worthy national life could no more be procured for it by a glorious spiritual culture for itself *alone* than this end could be gained without this culture. But while the leaders of the spiritual movement were going as far in science and art as their powers reached, they were providing in the best way that, when the great moment should come, it would find a great generation. So the author is just when he says of German science that later, paying no attention to the weak beginnings of political life in the

South-German Chambers, it continued to dig in the deepest mine of truth. I consider what follows untrue: "As Lessing, Goethe, and Schiller confined us altogether to purely spiritual interests, they certainly helped to prepare the wretched calamity of 1806." I believe that this calamity had an entirely different cause, and those who were to blame for it were not afflicted with great idealism. And for this reason every one will the more readily agree to the following sentences: "Did not the German mind, instructed by them, become gloriously open in the national work of Stein, Gneisenau, Fichte, and Schleiermacher?" And further: "For it was really only a question of time when the capacity for truth and scientific work, steeled in purely spiritual matters, should be capable of political tasks also."

I am of the opinion that precisely this view of things comes to light in the few passages from Goethe cited above; and I have here presented this whole circle of ideas in connection, because within it the figures and events of the *Märchen* seem to me to move.

Not that I find in the *Märchen* a special prediction of Prussia's calling and future greatness, or even of the French war. Nor do I see in it a polemic against Jesuitism and the Ultramontane policy which have done so great harm to the cause of Germany. In the first place, Goethe was very far from conceiving a union of Germany under the leadership of Prussia (he incidentally expresses himself against Eckermann very plainly upon this point); and then a connection of imagination with reality going so into particulars would naturally have resulted in those frightful monstrosities of which the immediate introduction to the *Märchen* speaks. More than this: all polemical negation lies far from him; he leaves the strife of already existing parties and the question of the practical shaping of the future untouched. *On the other hand, his gaze falls upon all the positive forces that exist in the nation; it lets him survey the work done by them, and shows him how they, developing together, attain to the goal desired by all; it shows him that the spiritual forces only attain to their full strength in union with the political, that the latter are first unfettered by the former, and that through their joint influence the redemption of all is accomplished.*

I cannot refrain from introducing here a remarkable testimony of how far men now living were from anticipating, forty years

ago, the development of German affairs as it has now come about. In an article in his historical periodical, in 1832, thus immediately after the death of Goethe, Leopold Ranke thus discusses the question "Of the Separation and Union of Germany": "Although those fanciful expectations—of an hereditary Emperor and a German King at his side, of a Chamber of Peers of the German Princes and a lower House of Commoners; or of a President of the union holding office for a term of years, with a Senate of Princes and a House with its members chosen from the separate states—have often been proposed and have never accomplished anything, men are not yet weary of repeating them; and even if these expectations were fulfilled, they would satisfy those who entertain them least of all."

"If our ancestors ventured to speak of things so far reaching, they clothed them in the cloak of plays of the imagination." The author of the Quixotic "*Simplicissimus*" is then mentioned as the first to speak of a German Parliament.

"He treats the idea in a jesting spirit," adds Ranke, "but with us similar thoughts, which launch out even more widely, are expressed in manifold forms, with earnestness, pathos, and apparent hope."

"Those visionary wishes are nothing but the reaction from an unsatisfactory condition." "A natural, sound condition is recognized in this, that idea and reality lose themselves in one another, the ideal working in things themselves, fashioning and giving life." While the author considers only the possibilities of a union of Germany, in order not to fall into the error which precludes all success—viz., that of striving after the impossible and of seeking for the desirable beyond the limits of the attainable—having examined into the separating forces, he sets forth the positive forces which permit a final union to be hoped for. He finds them in the development of three joint affairs—the military system, the press, and commerce—which concern security, spiritual development, and material well-being. He puts in the highest place the strong development of the means of defence; the next in importance is "the great possession which the German nation acquired in the last century—our literature. It has become one of the most potent forces of our union; in it we first became really conscious again of union. It now creates the atmosphere in

which our childhood grows, our youth breathes, which animates all the arteries of our being with original vitality. Let it be acknowledged that no German would be what he is without it." Finally, the third force is the fostering of trade and commerce—economic union.

One sees that these are the same causes which afterward, in reality, showed themselves to be accomplishing the union, the influences of which, coming to the front by turns and in the end united, Baumgarten, looking backward, brings clearly to our perception. But if even the historian, when he brings to view the politics of the future, confines himself so wisely to a general consideration of ideal forces, and carefully avoids prescribing for them a definitely formalized development, how much more should we expect the same from the poet, to whom the dream of a union of his nation presents itself as a poetic vision!

And now to the Märchen itself. When we consider how in the mind of the poet all those great forces which constitute the life of the nation—viz., science, religion, art, literature, and even beauty and truth—present themselves united in joint activity, and yet not in an abstract and general way, but as they exist and work in Germany, and in a definite time and manner make a part of its progressive history, and as they come into relation with the political forces of the people, is it possible to cast a glance into the inner workshop of the poetical imagination and to conjecture how it happens that such ideas take shape? Surely we may believe that even chance outward impressions have an influence in this process; and the following communication, which we receive from C. Schönborn, is worthy of thanks: "While wandering up and down in the 'Paradies,' a pleasure-walk along the bank of the Saale, near Jena, Goethe saw on the other side of the river, in a shady and blooming meadow, a beautiful woman (probably the wife of Prof. Schütz), whom nature had gifted with a splendid voice, clad in a white dress and bright-colored hat, strolling about with other ladies; and he heard her song over the water. Near the park lived an old man, who for a small fare would carry over to the other bank in a little skiff any one who wished it. When twilight was coming on there came a party of students to the bank, who with the help of the old man crossed the river, laughing, and rocking the boat. That evening awoke in Goethe, as he

once said, the thought of the Märchen with the green snake." However real such impressions may be for giving the impulse to the invention of this or that situation, they are always only the impulse which gives shape to already existing material. It seems to me possible to push forward at least a few steps farther into the interior of the workshop. I mean that language itself has hidden within it a multitude of germs and suggestions for the presentation of the spiritual world under bodily forms, and that the poet who lets these germs develop and bloom in a self-created magic garden is even thus maintaining a connection with the poetizing soul of the people. Let us consider only the series of metaphors that we find in the Märchen. There is the still-illuminating but wonder-working light of science; and scattered gold, meaning the results and catch-words of a new and enlightening education of the spirit, spread everywhere in popular form. (Golden grains of corn is a common figure for significant thoughts.) We speak of the current of the time, of the stream of events, or of history, of the ferryman who steers his boat through it, whether it be the bark of his own fate, or that he makes the passage in the service and interest of others. We speak of golden wisdom and brazen power, of the brightness and splendor of majesty, of the realm of ideas. We speak of Truth as an inaccessible Urania in her crown of rays, who, gracefully decked with the veil of poetry, becomes visible as Beauty to mortal eyes. So language speaks also of the consuming thirst for truth, of crippling reflection, and of the pallor of thought; and language likes also to invert the figure, and speaks of those who stand blinded and condemned to inactivity at the sight of a supernatural glory, as chained by the power of an eye on whose gaze they hang. One pays the necessary tribute to his time by submitting to the conditions under which alone it allows efficiency to become possible. If, on the one hand, the superstitions of the people extend like shadows into the world of ideas, on the other hand, though they are unsubstantial and without indwelling, conscious will, they are capable, being encompassed by mighty giant-forces, of causing decay and destruction. Within such a circle of living motives, then, it may also be allowed the poet, freely inventing, to add new figures analogous to these well-known ones, provided that the most prominent are able to approach the reader familiarly.

I consider the Will-o'-the-wisps especially as such happily chosen figures.

Of Wekhrin, one of the most prominent political writers of the eighteenth century, one of his contemporaries, Schlözer, who is related to him in many ways, says that "he shot over Germany like a comet." It is a similar figure and one often employed to compare those restless spirits who are now here, now there, always ready and clever in speech, incessantly busy in taking up ideas and spreading them abroad, seldom themselves of a great and deep nature, but constantly the bearers of significant thoughts—to compare such men as Schubart, Wekhrin, Schlözer, Huber, Görres, and so many others to Will-o'-the-wisps scattering gold; for though they perform great and indispensable services, they cause error also, and lead many a one astray. "When the political writer spreads new, true, and important ideas among his readers," says Schlözer in his letters to Eichstedt, "they examine them, and take steps accordingly. When he collects and copies the important ideas of others for hundreds of thousands—that is, has them printed—hundreds of thousands, surely, learn something important, which before perhaps not a hundred knew, and take steps accordingly. That is, the writer works in his readers. In this way the English have maintained their charter, and through this influence, if God is willing, in fifty years there will no longer be a serf in Germany. Political writers have brought about the restriction of torture; they have made it possible for an honorable German woman to grow old with honor, and without fear of being burned as a witch." Even as late as 1782 such a trial for witchcraft had occasioned Wekhrin's celebrated contention with the magistrate of the Canton of Glarus. How much influence the journals of this man gained, which he edited in the following order—"Die Chronologen," "Das Graue Ungeheuer," "Hyperboräische Briefe," "Die Paragraphen"—may be judged from the fact that a great number of prominent men of all ranks assisted him with contributions. Of these are mentioned Duke Carl von Sachsen-Meiningen, Beck, Bürger, Dohn, Forster, Merck, J. von Müller, Planck, Salzmann, Schlözer, Thümmel, and even Reinhold. This whole movement, however, was dependent in the highest degree upon French literature. Rousseau, Montesquieu, the encyclopædists, and, above all, Voltaire, were their

heroes; of the last of whom Carlyle says that "if he and his work were struck out of the history of the eighteenth century, it would make a greater difference in the present condition of affairs than could be said of any other man of the last century." Many of these political writers owed a substantial part of their training to social intercourse in Parisian salons, and in language and character showed the influence of the French nature. According to the spirit of the time, they contended, in the first place, in the province of religion, and only in a subordinate degree for political and social interests; in this latter field even such a man as Justus Möser ranks with them, though the spirit of his writings was very different.

Having made the necessary introduction, I think I may now bring forward the Will-o'-the-wisps as somewhat more familiar personalities. In the midst of the night they awaken the old man with loud cries. While he is carrying them over the river, they hiss together in a very rapid tongue, and every now and then break out into loud laughter, hopping back and forth upon the sides of the boat. They laugh still more at the warning to be seated, boasting of their superiority to the snake that no one of their race has ever "sat." The French traits of lightness, liveliness, and sometimes of frivolity, but always a certain ready cleverness, characterize them throughout the whole Märchen, as in their behavior to the Lily, before whom they conduct themselves very politely. "They said quite ordinary things with the greatest assurance and much emphasis." Moreover, a busy, tireless unrest characterizes them; they incessantly scatter their gold, and know how to take it up again everywhere with the greatest dexterity.

They seek the fair Lily, but, without knowing it, come from the bank on which she has her abode; however, having come to the other bank, they begin even there their activity rich in good results for all; indeed, by this roundabout way they attain their goal and gain the desired meeting with the fair Lily and her attendants; and it is they who alone at last are able to unlock the temple.

Unsatisfactory circumstances, an incomplete present, and an unfulfilled longing lay a feeling of deep resignation upon all the characters of the Märchen. Only the Man with the Lamp looks calmly into the future, though by himself he is not able to help;

but the noble youth has fallen into hopeless discouragement; and even the fair Lily, "removed from sweet, human enjoyment," leads only a half-existence. With the entrance of the Will-o'-the-wisps a new life begins to stir in this magic circle. Here and there, without purpose and unconscious of the consequences, they give impulse and incitement, which, falling upon momentous forces, lead to most important events. These forces, now endowed with life before our eyes, come forth into an activity which mounts continually higher, becoming ever more joyous with hope; the carelessly scattered gold becomes through them an illuminating, wonder-working light, which proves itself equally effectual for bringing to view what had hitherto been longed for, indeed, but never yet beheld, for the maintenance of what had been endangered, and for the upbuilding of the future.

The forces thus upraised and working in ever-increasing harmony are not able to avert the catastrophe which the ill-omened helplessness of the youth has enabled us long since to anticipate; after the misfortune has happened we see the Lights busy with quiet but redoubled activity, guarding and upholding the endangered forces of life, and opening the path to final perfect salvation and completion.

The condition of German affairs in the eighteenth century is represented in bold and general strokes. A people in whom the noblest spiritual forces are efficaciously working, finds itself, nevertheless, in the condition of a crippled existence, for all political institutions are wanting to it. Science, religion, literature, and art can, indeed, furnish it with ideas and theories, with hundred-fold salutary forces, but there is lacking the substantial edifice of great and serviceable state-forms, by which, on the one hand, the capacity of the people can be unfettered, and, on the other hand, its noblest spiritual efforts can receive at last the proper sanction. *The temple does not stand at the river*—that is, the organic, efficient political establishment, which according to its nature must be at once great and beautiful, has not yet become a reality, has not been set up in the course of events, close to the banks which hem in the rushing stream of history. *The bridge is not yet built*—that is, the mass of the people are still cut off from the land which lies for them on the further side of the river of life; only a few may cross by various means to the other side.

That other bank is the realm of the spirit, the land of ideas, where Beauty and Truth reign united in one person. This is the august goddess, as Schiller represents her in the "Künstlerin," and Goethe in imperishable beauty in the "Zueignung," the heavenly Muse who was guide and friend to both; she who reached to Goethe the veil—

" Aus Morgenduft gewebt und Sonnenklarheit,
Der Dichtung Schleier aus der Hand der Wahrheit ";

who appeared to the former as "the awfully glorious Urania"; who, seen only by purer spirits, moves over the stars, destroying as she goes, and who, having laid aside her crown of rays, reveals herself as Beauty to mortal eyes.

And now that noble youth, of kingly stature, still clad in the purple, but deprived of his sword, who in deep sorrow walks composedly with naked feet over the hot sand, banished by the blue eyes of the fair Lily, for whose sake he has given up and lost everything! He is the genius of the German nation, which, when it was a question of choosing between truth and power, let its kingly authority crumble to dust, and followed with searching, longing eyes the footprints of truth and beauty, until the strength of its noble limbs was maimed, until it seemed to sink into torpor and death. The apprehension of the struggle for the ideal is wonderfully discerning; and it may be said that Goethe thereby answered beforehand all those charges of his having failed to recognize the perniciousness of a too æsthetic education. "So fatal is the power of her beautiful blue eyes that they deprive all living beings of strength, and that those whom the touch of her hand does not slay feel themselves changed into the condition of shadows wandering alive." When an individual or a society devotes itself to spiritual and æsthetic interests with an exclusiveness which is so indifferent to everything else that it pays but little attention to the affairs of real life, it does injury to its whole nature, and works to its own destruction, for as the highest well-being of the individual depends upon an harmonious bodily and spiritual development, so is the welfare of the state conditioned upon the uniform working together of the spirit-forming and state-forming forces. Indeed, whole peoples have sunk into decay who, in obstinately eager searching for truth, or in immoderate devo-

tion to the ideal of beauty, thought that they could neglect care for their political existence. Thus the Jewish and the Greek nations passed away, but straightway there grew up upon their graves a mighty forest, which makes known their memory to later peoples. Thus Beauty and Truth rewards services rendered to her. Her rich garden still bears no fruits, and all this domain of true perceptions and beautiful forms only becomes *useful and nutritious to the living when they have been brought over upon the securely built bridge from the realm of ideas into the world of actual working life*. "No plant in my garden," laments the fair Lily, "bears either flowers or fruit; but every twig that I break and plant upon the grave of a favorite grows green straightway, and shoots up in fair boughs. All these groups, these bushes, these groves, my hard destiny has so raised around me. These pines stretching out like parasols, these obelisks of cypresses, these colossal oaks and beeches, were all little twigs planted by my hand, as mournful memorials in a soil that is otherwise barren."

A beautiful and striking figure has in it something infinite; it cannot be expressed how the mind is always aroused by it anew. Let us call to mind all that is great and momentous in what the foremost spirits in the service of truth and beauty have accomplished since the awakening of the German nation. Her thoughtful poets, her bold, tireless thinkers—how many of them have passed away, after having spent their lives in pursuing their ideals, without even a small part of what they have labored and struggled for becoming a real possession of our people! How much less have their labors produced life-giving and gladdening nourishment for the daily and enduring happiness of all! Thus they, then, have found their graves in the realm of ideas, and upon their graves have grown those groups of many kinds of trees, the memorials of their work, in the quiet shade of which a few favored ones who gain admittance there, find refreshment and strength.

At any time when it pleases him the Man with the Lamp, gliding noiselessly back and forth over the river, is here a trusted guest, and is even called hither by the spirit of his lamp, if he is needed; above all is Science at home among these memorials of the past in the garden of the fair Lily; its voice and help count for much even in the realm of the beautiful, and, although its own work is self-directed and independent of the power of the ideal of beauty,

still its highest achievement is only reached through union with beauty, just as beauty through it alone becomes capable of its freest creations. *But, however, in their close intercourse with each other, both lead a restricted life, feeling that they fail of their fullest activity so long as, turned to a narrow self-sufficiency, they are cut off from active, enduring, and reciprocal association with all the forces of the nation. Art and science flourish perfectly only in the state, though they may have accomplished something great without it through their own powers.*

However, though the nation may lack the sound and necessary organs by which it attains to complete life, though the masses may be cut off from the light of truth and the charm of beauty as well as from political power, still there are several ways by which that obstructed intercourse is kept up in quiet passing back and forth, but only for individual travellers. The *Märchen* gives us the old Ferryman, but he is only permitted to carry passengers from the bank on which the fair Lily dwells; he can bring no one in the opposite direction. In order to afford a passage from the bank where the masses of the nation dwell, who are scarcely aware of the opposite bank and its glories, or gaze over to it in unsatisfied longing—to afford a passage from this bank to the bank of the fair Lily, are given the Snake, who at mid-day curves herself over the river, and the shadow of the Giant, who has his greatest strength at morning and evening. The wife of the old man has often crossed in both ways; she is well known in the garden of Lily, and is on good terms with Lily herself.

The anticipation of the true and beautiful and the need of picturing it to itself never die in a nation so long as it is still capable of life. Before Science takes up its abode in a nation, before the light of knowledge shines for it, it makes for itself in fable, myth, and the forms of religious worship the pictures of these anticipatory conceptions, and they who cannot yet see the light of knowledge are continually being carried over to the ideal through the power of this unconscious and involuntary imagining. Where and how arise these mighty births of faith and anticipation? Who showed them the way? Who ever forced them into a plan? Who was ever able to lead or to constrain and master them? They belong to the whole broad body of the nation; they arise of themselves, and are purposeless and incalculable; with conscious ef-

to all civilized Europe. From it German literature received an impulse most rich in results on a side on which it most needed to be aroused. For while it now took to itself that lightness and grace, that verve and animated precision, while it replenished itself with those ideas which enkindle the people and exert an immediate and practical influence, it still remained true to itself, it knew how to melt that gold in its veins, it cleansed it from those elements which were foreign to itself, and a light was enkindled in it which has ever since lighted the nation on all its paths with an ever-increasing brightness.

The figure of the green Snake, which Goethe chose to represent this stage of German literature, seems to me a very happy invention. Let one read the first part of the *Märchen* and see if, when the meaning which I have given is accepted, the most manifold relations do not everywhere spring into view, carrying along the characterization, now in an earnest and again in a satirical and ironical spirit.

I will return to this point again at the proper place. Let us now follow the action of the *Märchen* from the beginning.

(To be concluded.)

CAN ECONOMICS FURNISH AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD FOR MORALITY?

BY SIMON N. PATTEN.

It is affirmed by Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his *Data of Ethics*, that all current methods of ethics have one general defect—they neglect ultimate causal connections. Now that he has added another method of ethics to those we previously possessed, certainly it is not out of place to examine whether he has neglected any of those ultimate causal connections which were overlooked by previous moralists. It must be conceded that he has brought out many causal connections by which a much clearer view of ethics can now be had than was formerly possible; but that he has clearly enumerated or even consciously recognized those ulti-

mate causal connections which lie at the basis of the true ethical system must be doubted even if we accept those general principles from which he proceeds. Mr. Spencer affirms that it is the business of Moral Science to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of actions tend to produce happiness and what kinds to produce unhappiness. An examination of his books, however, will reveal that he has deduced most of his conclusions from the laws of life alone. A reader is left in complete darkness as to what those ultimate conditions of existence are to which humanity must ultimately conform to obtain the highest type of existence. When I endeavor to determine these ultimate conditions and seek aid from Mr. Spencer's writings, I find that he, as well as his predecessors, has an inadequate idea of causation, and at some points he seems to have no idea of causation at all. To be specific, I would say that Mr. Spencer asserts that on our planet an evolution is taking place in which the fittest tend to survive and through which the surplus of our pleasures above our pains is constantly increased. Now, if such an evolution is taking place, it must be due to the peculiar natural conditions of our planet. Whoever asserts that a progressive evolution must take place on Mars, Jupiter, or any other planet regardless of their peculiar natural conditions, certainly lacks an adequate idea of causation. The same would be true of any one who asserted that a progressive evolution would take place on our planet if all the soils and climates were like that of Greenland, Sahara, or many other places. Evolution can be progressive only under peculiar natural conditions, and only when all these conditions are present can we expect a progressive evolution.

Mr. Spencer, however, asserts more than that we have a progressive evolution. He also asserts that this evolution has a given goal—an ideal social state where pleasure is unalloyed with pain anywhere. In asserting the possibility of an ideal state where all right conduct has no necessary painful consequences, he either has an inadequate idea of causation or he means to affirm merely that the natural conditions on our planet are such as to allow an ideal social state.

Supposing that in his two main propositions we have a progressive evolution and that an ideal social state is for us possible, he means only that these two propositions are true of the natural

conditions of our planet, there is still need to examine the natural conditions which each of these propositions presupposes to see if they harmonize enough so that both of them could be true of one planet. If the natural conditions needed for an ideal social state where pleasure is unalloyed with pain are anywhere different from those which a progressive evolution demands, then an ethical system which endeavors to ground itself on both of these propositions lacks consistency, and one or the other proposition must be given up so as to harmonize our ethical ideal with natural conditions.

If Mr. Spencer wished to show that his idea of causation was more developed than that of his predecessors, he should have shown that these two fundamental points of his system harmonize. He has, however, avoided all discussion of the necessary conditions of existence and has sought only to elucidate the laws of life; yet these laws are not ultimate, but depend on the external conditions of existence.

I wish to discuss in detail the external conditions upon which these two propositions depend, and think it can be made clear that they require for their realization radically different natural conditions—so different that it is impossible for one planet to have all the natural conditions necessary to make both of these ends possible. I shall endeavor to determine what natural conditions a progressive evolution demands, and then these natural conditions can be compared with those which Mr. Spencer's ideal social state presupposes.

The evolution of life, we are told, is a continual adjustment of internal relations to external conditions. We thus have two distinct problems to investigate—the fixed external conditions and the internal relations which must adjust themselves to the external conditions. To the second of these problems evolutionists have devoted their entire attention, bringing in the external conditions in a casual way. They presuppose such a set of external conditions as would make a progressive evolution possible and then investigate the changes in the internal relations which take place as these relations gradually adjust themselves more and more to external conditions.

What, then, are the external conditions which favor a progressive evolution? To answer this question we must first determine

what are the external conditions upon which we are dependent and to which we must adjust ourselves. There is no great difficulty in determining these conditions, since they mainly lie in the conditions determining the food-supply. It is true that we need water and air and a few other things outside of the food-supply; but as these are found in abundance where any food can be obtained, we can overlook these factors and give our attention solely to the conditions of the food-supply. To adjust ourselves to natural conditions is, when stated specifically, to adjust ourselves to the food-supply, and to say that we are surrounded by natural conditions favorable to a progressive evolution is to say that the food-supply enlarges as the intelligence of those who consume it increases. To illustrate this proposition let us take an extreme case. Suppose a world so situated that the sun shone on every part alike, thus causing an equal temperature everywhere, and that there were no mountains or hills, no differences of soil or climate, nor any other difference by which one locality would have an advantage over any other locality. Upon such a world, if a suitable plant were introduced, it would spread until it covered the whole world. But would it tend to evolve into many varieties and cover the earth with as many kinds of plants as we now have? Suppose, further, some low class of animals to be introduced, would they tend to form varieties and create a progressive evolution?

On the other hand, let us suppose a world which has many different climates and soils, many hills and mountains, swamps and deserts, and all that variety in other particulars which would be sure to arise from such a diversity of fundamental conditions. If upon such a world first a plant and then a low class of animals were introduced, what would be their tendencies to form varieties and to evolve into higher forms of life?

If we examine the writings of our leading evolutionists to determine which of these worlds would have the conditions favorable to a progressive evolution, it will be found that all their proof presupposes a world where there is a great variety of soil and climate and would not apply to such a world as was supposed in our first illustration. A given animal or plant spreads over a limited territory where external conditions are favorable. When these limits are reached a new variety is evolved suitable to an adjacent region with somewhat different external conditions, and when this

region is filled another variety arises suitable to still other external conditions which other regions possess. When all the world is once filled with simple organisms, complex organisms are evolved with enough intelligence to utilize those portions of the food-supply which are not accessible to lower organisms.

Certainly such arguments take for granted that we live in a world of frost and heat, of mountains and valleys, and of all those other changes to which we as a race are subjected. Examine these arguments from the objective side and they show that low organisms can exist only under simple conditions, and all the food-supply cannot be utilized by such organisms wherever there is a great variety of soil and climate. Room and food are thus left for higher organisms to evolve under those complex conditions from which the simpler organisms are excluded, and a progressive evolution can continue so long as still higher organisms obtain support through a greater utilization of the food-supply. In other words, a progressive evolution is possible when but a portion of the whole food-supply is available to low organisms, and the more the intelligence of an organism is increased the greater is the portion of the food-supply which it can acquire. The food-supply, however, can be small to low organisms and enlarge to higher organisms only in a world of great variety of soil and climate, and only in such a world can we expect to find a progressive evolution. In a world without change or variety of any kind a complex organism would have no advantage over a more simple one. All the food-supply could be obtained by simple organisms and there would be no unoccupied regions over which higher organisms could spread.

It may be said that in such a world, organisms would still tend to adjust themselves to Nature. Certainly; but under these conditions low organisms would be completely adjusted to Nature. What, for instance, can be better adjusted to Nature than a grasshopper on a warm summer day when the whole surrounding world is covered with grain and grass upon which he may feed? If we contrast him with the ant, who works to lay by a store for winter, he is much better adjusted to present external conditions. It is not the lack of adjustment to present conditions that proves the superiority of the ant over the grasshopper. The grasshopper can adjust himself to the summer heat and plenty, but the damp-

ness and frost of the coming autumn find him unprepared. It is only because we live in a world of change where one extreme follows the other in rapid succession that the adjustment of the ant to Nature is better than that of the grasshopper. In a world of deadening uniformity the grasshopper would have the advantage over more complex organisms and could displace them.

A world of change would be a world of intelligence, but it would not be a world of pleasure unalloyed with pain anywhere. To be free from pain it would be necessary to migrate to another world where there is a complete uniformity, and where wind and hail and frost and other disagreeable results of changing climate cannot interrupt a life of pure pleasure. Must we not therefore conclude that the external conditions needed for an ideal state of pure pleasure are radically different from those which a progressive evolution presupposes? When Mr. Spencer assumes that all our pains arise from an incongruity between the natures which men inherit from the present social state and the requirements of social life he overlooks the fact that many of our pains arise from those changing external conditions over which we have no control. Certainly, if there were a complete adjustment of internal relations to external conditions, there would be no pain, but it should be kept in mind that there can be no complete adjustment when the external conditions are variable. If the axis of the earth did not incline to the sun so as to cause changes of seasons, and if our mountains were levelled and our soils made of equal fertility, then we might adjust ourselves so completely to Nature that we should have no pain. So long, however, as our external conditions remain as they are, our adjustment to it must always be incomplete, and there must be many pains and diseases which arise purely from necessary external conditions. Our moral ideas, therefore, must be very different from what they would be if we were surrounded by a different external condition.

Even Mr. Spencer has affirmed that moral principles must conform to physical necessities; but when he lays down the condition of absolute ethics he overlooks all the physical necessities of our planet and adopts a moral standard which may be a very good one on Mars or Jupiter, but certainly is not fitted for our world. If the law of absolute right can take no cognizance of pain, it certainly can take no cognizance of our planet; and when

Mr. Spencer considers an ideal man as existing in an ideal social state, he clearly shows that his ideal presupposes a world without change and not such a one as that in which we live. While believing in a progressive evolution, he takes away the very conditions which make a progressive evolution possible in order that he may predicate an ideal state without pain as a possibility for us.

Mr. Spencer tells us that the best examples of absolutely right actions are those arising where the nature and its requirements have been moulded to one another before social evolution began. Now, for two things to become moulded to one another their external conditions must be constant and not variable, and, as our external conditions are variable, we cannot ever become completely moulded to them. Were all our relations between man and man, this moulding might become complete; but our most important relations are not those between man and man, but between man and Nature. In giving its natural food to the child the mother receives pleasure; but can the mother get her food from Nature without pain? To my mind, the chief source of the mother's pleasure would arise from the fact that she can exempt her child from all those pains to which every one must submit who acquires his food direct from the hand of Nature. The external conditions surrounding the food-supply must determine what are the highest types of moral action, and so long as one man, by bearing more than his share of the pains necessary to procure food, can exempt his family or his friends from their pains, or can reduce their pains more than his pains are increased, so long will such actions be regarded as of a higher type than are those which bring less pleasure but no pain to all concerned. We admire the warrior who sacrifices his life for his country, because such actions are typical of those which every one must perform in every-day life. If we did not have to fight with Nature for food, we should not think of fighting with one another, and then Mr. Spencer's absolutely right actions might become models. So long, however, as most of us must live in unhealthy climates, plough the land in April rains, harvest wheat in August heat, husk corn in November frosts, and feed our stock in December snows, we shall admire acts of self-sacrifice by which the few suffer more than the many may suffer less.

It is at this point where Mr. Spencer has made a great mis-

take. He discarded the utilitarian doctrine because in its current form this morality is merely empirical, and utilitarians do not deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of actions tend to produce unhappiness. But does this deficient method of procedure justify Mr. Spencer in overlooking the external conditions of existence so that he can set up a life without pain as a model for imitation?

A moral doctrine can be deduced from the external conditions of existence, and thus Mr. Spencer's objection can be avoided. To conform to Nature is, as I have said, to conform to the conditions of the food-supply, and as the amount of the food-supply depends largely on the actions of men, those actions which permit an increase of the food-supply or economize its use are moral actions. The number of persons who can exist in our world by hunting and fishing are small, and as each person must have many hundred acres to support himself, he excludes many beings from the possibilities of a happy existence. When men resort to agriculture they decrease the number of acres which each one must have to procure his food, and thus allow many possible beings to become actual participants of a happy existence. The food-supply is further augmented when men use wheat, beef, and other articles of which Nature is least productive in relatively less quantities and consume relatively more of rye, potatoes, rice, and similar articles of which Nature is most productive. A proper rotation of crops and a right use of commerce allow the food-supply again to be greatly increased, and greatly decrease the number of acres which each man must have to provide himself with food. The economy of the food-supply is of no less importance than are the methods by which we produce our food. At the present time almost every one consumes two or three times the amount of food needed for his health simply for the pleasure which its consumption affords. So long as each one eats enough to maintain health, and then in liquor and tobacco consumes the produce of enough more land to support another man, half of the possible beings to whom this world might afford a happy existence are excluded, and the gross sum of human happiness is greatly reduced.

There is yet another condition to happiness which must be considered before we can determine what is the gross sum of happiness which this world can afford to human beings. The mental

qualities inherent in man which have been developed in increasing the food supply determine how many sources of pleasure the members of a society can enjoy. The man whose vocation calls into activity but one quality has few sources of pleasure other than eating and drinking. If the production of rice or potatoes or of cloth or shoes requires of the laborer but little skill, those who produce these articles will have their faculties but partially developed, and will thus be cut off from most of those pleasures which are most enjoyable to fully developed beings. The greater the number of qualities which are developed in any man, the more sources of pleasure will he have which are not derived from a mere consumption of food. The inexclusive pleasures of fully developed beings do not draw largely on the food-supply,¹ and hence these enjoyments do not exclude others from the possibilities of a happy existence.

Each individual through his actions and demand for food creates a demand for land. Some one individual needs but five average acres to supply his wants, a second ten, a third twenty, a fourth one hundred, a fifth five hundred, and still others need one thousand acres or even more. We must, of course, count in each one's share the number of acres which his conduct, considered as a whole, causes to be unoccupied or partially used. If a people have such habits that they cannot live near together, or if they are so warlike that they prevent a large portion of the earth from being occupied, the unoccupied or partially used land must be credited to them.

All our conduct influences our demand for land, and that conduct is, in an objective sense, the most moral which enables us to exercise all our faculties on the least land. We can, therefore, judge of the conduct of individuals or of nations by their demand for land. It is not necessary to know the subjective feelings of all individuals or how they increase their own happiness. We can judge of their conduct from what they desire for consumption and from how much of a demand for land this consumption creates. Those pleasures or habits which create a large demand for land are less moral than are those which require the exclusive use of fewer acres of land. The greatest happiness for

¹ Patten, *Premises of Political Economy*, Chap. II.

the greatest number cannot be attained without the greatest economy of the food-supply and the use of all the land in the most productive manner. Only that conduct can be absolutely right which allows both of these ends to be fulfilled. Upon our planet at least all the food-supply cannot be utilized unless some persons are willing to endure pain. By harmonious actions we can greatly increase the surplus sum of our happiness above our pains, and also the number of those who can participate in our pleasures. Yet some pains must be endured, and that conduct, however painful it may be, which reduces the gross sum of the pains which humanity must endure, must serve as a type of perfect action. Suppose two planets with external conditions like our earth. On one of these the people admired those acts which involve no pain, while on the other a life of self-sacrifice furnished a model for imitation. On the first of these worlds only a mere fraction of the food-supply could be utilized and the population would be small. A few islands or small valleys in favored localities might be found where frosts, storms, and disease were so rare that a life without pain could be enjoyed. These localities would be isolated, since commerce cannot be carried on without pain, and as a result the inhabitants would be deprived of many sources of enjoyment.

On the second of these worlds, where the thought of pain would not deter any one from action, the outcome would be very different. Every climate could be utilized, even though many of them might be unhealthy, and all kinds of food could be produced. Every productive act could be carried on at the point where the least labor would be required, while commerce could distribute all the produce of industry even though a few sailors froze their fingers furling the sails or perished in a shipwreck. The second world would have many times the population of the first world and many more sources of enjoyment.

Suppose, now, a third world of complete uniformity, where storms and frosts never come and where disease never arises except through filth and ignorance. Here Mr. Spencer's ideal man might exist, since he would be in complete harmony with surrounding nature. In such a world as ours, however, he could not exist. He needs not only an ideal social state, but an ideal world. For each world there is an ideal man and a corresponding social state, and the ideal man in a world of change must

be different from that of a world of complete uniformity. A world of change cannot offer a life without pain, but it can offer a life with many intense pleasures and but few pains. Such a life forms an economic ideal, and it certainly corresponds to the possibilities of the world in which we live. The greatest happiness for the greatest number can be attained by us without any modification of external Nature, and if evolution tears down ideals formed by partially evolved subjective feelings and replaces them with other ideals which can be realized, we must expect that the economic ideal of morality will gradually displace those ideals which can be realized only on worlds with other external conditions.

BOOK NOTICES.

"MIND."

THE English Philosophical Journal, "Mind," has received notice or a record of the contents of certain numbers in "The Journal of Speculative Philosophy," as follows: Vol. X, No. 1, January, 1876, contents of the first number, January, 1876, with the Prospectus; Vol. X, No. 4, October, 1879, notice of Vols. I-III, by W. M. Bryant, and contents of the numbers for January and April, 1879, with brief remark by the Editor; Vol. XV, No. 4, October, 1881, contents of January and April, 1881. "Mind" is the most ably edited of all journals devoted to philosophy, and as we shall from time to time publish in this Journal a record of its contents, it has been thought advisable to present the entire contents from the beginning in connection with the following notice of Vols. XII and XIII:

EDITOR.

CONTENTS OF "MIND," VOLS. I-XI, NOS. 1-44.

1876-1886.

January, 1876, Vol. I, No. 1.—Editor,¹ Prefatory Words; H. Spencer, *The Comparative Psychology of Man*; J. Sully, *Physiological Psychology in Germany*; J. Venn, *Consistency and Real Inference*; H. Sidgwick, *The Theory of Evolution in its Application to Practice*; S. H. Hodgson, *Philosophy and Science (I)*; Rector² of Lincoln College, *Philosophy at Oxford*; Prof. Bain, *Early Life of James Mill (I)*; *Critical Notices, Reports, Notes, New Books, News.*

April, 1876, No. 2.—G. H. Lewes, *What is Sensation?* Prof. W. Wundt, *Central In-ner-vation and Consciousness*; A. Bain, *Mr. Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics*; H. Calder-

¹ Prof. George Croom Robertson.

² Mark Pattison.

- wood, Mr. Sidgwick on Intuitionism; Editor, Mr. Jevons's Formal Logic; S. H. Hodgson, Philosophy and Science (II); H. Sidgwick, Philosophy at Cambridge; J. F. Payne, James Hinton; Critical Notices, Reports, Notes, Correspondence, New Books, News.
- July, 1876, No. 3.—H. Helmholtz, The Origin and Meaning of Geometrical Axioms; R. Flint, Associationism and the Origin of Moral Ideas; F. Pollock, Evolution and Ethics; F. Max Müller, The Original Intention of Collective and Abstract Terms; S. H. Hodgson, Philosophy and Science (III, concluded); T. M. Lindsay, Hermann Lotze; W. H. S. Monck, Philosophy at Dublin; Critical Notices, Reports, Notes, Correspondence, New Books, News.
- October, 1876, No. 4.—J. A. Stewart, Psychology—a Science or a Method; J. Ward, An Attempt to interpret Fechner's Law; J. Sully, Art and Psychology; J. Venn, Boole's Logical System; R. Adamson, Schopenhauer's Philosophy; A. Bain, The Life of James Mill (II); Editor, Philosophy in London; Critical Notices, Reports, Notes, Correspondence, New Books, News.
- January, 1877, Vol. II, No. 5.—A. Bain, Education as a Science; H. Travis, An Intropective Investigation; H. Sidgwick, Hedonism and Ultimate Good; J. P. N. Laud, Kant's Space and Modern Mathematics; J. J. Murphy, Fundamental Logic; J. S. Henderson, Lord Amberley's Metaphysics; W. G. Daviss, The Veracity of Consciousness; J. Veitch, Philosophy in the Scottish Universities; Critical Notices, Reports, Notes and Discussions, New Books, News.
- April, 1877, No. 6.—E. B. Tylor, Mr. Spencer's Principles of Sociology; G. H. Lewes, Consciousness and Unconsciousness; A. Barratt, The "Suppression" of Egoism; J. G. Macvicar, The so-called Antinomy of Reason; W. S. Jevons, "Cram"; J. Veitch, Philosophy in the Scottish Universities; Critical Notices, Reports, Notes, New Books, News.
- July, 1877, No. 7.—C. Darwin, Biographical Sketch of an Infant; A. Bain, Education as a Science (II); D. G. Thompson, Knowledge and Belief; C. Read, On some Principles of Logic; Editor, English Thought in the Eighteenth Century; Th. Ribot, Philosophy in France; Critical Notices, Notes, Correspondence, New Books, News.
- October, 1877, No. 8.—R. Verdon, Forgetfulness; A. Barratt, Ethics and Politics; T. M. Lindsay, Recent Hegelian Contributions to English Philosophy; W. Wundt, Philosophy in Germany; A. Bain, The Life of James Mill (III, concluded); Critical Notices, Reports, Notes and Discussions, New Books, News.
- January, 1878, Vol. III, No. 9.—J. Sully, The Question of Visual Perception in Germany (I); Editor, The Physical Basis of Mind; J. Venn, The Use of Hypotheses; Prof. W. K. Clifford, On the Nature of Things-in-Themselves; A. J. Balfour, The Philosophy of Ethics; Prof. J. P. N. Laud, Philosophy in the Dutch Universities. Critical Notices, Notes and Discussions, New Books, News.
- April, 1878, No. 10.—G. Allen, Note-Deafness; J. Sully, The Question of Visual Perception in Germany (II); F. Pollock, Notes on the Philosophy of Spinoza; H. Helmholtz, On the Origin and Meaning of Geometrical Axioms (II). Philosophy in Education (I), J. A. Stewart; (II), Editor; Critical Notices, Reports, Notes and Discussions, New Books, News.
- July, 1878, No. 11.—G. J. Romanes, Consciousness of Time; Prof. Bain, Education as a Science (III); G. Allen, The Origin of the Sublime; D. G. Thompson, Intuition and Inference (I); A. Sidgwick, The Negative Character of Logic; Prof. W. H. S.

- Monck, Butler's Ethical System; Rev. W. Cunningham, Political Economy as a Moral Science; Critical Notices, Reports, Notes and Discussions, New Books, News.
- October, 1878, No. 12.—G. S. Hall, The Muscular Perception of Space; Prof. Bain; Education as a Science (IV); D. G. Thompson, Intuition and Inference (II); A. J. Balfour, Transcendentalism; G. Barzellotti, Philosophy in Italy; Critical Notices, Reports, Notes and Discussions, New Books, News.
- January, 1879, Vol. IV, No. 13.—W. James, Are we Automata? E. Gurney, On Discord; J. Venn, The Difficulties of Material Logic; F. Pollock, Marcus Aurelius and the Stoic Philosophy; O. Plumacher, Pessimism; G. S. Hall, Philosophy in the United States; Notes and Discussions, Critical Notices, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- April, 1879, No. 14.—G. S. Hall, Laura Bridgman; J. Sully, Harmony of Colors; Rev. R. Harley, F. R. S., The Stanhope Demonstrator; Prof. Bain, John Stuart Mill (I); A. Sidgwick, Definition *De Jure* and *De Facto*; L. S. Bevington, The Personal Aspect of Responsibility; Notes and Discussions, Critical Notices, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- July, 1879, No. 15.—G. Allen, The Origin of the Sense of Symmetry; W. James, The Sentiment of Rationality; C. Read, Kuno Fischer on English Philosophy; J. N. Keynes, On the Position of Formal Logic; Prof. Bain, John Stuart Mill (II); F. Y. Edgeworth, The Hedonical Calculus; Notes, Critical Notices, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- October, 1879, No. 16.—A. Lang, Mr. Max Müller and Fetishism; G. A. Simcox, An Empirical Theory of Free Will; E. Gurney, Relations of Reason to Beauty; S. H. Hodgson, On Causation; Prof. Bain, John Stuart Mill (III); Notes and Discussions, Critical Notices, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- January, 1880, Vol. V, No. 17.—E. Montgomery, The Dependence of Quality on Specific Energies; L. S. Bevington, Determinism and Duty; H. McColl, Symbolical Reasoning; C. Read, The Philosophy of Reflection; Prof. Bain, John Stuart Mill (concluded); Notes and Discussions, Critical Notices, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- April, 1880, No. 18.—L. Stephen, Philosophic Doubt; J. Sully, Pleasure of Visual Form; G. Allen, Pain and Death; H. Sidgwick, Mr. Spencer's Ethical System; S. H. Hodgson, Dr. Ward on Free Will; Notes and Discussions, Critical Notices, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- July, 1880, No. 19.—F. Galton, F. R. S., Statistics of Mental Imagery; E. Montgomery, The Unity of the Organic Individual; J. Venn, On the Forms of Logical Proposition; T. Thornely, Perfection as an Ethical End; W. R. Sorley, Jewish Mediæval Philosophy and Spinoza; Notes and Discussions, Critical Notices, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- October, 1880, No. 20.—G. Allen, *Æsthetic Evolution in Man*; E. Montgomery, The Unity of the Organic Individual (concluded); A. W. Benn, Another View of Mr. Spencer's Ethics; W. L. Davidson, Botanical Classification; J. Watson, The Method of Kant; Critical Notices, Notes and Discussions, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- January, 1881, Vol. VI, No. 21.—J. Sully, Illusions of Introspection; J. Venn, Our Control of Space and Time; S. H. Hodgson, M. Renouvier's Philosophy—Logic; D. G. Thompson, *The Summum Bonum*; H. Spencer, Replies to Criticisms on *The Data of Ethics*; Notes and Discussions, Critical Notices, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- April, 1881, No. 22.—E. Gurney, Monism; S. H. Hodgson, M. Renouvier's Philosophy—Psychology; Rev. W. L. Davidson, The Logic of Dictionary-defining; A. W. Benn,

- Buckle and the Economics of Knowledge; Notes and Discussions, Critical Notices, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- July, 1881, No. 23.—Prof. J. Earle, The History of the Word "Mind"; E. Montgomery, The Substantiality of Life; J. T. Punnett, Efficiency as a Proximate End in Morals; Prof. J. Royce, "Mind-stuff" and Reality; J. Sully, George Eliot's Art; Notes and Discussions, Critical Notices, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- October, 1881, No. 24.—G. Allen, Sight and Smell in Vertebrates; C. F. Keary, The Homeric Words for "Soul"; C. Read, G. H. Lewes's Posthumous Volumes; T. Whittaker, "Mind-stuff" from the Historical Point of View; A. Seth, Hegel: an Exposition and Criticism; Notes and Discussions, Critical Notices, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- January, 1882, Vol. VII, No. 25.—Prof. T. H. Green, Can there be a Natural Science of Man? (I); Prof. J. Royce, Mind and Reality; A. Sidgwick, The Localization of Fallacy; A. W. Benn, The Relation of Greek Philosophy to Modern Thought (I); Notes and Discussions, Critical Notices, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- April, 1882, No. 26.—Prof. T. H. Green, Can there be a Natural Science of Man? (II); Prof. W. James, On some Hegelisms; E. Montgomery, Causation and its Organic Conditions (I); A. W. Benn, The Relation of Greek Philosophy to Modern Thought (II); Critical Notices, Notes and Discussions, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- July, 1882, No. 27.—Prof. T. H. Green, Can there be a Natural Science of Man? (III); E. Gurney, The Utilitarian "Ought"; J. Sully, Versatility; E. Montgomery, Causation and its Organic Conditions (II¹); Critical Notices, Notes and Discussions, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- October, 1882, No. 28.—F. E. Abbot, Scientific Philosophy: a Theory of Human Knowledge; T. Davidson, Perception; E. Montgomery, Causation and its Organic Conditions (IV²); H. Sidgwick, Incoherence of Empirical Philosophy; Notes and Discussions, Critical Notices, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- January, 1883, Vol. VIII, No. 29.—Editor, Psychology and Philosophy; A. Sidgwick, Propositions with a View to Proof; Prof. Bain, On Some Points in Ethics; H. Sidgwick, A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy (I); Notes and Discussions, Critical Notices, New Books, Correspondence, Miscellaneous.
- April, 1883, No. 30.—J. Ward, Psychological Principles (I); Prof. G. S. Hall, Reaction-time and Attention in the Hypnotic State; M. Martin, On some Fundamental Problems in Logic; E. Gurney, "Natural Religion"; Prof. W. Wallace, Ethics and Sociology; Notes and Discussions, Critical Notices, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- July, 1883, No. 31.—H. Sidgwick, A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy (II); K. Pearson, Maimonides and Spinoza; F. W. Maitland, Mr. Herbert Spencer's Theory of Society (I); Father Harper, S. J., The Word; Notes and Discussions, Critical Notices, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- October, 1883, No. 32.—J. Ward, Psychological Principles (II); G. Allen, Idiosyncrasy; F. W. Maitland, Mr. Herbert Spencer's Theory of Society (II); Dr. J. H. Stirling, The Question of Idealism in Kant: the Two Editions; Prof. E. Caird, Prof. Green's Last Work; Notes and Discussions, Critical Notices, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- January, 1884, Vol. IX, No. 33.—Prof. W. James, On some Omissions of Introspective Psychology; J. S. Haldane, Life and Mechanism; S. H. Hodgson, The Metaphysical

¹ II. Instalment in "Mind," but III. Division of Discussion.

² IV. Division of Discussion, III. Instalment in "Mind."

- Method in Philosophy; A. J. Balfour, M. P. Green's *Metaphysics of Knowledge*; Research and Discussion, Critical Notices, New Books, Correspondence, Miscellaneous.
- April, 1884, No. 34.—H. Sidgwick, *Green's Ethics*; Prof. W. James, *What is an Emotion?* A. Binet, *La rectification des illusions par l'appel aux sens*; F. Y. Edgeworth, *The Philosophy of Chance*; T. Whittaker, *Giordano Bruno*; Discussion, Critical Notices, New Books, Correspondence, Miscellaneous.
- July, 1884, No. 35.—C. Mercier, *A Classification of Feelings*; E. Montgomery, *The Object of Knowledge*; H. H. Ellis, *Hinton's Later Thought*; Research and Discussion, Critical Notices, New Books, Miscellaneous.
- October, 1884, No. 36.—E. Gurney, *The Problems of Hypnotism*; C. Mercier, *A Classification of Feelings (II)*; Dr. J. H. Stirling, *Kant has not answered Hume (I)*; Discussion, Critical Notices, New Books, Correspondence, Miscellaneous.
- January, 1885, Vol. X, No. 37.—C. Mercier, *A Classification of Feelings (III)*; Prof. W. James, *On the Function of Cognition*; Dr. J. H. Stirling, *Kant has not answered Hume (II)*; Prof. H. Calderwood, *Another View of Green's Last Work*; J. T. Punnett, *Ethical Alternatives*; Critical Notices, New Books, Notes, and Correspondence.
- April, 1885, No. 38.—E. Gurney, *Hallucinations*; Rev. H. Rashdall, *Prof. Sidgwick's Utilitarianism*; Dr. E. Montgomery, *Space and Touch (I)*; Discussion, Critical Notices, New Books, Notes, and Correspondence.
- July, 1885, No. 39.—R. Hodgson, *The Consciousness of External Reality*; E. H. Rhodes, *The Scientific Measurement of Time*; J. M. Macdonald, *The Science of History*; Dr. E. Montgomery, *Space and Touch (II)*; Research, Discussion, Critical Notices, New Books, Notes, and Correspondence.
- October, 1885, No. 40.—J. Sully, *Comparison*; Dr. E. Montgomery, *Space and Touch (III)*; S. H. Hodgson, *Free-Will and Compulsory Determinism*; Research, Critical Notices, New Books, Notes, and Correspondence.
- January, 1886, Vol. XI, No. 41.—J. Dewey, *The Psychological Standpoint*; Prof. K. Pearson, *Meister Eckhart, the Mystic*; W. Mitchell, *Moral Obligation*; J. Jacobs, *The Need of a Society for Experimental Psychology*; Research, Discussion, Critical Notices, New Books, Notes, and Correspondence.
- NOTE.—This number contains a General Index to Vols. I-X (1876-'85).
- April, 1886, No. 42.—J. Dewey, *Psychology as Philosophic Method*; Prof. C. Lloyd Morgan, *On the Study of Animal Intelligence*; Prof. G. S. Fullerton, *Conceivability and the Infinite*; Prof. H. Sidgwick, *The Historical Method*; Research, Discussion, Critical Notices, New Books, Notes, and Correspondence.
- July, 1886, No. 43.—F. H. Bradley, *Is there any special Activity of Attention?* S. Coit, Ph. D., *The Final Aim of Moral Action*; D. G. Ritchie, *On Plato's Phaedo*; Research, Discussion, Critical Notices, New Books, Notes, and Correspondence.
- October, 1886, No. 44.—Prof. A. Bain, *Mr. James Ward's "Psychology"*; S. H. Hodgson, *Illusory Psychology*; S. Alexander, *Hegel's Conception of Nature*; Research, Discussion, Critical Notices, New Books, Notes, and Correspondence.

A. G. LANGLEY.

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[WHOLE No. 88.

GOETHE'S MÄRCHEN:¹

A POLITICO-NATIONAL CONFESSION OF FAITH OF THE POET.

BY DR. HERMANN BAUMGART.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY ISAAC N. JUDSON.

(Concluded.)

CHAPTER IV.

The river over which the Ferryman carries the Will-o'-wisp is swollen to overflowing.

More unfavorable than formerly, the events of the time flow by and separate the nation by a broad obstruction from the goal of its best internal strivings. Although the established forms of government, I might say the existing provisional government (Nothstaat), are still so estranged from these strivings and needs, and so utterly indifferent to them, nevertheless, in so far as they

¹ From "The Diversions (Unterhaltungen) of German Emigrants" (see translation in Bohn's Library). These emigrants were the French nobility (émigrés) fleeing from the French Revolution. The reader of this Journal will remember the interpretation of this Märchen ("The Story of the Snake") by Rosenkranz, published in Volume V, and will welcome this explanation of Baumgart, which seems to hit the very thoughts of Goethe himself. Of course every one has read the marvellous rendering of "The Tale," by Thomas Carlyle. It is one of those literary works which should be read once a year, through life.—EDITOR.

maintain intercourse and the connection of the whole, they further their interests, even if they do so involuntarily and unwillingly. And so the state even promotes intercourse with that bank on which the fair Lily is; however, as it is serviceable in spreading ideas only in a mechanical way, it cannot bring over any one from the opposite bank; of itself it cannot create new thoughts, and is not interested in the least degree in arousing them.

But the Ferryman does not carry the Will-o'-wisps over the river to the bank where they begin their eager work without the fare which is due him. At this point Goethe has introduced a deep, fine, and still very simple reference. The Will-o'-wisps—who during the passage have behaved in a very restless manner, so that the old man begins to fear that the boat may capsize—in order to reward him, shake down into the wet boat a mass of glittering gold pieces.

“‘For Heaven’s sake, what are you about?’ cried the old man; ‘you will ruin me forever! Had a single piece got into the water, the stream, which cannot suffer gold, would have risen in horrid waves and swallowed both my skiff and me; and who knows how it might have fared with you in that case? Here, take back your gold.’

“‘We can take nothing back which we have once shaken from us,’ answer the Lights.

“‘Then you give me the trouble,’ said the old man, ‘of raking them together and carrying them ashore and burying them.’”

Is an explanation required here?

The literature of enlightenment, which so misleads the vulgar, lightly shaking down and carelessly spreading everywhere its shining and blinding thoughts, and which makes the old stewards of the ship of state so greatly to fear lest the boat capsize, and lest the times may not endure the poisonous food! And so they take the trouble to carefully guard the dangerous new thoughts and to lock them up—so far, indeed, as it is possible for them to do so.

Although the Will-o'-wisps are on the other bank, they cannot go on their way till they have paid the fare which they owe. “‘You must know that I am only to be paid with fruits of the earth.’ ‘With fruits of the earth? We despise them and have never tasted them.’ The Lights were making off with jests; but they felt themselves, in some inexplicable manner, fastened to the

ground; it was the most unpleasant feeling they had ever had. They engaged to pay him his demand as soon as possible; he let them go and pushed away."

The meaning seems to me very plain and pertinent.

Every new thought that is brought into circulation is practically dead and ineffectual so long as it cannot satisfy an actual want of the time; so long as it does not afford immediate nourishment to the masses of the nation it does not exist for them, and is chained to the ground. It is, in truth, one of the most unpleasant feelings for the originators of such ideas, especially if political influence is their sole aim: Science can endure it, and is even relieved from paying the toll. The new ideas of enlightenment, also, are not immediately concerned about their efficiency; still they are not for this reason exempt from the fare. First of all they are concerned only for themselves, and have a great longing for the fair Lily; it is characteristic that they have come from the bank where she dwells without knowing it, and that they imagine her to be on the opposite shore. We shall see later how they pay their debt.

In the chasm in which the old man seeks to conceal the gold of the Will-o'-wisp the fair green Snake takes possession of it. It melts in her inwards and spreads through her whole body; from it she becomes luminous; long ago she had been told that this was possible. Everything appears to her more beautiful and enchanting through her own graceful light. "Every leaf seemed of emerald, every flower was dyed with new glory." She is now for the first time impelled to leave the lonely mountain-places in which she had hitherto remained, and to venture forth to find the source of the new light.

"The toil of crawling through bog and reeds gave her little thought; for though she liked best to live in dry, grassy spots of the mountains, among the clefts of rocks, and for the most part fed on spicy herbs, and slaked her thirst with mild dew and fresh spring-water, yet, for the sake of this dear gold and in the hope of this glorious light, she would have undertaken anything you could propose to her."

Let me here remind the reader of what I said before of the condition of German literature at the middle of the last century, and of its peculiar devotion to descriptions of nature, which, how-

ever, at first lacked intrinsic beauty. The general elevation and refinement of taste which are brought about by external influences profited it also, and it now at last succeeded in freely following its natural bias toward an observation of nature, which was poetically glorified, artistically perfected, and at the same time deeply genuine. Even before a striving after the noble and spiritual was characteristic of it, and many a beauty was familiar to it, it moved about in an ideal, abstract world, like the Snake "who slaked her thirst with mild dew and spring-water." She now left the grassy spots of the mountains in the hope of the glorious light, and minded not the toil of crawling through bog and reeds: in this picture is pointed out that movement of the German popular literature when, aroused by the ideas of the new enlightenment, which worked immediately and practically, it now abandoned the sphere of abstract reverie, and was no longer blind to the fact that the goal of truth and beauty can only be attained in the toilsome mastery of the objects and tasks of real life.

Now comes the conversation with the Will-o'-wisp, the pride of "the gentlemen of the vertical line," and the discomfiture of the Snake, for "let her hold her head as high as possible, she found she must bend it to earth again would she stir from the spot"; then the mischievous generosity of the Lights, by which the Snake profits so well ("her splendor began visibly increasing; she was really shining beautifully, while the Lights in the meantime had grown rather lean and short"); finally the circumstance that it is the Snake who shows the Will-o'-wisps the way to the fair Lily and makes the bridge for them. It is not possible to touch upon all the hundred-fold references which lie here in every word. But is it too much to say that there is here a perfect resemblance to the course of the development of our literature, which was described above? How, under the influence of the spirit of enlightenment of the century, which affects it so powerfully, it leaves the regions of abstract theory and sentiment, in which it had so long moved about, lonely and exclusive, self-sufficient but somewhat heavy, already of noticeable beauty, but not yet transparent and luminous; and minds not the difficulty of turning to real life; and how the promise that the time is at hand is at last fulfilled in it, and how, through the unfolding of its own glorious inner nature, it becomes capable of performing the great-

est tasks. Is it incorrect to say that the true, artistic allegory here completely meets that high demand which was laid down above; that, while figures and thoughts mutually throw light upon each other, the latter should stand forth in ever greater distinctness, and the former in ever greater beauty? It requires here a great effort to restrict one's self in interpretation.

The *Märchen*, being developed entirely from the nature of the characters, moves forward in the manner of an epic poem, the significance of its contents becoming at the same time continually greater.

As literature had now attained to an ever-increasing internal beauty and clearness, it straightway felt in itself the earnest desire to turn its attention to the greatest tasks of the nation, of which before it had dimly felt many an anticipation, but of which it had had as yet no clear and open view.

"She now believed herself capable of illuminating these things by her own light, and hoped to get acquainted with them at once." She hastens by the usual way to the subterranean temple with the images of the kings.

The meaning cannot be doubtful to one who yields assent to what has been already said; the happily chosen figure, by continually bringing to view new phases of the resemblance, is confirmed in the best manner.

Literature, seeking its way gropingly, first turns its attention in poetical anticipation to patriotic and historical ideas, and becomes acquainted with their venerable outlines; then, aroused by the political movement of the age, it undertakes to bring a clear light upon these things for itself. Is it necessary to remind the reader how in the seventies and eighties of the last century such a union and mutual penetration of poetical and historical endowments was exhibited in *one* man of the nation; how powerful an influence the poems of *Herder* had upon the development of historical knowledge, while, on the other hand, his historical works moved so completely in the æsthetic and poetical direction of those days; how the vaguely dreaming patriotism of a Klopstock and of the whole choir of bards now began to bear fruit, while men were no longer content to sing of Hermann the Cherusker, but rather began to direct their efforts to lighting up the dark regions of former times and to scrutinizing the events of the past in the light of the pres-

ent? It was, however, precisely the holy soil which had once witnessed the great battles of the Romans which now produced the first investigator who united to a sympathetic and imaginative perception of the German past the exact labor of the experienced man of business and the scholar—*Justus Möser*.

Thus it was pertinent to represent in a sensible figure this process, how the history of the past begins to be exhibited in literature in synoptical grouping and in definite form. However, there is still another thing which necessarily exercised a vital influence upon this representation.

Those beginnings of political and historical investigation were far removed from a strictly scientific objectivity. On the other hand, as they had been aroused and influenced by the question of the best form of government, they continually pursued this aim, to find immediately in the study of the past the solution of the riddle of the present. It might be said that the time worked itself with all its might into the error of thinking that the happiness of nations could be established if the question of the best form of government were successfully answered. Let us now accompany the Snake into the temple; then all riddles will solve themselves.

Here sit enthroned in their niches the four Kings, the types of German kingship, following and at the same time supplementing one another; for, indeed, it need not be said that the separation of these conceptions exists only in the representation. The Märchen gives the names of the first three: they are Wisdom, Appearance, and Strength; the fourth is an inorganic mixture of these three. Now, it is evident that in the true monarchy these three principles must be intimately and inseparably united, and, further, that at no step in the development of monarchy can one of them be thought altogether wanting; however, in different phases of the kingship they predominate in different proportions.

The golden king—the royal dignity in its oldest and most venerable form, the patriarchal kingship—“In size beyond the stature of a man, but by its shape the likeness of a little rather than a tall person.” The Snake points out light to him as the grandest thing and speech as the most refreshing: by this is meant that with this monarch the means of gentle persuasion and of enlightening instruction stand highest.

The Snake then turns to the silver king, whom the *Märchen* names *Appearance*: here we have the majesty which is consecrated by a long duration of legitimate tradition, whose power rests upon inherited authority, and which is held within the bounds of moderation and justice by the proud consciousness of exalted worth. "His shape was long and rather languid; he was covered with a decorated robe; crown, girdle, and sceptre were adorned with precious stones; the cheerfulness of pride was in his countenance; he seemed about to speak, when a vein, which ran dimly colored over the marble wall, on a sudden became bright and diffused a cheerful light throughout the whole temple. By this light the Snake perceived a third king made of brass, and sitting mighty in shape, leaning on his club, adorned with a laurel garland, and more like a rock than a man."

Out of the opened wall enters the Man with the Lamp, who stands for the idea of Science. It is noticeable that he first enters with the still flame of his lamp when the silver king is being scrutinized. I take the meaning to be as follows: Long before in the popular literature the picture of the antiquity of the German people had arisen in golden light; in poetical transfiguration and in a certain sort of *a priori* construction, which was peculiar to those times, men had by degrees formed for themselves definite conceptions of the earliest history of our nation. On the soil thus prepared historical investigation then arose, which for later times could not be dispensed with.

"'Why comest thou, since we have light?' asked the golden king of the old man. 'You know that I may not enlighten what is dark,' was the answer," which is intelligible enough. Still, poetry has everywhere cleared the way for knowledge.

"'Will my kingdom end?' asked the silver king. 'Late or never,' answered the old man." It was a golden age when Wisdom reigned, revered for itself; later generations needed the outward splendor of majesty, which, as a visible sign, must cause them to see the necessity of valuing internal greatness. Late or never will the time come when the conscious recognition of moral and intellectual superiority will make the outward signs and attributes of majesty unnecessary. "With a strong voice the brazen king began to ask, 'When shall I arise?' 'Soon,' answered the old man." The last question touches directly upon what take

place in the Märchen. Power had slept too long in the German Empire. Since the nation's consciousness of its own existence is becoming ever stronger in the anticipations of poetry and in the results of investigation, since the lights of both unite to thoroughly illuminate for it the temple of its history, the time cannot be far distant when, armed in brass, it will go forth to laurel-crowned victory.

And with whom shall this crushing power combine? "With thy elder brothers," answered the old man to the brazen king. *Wisdom* and *true majesty*, combined with *armed strength*—this is the promise to the German Empire in regard to its future form of government, the fulfilment of which Science was preparing in the depths of its workshops.

"What will the youngest do?" asked the king.

"He will sit down," replied the old man.

"I am not tired," cried the fourth king, with a rough, faltering voice. He stood leaning on a pillar; his considerable form was heavy rather than beautiful, an inorganic mixture of the metals of his brothers, of unpleasant aspect."

Here is seen a striking picture of the condition of the German Empire in its last days: still great in stature, but how heavy! not wanting in gold, silver, and brass in the structure of its limbs, but, alas! not united inwardly, powerfully, and in conformity with a cast; but obstructing, confusing, bound together in unholy strife, and still not bound. The old man announces its end, which comes to pass in the Märchen in a tragi-comic manner, as it did later in reality; this end, however, it might still have averted in spite of its impotent clumsiness.

The old man speaks to the three kings of three secrets; the most important of these is the open one, which consists in this: that all these hidden things have already come to light. Every one knows it, but only the superior observer, who bears the light of knowledge in his hand, sees already the mighty consequences which must follow in the near future.

"I know the fourth," said the Snake, approached the old man, and hissed something in his ear.

"The time is at hand!" cried the old man with a strong voice. The temple reëchoed, the metal statues sounded; and that instant the old man sank away to the westward and the Snake to the

eastward ; and both of them passed away through the clefts of the rocks with the greatest speed."

To the discoveries which Science wins and quietly guards must be added the impulse to action, which constrains men to fashion them to practical ends. This is precisely the service which popular literature and the press have ever had to render in times of preparation for great world-events ; this is the means of communication which makes the bridge from their realm to the other bank, where the mass of the people dwell. This is *the fourth secret*, that this literature, moved by a new impulse, has now entered upon a new phase—to open the eyes of the people. The time is ripe ! For the first time the mighty word is spoken by scientific knowledge.

It is in accordance with the epical character of the *Märchen* that now, during the clash at the mighty close of the conversation, the scene correspondingly changes.

Truly no further word is needed to make clear the significance of the old man. "He was dressed like a peasant, and carried in his hand a little lamp, on whose still flame you liked to look, and which in a strange manner, without casting any shadow, enlightened the whole dome."

It would be a waste of words to carry out the parallels. But further : "All the passages through which the old man travelled filled themselves, immediately behind him, with gold ; for his lamp had the strange property of changing stone into gold, wood into silver, dead animals into precious stones, and of annihilating all metals ; but to display this power it must shine alone. If another light were beside it, the lamp only cast from it a pure, clear brightness, and all living things were refreshed by it.

Beautiful and significant ! When Science works for itself alone, all objects receive under its treatment a like high value. What in life possesses an imaginary worth is destroyed as such, and subjected to its decomposing analysis ; on the other hand, what is most important in life gains under its hand priceless worth ; the stone becomes gold, the wood silver. But the most precious thing to Science is the organic body ; just when life has passed from it, it changes it into precious stone, in which it knows how to discover the most wonderful forces. Again, through it all things, laying aside their accidental and imperfect forms, assume those

which are regular and essential, and thus become beautiful; at the end of the Märchen also this is displayed as the miraculous power of the lamp. But how glorious is its failure even! When the lamp shines beside another light—that is, when Science does not work exclusively for the fulfilment of its own ends, but joins with knowledge arising from other sources, whether from life, art, or religion—then it constantly emits a pure, clear brightness, and all living things are thereby refreshed.

I come now to a part of the Märchen in which the form of words chosen by Goethe seems at first somewhat surprising, though the feeling passes away with closer study. I refer to the figure of the old Woman and the part of the narrative which relates to her. The perplexities which here for the first time present themselves to the exact understanding vanish the more readily as the lightly ironical tone, which here for the first time prevails, allows toward the end the deep earnestness and the splendid conception of the ground-thought to be more successfully developed.

I said above that it would be shown later how the Will-o'-wisps succeeded in paying the fare which they owed the Ferryman. The point in question is: In what manner and in what sphere did those new ideas, of which the Will-o'-wisps appear as bearers, succeed in gaining admission into the nation and obtaining a firm foothold there, through the actual satisfaction of an immediate, practical need? This was the meaning of the field and garden fruits which were demanded as fare for the passage. This time let us pass outside of the actual circumstances. To speak briefly: While in France the new ideas of the philosophic century became effectual in religion and politics at the same time—since abuses which had to be attacked had grown up there in both spheres and were absolutely inseparable—in Germany, on the other hand, the spirit of enlightenment won its first victories, particularly in the sphere of the Church, and began afterward to extend its influence to political affairs. Religion did, in fact, pay the toll for the bringing in of the new ideas into Germany. However, the deeply felt need of the nation could not be fully satisfied in this wise.

Rather did that movement remain incomplete—and we shall find in the Märchen references to this fact of surprising insight

and depth—and the satisfaction of the wishes of the nation for a thorough reform of religion remained thrust into the background; for a new superstition, different in form from the old but akin to it in spirit—since it arose from the same shortsightedness and superficiality—followed fast upon the heels of the new philosophical rationalism, and deprived the movement of a part of its desired results. It is sufficient to refer in a word to how the religious reform of the last century shows itself in so many ways enfeebled and stunted, on the one side by the degeneration of the radical rationalism, and on the other by those manifold mystical, theosophical, and thoroughly absurd excesses, at the appearance of which, here as well as there, thoughtlessness and credulity, mania for the miraculous and scepticism, formed their old alliance.

As was said before, the *Märchen* assumes in this part the tone of light irony which Goethe was fond of displaying in matters pertaining to the Church in spite of the earnest and deep reverence of his character.

It seems to me that the old Woman, the wife of the Man with the Lamp—who, at the end of the *Märchen*, made young for a thousand years, enters into the league with him, who is on good terms with the Lily, but, above all, is not presented without many significant traits of old age, and many, though excusable, absurdities—is the figure which Goethe chose to represent religious ideas as they existed in the mass of the people in the last century. That is, however, by no means a degrading picture which makes religion the wife of knowledge, who, of equal birth with him, possesses by feeling and intuition what Science must investigate and prove. To be sure, these religious forms appear here needing the rejuvenating new birth; but it was a great and beautiful thought to represent this reform as necessarily coincident with the political regeneration of the nation.

The old man finds his wife sobbing over the impudence of the Will-o'-wisps. She had at first received them with pleasure, but afterward they had annoyed her in a shameful manner, even to licking up the gold from the walls, the stones of which she had not seen in a hundred years. This tasted better to them than ordinary gold. It made them broader and brighter, and immediately they shook down a pile of gold pieces about themselves;

and the faithful Mops of the old Woman ate a few of the coins, and now, to her great sorrow, lies dead in the chimney.

The narrative is to be referred in every particular to the enlightenment of the Church. The new ideas, at first most gladly welcomed, soon make themselves very obnoxious to the Church; and there is great grief for the gold which is brushed down from the old walls. On the other hand, how striking it is that the spirit of enlightenment, though it fights against religious ideas, yet draws from them a great part of its strength, which afterward it continues to display in most generous fashion! But there are in the household of the popular Church things which cannot endure this carelessly scattered food. Once more it sounds at first strange, and seems perhaps somewhat sacrilegious to say that Goethe meant by the faithful, beloved Mops of the old Woman the popular belief in miracles. And yet this idea also wins an entirely different and an earnest aspect when we follow the course of the narrative further.

The Lamp changes the dead animal into the most beautiful onyx, which the fair Lily endows with life; and he becomes her dear playmate; and, what is more, among the concurrent signs of misfortune, which, nevertheless, are shown to point to a near and great happiness, he is made especially prominent. Here also the interpretation receives full confirmation.

The faith which perishes in the people becomes as myth a precious object in the hands of Science.

This happened in many ways during the last century in connection with biblical ideas which became the object of scientific and particularly of æsthetic treatment in the same proportion as they ceased to be influential as actual beliefs. Let one recall Herder's "Geist der ebräischen Poesie" and Goethe's Bible studies. Indeed, when the Bible began to be studied from this point of view, poetry received on this side a marked enrichment and impulses which were rich in results. How simply and significantly is this fact brought out in the Märchen, which makes the lamp send the precious stone to the fair Lily, who endows it with life!—those ideas departing from life, fall to Science, who harmoniously orders them according to the laws of form inherent in them and then hands them over to Art, from whom they now obtain a second life.

However, the old man praises his wife for having promised the Will-o'-wisp to pay the fare for them: "Thou mayest do them that civility, for they perchance may be of use to us again." Filled with great and far-reaching thoughts, he already sees in the present supposed misfortune the preparation for the coming salvation. Therefore, as he is sending the onyx to the fair Lily by his wife, he also sends her word: "She should not mourn; her deliverance is near; the greatest misfortune she may look upon as the greatest happiness, for the time is at hand."

The old Woman sets out with the onyx and the fruits which are intended for the river.

"Whatever lifeless thing she was carrying, she felt not the weight of it. On the other hand, the basket in those cases rose aloft and hovered along above her head; but to carry any fresh herbage or any little living animal she found exceedingly laborious." This also is no arbitrary, meaningless invention. The organic, living thing and the fruits of the earth are symbolic of a force engaged in practical activity and affording immediate nourishment to the needy. On the other hand, the dead thing which makes the basket rise and freely hover along refers to an abstract, theoretical possession. It is truly characteristic of Goethe to point out that in the Church what really demands effort, and therefore merits acceptance, is not found in the dogmatic system, but in the smallest living deed.

To what follows in the Märchen I alluded when I said that the religious renovation was stunted by new vagaries of the imagination, which arose in it naturally and necessarily, and so was able to make good to the nation only a part of the anticipated results. The Giant takes his share from the fruits intended for the Ferryman without the woman's being able to prevent it; and the Ferryman accepts the insufficient fare only on condition that she pledge herself to the river for what is lacking. Her hand dipped in the river becomes black in token of the pledge and begins to disappear. The old Woman, greatly distressed on observing this, receives the following answer: "For the present it but seems so; if you do not keep your word it may become so in earnest. The hand will gradually diminish and at length disappear altogether, though you have the use of it as formerly. Everything as usual you will be able to perform with it, only nobody will see it."

"I had rather that I could not use it and no one could observe the want," cried the old Woman. "But what of that? I will keep my word and rid myself of this black skin and all anxieties about it."

The Church is not, indeed, injured in her nature by the reception of the enlightening spirit (thus the gold which the Will-o'-wispis brush down is restored again by the lamp), but in her anxiety to give what is promised the people by the new ideas she is impeded by the irresistible giant power of the old superstition, and so remains indebted for that demand of the time and also bears outwardly the marks of this debt. It is, moreover, a finely ironical and yet an earnest and thoughtful point that the old Woman, the representative of the Church, declares that she finds it harder to forget the damage to her beauty than to suffer a real loss in her power to work. In reality, however, even if the outward appearance entirely vanish, the power of the idea which lies beneath it cannot perish.

The narrative now approaches its crisis. The beautiful Youth presents himself to the old Woman. "His breast was covered with a glittering coat of mail in whose wavings every motion of his fair body might be traced."

"From his shoulders hung a purple cloak, around his uncovered head flowed abundant brown hair in beautiful locks; his graceful face and well-formed feet were exposed to the scorching of the sun. With bare soles he walked composedly over the hot sand, and a deep inward sorrow seemed to blunt him against all external things." The sorrowful Genius of the German nation is meant, whose ability to act is maimed in the search after the ideal of truth and beauty. Great events and the concurrence of great circumstances are needed to arouse it to a new life and higher deeds. "What is to live forever in song must perish in life," sings the poet. This utter ruin would have been the fate of the spirit of the German nation if it had become henceforth only a subject for Art to remember and celebrate. The death which the touch of the fair Lily brings seems almost more desirable to the young man than the unsatisfied longing for union with her, which feeling destroys all other powers. To bring out the meaning no word need here be added to the words of the Märchen. "Behold me," said the Youth to the woman; "at my years, what a miserable fate

have I to undergo! This mail which I have honorably borne in war, this purple which I have sought to merit by a wise reign, destiny has left me; the one as a useless burden, the other as an empty ornament. Crown and sceptre and sword are gone, and I am as bare and needy as any other son of earth, for so unblest are her bright eyes that they take from every living creature they look on its force, and those whom the touch of her hand does not kill are changed to the state of shadows wandering alive."

I have already taken occasion to speak more fully of this figure of the crippling and even death-bringing power of the ideal. Here let it suffice merely to select from what follows a significant passage, which confirms and completes the interpretation which I have given above: "He inquired narrowly about the Man with the Lamp, about the influence of the sacred light, appearing to expect much good from it in his melancholy case."

With what mighty strides and with what salutary influence did Science encroach upon that all too eager solicitude of the German genius, and how much good service did it render in preparing the way for the final reconstruction!

Both travellers—the old Woman and the Youth—tread now the majestic arch of the bridge which the Snake forms over the river. They are astonished at the glorious brightness with which it wonderfully glitters, illumined by the sun, for they know nothing as yet of the change which had taken place in the Snake; and they pass over in awe and silence. The beautiful literature of the last century arose upon the path of all the best efforts of the nation, promising happiness and awakening hope, and brilliantly illuminated the path to the highest goal.

On the other side the Snake follows them, the Will-o'-wisp add their presence, and all betake themselves to the park of the fair Lily. "For however many people might be in her company, they were obliged to enter and depart singly, under pain of suffering very hard severities."

This is again one of the points which would be absurd if it meant nothing for the characterization. It is a truth easily grasped that the entrance to the ideal of beauty is open to all, but that each can gain it only for himself and in the way peculiar to himself, and that the society of others is an absolute hindrance in entering this Holy of Holies.

In the park we tread the region of pure Beauty, who charms all senses at the same time, expressing herself as a force working alone, the same in all the arts, and in like manner in all their different forms. The lovely tones which she sings to the harp show themselves first as rings on the surface of the still lake, then as a light breath they set the grass and bushes in motion. Still with sadness she makes answer to the praises of the old Woman, for her canary-bird, which used to accompany her songs most delightfully and was carefully trained not to touch her, frightened by a hawk, had taken refuge in her bosom, and in a moment had died.

The signs multiply which point to a general impending catastrophe. To the change which has taken place in literature, to the significant events in the sphere of the Church, to the broadening of scientific interests, is now added an occurrence which relates to the realm of the fair Lily, and thus concerns the sphere of beauty. I do not hesitate also to lay claim to an interpretation of the dead bird and the hawk, and so much the more as the Märchen keeps both in view to its close and lets them complete their rôles. The bird is awakened to new life simultaneously with the Youth, while the hawk, rising high in the air, with the light of the sun reflected from the mirror, awakens the companions of the Lily, and spreads heavenly brightness about the young lord. The Lily herself, as much as she mourns the death of the bird, sees in it a good omen for the future and is confidently strengthened in this hope by the Snake, since "the time is at hand." The harmless singer, which Beauty herself had taught, is driven to death by a stronger, rougher bird; and it brings this fate upon itself, for, instead of flying about Beauty in joyous sport, fleeing from the hawk, it takes refuge in her bosom.

I remarked above that in these happily chosen symbols and in the relations in which they are placed to one another there is something inexhaustible which always prompts to new thoughts. So here Beauty cannot protect her favorites, but rather hastens on their destruction, if they do not know how to meet the events, demands, and dangers which come upon them from without otherwise than by a closer adherence to her. Precisely that altogether pernicious result which comes of effort directed exclusively to æsthetic ends, a subject upon which so much has since been said, is

here expressed in the plainest manner in the figure of the Lily whose touch brings death.

But we have now reached the point where the events prepare for the last grievous catastrophe, and here the mind of the poet looked into the future with wonderful clearness. All the manifold forces of the nation intent on earnest and eager activity cannot prevent the fatal calamity; death impends even over the beautiful Youth; and as a harbinger of the storm, making known the coming disaster, there appears in the realm of the fair Lily that bird of prey, which silences the song of her darling. The thought of the poet presents itself to me as follows: This nation must meet with disaster before it can rise to its full power; but afterward the time will come—and this time is near—when, by a united effort of all its spiritual forces, it will also win for itself outward force, a position of strength, and a well-ordered government, without which the most spiritual people can no more flourish than can the soul without the body. I do not say that Goethe foresaw Jena and the war for freedom. By no means! Those crushing blows went far beyond his expectations. But he had before his eyes the dissolution of the Empire in those years of the Revolution (of this I spoke above), and the times had become terribly earnest about him. The peaceful calm of æsthetic labor and pleasure was destroyed by other and more difficult cares than songs and poems required—by questions which demanded immediate practical solution. Before these harsh demands it seemed that the Muses must be silent, but only to awake again in a more beautiful future. This strong patriotic feeling, which silences lyrical strains, is the hawk which frightens the beloved singer to death. The day arrived when this became a reality for Germany. Must not the friends of Beauty have mourned over this so long as the confidence was still lacking to them with which the other tendencies of the national spirit looked forward to the fulfilment of their common hopes?

Thus the lamentation of the fair Lily, which must otherwise seem extremely absurd, becomes perfectly intelligible and most significant to me; and I can thoroughly understand how Goethe could quote its closing lines with the greatest earnestness in the letter to Schiller which I mentioned above:

“What can these many signs avail me?
 My singer's death, the coal-black hand?
 This dog of onyx, that can never fail me?
 And coming at the Lamp's command?”

“From human joys removed forever,
 With sorrows compassed round I sit:
 Is there a temple at the river?
 Is there a bridge? Alas, not yet!”

“‘The prophecy of the bridge is fulfilled,’ cried the Snake; ‘you may ask this worthy dame! What formerly was untransparent jasper, or agate, allowing but a gleam of light to pass by its edges, is now become transparent precious stone. No beryl is so clear, no emerald so beautiful of hue.’

“‘I wish you joy of it,’ said the Lily; ‘but you will pardon me if I regard the prophecy as yet unaccomplished. The lofty arch of your bridge can still but admit only foot-passengers; and it is promised us that horses and carriages and travellers of every sort shall, at the same moment, cross the bridge in both directions. Is there not something said, too, about pillars, which are to arise themselves from the waters of the river?’”

Could a picture speak more plainly and eloquently? However beautiful and refined literature may become, it cannot satisfy the great mass of mankind so long as it is the exclusive possession of individuals who are able to reach on its arch the realm of perfect ideas. No, it is to become a common good of all, to offer itself to all, to become attainable by all. Then will the pillars which afford the arch lasting strength and endurance arise of themselves out of the earth beneath it! If the need of the new spiritual teaching has once fastened its roots in the hearts of the people, then will the fruit be renewed forever, and increase a hundred-fold.

It is also a thoroughly consistent carrying out of the picture that the fair Lily sends the little dead singer to the Man with the Lamp, that he may change it into beautiful onyx, and that she may then endow it with life again.

If, amid the more earnest and pressing work of the nation upon its political up-building, lyrical production suffers a decline, theoretical reflection is so much the more eagerly engaged in holding

fast the æsthetic treasures that have been won and in making them lastingly useful. Nevertheless, they can never obtain life save from the touch of that feeling for beauty to which in the first place they owed their existence.

The Snake turns the attention of the fair Lily to that political work of the future: the temple is built, although it still reposes in the depths of the earth; but the words have already resounded in it, "The time is at hand."

A pause occurs in the narrative, as if in expectation of the coming catastrophe. The attendants of the Lily, beautiful and fascinating beyond expression, and yet not to be compared with the Lily herself, are busily engaged in serving her. In them we shall later on recognize the representatives of the arts; but here, for the present, they appear only as proper attendants in suitable service about the exalted beauty. Here, as in what follows, in the innocent play with Mops, now restored to life by her touch, in the anger of the Youth at it, which brings on the catastrophe, for he throws himself in despair upon the fair Lily and falls to the earth deprived of life by her touch—in all this the narrative moves forward like a true epic; and it would be preposterous to seek out in all these details the course of the thoughts which lie beneath the whole. Only now and then in a proper place a word recalls the allegorical meaning. Thus that remark upon the beauty of the attendants of the Lily; thus the circumstance that the Youth bears the hawk upon his hand, calling it the companion of his woe, for indeed it also is injured by the look of the fair Lily—the vigorous soaring of the political epoch now announcing itself being obstructed by the power of æsthetic culture, which still rules alone.

The following scene is beautiful and affecting beyond description. I shall not attempt to accompany each particular with my comments, but will let the poem speak for itself. If in itself, with each advancing step, it continually moves and elevates the soul more deeply, these sensations affect the reader with much greater power, if the perfectly individualized characters of the story, which here also unfolds itself in a perfectly individual manner, have long since become the familiar symbols of those great all-moving thoughts:

"The misery had happened. The sweet Lily stood motionless,

gazing on the corpse. Her heart seemed to stop in her bosom, and her eyes were without tears. . . . Her silent despair did not look round for help; *she knew not of any help.*"

"On the other hand, the Snake bestirred herself the more actively; she seemed to meditate deliverance; and in fact her strange movements served at least to keep away, for a little, the immediate consequences of mischief. With her limber body she formed a wide circle around the corpse, and seizing the end of her tail with her teeth, she lay quite still."

The waiting-maids adorned the Lily; the one winding about her a shining veil, the second handing a harp to her, the third showing to her her reflection in a clear round mirror. "Sorrow heightened her beauty, the veil her charms, the harp her grace; and deeply as you wished to see her mournful situation altered, not less deeply did you wish to keep her image, as she now looked, forever present with you."

"With a still look at the mirror she touched the harp; now melting tones proceeded from the strings, now her pain seemed to mount, and the music in strong notes responded to her woe; sometimes she opened her lips to sing, but her voice failed her; and ere long her sorrow melted into tears, two maidens caught her helpfully in their arms, the harp sank from her bosom; scarcely could the quick servant snatch the instrument and carry it aside."

Could there be a more striking and more moving picture of the beauty of grief, illustrating how, in the distress of the fatherland, when the joyous and innocent songs of Nature have long since been silenced, mourning Art glorifies even her complaints through the features of beauty, and continues to give them expression in painting, in music, or in the veil of poesy, till deadly fatigue seizes upon her also?

"Who brings us the Man with the Lamp?" hisses the Snake, The maidens look at one another hopelessly, the Lily's tears fall faster, and the old Woman with the basket comes back breathless, and complaining that she is not able to pay her debt to the Ferryman, and fears being maimed forever.

In the general confusion the Snake gives advice to all. She asks the Will-o'-wisp to bring the Man with the Lamp to the spot. "Alas the beam of the sinking sun was already gilding

only the highest summits of the trees in the thicket, and long shadows were stretching over lake and meadow ; the Snake hitched up and down impatiently, and Lily dissolved in tears."

I will break off here for a moment, in order to refer to a letter of Goethe's which calls vividly to mind this situation of the Märchen. It is among the letters to Friedrich August Wolf, which Michael Bernays made public, and is dated November 28, 1806. In this letter Goethe encourages him, in the bitter distress of the fatherland, to maintain his own strength, and thereby that of so many others, by so much richer and more spiritual activity. In the excellent introduction to these letters Bernays expresses himself as follows :

"When all things about him seemed to have fallen asunder and crumbled to pieces, Goethe was chiefly concerned with unshaken courage in saving and upholding whatever gave worth to his existence. He made use of the first moment which again offered a longed-for activity ; for only the man of action makes himself master of himself and of the unfavorable influence of the moment. As his papers were uninjured, he devoted himself eagerly to the continuation of his extensive labors, and busied himself especially in collecting and arranging all that he had thought and marked out with regard to important problems of natural science. And as he himself found strength and consolation in incessant work, so he ceased not to exhort others also to similar application. Everywhere, as far as the circle of his activity reached, he exerted himself by word and deed to comfort, help, and encourage. He wished above all that the spiritual activity of the nation should not stagnate. As the political power of Germany seemed to him to be ruined, so he wished that the spiritual life of the nation should gird itself with greater strength, should arise to the noblest and most strenuous efforts, and thereby win recognition from the foreign conqueror."

The author adds a communication of Fernow's, of January 7, 1807, to Bottinger upon Goethe's opinions and expressions : "Let Germany have now only one great and holy purpose—to hold together in spirit, and, in the general ruin, at least most zealously to guard the as yet uninjured Palladium of our literature."

At the right moment there appears to the waiting ones the Man with the Lamp, impelled by the spirit of the Lamp, "which

sparkles when he is needed," and guided by the hawk, which, sailing high in the air, caught the last beams of the setting sun. How beautifully does the soaring of patriotism serve as guide to science, that it may hasten with help before intolerable corruption shall seize upon the prostrate body of the nation!

"Whether I can help, I know not," says the old man; "an individual helps not, but he who combines with many at the proper hour. We will postpone the evil and keep hoping."

The sun had set, but the darkness was lighted by the Snake and the Lamp; "and also the veil of the Lily gave out a soft light, which gracefully tinged, as with a meek dawning red, her pale cheeks and her white robe. The party looked at one another silently reflecting; care and sorrow were mitigated by a sure hope." This also was afterward fulfilled, and in a much more glorious manner than Goethe could have then anticipated. Illuminated by the soft light of science, warmed by the life-breath of an ideal literature, glorified by the radiance of beauty, thus the time travelled in quiet hope to meet the deeds which, after the night of humiliation, brought on the morning of national resurrection.

What follows is also true: if the following time corresponded in so many respects to the anticipatory pictures of the Märchen, *one must still be on his guard against wishing to find in reality a fulfilment of them in all their details, a fulfilment in the same time and in the same mutual relations.* Much came to pass later, much we are now in the midst of; but the Märchen brings all into one view and into one narrative, unfolding itself at one time. It must also be remembered that if, on the one hand, the events have come to pass in far grander fashion than Goethe could have then foreseen, on the other hand, in developments of so lofty a nature, long pauses intervene when things are at a standstill. Of all these questions of how, when, and how long, such a composition as the Märchen, from its very nature, can take no notice. It suffices it, by means of the poetic imagination, to give bodily form to the working forces and their mutual relations, and to bring them to view in a free treatment. Thus moving about in perfect peace in the regions of intelligible speculation, it gains also the freedom of perfect humor, which allows it, amidst the deep earnestness of tragic pathos, to maintain a sharpness and

clearness of view for the shortcomings of things, and, without losing a kindly valuation of their worth, to enlighten these shortcomings with the playfulness of comic contrast.

At this expectant moment of the narrative the Will-o'-wisps, who meantime had become extremely meagre, make their entrance. They behave themselves very prettily toward the Lily and her attendants; "with great tact and expressiveness they said a multitude of rather common things." They are especially eloquent in praise of the Lily's beauty. The old Woman alone is worried, and, in spite of the assurance of her husband "*that her hand can diminish no further while the lamp shines on it,*" she more than once declares that if things go on thus, before midnight this noble member will have vanished.

The Man with the Lamp had listened attentively to the conversation of the Lights, and was gratified that the Lily had been cheered in some measure and amused by it.

If a special interpretation is here demanded, let it be given in a few words. The spirit of enlightenment, after having performed such important services, devotes itself to an æsthetic philosophy with somewhat diminished powers. By a superior criticism, however, it is not undervalued in the present and is marked out for important services in the future, as the *Märchen* later on shows. So also it is assured the Church by the light of pure knowledge that she is indestructible in her legitimate position, though amidst manifold distresses she be disturbed by grievous cares and give utterance to her apprehensions all too anxiously.

At the departure, the old man with solemn words admonishes them each to perform his task and his duty on the other side of the river, for the hour has now come. Only the three maidens remain behind, for they had fallen asleep, "and one could not blame them, for it was late." "'Take the mirror,' said the old man to the hawk; 'and with the first sunbeam illuminate the three sleepers and awake them with light reflected from above.'" If the arts can take no part in deciding the battle, the patriotic spirit awakens them after the victory to a new and more beautiful life.

The place is most curiously illuminated by the many lights of the party; and they now pass over the river on the arch of the helpful Snake, which shines more beautifully than ever before.

It is literature that opens the way into the life of the people to all these collected and matured spiritual forces of the nation and builds the bridge that leads them to the scene of practical activity.

The old Ferryman views with astonishment the gleaming circle and the strange lights which are passing over it. They, in truth, are engaged in ushering in a world of which till then the old state had had no inkling.

"The old man stooped toward the Snake and asked her: 'What hast thou resolved upon?'

"'To sacrifice myself rather than be sacrificed,' replied the Snake; 'promise me that thou wilt leave no stone on shore.'"

Her body crumbles into thousands and thousands of shining jewels, which the old man throws into the river. "Like gleaming, twinkling stars the stones floated down with the waves; and you could not say whether they lost themselves in the distance or sank to the bottom." Out of them arise the pillars of the bridge, which builds itself and will evermore connect the shores. The allegory is easily understood.

None the less what follows:

"'Gentlemen,' said he with the lamp in a respectful tone to the Lights, 'I will now show you the way and open you the passage; but you will do us an essential service if you please unbolt the door by which the sanctuary must be opened at present and which none but you can unfasten.' With their pointed flames the Lights ate both bar and bolt of the brazen doors of the temple so that they sprang open with a loud clang, and the figures of the kings appeared within the sanctuary." Thus it is these representatives of the restless spiritual movement of the press, incessantly receiving the new and unweariedly occupied in bringing it into practice, which, attended by Science, bring it to pass that the political thoughts which have become familiar to them acquire shape and enter into life.

The temple is opened, but it does not yet stand at the river!

"'Whence come ye?' asked the gold king.

"'From the world,' said the old man.

"'Whither go ye?' said the silver king.

"'Into the world,' replied the old man.

"'What would ye with us?' cried the brazen king.

“‘Accompany you,’ replied the man.

“‘Take yourselves away from me, my metal was not made for you,’ said the golden king to the Lights. Thereupon they turned to the silver king and clasped themselves about him; and his robe glittered beautifully in their yellow brightness.

“‘You are welcome,’ said he; ‘but I cannot feed you. Satisfy yourselves elsewhere and bring me your light.’”

Is it too much to say that *each word* of Goethe’s composition is significantly and thoughtfully chosen? And do not the thoughts which belong to the circle of ideas before mentioned present themselves in completeness in the smallest part of its beautiful structure? Sometimes, however, the connecting parts are invented by an independent imagination according to the laws of beauty governing the representation; but here, toward the close of the *Märchen*, almost everything is symbolic in the most pregnant sense.

“The Lights removed, and gliding past the brazen king, *who did not seem to notice them*, they fixed on the compounded king. ‘Who will govern the world?’ cried he with a broken voice.

“‘He who stands upon his feet,’ replied the old man.

“‘I am he,’ said the mixed king.

“‘We shall see,’ replied the old man, ‘for the time is at hand.’”

It is very soon shown in regard to the mixed king, that excellent type of the Holy Roman Empire, that the time is at hand, and that he can stand upon his feet no longer, however bitter it may be to him to acknowledge it.

In the meantime, while the Lily, who is greatly pleased to hear the fateful words for the third time, is thanking the old man most heartily, the promise is fulfilled in a most wonderful manner; for the temple comes forth from the depths of the earth, passes under the river, and mounts up on the other bank, so that at last it “stands on the river.”

The dream of a united government, containing in itself the ideal good, becomes a reality.

A peculiar and very significant circumstance at this point of the narrative demands a brief comment.

In its ascent, the temple tears from the ground the hut of the old man and takes it within itself, and the hut, as it sinks down,

covers the old man and the Youth. By virtue of the Lamp locked up in it, the hut is converted from the inside to the outside into silver; also its form changes, and, losing its accidental shape, it spreads out into a noble case of beaten workmanship. "Thus a fair little temple stood erected in the middle of the large one; or, if you will, an altar worthy of the temple." From within mounts aloft the noble Youth, lighted by the Man with the Lamp, and a man in a white robe with a silver rudder in his hand supports him.

A wonderful passage and thoroughly characteristic of Goethe.

The existing state is not destroyed in revolutionary manner to make way to the state of the future; a *tabula rasa* is not made of existing political forms, which still make communication possible from the side of ideal forces to the people; but on the spot where in miserable and accidental forms the hut of the old provisional government had been built arises the perfect glory of the noble temple; and this new state, taking into itself the forms of the old order, supplies them with propelling and creative life, which penetrates them with rejuvenating power, which transfigures them and fashions them anew.

During this time the old Woman is less affected by these great events than she is anxious about her hand, which, in fact, has been growing smaller and smaller.

"Am I then to be unhappy after all?" she cried. "Among so many miracles can there be nothing done to save my hand?" Her husband pointed to the open door and said to her: "See, the day is breaking; haste, bathe thyself in the river." "What an advice!" she cried; "it will make me all black; it will make me vanish altogether, for my debt is not yet paid." "Go," said the old man, "and do as I advise thee; all debts are now paid."

It is impossible to approach in words of interpretation the beauty and depth of the poetical picture.

"See, the day is breaking!" cries clearness of perception to the old church, which stands still frightened and trembling in the presence of the new forms, fearing from them further danger and abridgment.

"Haste, bathe thyself in the river! All debts are paid!" In the renewed and rejuvenated life of the people, it is promised the Church that, if she will become free from faults, she will no longer

be in debt to this people, but, herself rejuvenated, will forever belong to it.

By the light of the rising sun the old man stepped up to the Youth. "‘There are three,’ he cried, which have rule on earth—Wisdom, Appearance, and Strength.’ At the first word the gold king rose; at the second the silver one; and at the third the brass king slowly rose, while the mixed king on a sudden very awkwardly plumped down." When the Lights have completely eaten up the golden veins in him, he crushes together into an inorganic heap. "He was not sitting, he was not lying, he was not leaning, but shapelessly sunk together." The type of the old German Empire, which, before the rise of New Germany, had fallen miserably to pieces and become the derision of the whole world.

Now follows the noble consecration of the king, the beauty of which I will refrain from marring by a single word of interpretation.

"The Man with the Lamp now led the handsome Youth, who still kept gazing vacantly before him, down from the altar and straight to the brazen king. At the feet of this mighty monarch lay a sword in a brazen sheath. The young man girt it round him.

"‘The sword on the left, the right free!’ cried the strong king. They next proceeded to the silver king; he bent his sceptre to the Youth; the latter seized it with the left hand, and the king in a pleasing voice said: ‘Feed the sheep!’ On turning to the golden king, he stooped with gestures of paternal blessing, and, pressing his oaken garland on the young man’s head, said: ‘Understand what is highest!’

"During the progress the old man had carefully observed the prince. After girding on the sword, his breast swelled, his arms waved, and his feet trod firmer; when he took the sceptre in his hand his strength appeared to soften, and by an unspeakable charm to become still more subduing; but as the oaken garland came to deck his hair, his features kindled, his eyes gleamed with inexpressible spirit, and the first word of his mouth was ‘Lily!’

"‘Dearest Lily!’ cried he, hastening up the silver stairs to her, for she had viewed his progress from the pinnacle of the altar—‘dearest Lily! what more precious can a man, equipped with all

desire for himself than innocence and the still affection which thy bosom brings me!

“O my friend!” continued he, turning to the old man and looking at the three statues, ‘glorious and secure is the kingdom of our fathers; but thou hast forgotten the fourth power, which rules the world earlier, more universally, more certainly—the power of love.’

“With these words he fell upon the maiden’s neck; she had cast away her veil, and her cheeks were tinged with the fairest, most imperishable red.

“Here the old man said with a smile: ‘Love does not rule, but it trains, and that is more.’”

If any one is surprised that the fair Lily is here called the “power of love,” since she has hitherto appeared as truth presenting itself in the form of pure beauty, let him call to mind, in order to appreciate the full meaning of the passage, Schiller’s philosophy of beauty, with which Goethe sympathized so completely in those years of their intimate friendship; let him remember that Schiller’s æsthetical letters were published in the same issue of the “Horen” in which the Märchen appeared. When the new monarch, having wisdom, majesty, and strength, still feels the need in his realm of the power which rules the world earlier, more universally, and more certainly—that power is meant which, winning the affection of men and taking possession of their souls, leads them sooner and more immediately to morality and voluntary submission to the sway of justice and virtue than the law and the might of the state could compel them to such submission. The leading thought in the work of Schiller and Goethe might be thus expressed: Pure beauty is the truth which, having assumed a sensible form, through it takes possession of men’s souls with quiet but irresistible power; if it succeeds in taking up its abode among a people, it then allies itself as a mighty companion with those supreme forces which regulate and maintain the whole, enkindling love for all that is good, noble, and great—indeed, it is this love. Æsthetic culture alone cannot compensate for a lack of discipline in the state, but to a genuine national government it becomes the most glorious ornament and a mighty support: *it cannot rule; but it trains, and that is more.*

It was now broad day, and over the river stretched for all time

the strong and beautiful bridge with porches and colonnades, affording a safe passage to the thousands who flowed like streams in both directions without hindering each other.

"Remember the Snake in honor," said the Man with the Lamp; "thou owest her thy life; thy people owe her the bridge by which these neighboring banks are now animated and combined into one land. Those swimming and shining jewels, the remains of her sacrificed body, are the piers of this royal bridge; upon these she has built and will maintain herself."

Now there enter the temple the Lily's beautiful attendants, whom the hawk with the mirror has awakened to new life. With them is an unknown one, more beautiful than the others, who in sisterly sportfulness hastens with them through the temple and mounts the steps of the altar. Both the Man with the Lamp and the old Woman have renewed their youth and taken on a noble beauty, and they make anew their compact, that united they will live together for a thousand years to come.

We are at the end.

In union with *Wisdom* and the venerable principle of *revered Majesty, Power* has founded a new kingdom. *Truth, transfigured as Beauty*, stands by the side of the new monarch, his most trusted helper and companion, and, in imperishable youth, she ever urges him to place the strength of his rule upon the foundation of the culture of a noble morality, which, through the power of *beautiful and pure love*, streams everywhere from the royal pair throughout the whole people. Nearest to their throne stands the power to which they owe so much—the still-illuminating, wonder-working *light of Science*; in closest union with *Science* is *Religion*; by means of the all-awakening and life-giving power of the ideal national government, which is at last established, both are filled with new and youthful vigor for renewed and active work, which will extend into far-distant epochs. In high honor in the new state is the power which receives the spiritual blessings thus won, fashions them with creative force, and spreads them abroad—namely, *Literature*; it stands forever now as the *strong bridge* which furnishes to *all* an unobstructed passage to these blessings. Since its noble powers first turned to the people and spread among them, its noble edifice has sprung up from the very midst of the people. Also the joyous *songs of popular origin*,

which died away before the breath of the new spirit, are awakened to new life with the new birth of the national genius, and the blow of the hawk's wing no longer terrifies the harmless little singer; and even the hawk is no longer hateful to the fair Lily. "Soaring high aloft above the dome, the hawk caught the light of the sun and reflected it upon the group which was standing upon the altar. The king, the queen, and their attendants, in the dusty conclave of the temple, seemed illuminated by a heavenly splendor, and the people fell upon their faces."

Thus, then, the many forces, of whose influence the Märchen treats, attain in beautiful union their common goal. Only of Mops no further mention is made. The fair Lily, who, to the great disgust of the Youth, had played so eagerly with him, had at the entrance into the temple taken him upon her arm; from this point we lose sight of him altogether.

I cannot refrain from expressing here a conjecture which particularizes the general meaning of this symbol as given above. This Mops with which the fair Lily plays so gracefully and which the Youth finds so disgusting—might he not be a humorous and satirical reference to the beginnings of romanticism, which began plainly to develop about the middle of the nineties of the last century? At least it is certain that this arose from the *transmission of the mysticism of the Church, which was shattered by the spirit of enlightenment, into the æsthetic realm*; and this also is certain: if Goethe, on the one hand, judged objectively enough to assign a certain æsthetic value to the romantic productions, on the other hand he certainly felt toward this movement as the Youth did when he saw Mops in the arms of the fair Lily.

However this may be, in the state now attained to its power there is no place for this mystical romanticism.

With regard to the last figure of which we have to speak—would that the course of events might correspond to the optimistic way in which the Märchen lets him find his appointed end!

The great Giant, who knows nothing of the bridge, stupefied with sleep, reels over it, and causes with the shadow of his huge fists harm and confusion among the crowds of people who are surging back and forth. "The king, as he saw this mischief, grasped with an involuntary movement at his sword; but he be-thought himself, and looked calmly at his sceptre, then at the

lamp and the rudder of his attendants." Against the pernicious figure of superstition power can do nothing, and, advised by prudence, the injured majesty of the state looks back upon historical tradition, and so checks the rash movement of his anger. These phantoms, restricted to narrow bounds by all the active and salutary forces of the rejuvenated nation, shall of themselves lose their injurious power, and henceforth show themselves serviceable and helpful to the whole.

"'We and our gifts are powerless against this powerless monster,' said the Man with the Lamp. 'Be calm! He is doing hurt for the last time, and happily his shadow is not turned to us.'

"He was walking straight to the door of the temple, when all at once in the middle of the court he halted, and was fixed to the ground. He stood there like a strong colossal statue, of reddish glittering stone, and his shadow pointed out the hours, which were marked in a circle on the floor around him, not in numbers, but in noble and expressive emblems."

May the day soon come when such an end will overtake the phantoms which still cause so much mischief and confusion in our national life! Impenetrable are they to the rays of knowledge; the sword may not be unsheathed against them; but the healthy forces of the nation may shut them up within limits which shall be continually more restricted on all sides, until their power to harm is taken away; and, since they are inextirpably rooted in human nature, they may still serve, by the direction in which they extend, significantly, like heralds, to call attention to the changes and developments which arise and complete themselves in the nation's life.

THE SECRET OF KANT.¹

BY GORDON CLARK.

Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" was given to the world in 1781. At the end of a hundred and twelve years it may seem rather late to talk about Kant's "secret," as if the real outcome of his great book has not yet been adequately grasped and absorbed by the human mind. Such, however, is precisely the claim here made, and to show the fact is the aim of the present article.

To waste no words in coming to the point, the secret of Kant is the

ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTION.

By this analysis of perception Kant also analyzed, once and for good,

MIND AND MATTER, TIME AND SPACE.

So "the secret of Kant" is pretty nearly the secret of the universe.

But, in the haste to ride general results, the one vital affair in the "Critique of Pure Reason" was impatiently skipped over, even in Germany, and is not yet truly seen to have been established, although without Kant's analysis of perception the post-Kantian philosophy of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel would go as well for nothing as one of Rip Van Winkle's drinks. In England, not longer ago than the latest edition of Mr. George Henry Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," we were directly told, in the most innocent way, that Kant had never analyzed perception at all.

"He does not trouble himself" [said Mr. Lewes] "with investigating the nature of perception; he contents himself with the fact that we have sensations, and with the fact that we have ideas whose origin is not sensuous."²

¹ As this bit of writing is designed to effect a purpose, not to display erudition, and is partly at least for good readers who may not know German, the quotations from Kant are all taken from his "Critique of Pure Reason," as translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn (Bohn's Philosophical Library, edition of 1860).

² Lewes's Biog. History of Philosophy: Kant, § 3, ¶ 7.

Such a statement as this reminds one of the description of "the play of Hamlet with Hamlet left out." If that funny muddle, "the history of philosophy," had dealt with Shakespeare, perhaps we should have been informed that Hamlet was never, in any circumstances, a part of the piece.

But even the capital offence of Mr. Lewes, as a critic of philosophy, is hardly so bad as a conclusion lately reached by a philosophical writer in America, that Kant's work was substantially a local German affair, which the rest of the world has now outgrown. Our great and good American soldier, General Hancock, made no such misfire as this when he counted our national tariff another "local affair," of some interest indeed to certain States and sections. The truth is that the world has just begun its work with Kant, and that Kant himself, from the psychological standpoint, was the full result of everything that had preceded him—in Greece, in France, in Britain, and in his own country. The use he made of Aristotle, of Descartes and Locke, of Leibnitz, Berkeley, and Hume, leaves no doubt whatever, in this respect, when Kant has once been read with any real understanding of him.

First of all, be it said, Kant, both as *savant* and philosopher, had utterly absorbed the information and the conclusions of what may be called

"SCIENTIFIC IDEALISM."¹

This idealism had been chiefly developed by solid, materialistic Britons, though Hobbes and Descartes laid it down at nearly the

¹ Hair-splitters can easily play their part here, with some spectacular effect. Kant explicitly repudiated idealism of several sorts, and regarded his own idealism as realism—a conclusion, too, in which he was perfectly right. Phenomena are real—are sensuous objects, material things, in the full extent to which matter can exist. But what are "material things" *made of*? That is the question. According to Kant, every one of them is a compound of three elemental factors: *First*, the principle of "mind," as active "synthetical unity"; *Second*, the principle of "sense," as passive "susceptibility"; *Third*, the principle of the ultimate non-ego—the objective *background* of matter, the "noumenon," or, plurally speaking, "things in themselves." The impingement of some "noumenon" on "sense"—the composite relation of these *two*—is *constructed a relation* by the synthesis of mind in its phase which Kant termed "apprehension." It was known and proved before Kant that matter is always a relation between its objective background and subjective sense—a relation in which the background is transformed into the matter itself. *This* idealism is what I term "scientific," because it is not confined to philosophers, but is held by scientists as well, so far as

same time. It is merely the knowledge which any one may now get from his first lessons in optics, that things of matter—the objects of our five senses—are constituted such through the structure and action of these senses themselves. That is to say, material things—whatever we see or feel, hear, taste or smell—while existent and real—while exactly what everybody takes them to be—are *made so* through a principle of

RELATIVITY.

Or, as Kant put it, every “phenomenon” is a “re-presentation”—that is, some lot of effects on our sensuous nature, bound together into a unity of them, the unity thus formed becoming an object of apprehension—a percept. Scientific idealism, of course, does not question for a moment the given duality of the cosmos, which appears to us as what we call “mind and matter.” Here are *we*; out there, indubitably apart from us, are other things, involving another source. But scientific idealism has found that this source is itself quite other than the things we connect with it, and can properly be described in this connection only as

“SOURCE OF IMPACT.”

It has nothing to do with “matter” in the common (and *proper*) acceptance. It enters *into* matter, as the ultimate non-ego, the objective background, of every phenomenon. But in all material things the background is *transformed* by contact with subjective sense (in us or other organisms), and “matter” is really the fusion, the compound, the third term, of these two elemental principles.

This truth appears to have been reached well enough, even in the old tenet of India, that “matter is illusion.” In Greece, Carneades is said to have understood it in something like our own inductive way. But in the manner of “modern science” it was first clearly seen and stated by

THOMAS HOBBS.

“Qualities called sensible” [said he] “are, in the object that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter by which it presseth

they have generalized their facts. It was this idealism that Kant took for granted. But the relation between subjective sense and the ultimate non-ego he *centered with mind*—showing that sense always *contains* mind, though the mind of sense is the awareness of instinct.

our organs diversely.¹ . . . Because the image in vision, consisting of color and shape, is the knowledge we have of the qualities of the object of that sense, it is no hard matter for a man to fall into this opinion, that the same color and shape are the very qualities themselves."

But, concluded Hobbes :

"The subject wherein color and image are inherent is not the object or thing seen. . . . There is nothing without us (really) which we call an image or color. . . . The said image or color is but an apparition unto us of *the motion, agitation, or alteration, which the object worketh in the brain, or spirits, or some internal substance of the head.* . . . As in vision, so also in conceptions that arise from the other senses, the subject of their inference is not the object, but the sentient."

The investigations of

DESCARTES

led him to announce the principle thus :

"Nothing passes from external objects to the soul except certain motions of matter (*mouvements corporels*). . . . The ideas of pain, of colors, of sounds, and of all similar things must be innate, in order that the mind may represent them to itself, on the occasion of certain motions of matter *with which they have no resemblance.*"²

When

LOCKE

began his "Essay," and posited mind in its first estate as a passive nonentity—a "blank tablet"—he had no vital conception, it would seem, of scientific idealism. But, in the patient thinking of twenty years, such a man could not fail to come upon the law ; hence his "secondary qualities" of objects, which he affirmed to be "nothing in the *objects themselves* but powers to produce various sensations in *us*," though he considered certain "primary qualities"—bulk, extension, figure, motion, rest, number—to inhere actually in "bodies," without relation to minds or senses.

But it was seen quickly enough that Hobbes and Descartes had been right in making no such distinction as Locke assumed, be-

¹ "Leviathan," John Bohn, 1839, p. 2. "Human Nature," John Bohn, 1839, p. 4.

² This translated excerpt is taken from Prof. Huxley's "Hume," 1890, p. 84.

tween the "primary" and the "secondary" qualities of phenomena. The first are simply *invariable* qualities; the second, *variable*. "Primary" qualities present themselves with objects in general; "secondary" qualities, with certain objects and not with others. But invariability may exist in a principle of relation quite as well, to say the least, as in any ultimate objectivity. Besides, the "primary qualities of bodies" are, in one crucial aspect, anything *but* "primary," as not being immediate, but only inferential. We experience no single object of matter, for instance, without instinctively experiencing some degree of "bulk," or "solidity"; but that *all* material objects possess "bulk" is a conclusion that transcends experience, and is reached only by referring various experiences to *mind*. It is not a perception at all, but a *conception*—an *inference* of relating things to thought. As a general principle, then—a category—the very birth of it depends on this relation.

It was very easy for so acute a man as

BISHOP BERKELEY

to place Locke's primary qualities of matter where they belong, and to show that nothing in the universe has any actual being, apart from a universal element that, wherever it may be posited, can alone be called subjectivity.

HUME'S IDEALISM

is most completely illustrated in a quotation made prominent by Prof. Huxley:¹

"'Tis not our body we perceive when we regard our limbs and members, but certain impressions which enter by the senses; so that the ascribing a real and corporeal existence to these impressions, or to their objects, is an act of the mind difficult to explain."

Since Berkeley and Hume no philosophical thinker, perhaps, of any significance, anywhere in the world, has questioned the "ideality" of "material things." Even Reid, as the philosopher of "common sense," declared that

"No man can conceive any sensation to resemble any known quality of bodies. Nor can any man show, by any good argument, that all our

¹ Huxley's "Hume," p. 80.

sensations might not have been as they are, though no body, nor quality of body, had ever existed."

The idealism of the

RECENT MATERIALISTIC PHILOSOPHERS—

such, say, as Mr. Lewes, Herbert Spencer, and the "Positivists"—has been most comprehensively expressed by John Stuart Mill, in his statement that "Matter is a Permanent Possibility of Sensation."

"If" [said Mr. Mill] "I am asked whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner accepts this definition of it. If he does, I believe in matter; and so do all Berkeleians. In any other sense than this I do not."

Now there is no such thing as comprehending Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason"—there is no use of touching it at all—until one sees that Kant founded himself, utterly and literally, in scientific idealism. He took it wholly for granted before he ever inked a quill to begin his great work. It is a pity he neglected to say so, in his very first sentence. Still, he was clear and specific enough when it so happened that he got ready. At the close of his "Transcendental *Æsthetic*," under the head of "General Remarks," he set out with this unmistakable declaration:

"In order to prevent any misunderstanding, it will be requisite, in the first place, to recapitulate, as clearly as possible, what our opinion is with respect to *the fundamental nature of our sensuous cognition in general*. We have intended, then, to say that all our intuition is nothing but the re-presentation of phenomena; that the things which we intuit are not in themselves the same as our re-presentations of them in intuition, nor are their relations so constituted as they appear to us; and that *if we take away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear*. . . . What may be the nature of objects considered as things in themselves, and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility, is quite unknown to us. We know nothing more than our own mode of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which, though not of necessity pertaining to every animated being, is so to the whole human race. With this alone we have to do."¹

¹ "Critique," p. 35.

This one excerpt from Kant tells in itself the whole story of his fundamental idealism. But repeated proof can easily be had, if wanted. He closes his dissection of space, for instance, thus :

“ Objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and *what we call outward objects* are nothing else but mere *re-presentations of our sensibility*, whose form is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is not known by means of these representations, nor ever can be, but respecting which, in experience, no inquiry is ever made.”

Once more :

“ The faculty of sensibility not only does not present us with any indistinct and confused cognition of objects as things in themselves, but, in fact, gives us *no knowledge of these at all*. On the contrary, as soon as we abstract in thought *our own subjective nature*, the object re-presented, with the properties ascribed to it by sensuous intuition, *entirely disappears, because it was only this subjective nature that determined the form of the object as a phenomenon.*”¹

The principle of scientific idealism being once comprehended and accepted, and the fact being plain that Kant took it as fully established more than a century ago, there is really not much further difficulty with his whole industry, except in its maddening order and exhausting prolixity.

THE “CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON” PROPERLY BEGINS

at the end of its first fifty thousand words or so, with what Kant designated as his “ Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding,” and with the section in which he treats “ The Possibility of a Conjunction of the Manifold Representations given by Sense.” He says :

“ The manifold content in our re-presentations can be given in an intuition which is merely sensuous—in other words, is nothing but susceptibility ; and the form of this intuition can exist *a priori* in our faculty of representation, without being anything else but the mode in which the subject is affected. But the conjunction (*conjunctio*) of a manifold in intuition never can be given by the senses ; it cannot therefore be contained in the pure form of sensuous intuition, for it is a spontaneous act of the faculty of representation. And as we must, to distinguish it from sensi-

¹“ Critique,” p. 37.

bility, entitle this faculty *understanding*, so all conjunction, whether conscious or unconscious, be it of the manifold in intuition, sensuous or non-sensuous, or of several conceptions, is an act of the understanding. To this act we shall give the general appellation of *synthesis*, thereby to indicate, at the same time, that *we cannot represent anything as conjoined in the object without having previously conjoined it ourselves.*"

It is hardly too much to say that the whole secret, with pretty nearly the whole substance of Kant, is packed in those few words. They declare simply that, without an ultimate, *a priori* principle, to be entitled "*understanding*," there can be no possibility of existence for any objective thing, whether material phenomenon or mental conception. They declare that, without

THE UNITY OF A SUBJECTIVE ELEMENT

in the universe, there can be no objective unit whatever—no space, no time, no monad, either perceptible or thinkable. And such is the case if scientific idealism be true. Let us see:

The "manifold content" of an "intuition" may be merely "sensuous": that is to say, the various properties of the intuition called a stone—take the stone that Dr. Johnson kicked to disprove idealism—are "effects on the senses." The color, the texture, the weight, the size—every one of all such "material" attributes—exist, as they are, solely by relation to *me*, or to some other being in whom is organized the element of "sense." Matter is *made* of impact—impact between its objective background ("the noumenon" or "nomena") and some sort or degree of subjectivity. Without these two terms, their product of interaction, their third term, matter, is *not*. So "the manifold content" of a "re-presentation"—or, what is the same thing, the properties of a material object—are "nothing but susceptibility"—effects on sense. By

"THE FORM OF INTUITION"

Kant meant, as he repeatedly explained, the *plural quality* of space and time. Space is made of *spaces*; time of *times*; and the plural contents (always such) of matter can only exist under the plural contents of space and time—that is, in sections of space and sequences of time, these sections and sequences being the intrinsic character, the divisible quality, the essential "form" of space and time as total units or completed things.

"But," says Kant, "*all conjunction*" is "an act of the understanding," and "can not be contained in the pure form of sensuous intuition," by which he means that time could never be a conjunct of times, space a conjunct of spaces, nor a stone the conjunct of its properties—each a "synthesis" of a "manifold content"—unless made so by the synthetical unity of a *priori* mind.

In our quotation Kant attributes "*unconscious*" action to the "*understanding*"—the unconscious action of "conjunction" or "synthesis." His phrase has been a perpetual stumbling-block to his critics, but he meant exactly what he said. Unconscious mental synthesis is what he afterward designated as

"THE SYNTHESIS OF APPREHENSION,"

as distinguished from

"THE SYNTHESIS OF APPERCEPTION,"

when he said :

"I premise that by the term *synthesis of apprehension* I understand the combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition, whereby perception, that is, empirical consciousness of the intuition (as phenomenon), is possible."¹

In illustrating the category of quantity, Kant talks of "making the empirical intuition of a house into a perception, by apprehension of the manifold contained therein," and says that "the *necessary unity of space* and of my *external sensuous intuition* lies at the foundation of this act."² Here is suggested the whole dissection of phenomena, the whole analysis of perception, but, unfortunately, without details, a few of which, at this point, would have made the whole basis of his work perfectly clear. The "manifold" contained in an "empirical intuition"—take the stone we have used for an example—is simply the diversity of "properties," constituting the object—the color, texture, size, weight, and the rest of them; and these properties are "effects of sense." Every one of them is a relation to subjectivity, a result of impact *on* subjectivity, and is in the *object* only as reflect-

¹ "Critique," p. 98.

² "Critique," p. 99.

ing or re-presenting there the sensuous nature of a *subject*. But these various "effects on various senses," these merely subjective separates—how do they *get united* into *one thing*? What constitutes the unity of sensuous manifolds? Every phenomenon being an essential plurality—a lot of "sense-effects"—what closes together the various effects on various human senses, called the properties of a stone, into the one phenomenal object, the stone itself? To this end there must be some common subjective ground of those subjective things, "effects on sense." There must be some subjective unity in which those subjective pluralities all merge, for only as *merged* do they get to be an *object*. Now, a common subjective ground of various effects on various senses can only be a common *awareness* of them—a

"SYNTHETICAL UNITY OF APPREHENSION,"

or just instinctive, automatic consciousness in the germ. This must be common to all the senses together, and to each sense separately. What, for example, is seeing, but the simple awareness of sight? What is touch, but the simple awareness of feeling? What is any "intuition," which means any taking-in of any phenomenon, but a common awareness, however rudimental or developed, of some conjoined diversity of effects on sense?

And it must be added here, as vital to the full comprehension of Kant, that not only every material object, like our example, the stone, is made of essential plurality of sense-effects, but that

EVERY SEPARATE PROPERTY

of an object is also made of like plurality. No object, and no property of an object, is, or can be, single, unal, or, in other words, any *thing*, until constructed so, in sense, by the "unconscious understanding" thereof—the synthetical unity of instinctive, automatic "apprehension." To realize this fact, it is only necessary to remember that every property of anything, say the hardness of a stone, is a compound relation between the impact of some ultimate non-ego on the sense of touch, and the peculiar nature of the sense itself: so the property of hardness must contain *essential diversity*, something from each of *two fundamental sources*. As Aristotle, from his ontological investigations, found that matter, if regarded as an absolute independence—an unrelated thing in

itself—is *no thing*, but only chaotic indeterminateness—formless “potentiality”—so Kant, from his psychological inquiry—his dissection of phenomena as existent through perception—found the same truth in a deeper significance. The

ENTIRE PRINCIPLE OF UNITY,

whether in a feeling, a thought, a material object, or the universe as a whole, can alone exist through

THE PRINCIPLE OF MIND.

This is the very bottom of the secret of Kant.

But we have seen that mind, in its lowest state, is what Kant, “to distinguish it from sensibility,” entitled “unconscious understanding.” There used to be an old saw in philosophy—still, indeed, at work—to the effect that “there is nothing in the mind that was not first in sense.” Leibnitz, adding a piece to the saw, said: “Except mind itself.” Leibnitz affirmed, that is, that sense always *contains* mind—that mind is *in* sense as a component of it, and that without mind there is no sense at all. What Leibnitz perceived and asserted, Kant *proved* by “observation and induction”—by analyzing phenomena under the law of scientific idealism.

MIND IN SENSE

—the mind of sense—is just automatic, animal awareness, just simple

“APPREHENSION,”

undeveloped, and in the lowest animal life not to be developed, into

“APPERCEPTION,”

the “*conscious*” stage of “understanding,” capable of forming a *concept*.

Well, in the genesis of a stone, or other material object, certain effects on sense are merged in the unit they compose, by reception into the “synthetical unity of apprehension.” The stone is *created* in this way. Its own objective unity—its wholeness, or “*form*” as a stone—is thus the derivation, the manufactured product, of

SUBJECTIVITY, AS A COSMIC ELEMENT,

an element *a priori* to the existence of any possible phenomenon. The stone, however, *is* objective—is just the palpable thing that everybody takes it to be, out there in space. This is a given *fact of perception*—something, as Kant said, “never questioned in experience.” As such *fact*, how can it be accounted for, when we know, at the same time, that the stone is nothing but a plexus of subjective states? How does the bunch of *internal impressions* get *externalized*? What is the cause of this reflex, this “representation”? It must be something inherent in the principle of *apprehension itself*, or the plexus of impressions would necessarily stay within us. Being wrought internally, it would remain internal. Hence, this “apprehension”—this element of instinctive synthetical awareness—must be in its nature a *double*—an entity which reproduces, or throws out before itself, whatever lot of sense-effects it receptively synthesizes, or binds together in a sheaf, known as some object. But all this, summed up, means only that mind, even in its lowest form of “unconscious understanding”—the simple automatic apprehension which shuts together certain effects on sense into a totality of them—must, *as being apprehension*, necessarily, though instinctively, apprehend its own product. Here is the full explanation of the amusing, iron-clad conception of Hobbes, that an “image,” or a “color,” is but an apparition unto us of “motion, agitation, or alteration” in some “internal substance of the head.”

THE SELF-REFLEXIVENESS OF APPREHENSION,

in the manufacture of phenomena, was named by Kant

“THE TRANSCENDENTAL SYNTHESIS OF IMAGINATION,”

the word “imagination” standing on its roots, and meaning *the image-making faculty*. Phenomena, as reflex-conjuncts of sense-effects, are “produced”—put out—by this second function of apprehension; so Kant said he sometimes called it “productive imagination.” It is that function of pure elemental, or a *priori* awareness, which “re-presents” itself in the constitution of every object, as its *unity*, but a unity *shaped* according to some object’s filling of sense-effects. Hence Kant says:

“This synthesis of the manifold of sensuous intuition, which is possible and necessary *a priori*, may be called figurative synthesis (*synthesis speciosa*).”

Thus Kant found mind in sense, “unconscious understanding,” the instinctive awareness of animal susceptibility, as it existed in himself, to be the literal objective basis of all phenomena—the first “material” unity of every “material thing.” And he found this elemental source of all unity to be an innate

SELF-ACTIVITY

—a self-seeing mirror, as it were—a double of receptiveness and reflectiveness. Here, at last, was the *actual, living thing*, of which Locke’s “blank-tablet” had long been the still-born, stone figure.

Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his remarkable investigation of “The Principles of Psychology,” posits “mind” as always implied in sentiency, and as necessary to the genesis of any phenomenon, even the “first nervous shock” of a sensitive being. Recognizing the law of scientific idealism, he has seen, too, that our objective world is made up, at the perceptive outset, of such shocks. Again, he has proved, with great detail, that the action of mind is always of one general nature, whether in the lowest animal instinct or the highest conscious reason. But back at the first nervous shock, Mr. Spencer *stops* with mind, and says that at the next regress it becomes “unknowable.” Yet nearly a hundred years before this investigation Kant showed precisely what this so-called “unknowable” *is*. He showed that mind, in all stages and states—

MIND IN ITSELF

—is a synthetical unity of awareness. In germ, as “unconscious understanding”—as the mind of sense—its function is to be simply apprehensive of, and thus to conjoin in its instinctive cognizance, some “manifold” contained in a “nervous shock,” or in various sense-effects, into some *unity*; which then, as *itself apprehended*, or *made a reflex*, becomes an impression, an image, an object.

Such is the base of Kant’s analysis of perception, and so of matter as always nothing but a relation to sense. At the beginning of his work, however, he confined his attention to

SPACE AND TIME,

and in such a way as to confound his readers from that day to this. Still, at the opening of his "Æsthetic," he implies, if only in one remark, all that has been explained here :

"If I take" [says Kant] "from our representation of a body, all that the understanding thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force, divisibility, and also whatever belongs to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness, color, there is still something left us from this empirical intuition, namely, *extension and shape*. These belong to pure intuition, which exists *a priori* in the mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any real object of the senses or any sensation."

Students of Kant, in general, know well enough why he attributes "extension" to "bodies," as derived by them from a *a priori* mind. *Space* is so derived; hence all things *in space*, which is the "form," the "condition" of their existence, must partake of its nature, which is pure extension, pure "given quantity," as he designates it. But why does the *shape* of a material body belong to "pure intuition," and *come from mind*? Simply because the shape (let it be of a stone) is merely the *objected* "*synthesis of apprehension*," in which the properties of the stone, as impressions of sense, are *unified*, but in accordance with their special variety. The shape is their "figurative synthesis," their "*synthesis speciosa*." Now, in the meaning of Kant, and in the nature of the case, space is *made* in precisely the same *manner* as a stone; only the stone is full of diverse properties—special effects on sense, got from some impinging background of matter—some "noumenon"—while space has no properties at all, except additions and divisions of *itself*—spaces. In other words, the stone is a *special* relation between mental synthesis and sensuous susceptibility, the latter being in particular impact with some noumenal non-ego, and being definitely *filled* from it. Space, on the other hand, is a *general* relation between the same mental synthesis and the same sensuous susceptibility, the latter holding *no contents* from any noumenon, yet being recipient to *all* possibility of noumenal impact. Hence, space is just "the synthesis of apprehension" itself, set in self-reflex, objected, phenomenated. The stone, in its unity, its form, its "shape," is this objected synthesis of apprehension, *filled* with certain sensuous effects. The synthesis of apprehen-

sion, again, as the condition of any special "shape" into which it may be stuffed, is of course *a priori* to the stuffed shape; so space is *a priori* to the stone in space. Once again, space is the outward re-presentation, the very double to the eye, of the synthesis of apprehension; for space is just the

VISIBLE SYNTHESIS OF THE APPREHENDED

—the transparent base of coexistence for all external things.

It must be remembered that the synthesis of apprehension, as the "mind" of "sense," is itself a *double*, containing the pure conjunctive unity of "unconscious understanding" as an active factor, and susceptibility to impact as a passive factor. In the conjoined relation of these two factors every material phenomenon gets to exist; so there must be *some* relation of space to *every* external object, and to *all* external objects—which is to say at once that space is *infinite*, both in extent and divisibility, so far as it can apply to objects *at all*.

And here, too, is the reason that the 'contained character, the constituent quality, of space—meaning what Kant termed the "form of the intuition"—is essentially plural. This constituent quality of space is a re-presentation of mind, as at once active and passive, receptive and reflexive—as fundamental *a priori* self-separateness. But *space itself*, as a *whole*, is the *synthesis* of this self-separateness. It is self-unity of self-separateness, *materialized*. Space, made of spaces, is a thing identical in form and contents. Kant said:

"Space re-presented as an *object* (as geometry really requires it to be) contains more than the mere *form of the intuition*; namely, a combination of the manifold given according to the form of sensibility into a re-presentation that can be intuited; so the *form of the intuition* gives us merely the manifold, but the *formal intuition* gives unity of re-presentation. In the "Æsthetic" I regarded this unity as belonging entirely to sensibility, for the purpose of indicating that it antecedes all conceptions, although it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to sense, through which, however, all our conceptions of space and time are possible. . . . By means of this unity alone (the understanding determining the sensibility) space and time are given as intuitions."

It is strange that Kant did not put this explanation, with the rest like it, at the beginning of his "Critique," where it belonged,

instead of burying it piecemeal in his "Transcendental Logic,"¹ where its vast significance has, to this day, been as good as lost.

It is easy enough to follow out Kant's

GENESIS OF TIME,

in the same way as his genesis of space. The constituent quality of space and time is the same in both, and is subject in both to the same act of synthesis, in order that the essential plurality of "the form of intuition" may be created into the unity of "the formal intuition" itself—the single thing, space or time. But time is the "form" of "*in*-ternal sense," as Kant put it, while space is the "form" of "*ex*-ternal sense"—sense being to Kant not its physical organs (which are matter), but mental *susceptibility* as distinguished from mental *synthesis*.² Every phenomenon in space and time is made of active subjective-synthesis, passive subjective-susceptibility, and noumenal impact. Space and time themselves are made of the synthesis and the susceptibility alone. But pure synthesis, which means just pure identity of awareness, can *have* no "susceptibility," cannot be *occupied*, without *change of state*; and any change of state in a pure general awareness forms succession of states, or, as Kant said, "*generates time*." But conjunction, again, of synthesis and susceptibility must be the relating of separates, with reference to the objective as well as the subjective factor. As objective effect this relation is pure co-existence of separates in the same time, through outness from each other—space. All objects, impressions, "effects of sense," must take the order of time; but "objects of internal sense" (certain feelings, or emotions), having no direct filling from noumena, are not objects in space.

As Kant was so largely a consequence of English psychology, it was natural he should take the peculiar method he did to prove the subjective origin of the objective percepts, space and time. Locke had pretty nearly convinced the thinking world that all knowledge comes from "experience," and is "limited" by it; and Hume had shown that this experience is a subjective record, good for information at any time, as far as it has gone, but ex-

¹ To be found, in this instance, in a *note* on page 98 of the translation here followed.

² Kant's first point in his "Metaphysical Exposition of Space" is to declare "the external sense" a "property of the mind."

cluding, by its very nature, all possibility of any universal and necessary truth. If all knowledge were really confined to experience, we could not say that one and one make two, but only that one and one *have made* two, up to date: to-morrow, one one and one *might* make three. Now, the reason that one and one make two, and *always must* make two, is simply that the human mind is a principle of awareness which receives impressions only by connecting them according to its *own unity*. There every record begins; thence every order proceeds; and number is the order imposed by consciousness on its receptions, or *experiences*. The statement that "one and one make two" is what Kant called "a synthetical judgment *a priori*," because the predicate of the judgment contains something more than the putting together of two experiences—all that is directly involved in the subject—and adds the implication of *universal and necessary order* in the conjunction. Scrutinizing space and time, Kant saw at once that, while *objective things*, these two objects are universal and necessary to perception—are its *a priori* vistas. But, if so, they could not be like the objects in them, contingent on some ultimate non-ego, but must be reflexes of *mind* in relation to sense. By taking this method of proof, Kant cornered Locke and Hume on their own ground; and, by showing that established sciences, like mathematics and physics, would be impossible under any "objective" derivation of space and time, he rendered himself unanswerable. If he had explained his *idealism*, however, by dissecting any one phenomenon in space and time, his whole work would have been made clear, and would long ago have been understood.

We have seen that the secret of Kant lies, first of all, in his phrase "the synthesis of apprehension," or "the transcendental synthesis of the image-making faculty."

"It is an operation" [he says] "of the understanding on sensibility, and the *first* application of the understanding to objects of possible intuition, and at the same time *the basis for the exercise of the other functions of that faculty.*"¹

But having duly emphasized this point, it must now be said that the synthesis of apprehension alone is altogether inadequate to give form to an

¹ "Critique," p. 93.

OBJECT,

in the full import of that word. For an *object* is something held distinct by itself, in connection with another object, or with various objects. "Unconscious understanding" cannot form such connection and distinction, but can only blindly manufacture single intuitions, affording at most what Kant termed "a rhapsody of perceptions," in which no one would be first or last, or anything at all when past. A fish-worm, perhaps, has such a "rhapsody of perceptions" for its objective world. In the world of man the *a priori* element of intelligence which shapes it must be objected in the phase of

CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER,

or "apperception."

In noting the difference between the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of apperception, Kant said :

"It is one and the same spontaneity which, at one time under the name of imagination, at another under that of understanding, produces conjunction in the manifold of intuition."¹

Apperception is simply

MIND ADEQUATE TO CONCEPTION.

That there can be a stone, as known to a *human being*, there must be a synthesis of sense-effects (its properties), in which they are distinguished among themselves, and in which objects as wholes are distinguished from each other. A synthesis of this kind presupposes not merely "unconscious understanding," but an understanding that recognizes *itself* in connecting all things else.

"I am conscious" [said Kant] "of my identical self in relation to all the variety of representations given to me in intuition, because I call all of them *my* representations. . . . The thought, 'These representations, given in intuition, belong all of them to me,' is just the same as 'I unite them in one self-consciousness.' . . . Synthetical unity of the manifold in intuition, as given *a priori*, is therefore the foundation of the identity of apperception itself, which antecedes *a priori* all determinate thought. But the conjunction of representations into a conception is not to be

¹ P 99, note.

found in objects themselves, . . . but is, on the contrary, an operation of the understanding itself, which is nothing more than the faculty of conjoining *a priori*, and of bringing the variety of given representations under the unity of apperception. This principle is the highest in all human cognition."

So, to the existence of any distinguishable object there must pre-exist the element of mind in the phase of self-consciousness; and when Kant talked of

THE OBJECTIVE UNITY OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

he meant literally that "the synthetical unity of apperception," as well as "the synthetical unity of apprehension," is *materialized* in all *conceivable* things. To form the sense-effects of a stone into a single "intuition," they must be merged in a synthesis of apprehension; but to *set* the intuition as thus created—to make it remain *itself* in the midst of *others*, it must be merged with them in a higher synthesis—a common connective consciousness, which, distinguishing them in itself, re-presents them as distinguished.

It is here we reach Kant's famous

"CATEGORIES,"

which are simply conceptions of the pure synthetical unity of mind, as forming the unity of all things and of all connection among them.

The principle of mind, beginning, as we have seen, even with the instinctive mind of sense, is a spontaneous self-activity, receptive, reflexive, and resumptive of its doubles. By being the first, it unifies any and every manifold of sense-effects; by being the second, it *re-presents* the product—throws it *out*; by being the third, it apprehends the externalization, and a percept is born. Mind is thus essentially a *triad* as well as a *unit*. But if so, it is a

QUANTITY

—a sum of its own phases; and in these phases it is a *Unity*, a *Plurality*, and a *Totality*.

and, again, as just a *priori* principle and basis of all things, is their universal

QUALITY.

But, as self-reflexive, self-resumptive, it is at once a *Reality*, a *Negation*, and a *Limitation*, which means it is that which, in its double, contraposes one state to another, while, as a whole, it is the limit of both states.

It goes without saying that a principle of self-reflex is the

RELATION

of its reflexes, and in this relation is a *Substance* with *Dependence*, a *Cause* with *Effect*, and a *Reciprocity* of its separates. This short-cut to the Kantian categories¹ is certainly no sufficient "deduction" of them; for they are reflexes of conscious, not "unconscious" understanding; and the structure and action of instinctive mind would be nothing *known*, without the structure and action of conceptive mind. The synthesis of the latter proceeds, not through the formation of sense-effects into units of intuition, but through the formation of these already-made units (objects or their properties) into species, genera, and ultimate universals—the pure unity of these groupings, without regard to the things grouped, being just the pure *a priori* unity of self-conscious awareness.² Thus, those ultimate universals, the categories, are objective reproductions of pure conceptive synthesis, without which there could be no connection of things in *thought*—which would amount precisely to

NO REALIZED OBJECTS

and

NO OBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE.

But that the categories are implicit in even the mind of sense, and that the first form of every phenomenon is the reflex form of this stage of mind, shows how literally the bases of thought are the *a priori* bases of all phenomena. Sir William Hamilton fancied

¹ Those of Modality are omitted, as not entering into the constitution of objects, but only reflecting the manner of their reception by mind in accordance with their constitution.

² As usual, Kant puts this exceedingly important part of his dissection of mind—and so of its objects—precisely where one finds the most difficulty in getting at it. He treats it exhaustively, however, under what is entitled "The Schematism of the Categories."

that Aristotle's categories were "genera of real things," while Kant's categories were "determinations of thought," and, as mere "*entia rationis*," must "be excluded from the Aristotelic list." But there are no "genera of real things" except *as* "determinations of thought"; and, in making an experimental classification of objects, Aristotle found some of the Kantian categories, because the synthetical unity of mind had put those categories into the objects at the creation of them. To Kant an *object* meant something of which Sir William Hamilton had no boding.

We can barely touch Kant's analysis of mind in its third phase—that of

REASON.

It is still the same principle of awareness, with the same function of synthesis; but, as reason, it does not apprehend or conceive: it concludes or comprehends. *Seeing* things, and then *thinking* them as such, it ends in asking, "*Why?*" The pure *form* of answer, apart from all contents, is "*because*"—on account of *cause*. Thus reason forms its synthesis of comprehension by referring the particular to the general for a cause—a process that can never stop short of including all things in ultimate unities of cause. It is evident that ultimate unities of cause must contain all subordinate causes or conditions under them. There can be just three such ultimate unities; for there are just three possible kinds of being and conditions that relate to their universals: subjective being and conditions to subjective unity of them; objective being and conditions to objective unity of them; and all being and conditions, both subjective and objective, to the universal unity of being and conditions. These final unities, again, *as* final—as totalities of conditions with none beyond—are themselves "unconditioned."

Reason, then, as an *a priori* synthetical unity, necessarily refers all conditions of things to their final or absolute unities, which are in reality nothing but conceptual reflexes of Reason's *own nature and action*. To be an identity of mind, for instance, to the conditions of subjectivity, reason must receive *them* into *its* unity, which thus becomes *their* totality. Now what is the objective representation, the rational conception, of the totality of subjective conditions? It is simply the "transcendental idea" of pure subjectiveness, or Soul. In the same way the totality of objective, phenome-

nal conditions, is the idea of the Universe; while the totality of *all* conditions, both subjective and objective, is the idea of that in which all mind and all matter are related as their final cause or reason—God.

The preceding sketch of Kant's great work, "The Critique of Pure Reason," is necessarily curtailed and imperfect. Still, I trust that his central thought—the one thought never out of his mind as the foundation of his philosophy—has been duly indicated. If so, his "secret" is open—a secret which lies in the fact that he saw through the principle of relativity, the law of scientific idealism, and relaid the whole structure from the corner-stone up. Before Kant it was known well enough that "matter," however we must all accept it with our hands and eyes, has no standing, under the analysis of thought, except as a system of effects on ourselves. Hume, we remember, saw all this so clearly that he pronounced the very organs of sense, "our limbs and members," to be "not our body," but "certain impressions" to which the mind ascribes "a corporeal existence." Our limbs and members certainly *are* our body—the only body we have—but Hume was right in his meaning that our body is a phenomenon which has no existence but as a plexus of impressions on a principle of intelligence, possessing various modes of reception, named senses. But this *principle of intelligence* itself was, to Hume, not a fact to be grasped by "reason," not a principle to be known and described, but was to be taken as a "force and vivacity" unknowable beyond an *instinct* of it. Hume's unknowable "force and vivacity"—an improved form of Locke's "blank-tablet"—Kant *analyzed* in the light of its products; namely, those conjuncts of sense-effects called intuitions; those conjuncts of intuitions called objects; those conjuncts of objects called species, genera, and categories; and finally those conjuncts of all things and all conditions of things, called transcendental ideas. Now, such conjuncts of various "manifests" actually exist. They are man's percepts and concepts; they are his facts, his environment. But *as* percepts and concepts, and always conjuncts of "the manifold," they are formed, organized, totalized, through a *principle*—the principle of perception and conception itself. This is Kant's *a priori* synthetical unit, common and necessary to all "things" and to all "experience."

In our day the last word of any weight as against Kant—though not aimed at him in special—has been offered to us by that exceptionally able man,

PROFESSOR HUXLEY,

who is so apt to "hit the nail on the head," if there is any nail to hit. Too learned, both as philosopher and scientist, to question idealism, he admits it as unqualifiedly as did Mr. Mill; but he defends "what is commonly called materialism" in this way:¹

"If we analyze the proposition that all mental phenomena are the effects or products of material phenomena, all that it means amounts to this: that whenever those states of consciousness which we call sensation, or emotion, or thought, come into existence, complete investigation will show good reason for the belief that they are preceded by those other phenomena of consciousness to which we give the names of matter and motion. All material changes appear, in the long run, to be modes of motion; but our knowledge of motion is nothing but that of a change in the place and order of our sensations; just as our knowledge of matter is restricted to those feelings of which we assume it to be the cause."

To this

LAST POSTURE OF MATERIALISM

the open secret of Kant is the full reply. It is simply of no consequence to the case what states of consciousness precede or follow what other states of consciousness. Let it be granted (whether true or not) that "phenomena of consciousness to which we give the names of matter and motion" precede all others. What of it? Kant has proved to us that *no* phenomenon of consciousness—no matter, no motion, no sensation—and, beyond all these, no time and no space, in which all the rest appear—has, or can have, *any existence*, except as put into unity, form, and order, by the unity, form, and order of mind. If both "the synthesis of apprehension" and "the synthesis of apperception" enter into any state of consciousness named matter, *to give it birth*, there is no danger of taking the element of intelligence for an *afterbirth* of the process.

¹ "Hume," page 80.

Here is

THE PIVOT OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY,

on which it all turns. Uproot the pivot who can? It is said that the thought of the world is now returning to Kant. It is strange—a “grim joke,” as Carlyle might say—but Herr Professor Kant foresaw what a mess of “cerebration” would follow him, and partly at least by his own fault. He prophesied it. In 1787, closing his “Preface” to the second edition of the “Critique of Pure Reason,” he said :

“To those deserving men, who so happily combine profundity of view with a talent for lucid exposition—a talent which I myself am not conscious of possessing—I leave the task of removing any obscurity which may still adhere to the statement of my doctrines. For, *in this case, the danger is not that of being refuted, but of being misunderstood.*”

This was said a hundred and six years ago. Kant has had many a critic since, in many a country, and his book has dissolved many a head; but his words, true when written, are true to-day. He has never been “refuted”; and while the human mind is a perceptive, a conceptive, and a rational unity, the construction of it will permit no such ambitious feat. The thought of Kant has been extended; and the extension we may cheerfully admit to be correction. His circumference was larger than he supposed; but he centres the circle of modern science and of modern philosophy.

Kant’s industry, as we have seen, began with the general acceptance of what, if designated in a national way, would be called British idealism. Mr. Lewes, as biographical historian and coroner of philosophy, tells us that, after Locke, “it was considered established” that we “could have no knowledge not derived from experience,” no experience but of “ideas,” and consequently that we “could never know things in themselves, but only things as they affect us.” While Kant set out to analyze “experience” for the *a priori* mental factor of it, and to dissect “ideas”—to which he gave the better name of “re-presentations” (meaning second-presentations, reflexes, doubles)—he inherited from the Lockists their conception of the ultimate non-ego—the objective background of matter—and never outgrew that conception. Whatever unity and form *we*, as units of mind, may bring to the nature and construction of our objects, the *filling* of

them is not innate in us. It has a source apart. It comes from another—say, sensuously, an *out*, though it is only *this* through *re*-presentation in space. But this ultimate non-ego Kant took for granted at his first step, and finally, as against Fichte and others, believed that he demonstrated. He called it the “noumenon,” the “real correlate of matter,” and pluralized it as “things in themselves.” Yet he insisted, just as Herbert Spencer does to-day, that ’tis “unknown and unknowable.”

In a certain way—vital enough, too—“things in themselves” *are* “unknown and unknowable.” Man is a small, dependent, limited being. Let us admit at once every old proverb in the world, to the effect that “the finite cannot comprehend the infinite.” Sir William Hamilton issued a complete list of such proverbs. Let us adopt the whole of it. “The finite cannot comprehend the infinite.” The very meaning of “things in themselves” is that they are withheld from us in their *specific contents*. But in their *general nature* they are related and revealed to us; and the revelation is always asserted when we name them “source of impact,” the “real correlate of matter,” “things in themselves,” or even “the unknown and unknowable.” Is there an “unknown and unknowable?” Yes, there *is*. But whatever *is* has *being*—*must* have being, or not be that which “is.” So much then we *know* of “the unknown and unknowable”: it has being; it is a *fact*.¹ But we know it negatively, as well as positively. We know what it is *not*, on precisely the same ground that we know what it *is*. Being a “noumenon,” it is *not* a phenomenon; being a “thing in *itself*,” it is not what things are to *us*. Being “the real correlate of matter,” it is *not* matter, but is the objective background of matter. But Kant had analyzed matter and found it to be a *relation*—a relation between finite subjective awareness and this very noumenal background now in view. He had found, too, that all *matter*—every spicule of it—is

EXHAUSTED IN THE RELATION

—that out of the relation matter has no existence. By these presents, then, we know that the objective background of matter, the ultimate non-ego, is *not material*.

¹ Even Mr. Spencer sees this quite clearly in criticising Hamilton and Mansel.

But here let us pause and think, for our final step : it is worth our while. When reduced to elements, to principles, what is there of the universe—the all of things ? Just the subjective and the objective, mind and matter. Hence, that which is *not matter* is *mind*. Nothing else is left for it.

We may wriggle at this terminus as much as we like, but there is no dodging it. It may be said, for instance, that, while we *know* and *experience* nothing but mind and matter (including with matter its phenomenated vistas, space and time), we can *imagine* something else than either ; and, during the past fifty years, this nonsense has found lodgment in many heads. Now I can imagine *anything*, in the meaning that I can arbitrarily produce some foolish *fancy*. I can imagine a white blackbird, with his tail-feathers on his head. But I cannot imagine even this self-evident contradiction as possessing neither mind nor matter. What is an object of imagination ? (of fancy ?) It may be empty of matter, and so unlike the white blackbird. But *no* object of imagination can be empty of mind. Imagination is itself an act of mind : hence every possible product of imagination must partake of mind. If, therefore, I imagine something apart from mind and matter, it must still spring from mind, contain mind, and so *not* be apart from mind. The "*reductio ad absurdum*" can be had cheap and sure, just where it is most needed.

Reaching the view where noumena, as impossible to matter, are resolved into mind or spirit, it is evident that we have now parted company with the good Professor Kant, though merely by taking a step beyond him which he himself had made inevitable. Very early in his work he had said :

"There are two sources of human knowledge (which probably spring from a *common, but to us unknown root*), namely, sense and understanding. By the former, objects are *given to us* ; by the latter, *thought*."

Dissecting, with Kant, the nature of "understanding," we have discovered in it the unal form of all our re-presentations—of every perceptible and conceivable object of fact. Dissecting "sense," with the same instructor, we have found it to be certain modes of mental susceptibility, its physical organs being nothing but relations between susceptible awareness and the noumenal unknown, like all the rest of "matter." Led, once more, by our Professor

straight up to this noumenal unknown, where *he* willed to stop and turn his back on it, we have only had to *look*, in order to see it collapse into the self-retention of Spirit—spirit *out of us*, but still *in itself*, as the totality of Spiritual Being. We have thus found the “one common root” of all knowledge and of all things. But we have touched, also, the apex of thought and can now see what is meant—really and fully meant—by

“ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.”

Absolute Idealism is not merely a phrase; it is a magnificent fact. Immersed in matter, fooled by our senses, we may insist on looking at all sensuous phenomena, as the Rev. John Jasper looks at the sun, with honest contempt for Copernicus and Newton. “De earf do *not* move roun’ de sun,” exclaimed the sturdy colored preacher, “but de bressed sun move roun’ de earf. Dere she go now: don’t I see her wi’ dese very eyes?” Parson Jasper does see the sun moving round the earth, and in the same way we all see the objects of our senses existing in perfect independence of ourselves. Still, as surely as astronomy has proved the delusion of taking the sun’s movement from the eye, philosophy—and indeed “practical science” itself—has proved the delusion of taking objective re-presentations as not constructed through subjective being. The inevitable end of this proof is the dissolution of noumena as anything “material,” and the inclusion of all things in

UNIVERSAL SPIRIT.

Of such spirit, finite subjectivity is a function—a necessary participative reflex, through which the Universal Spirit is life, manifestation, self-evolution. But here we must look back, and waive our final adieu to Kant. Here at last we must take a new guide, named

HEGEL.

But Hegel will never be of much use to mankind until the way to his starting-point is seen through Kant, and seen as clearly as sunlight. When Hegel sat down to write his “Logic,” he knew all there was in Kant’s idealism, implicit as well as explicit, and took it *literally*; just as Kant, when he sat down to write his “Critique of Pure Reason,” knew all the philosophical and scien-

tific idealism that had preceded him, and took the general result of it *literally*. But, as a requisite, perhaps, to his microscopic analysis of human subjectivity, he closed his eyes to all else. He declined to generalize his own discoveries. Hence his trouble with "the antinomies," his non-objectiveness for the "transcendental ideas," and his need of a "moral" ground for intellectual truth. Let us not presume to find fault with this need. If ever an error was high and holy, it was this one. It was the error of a conscience as grand, in a way, as even the master-mind that stands, so far, for the analytic capacity of the human race. But Kant's synthesis was Hegel. As Kant is the inmost centre of modern knowledge, Hegel is as yet the circumference. There has been now and then in the world a man who has dreamed of antagonizing, and even "refuting," Hegel. There has been now and then a man who fancied he could "distil" knowledge out of Hegel, without seeing a spark of light beyond Hume; and there was not long ago one man—a very imposing collector of philosophical *bric-à-brac*—who wondered if Hegel ever really knew what he was about—ever "understood *himself*." When the virtual sons of that genial Scotch bachelor, David Hume, arrive in sight of Kant, it may be of some use for them to begin a consideration of Hegel.

MYSTIC THEOLOGY.

BY DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK BY THOMAS DAVIDSON.

CHAPTER I.

The Divine Darkness.

§ 1. Trinity Superessential, Superdivine, and Superexcellent, Guide of Christian Theosophy, direct us to the superunknown, supersplendent, and supreme height of mystic oracles, where the simple and absolute and unchanging mysteries of theology are revealed in the superluculent gloom of the Silence that initiates into

hidden things, mysteries that in the deepest darkness outshine the brightest light, and in the altogether intangible and invisible overfill the eyeless intellects with superbeautiful splendors. This be my prayer!

But thou, O dear Timothy, in thine intense endeavor after mystic visions, put aside sensible and intellectual acts, and all things sensible and intelligible, and all things non-existent and existent, and, as far as may be, aspire to the unity of that which is above essence and knowing; for by a non-relative and absolute withdrawal from thyself and from all things, thou shalt, having put off all things, and been released from all things, be borne aloft to the superessential ray of divine darkness.

§ 2. See to it, however, that none of the uninitiated overhear these things—such, I mean, as are bound fast in things existent, and imagine that nothing exists superessentially above the existent, but think that, with their own knowing, they know Him who hath made darkness His hiding place. And if initiations into divine mysteries are above their reach, what shall we say of them who are more uninitiated, who image the overlying cause of all things by the last of existent things, and say that it in no way excels the godless, multiform shapes which they fashion; whereas they ought both to affirm of it all the affirmations of things that are, as being the cause of all things, and more properly to deny them all of it, as superexisting above all, and not to think that the negations are opposed to the affirmations, but much rather that it is above privations, being above all negation and position.

§ 3. Hence it is that the divine Bartholomew says that Theology is both great and least, and the Gospel broad and large, and yet concise. This seems to me to be a marvellous insight of his, that the Good Cause of all things is at once of many words, of few words, and of no words, inasmuch as it has neither word nor intelligence, since it superessentially overlies all things, and is shown forth without veil and truly only to those who pass through all things accursed and all things pure, and pass beyond all ascent of all holy heights, and leave behind all divine lights and sounds and words celestial, and pass into the gloom where, as the Oracles say, He who is above all truly is. Not in vain, indeed, is the divine Moses commanded first to purify himself and then to separate himself from those that are not pure; and after all purifica-

tion he hears the many-voiced trumpets, sees many lights forth-flashing pure and far-diffused rays; then he is separated from the many and, with chosen priests, attains to the height of divine ascents. But even then he is not in the presence of God Himself; nor doth he behold Him (for He is invisible); but only the place where He is. This, I think, indicates that the divinest and loftiest things of sight and intelligence are certain objective Words, objectified by Him who transcends all things—Words through which His presence, which is above all thought, is revealed, standing upon the intelligible heights of His holiest places. And then he is set free from the seen things themselves and from them that see, and passes into the truly mystical gloom of unknowledge, in which he dies to all cognitive apprehensions, and finds himself in the totally intangible and invisible, being altogether of Him who is above all, belonging to no one, either to himself or to another, but being united in its better part to Him who is altogether unknown, by complete inaction of knowledge, and, by knowing nothing, knowing super-intelligently.

CHAPTER II.

How we must be united and offer Hymns to Him who is the Author of all Things and above all Things.

It is in this superluculent darkness that we long to be, and through unsight and unknowledge to see and to know that which is above sight and knowledge, by very not seeing and not knowing. This, indeed, is truly to see and to know and to praise superessentially the Superessential by the removal of all existent things; just as those who make a statue out of a single block remove all the obstacles that impede the pure vision of the hidden one, and display, by mere removal, the hidden beauty, itself by itself. And we must, I think, praise the removals in a way opposite to the positions. The former, indeed, we put on, beginning from the first and passing down through the middle to the last; in the latter case, making our ascents from the last to the most principal, we remove all things, in order that without a veil we may know that unknowledge which lies hidden by all known things in all things that are, and may see that superessential darkness which is hidden by all the light in all the things that are.

CHAPTER III.

Affirmative and Negative Theologies.

In our *Outlines of Theology* we have celebrated the leading principles of Affirmative Theology, showing how the Divine and Good Nature is called One, and how it is called Three; what is the meaning in it of Fatherhood and Sonship, and what is the import of the theology of the Spirit; how from the immaterial and individual Good there sprang the embosomed lights of goodness, which have remained immanent in the Good itself, in themselves and in each other, with an immanence coeternal with their propagation; how the superessential Jesus was essenced with truths of human nature; and so on through all those truths revealed by the Oracles, which are celebrated in the *Outlines of Theology*.

In our work *On the Divine Names* we have shown how God is called Good, how Existent, how Life and Wisdom and Power, and all the other titles of the intellectual divine naming. In our *Symbolic Theology*, again, we have shown what are the metonymies from sensible to divine things; what are the divine shapes, the divine figures and parts and organs, what are the divine places and worlds; what the angers, griefs, wraths; what the intoxications and the nauseas, the oaths and the maledictions; what the sleepings and wakings, and all the other sacredly moulded shapes of symbolic divine representation. And I think you have seen how the last are more prolix than the first; for it was necessary that the *Outlines of Theology* and the evolution of the *Divine Names* should be briefer than the *Symbolic Theology*. The truth is, the further we carry our nods of negation upward, the more our words are contracted by the surveys of intellectual things, and so even now, in passing into the darkness that is above intellect, we shall find not brevity of speech, but complete absence of speech and absence of intelligence. And in the one case, speech, going down from the highest to the lowest, widened out to an extent proportionate to the amount of the descent; whereas, in the present case, mounting from the lowest to the highest, it is narrowed in proportion to the ascent, and at the end of the entire ascent it will be voiceless altogether, and altogether

united to the ineffable. "But why," you will say, "do we begin the divine positings from the first, and then begin the divine removals from the last?" Because, in positing that which is above all positing, we were obliged to begin positing the suggestive affirmation from that which is most akin to it; whereas, in removing that which is above all removal, we were obliged to remove it from the things that are farthest apart from it. Is not God more truly life and goodness than He is air and stone? And is it not more true that He does not suffer from intoxication and is not wrathful than that He is not named and is not thought?

CHAPTER IV.

The Supreme Cause of all the Sensible is not any Sensible Thing.

We affirm, therefore, that the Cause of all things, being above all things, is neither essenceless, nor lifeless, nor reasonless, nor mindless; nor has it body, or fashion, or form, or quality, or quantity, or bulk; nor is it in place, nor is it seen, nor hath it sensible contact. It neither feels nor is felt; nor has it disorder and confusion, as if excited by material passions; nor is it powerless, as if subject to sensible contingencies; nor is it in need of light; nor is it or has it either change, or decay, or division, or privation, or flux, or any other sensible thing.

CHAPTER V.

The Supreme Cause of all the Intelligible is not any Intelligible Thing.

Ascending again, we affirm that it is neither soul nor intellect; nor has it imagination, or opinion, or reason, or intelligence; nor is it reason or intelligence; nor is it spoken or thought. It is neither number, nor order, nor magnitude, nor littleness, nor equality, nor inequality, nor similarity, nor dissimilarity. It neither stands, nor moves, nor rests; it neither has nor is power or light; it neither lives, nor is life; it is neither essence, nor eternity, nor time. Even intellectual contact does not belong to it. It is neither science nor truth. It is not even royalty or wisdom; not one; not unity; not divinity or goodness; nor even spirit as we know it. It is neither sonship, nor paternity, nor any other ex-

istent thing known to us or to any other. It is not anything non-existent or existent; nor do things existent know it as it is; nor does it know existent things as existent. There is no speech, or name, or knowledge of it. It is neither darkness nor light; nor error, nor truth; nor is there universal positing or removal of it. Nay, when we posit and remove those things that come after it, we do not posit or remove it, since the complete and unitary cause of all things is above all positing, and beyond all removal the transcendence of that which is absolutely abstracted from all things and above all things.

FRIENDSHIP.

BY LEONORA E. HALSTED.

Friendship, happily, is nothing new; but, for that matter, neither is life; yet each person finds it quite interesting to live and to learn how others have lived; and so it is with the beautiful experience of friendship. Homer sings it in the early literature and Emerson analyzes it in the late; the Old Testament gives us a beautiful example of it, and the New a higher one; one of the chief works of Plato—"The Banquet"—extolled it, and one of the greatest poems of modern times—"In Memoriam"—grew from it as an exquisite plant from earth to light. Yet the subject is inexhaustible, for individuality has its freest play in this relation. Indeed, the friendships we have at the same time with different persons differ as much as they do. The relation changes and rearranges itself incessantly, for each man has various facets to his character; one friend fits to one, another to more than one, but no human being can by any possibility satisfy another at every point continuously.

" We hold our dear ones with a firm, strong clasp,
We hear their voices, look into their eyes;
And yet betwixt us in that clinging clasp
A distance lies."

This distance is the mystery of individuality; and it is curious to see how the sense of it has developed through the ages. Plato, in his famous conversation on love, gives an illustration of the way his age regarded it:

"If, where two who love are together, Vulcan were to stand over them with his tools in his hand and ask them, 'Do ye desire to be in the same place with each other, so as never by day or night to be apart from each other? for, if ye long for this, I am willing to melt you down together and to mould you into the same mass, so that you two may live as one person, and, when ye die, may remain forever in Hades, one soul instead of two.' On hearing this," proceeds Plato, "not a single person would appear to wish for anything else, but would in reality conceive he had heard that which long ago he wished for, and, being melted with his beloved, he would out of two become one."

But Montaigne does not wish an indistinguishable unity that would rob both of the chief joy of love—the joy of giving. "The friend," he says, "is sorry he is not treble or quadruple, and that he has not many souls and many wills to confer them all upon this one object." While, in our own day, individuality has developed so far that Emerson finds it necessary to say, "At times, let us bid even our dearest friends farewell, and defy them, saying, 'Who are you? Unhand me; I will be dependent no more.'" And in his poem somewhat ironically named "Give all to Love," he adjures the lover thus:

"Keep thee to-day,
To-morrow, forever,
Free as an Arab
Of thy beloved."

But this is the nomadic spirit defying social life and preferring isolation with caprice to freedom attained through the perfect law of liberty.

The true reason for love is the simplest one: "Because it is he; because it is I"; the spontaneous attraction of two characters for each other; the intense and abiding personal element that is as the earth to the plant, that by which it stands firm. But friendship is of the earth, earthy, unless it lifts itself into the light and grows and blossoms ever higher, bearing the fruit of

years of noble and tender experience in common. It cannot be lasting or good while it lasts if its chief strength lies in the employment of the senses. If to see, hear, or feel our friends in the literal meaning of these words is necessary in order to keep our affection alive, it is of small value. Friendship worthy of the name is supersensuous; it is capable of penetrating distance and silence to "coincide in rest" with an absent friend. It sees, hears, and feels without the need of bodily organs, for it lives in a higher atmosphere than that of the body and can command finer forces.

A close personal affection, however, attracts many dangers, chief of which is the desire to enslave. To friendship, on the contrary, freedom is absolutely essential. It is not, like the conjugal, a relation of one to one. There should be free play of individuality not alone of friends toward each other, but of each friend toward all others. The greed of exclusive possession is fatal. Demands in affection are death blows. The friend who asks more than he can command strangles by his clinging embrace. Seek ownership of your friend and you own but yourself, for you push him away. "Violence touches not love." Seek confidence and you repel it. Await it, content whether it hastens or delays, and, unless principle or lack of sympathy prevents, it will be yours in due season. What would hasten it is inconsistent with true friendship. Why should you pry even in thought into the hidden recesses of a friend's life? Do you not trust him, or are you unwilling that he should have any unshared thought or memory? It is like asking him what he has eaten in order to make that face and form. He, as his life has made him, is your friend; "here took his station and degree, one born to love you." Does not this result transcend details? On the other hand, where there is a reason for communicating facts, for telling what kind of food went to produce the spiritual muscle and nerve you admire in your friend, if he is honest and you are sympathetic, he will speak freely. Sympathy has an incalculable power; it is the dynamic force of the world.

But it is not to be expected that so complex a creature as man will find another person with whom he can coalesce in "the simplicity and wholeness with which one chemical atom meets another." Such unity is not found among animals, nor even

plants; each part in every union maintains its identity, and it would be retrogression for man not to maintain his. Friendship does not require him to sacrifice his individuality, but to enlarge it, for it is simply the spontaneous recognition in one nature of congeniality in another. Congeniality may exist in one portion of the meeting characters and not at all in others. Discrimination, the knowledge of when to withhold no less than when to give, is as essential to friendship as to love. Only an inexperienced person expects to throw his whole weight upon any other person as a child upon its mother, or the soul upon God. It is a childish thought and shows lack of appreciation of the other personality. Nowhere are the niceties of life, the delicacy of penetration, and the tact of usage more necessary than in all forms of affection. Without these, friendship is quickly trampled in the mire, and, if it exists at all, endures only by maintaining itself at a very low level.

So jealousy should be obliterated from friendship. The more friends your friend has, the richer are you, for you share his wealth, his added experience. We can possess fully only by participation. We come more into union with each other as we become more universal. The etymology of this word signifies turning all into one. The more that is done, the more there is to share; and the less we go outside of a single friend, a single interest, the smaller is our harvest—either to keep or divide. Friendship should reach out many hands to grasp the produce of others, giving of its own in return, and draw them back to feed and beautify those dearest.

The question of supremacy also should not obtrude itself between friends. "You ought to love me more than any other because I love you more than any other" is a wretched claim. The theory of sixpence for sixpence is not suitable to friendship; it has no business to demand what it is incapable of winning. If a friend can gain and retain affection, so much the better; if not, whose fault is it so much as his own? Moreover, the nature that considers itself defrauded if its affection is unreciprocated in degree has much to learn. In material wealth, whom do we consider the richer man? the one who can give, or the one who can only take? If you have millions to give away, are you not wealthier than the pauper who has nothing? And this holds

good of spiritual matters far more deeply. It is more blessed to give than to receive. It is infinitely better to love than to be loved; to be active than passive; to have energy than inertia.

Of course, in friendship as elsewhere the ideal is equality. "Love without love in return is like a question without an answer." Reciprocally to give and take is the most perfect condition, but the mercantile idea of *quid pro quo* should be disclaimed by friends as by lovers. Only in the rarest instances can the degree be the same. The desire to be loved is just and right in its place, but it must be made to keep its place, not usurp attention. The craving for return must be divested of selfishness, must not be a centralized point, but enclose a large circumference, in order not to injure the finer elements of friendship. A man, however, should rejoice in receiving as well as giving. If he does not, he cannot be a true friend, for in receiving reluctantly he deprives his friend of the very joy he himself most appreciates.

Montaigne, who, cynic as he is on some subjects, gross and vulgar in many ways, has yet a wonderfully deep insight into friendship, tells of an example which he considers "very fully to the point."

"Eudamidas, a Corinthian, had two friends, and, coming to die, being poor and his friends rich, made his will after this manner: 'I bequeath to Aretheus the maintenance of my mother, to support and provide for her in her old age; and to Charixenus I bequeath the care of marrying my daughter, and to give her as good a portion as he is able; and in case one of these chances to die, I hereby substitute the other in his place.' They who first saw this will made themselves very merry at the contents, but the heirs accepted the legacies with very great content, and Charixenus dying within five days after, Aretheus nourished the old woman with great care and tenderness; and of five talents he had, gave two and a half in marriage with an only daughter, and two and a half in marriage with the daughter of Eudamidas, and on the same day solemnized both their nuptials. Eudamidas," Montaigne remarks further on, "as a bounty and favor bequeaths to his friends a legacy of employing themselves in his service, and doubtless the force of friendship is more eminently apparent in this act of his than in that of Aretheus."

This is the true point of view. In friendship the receiver shows

even a greater generosity than the giver does, for his feeling is liable to misconstruction, whereas the material generosity is plain to the dullest sense. But the friendships are rare in which one can give or receive material benefit and not strain the relation. Silver and gold are heavy loads for the shoulders of friends to carry; they are apt to bend under the burden and we lose the free carriage our friends liked in us. Where a person feels he is under an obligation to another, if it be only for a dollar, the relation of friendship is disturbed. Love alone is true gratitude and removes all sense of obligation.

“This it was that made me move
As light as carrier birds in air:
I loved the weight I had to bear,
Because it needed help of love.”

The finest gratitude does not ask for opportunity to return the aid or favor received to the person from whom it came, but appreciates it so keenly that it seeks with eagerness opportunities of passing the good deed on. Thus it transcends the particular instance and broadens into “the general deed of man.”

Emerson scathes the commonplace which enters into our friendships, but it would seem more just to look upon it as the clothing of modesty. The heart must not unveil itself before an imperfect sympathy, and our ordinary remarks on meeting a friend are like the prelude that attunes the singer and his audience before the exquisite melody begins. Or a touch may be all that is necessary for this prelude—a touch on the key-note—so vital is deep emotion. I meet a friend after long years of absence, or a few hours in which much has occurred. We clasp hands, we look in each other's eyes, and the prelude is done; speech can begin with perfect security of comprehension. And to be understood! to understand! this is the chief glory of friendship. That which can be safely left unspoken is the main portion of any heartfelt speech. Words are but indications, buoys in the ocean of the unuttered. If one sees only the buoy, how impossible to convey to him a sense of the infinite sea! “Songs without words,” writes a friend; “a love-letter without words; any one can write a love-letter with words, but I can write and you can read a love-letter without

words." Ay, there it is; the harmony of feeling, the assurance of comprehension, the free ebb and flow of the tides of love out of and into one's being.

These caresses of friendship make the lyre of love vibrate as deeply and sweetly as the other touches of thought and unsensuous feeling. The harmony is the richer for every added chord. Emerson does not appreciate this; he is afraid of being familiar with his friends. He wants to keep them in the highest and most rarefied air. He will talk with them only on the mountain tops. "It would indeed give me a certain household joy," he acknowledges, "to quit this lofty seeking, this spiritual astronomy, and come down to warm sympathies with you; but then I know well I shall mourn always the vanishing of my mighty gods."

He forgets that God himself is love, and manifests himself to the lowly in heart, the childlike in spirit. He is terribly afraid of his friends; they are very breakable idols. He goes into the sanctuary only on rare occasions, when by fasting and solitude he has made himself worthy; he walks on tiptoe, he dares hardly breathe for fear the precious piece of rare porcelain will fall and he be left mourning among the fragments. But perfect love casteth out fear. It sweeps aside these brittle gods and walks out into the world accompanied, as by the breath of life, with the living, loving, bending, uplifting friend. Nothing is small to such a friend; a touch of the hand is a heart thrill; a sense of his presence creates an atmosphere of joy; a thought heard together echoes deeply and returns in a musical chord; an idea flashing simultaneously into two minds is like a touch of the Holy Spirit, for friendship as well as religion has its Pentecost.

You are not afraid of your friend's idealizing you; you want him to idealize you to the utmost reach of his capacity; for far from weighting you, it helps you to soar. In the eons of eternity you may become what he thinks you, and in the mean time he inspires you to persevere toward this glorious goal. When you are tempted to fall backward, his ideal holds you firm and helps you forward. Even if you fail him, as yourself, egregiously, you know that his love will take on the form of compassion, and will rescue you if rescue be possible. So you are not afraid of him. While a false note jars with hateful dissonance on the harmony of your affection, yet you rejoice in the thought that your friend's love

will aid you to less imperfect truth, and that, under his modulating touch, discords will at last blend into music.

It is difficult to tell what best evidences friendship. Love is the solvent of all things; it holds in solution, as it were, every possibility of devotion, tenderness, helpfulness; some event occurs and the possibility is precipitated into an act, a word, a silence. A slight thing may convey more meaning than a much greater thing. It is not quantity so much as quality that is precious. Deeds, however great, are not the stuff of which friendship is made, any more than food is the stuff out of which genius is made: all can eat, few can be geniuses or friends. But we cannot be either unless, when occasion demands, the food and deeds are ready. Yet if we fail even at the crucial moment, friendship should trust us, if we repent, beyond that failure. Where is there a greater instance of supreme confidence in a friend than Christ gave to Peter when, after Peter had denied him thrice, he gave him the opportunity to obliterate these denials by calling forth thrice the reassurance of his love and, moreover, taught him how to prove it?

Christ said a man cannot do more than to give up his life for his friend, yet how many have died for those they knew not! Witness the nurses and physicians who flock to a plague-stricken district. But by giving up one's life Christ may have meant, not death, but a living sacrifice. This indeed is a supreme test of friendship, for it is constantly recurring, never ending, and puts one's whole self to the proof. It is comparatively easy to die and be done with it, as the phrase goes, but to live day after day, week after week, year after year, and respond triumphantly to every test friendship can put upon one—this is to be a friend indeed.

But if few can be heroes, we can at least try to be genuine so far as we go, and this is the essential element of greatness. To be true, "never to relent, never to give one's self the lie," is the chief point.

"Being true unto thine own self,
Thou art faithful, too, to me."

"Gracchus and Blossius," we are told, "were more friends than citizens. Having absolutely given up themselves to one another,

each held absolutely the reins of the other's inclinations." But no one has a right to give himself up to another so absolutely as to be governed by that other. History shows us in large examples how such surrender eventuates. Give up your conscience and will to the church, and you become a priest-pulled puppet; give them up to the state, and you become a slave; give them up to society, and it scorns while using you; give them up in the family, and you are trodden underfoot. A man must stand like Coriolanus, "as if he were author of himself and knew no other kin." Then, from this attitude of self-possession the gift of himself becomes royal; his friendship is of more worth to one happy enough to secure it than diamonds or crowns; it has no measure but its own—spiritual life.

To me, the illustrations of deepest friendship are these: A woman of sensitive conscience, unsparing self-condemnation, and an intense reserve, when confessing a sin to another said, "I would as soon you knew it as to know it myself." What surety of comprehension this betokens! It reminds one of Tennyson's adjuration to his dead friend, to be near him through all the throes of life; but then comes the doubt whether really he does wish his friend to see "the inner vileness" and "the hidden shame." Yet love triumphs.

"There must be wisdom with great Death;
The dead shall look me through and through."

What makes the other instance greater is the fact that both were living, and the living have not the "larger, other eyes, to make allowance for us all."

To receive a confidence and shut it away so sacredly that its reflection may never be seen peering ghost-like from the mirrors of memory, even by the sensitive eye of the person who confided it, is a delicacy of friendship essential to its refinement. The dead indeed can be trusted not to remind us of our sins, but the living may make life a torture thereby, and confidence an unutterably bitter regret.

The second illustration is this: Two women were about to part for an indefinite period. One of them was in very unhappy circumstances and of a tempestuous nature. "Suppose," said she, "you should return five years hence and find me in a house of ill-

fame, what would you do?" "Go and bring you out," was the instant reply. It contains a great lesson, for such is the love that casteth out fear, and the faith that can move mountains.

The third example is of two men, one of whom alone was a true friend. It is told in "Sebastian Strome." Strome had led an evil life under the mask of goodness; he had committed crime, but at last became thoroughly ashamed of it. On the point of doing what he could to expiate it, he revealed himself in all his vileness to the friend who had revered him as a demigod, regarding himself as worthless in comparison. Overwhelmed by the revelation, Smillet's love broke out in the cry, "I'd rather have done it myself!" As a spontaneous expression of deep friendship it would be hard to find anything its superior.

All of these instances may seem as of small consequence compared to the action of Aretheus, but to me they indicate a far higher reach of personal friendship. They indicate; that is all. The weather-vane tells the way of the wind better than something less sensitive. The compass is insignificant compared to the waste of waters in mid-ocean, but it indicates where lies the harbor and safety.

And this brings us to the duties of friendship, for to be a compass in troubled waters is one of the chief offices of friendship.

Duties are based on principles. No matter how stately the superstructure may be, nor how fair the Palace of Delight, nothing truly human has its foundation elsewhere than on principle. The animal is beneath principle because unconscious of it (alas, that man has so much of the animal in him yet!); the divine may seem to transcend it; but this is only seeming. The divine weds principle to love and so makes principled action, spontaneous action—the perfect law of liberty, the truth that maketh free.

The ethics of friendship, then, are sincerity, fidelity, regard for the other's welfare, and trust.

Caprice and insincerity between friends cut both ways, for it would be more just to blame one's self, at least partly, for the mistake made in the choice of the friend and the ensuing disappointment, than to blame wholly the fickle or false person. Intelligent perception is quite as essential as devotion. How can one expect seed to take root where there is no earth? If we sow our seed,

no matter how plentifully, on barren rocks, who is to blame that it does not spring up and bear fruit ?

As to fidelity, while the close relationship of friends endures, it is easy to be true. But let a strain come and our principles are tested. If a friend falls away from one's esteem and respect, and all efforts to recall him prove useless, what then ? It is sometimes the highest office of friendship to end it. If a man palter with his own soul, shall his friend palter with it also ? Shall he not rather uphold the soul, having faith in its survival of this degradation, and refuse to recognize the evil mask as the true man ? "You are as though dead to me," are bitter words to say, but they may be the precursor of resurrection ; the reviving trumpet-call to one indeed dead in trespasses and sins. Then how gladly will the grave-clothes be stripped off, and the man clothed in rich raiment and seated at the friend's right hand or held in his close embrace !

Just in which way friendship can be best served, however—whether by withdrawal or ceaseless endeavor to reform—is a question only the friend can decide. One must have great faith in the power affection gives him to say to another involved in sin, "I will come and take you out." For if he fails and still tries to maintain the attitude of friendship he confirms the man in his evil. Forgiveness to anything less than heartfelt repentance evidenced by action is encouragement of sin. If a man belies his own sense of right until it ceases to have any influence over his acts, and his intimates, becoming aware of his wrong-doing, put up with him as he does with himself, not demanding amendment of life as a condition of continued friendship, they have done what they can to harden his heart. "It is not so bad after all," he tells himself. "My friends know it and yet are my friends all the same."

Such persons have much to answer for. The world reflects the image a man casts therein ; but if the mirror is defective he gets a distorted view of himself and his judgment cannot help but err. It is of vital importance to everybody what others think of him, for each one is dependent on his fellows and each is responsible for his relations to others.

Let us then be not too ready to drop our friends ; let us do so only when we must. Let us remember that hope is a virtue as

well as faith and charity, and give him not only one opportunity but many to reinstate himself. Peter should be a great comfort to all of us, because he proved how repentance and trust can redeem the man. Two months after he had denied Christ thrice he stood on the temple steps and proclaimed him to the world. But we can hardly look for a quick Peter-like conversion in our faithless friend; there is not the merit in us to create it; let us then give him time, give him all the time there is, which is eternity, and in some part of it our trust will be justified.

Strome's friend gave utterance to an expression of the purest unselfishness and his cry is echoed down the ages. "Would I had died for thee, Absalom, my son!" And this is what the son of man and of God did. Vicarious life is the moving power of the universe. In God the personal and universal are united. "The strangest fact in the history of the world," says Prof. Davidson, "is the extraordinary personal love that Jesus excited in those who came in contact with him. They felt that in loving him they were loving the infinite God." This personal love was the center from which the vast circumference of Christianity, with its immeasurable superiority to all other developments in religion or culture, drew its life, and will forever. Man and God have become friends. We need not be servants unless we choose, though those "who will not ride in his chariot must drag in his chains." But we are offered the divine prerogative of friendship, and "so great a thing as friendship let us carry with what grandeur of soul we may."

ARISTOTLE'S DOCTRINE OF REASON.

BY W. T. HARRIS.

There are two points of view from which the human mind may contemplate the world. The first is the view of the world from the standpoint of sense-perception; the second, the view from the standpoint of the Reason or speculative insight. Sense-perception views the world as a congeries of particular things, each one an independent existence having its own being by itself, apart

from the rest of the universe and in complete repose so far as its essence is concerned. All its relations to other beings are accidental and do not concern its essence. All its activities—movements, changes—too, are accidental, and do not affect its essential nature.

Such a view of the world is properly called *materialistic*. It looks upon the real and substantial as matter which fills space and is composed of hard particles, each excluding the others. Each material particle is an atom, or composed of atoms. These atoms are unchangeable and devoid of motion within themselves. This is the theory made to fit sense-perception. Sense-perception does not form a theory for itself of the universe, but reflection discovers the atomic theory as adapted to this sense-view of the world.

The reason in its view of the world, on the other hand, takes its stand on the theory of self-activity as the truly existent. According to it each thing in the universe is either a self-activity or dependent on a self-activity for all its qualities and attributes—all its properties and manifestations.

Thus our two views of the world stand in contrast. The sense-view supposes the essential to be quiescent matter without movement except what it receives from outside itself. The reason-view holds the theory that essence is self-activity, and that all quiescent matter or material things are phenomenal. By phenomenal it means dependent being—not self-contained and essential, but only the manifestation of an essence which is self-active.

To the sense-point of view nothing seems so absurd as the theory that makes self-activity the basis of existence. To the reason it is utterly impossible to hold any other theory than that of a self-active basis for phenomena. Sense-perception does not see the necessity for self-activity; in fact, it regards self-activity as inconceivable. Our minds can imagine a *thing*—a quiescent being, a form, a shape, but how can we imagine or envisage an activity—a self-activity? Sense-perception knows things, and things only. But reason knows things too, and it explains them through self-activity. Sense-perception explains things through things—great things through little things or particles of matter, and little things through less things; and all things through least things or material atoms. Thus, to sense-perception, the important category or principle of explanation is composition or combination. Analysis and

synthesis explain the composition of each thing out of other things. But composition is an activity; it implies change and motion. How do things get compounded—how does composition happen? On this topic sense-perception has not reflected. It has no theory of composition or decomposition, nor of any sort of activity in short; for it cannot image or picture an activity, and therefore ignores it altogether, or what is the same thing, refers it to the category of accident or chance: "Things happen to get composed or joined together."

From the fact that sense-perception regards *things* as the only essential beings and neglects activity, it explains all movement and change as something which has an external origin to the thing. Things get moved by the action of other things. The explanation of the movement of any one thing is thus avoided: "This thing moves because other things have impinged upon it and caused it to move." But why did those things impinge upon this thing? Why did they move and cause it to move? They moved, replies sense-perception, because other things impinged upon them and caused them to move, and still other things moved and caused those things to move. And so the origin of motion is pushed off *ad infinitum*; it is always from beyond the things.

It would seem as though sense-perception had a vague notion that the question of the *whence* of motion would somehow settle itself if it could be pushed off or postponed from present consideration. It says in effect: this thing is not the origin of motion; nor is that thing, nor any other thing. All motion that we see in things is derivative: "it cometh from afar." It is not derived from things. Sense-perception by this admission has brought itself into a dilemma. For it attempted to explain the world by matter—by great things and little things—by masses and molecules. But it was obliged to use the category of composition and decomposition, a category of activity and not of matter. All the differences in the universe arise from composition and decomposition; all the appearances, all the phenomena, all the things, in short, take on their present forms through this kind of activity known to sense-perception as composition and decomposition. Hence it would seem that activity is the essential principle of explanation after all. Take away composition and you have left only atoms. But atoms are invisible. We cannot see or perceive

them except in the vast aggregates which compose things. Visibility is then the effect of activity or composition. Inasmuch as atoms are invisible they are mere fictions of thought set up by theory in order to explain sense-perception.

Sense-perception explains things by composition, and ultimate things should be fixed elements or atoms. The dilemma into which this theory has run is this: all of reality should be in the form of ultimate things; but in point of fact all of reality perceptible by the senses is a result of activity. Because activity is the origin of visible form. The senses perceive only forms and shapes, but never perceive the forms and shapes of the ultimate elements. All objects of sense-perception are then perceivable only in so far as they are products of activity. Hence it is evident that the one essential problem before the common sense of the world is to explain composition and decomposition, motion and change, activity and passivity. But this problem it has avoided and ignored. It has acted like the ostrich when pursued by the hunters: it has hidden its head in the sands (atoms) in order to avoid the pursuing questions regarding composition and activity. It has ignored the question of origin of motion, but in doing so it has been obliged to deny its origin in things. All motion comes to things from without and there is no origination of motion on the part of things. If sense-perception or reflection said anything else than this—if it admitted, for example, that motion could originate in a thing, it would admit self-activity.

Reason sees this dilemma, and sees moreover that there is no escape from the admission of self-activity. Its reasoning is this:

(a) Shapes and forms, positions and relations, composition and decomposition, arise by movement and change.

(b) Change is either derived from some external source, or else it originates in self-activity within.

(c) But if it originates from some external source there must be self-activity in that external source. If it is asserted that the external source also receives its change from some other external source, reason replies effectively thus:

(d) Let this thing and all external things be devoid of self-activity; let each thing in the universe be moved only by external causes, and it follows that all things are derivative and dependent on motion which comes from without; it follows then that motion

originates in itself; or if it does not originate, but is self-existent, then of course its influence on things (producing composition and decomposition in them) is only the manifestation of motion as self-activity or essential energy. Motion, or the source of motion, existing apart from things, eternally giving rise to formation and transformation—causing worlds to aggregate and mineral strata to deposit; floods to disintegrate and frosts to fix; plants to grow; animals to manifest selfhood; races of men to seek to explain the world and themselves—such source of such motion is self-activity. The world shows a gradation from mere mechanism or the movement of composition and decomposition which manifests the action of external forces only, up to life in which movement arises as the manifestation of will-power energizing to accomplish an inward purpose or design.

Looking at the world then with the reason we see two orders of beings, a lowest and a highest, connected by intermediate orders participating in both. First there are mechanical beings—helpless and unconscious—impelled from without; aggregated and disintegrated by external forces: the lowest form of being in the world, being that cannot determine its own form, but takes it as an impress from some other being. From mechanical being reason looks up along the line of progress and sees beings that possess some power of determining their own form; at the summit of the world it sees man, gifted with the power of perfect self-determination. I say the *power* of perfect self-determination, and not the *full realization* of perfect self-determination. For man has the *power* to transform any *thing, fact, or event*, or any idea of his mind, and hence is responsible for them all. If it is already perfect he can make it imperfect; if imperfect he can make it perfect; or he can by his self-activity approximate perfection or imperfection. But he is not, as historic individual, already perfect.

Reason sees that the essence or essential being of the world must be not a thing or a being devoid of activity, but a self-activity. It recognizes in a man a being in whom is realized this self-activity as an energy or power, but not as a completely self-realized being.

Thus there are possible two forms of self-activity: first, self-activity as the *power* to realize itself; second, the self-activity that has completely accomplished this self-realization.

Now the insight of reason sees the necessity of self-activity as presupposed by all existence and change in the world. But what self-activity? The first or second form of self-activity—the complete self-realization or the *power* to realize itself? Certainly the former, the completed self-realization, is presupposed by a world of incomplete beings involved in a process of realization. Certainly a being must realize itself before it can realize others. A World-Reason therefore that furnishes the self-activity necessary to a universe of dependent and derivative beings must be a completed self-realization. Only a finite time can separate a being from the perfection toward which it is growing or developing and for which it possesses capacity. But time does not and cannot condition the growth of the universe. It must be as complete at one time as at another. The absolute is unconditioned as to time. Time past is greater than any given time, and hence more than sufficient for any possible development that was in progress. As a whole the universe is complete or perfect, and always has been. Any development or progress that we see now—any self-activities that we may now trace out in a stage of becoming or development, prove therefore that there is perennial renewal or new creation of beings that possess the capacity of growth.

Returning to our comparison between sense-perception and reason, we may now affirm that the latter is theistic while the former is atheistic.

Moreover, it is not a question of mere arbitrary choice which view one will take of the world. The theory of reason is the necessary view to the mature and logical thinker. The atomic view of sense-perception is possible only to persons of immature logical development, and although the number of persons who have traversed the logical steps and seen the connection may be said to be few in any age, yet the passage is open to each and every one, and has been open to them since its first exploration by Plato and Aristotle more than twenty-two centuries ago.

Sense-perception explains by ignoring all activity, and thus by omitting all that needs explanation. Reason explains through tracing activity of every sort to its necessary presupposition, self-activity, and identifying self-activity first as life or secondly as mind.

Religion, indeed, long before, had reached the true secret of

the universe, and made divine reason the burden of its revelation. Philosophy reached this result with Plato. In the form of religion the doctrine becomes the professed faith of the world, but as a philosophic insight it remains the possession of a few—of those few who will do the necessary thinking and go through the mental purification necessary to remove the images of sense that at first obscure the mental vision. In religion the doctrine remains a mystery which is believed, thought not understood. But, in theology, it is expounded by the aid of Philosophy. But without divesting one's self of the form of sense-perception, one does not get to the true view, although one may learn the word-formula that expresses it. It is not edifying to see divine things spoken of as though they were matters of the sensuous world-order. And yet though the piety of the intellect may be wanting, and there be no insight into the eternal verities, there may be self-sacrifice and an immaterial basis for practical life adopted, and the forms of ethical conduct assumed which are based on the spiritual view of the world. Nay, more; in the perpetual worship of a Personal First Cause the mind may come to place a true estimate on the things of sense in comparison with things divine.

Between this view of the reason and that of sense-perception there is a middle realm of transition.

When reflection commences, the mind begins to depart from the standpoint of sense which regards all beings as possessing independent validity. Reflection discovers relations and dependences. It learns the derivation of one being from another. At first it strives to retain the world-view of sense by adopting the atomic theory and using the categories of *composition* and *decomposition*. But it gradually lays these aside and adopts the category of *force* or *energy*. Even with this idea it tries to keep near the sense-point of view, at first, by ignoring the essential thought of force and calling it a "mode of motion," for it is evident that energy is not an object of the senses but an object of thought. It is indeed a very deep thought. Energy or force contains two ideas that form a sharp contrast, and yet it unites them in one. There is, in force, the idea of an inner being that manifests itself on an external environment. Internally one, it is externally multiplex; force unites these ideas of identity and diversity. Hence force is a category for the explanation of becoming, transition, development,

growth, evolution. The attempt to ignore the idea of energy or causal power in force, and to retain only a "mode of motion" is well enough for the purposes of investigating objects by the methods of natural science, but for purposes of real thinking in science or in philosophy it has never been consistently carried out. The category is too potent for the thinker: He finds himself slipping down into the idea of energy and efficient causality in spite of himself. Mode of motion is merely the fact to which he adds the idea of force in order to interpret it. Causality was explained by Hume's disciples as "invariable sequence"; force is now explained in like manner by "mode of motion." As soon as one begins to deal with essential relations between things—and by "essential relation" one means dependence of one thing on another, or the derivation of one thing from another—he begins to use the true ideas of cause and force.

Here we have an insight into the progress of natural science. Its first stage lays great stress on obtaining a mere inventory of nature; but the second stage investigates essential relations. Isaac Newton holds his high place in the esteem of men because he inaugurated this second species of science and connected all bodies of the universe near and far off by the essential relation of a gravitating force. Every particle of matter in its weight manifests the attractive force of all other matter in space. Science in its second stage passes beyond mere inventoring, and studies nature in its history. It studies each thing in its essential relations, and tries to discover its exact place in a connected series of evolution. The total evolution of an object is the history of the action of its energy.

Psychology has given a name to this mediating faculty of the mind that lies midway between Reason, which sees first principles, and sense, which sees immediate things and facts. It is called by German psychology *Verstand*, that is to say, the *understanding*. Aristotle calls it *διάνοια* (*dianoia*)—or discursive reason—*discursive* because it passes by inference from one thing to another, discovering relations and presuppositions.

This investigating faculty or activity of the mind does not, indeed, entirely desert the point of view of sense-perception, but it adopts by implication the view of reason. It makes activity the principle of explanation, and in this implies self-activity. But it

explains each object as derivative or dependent on its environment. The implication of self-activity contained in the idea of force, cause, or energy, is this: as we have shown, force connects unity and variety, internality and externality, being and manifestation. Now this contains the idea of origination, and struggle as it may to retain the idea of elements and composition, the understanding is obliged to admit the origination and transference of influence from one thing to another. Hence it comes to the idea of life, or the unfolding of an essential form of being in an external organism. Natural science has stopped for a while on a stage of arrested development—namely, on the idea of correlation of forces. But underneath the correlation there lies the assumption of the transmutation of each force into all the others in accordance with a definite law; and this definite law is the supreme form which is manifested in the correlation and transmutation. If each force may by its activity pass into the next force in the series of correlation, the whole series is the product of each force, and therefore not only a departure from, but a return to, each force. Moreover, the supreme persistent force is the self-activity which manifests its entire form in the distinctions of the series of special forces.

Such an entire form is what Plato called *εἶδος*, *idea*. It appears in living beings as species, general type, or exemplar of such general type.

The particular rose before me is an example of the class or species. Indeed, it is produced by a generic process which is manifested in the growth of the rose-bush. This particular animal, whatever it may be, exists through a generic process in which the lineaments and features of the idea, or *εἶδος*, manifest themselves. The *εἶδος* is a self-activity, and its process is life.

Nor is this idea (*εἶδος*) of Plato essentially different from what Aristotle calls by the same name, *εἶδος*. This is not mere form but formative energy, and in the seventh book of the *Metaphysics* (ch. ii), Aristotle sets forth the doctrine of the identity of formal cause (*εἶδος*) and energy (*ἐνέργεια*) and their relation to real being. Energy, it must be noted, gives rise to two sorts of actuality, corresponding to what we have already called first and second forms of self-activity. Aristotle uses the word *entelechy* (*ἐντελέχεια*) to express this idea.

Aristotle's technique has led to much misunderstanding. His use of the terms *matter* (*ὕλη*) and *form* (*εἶδος*) as though mere correlations, and his polemic against Plato's doctrine of *Ideas* has led to the opinion that he held solely to the view of ordinary common-sense realism, and repudiated self-activity as the independent and self-existent.

But one may easily see how erroneous this is by considering his definition of matter, or material cause. For, according to Aristotle, matter is mere capacity or possibility, and it is the form that gives it actuality. The form-giving cause produces any and all manifestations in what is called *matter*. Hence any reality in matter is due to its form, and matter by itself would be pure nothing. "Nothing," in the sense that it is the *void* in which something may be created, is pretty much identical with Aristotle's *ὕλη*. But, again, any reality may be the material as regards a new impress of formative energy—the stuff for new realities. Aristotle holds, moreover, to the self-existence and absoluteness of pure energy as active reason (*νοῦς*), which he describes in the third book of his far-famed treatise *on the Soul* (chapters v, vi), as the creator of all things, and that by which all things are perceived in the passive reason. This is separated (*χωριστόν*) from the body and not correlated with the forces of nature (*ἀνάθεός*). Its activity which he describes in the *Ethics* (Book X), and especially in the eleventh book of the *Metaphysics*, as theoretical insight, *θεωρεῖν*, is entirely perfect self-activity, and independent of all correlation, although it is related creatively to all things in the universe. This creative reason it is (he intimates in his *Psychology* iii-5) which makes possible the sense-perception, and the scientific investigation of objects in nature. The activity of *νοῦς*, or reason (called *intellectus* by the Romanic peoples), is intuitive and immediate insight such as we have into our highest categories, such as being, cause, essence, matter, quantity, and quality (whether we are able to consider those abstractly as in philosophy, or only use them concretely in sense-perception, and are entirely unaware of them as categories by themselves). For in all sense-perception there goes on a recognition of objects—an interpretation, as it were, of objects into what we already know and are familiar with, by the very nature of our minds. This view is outlined by Aristotle in his *Psychology* (iii, ch. 4,) in the passage where he calls our at-

tention to the fact that sense-perception takes or apprehends the forms of objects and not their matter.

Nutrition, or the activity of the plant-soul (*τὸ θρεπτικόν*), receives its environment into its organism as food, and converts or assimilates it by its activity, making it into vegetable cells. But in sense-perception the environment is not devoured, consumed, or added to the soul. Instead of appropriating it, the soul creates within itself by its self-activity the essential form of the object, and by this perceives it. Perception is not purely passive then, but a real and true self-activity of a higher order than nutrition. And even nutrition is a real manifestation of self-activity. For the living being, the plant, reacts on its environment and attacks and consumes it. Destroying the form that it finds, it uses it as matter and imposes a new form on it, and makes it into vegetable cells.

But sense-perception, on the occasion of the presence of the object, assumes the essential form of that object—becomes, as it were, that object; forming for itself an image of it, or a definition of it, causing, as it were, the environment which is presented in the outer court of its nerves of sense to be modelled within itself. In other words, the soul being essential form or formative principle, perceives by imitating the forms of things present in its environment. The essential particulars of form are creatively produced within the soul and recognized there by means of the categories which constitute the essential form of the mind, or which are the essential definitions of itself created by the soul as formative activity. Hence perception is essentially recognition—a translating of the environment into terms of the self.

The *creative reason* (called by the commentators since Alexander of Aphrodisias, the *Νοῦς ποιητικός*) is, therefore, rightly to be deemed the power of all perception and understanding in us. It is the highest that makes possible the lowest. It is creative reason that makes possible even the inorganic world. It is the same creative reason which is in our soul that makes possible our humblest sense-perceptions. But our understanding is above sense-perception, inasmuch as it deals consciously with the elements of the definition of objects. The definition discovers and announces what features are essential to the form of the object; and the form of the object is its reality. Hence the *διάνοια* or discursive

understanding—and this belongs to the passive reason according to the *Psychology* of Aristotle (III, v)—which investigates objects in their relations and in their general predicates, comes to discriminate by degrees the general and eternal elements of form in the definition of objects, and acquires the ability to grasp them by themselves apart from objects. It thus comes to be able to think of space, time, substance, quantity, quality, mode, identity, difference, unity, cause, relation, potentiality, actuality, and beings, in and for themselves, and to see in them the self-activity of the soul itself—its own definition, as it were. Thus it mounts up to Reason itself, which sees directly the Form of Forms, or the Cause of all Causes, the Divine Creative Idea.

In this, as before remarked, Aristotle substantially repeats Plato. In his *Phædrus* (97 C.) Plato calls Reason the cause of the universe in time and space, and in his *Philebus* (28 C.) he poetically calls it “the king of heaven and earth.” Aristotle in his polemic against Plato’s doctrine of ideas fails to quote those passages wherein Plato makes the supreme and essential being to be pure self-related activity, incorporeal and eternal. Plato is very careful to connect with his ideas and attribute to them such activity as is involved in creation and thought. It is true that he calls this rational activity self-movement, (*Laws*, X, 894 A.), but it is only a quarrel over words to criticise this expression when its definition is laid down and the genera which it includes are mentioned and it is expressly asserted that such self-movement is incorporeal. Aristotle laid great stress on the fact that the first source of motion—*primum mobile*—is itself unmoved. In this he is right so far as spatial movement is concerned. The self-activity is a perpetual movement out of difference into identity with itself, and through difference again back to identity, and therefore remains for and by itself, and certainly does not have spatial movement or change in the sense in which these appertain to finite things.

This is sufficiently emphasized too by Plato. That Plato and Aristotle agree in this is the view taken by the Neo-Platonists from the time of Ammonios Sakkas down to Proklos. The Scholastics hold the same view.

St. Thomas Aquinas (*Summa Contra Gentiles*, Lib. I, cap. xiii) says: “There is no difference between Plato’s ‘First Self-Mover’ and Aristotle’s ‘First Unmoved’”; and, referring to Plato’s *Laws*,

Tenth book, and to Aristotle's *Physics*, Books III and VI, he continues: "According to Plato, the self-moved is not a material body. Plato takes motion in the sense of *operatio* or intellectual action. The activity of the intellect and will and the love of God are called *self-movement* by Plato." Although Aristotle in the sixth book of the *Physics* holds that movement can be predicated only of what is divisible and corporeal, and also what is potential but not wholly real (Book III), yet this does not contradict the thought of Plato, but only his use of words. Plato would make a special designation for this new and wonderful thought which he has discovered, and he designates it self-movement as though in contrast to motion through others—the species of motion which sense-perception talks about as though it were the ultimate form of things.

Aristotle invented the word *ἐνέργεια*, *energeia*, or internal activity, and he also made frequent use of *ἐντελέχεια* (*entelecheia*, or having-of-completion within itself—to paraphrase its meaning) in order to express self-existent activity. Quibbles and objections could easily be made against these expressions. The sensuous meaning of the words *ἔργον*, *τέλος*, and *ἔχω* could be defined and shown to be incompatible with spiritual significations.

For Sense, as we have seen, takes a fundamentally different view of the world from Reason. According to "common sense," quiescent being is first, and thinking activity is afterward, as a function of said being. But the Reason says that self-activity is the basis of being. Indeed this is so stated in religion. God, the creator, creates by a creative thought. Time and space and all existence subsist in the divine thought. Here existence is the result of thinking; and God's thinking, too, is the immanent cause of his existence. He eternally IS, in his thinking; and his thinking eternally sets forth his divine form (*εἶδος*) as Reason. Without this thinking he would be formless and a pure nothing, and there would be no creation of a world. But divine thinking is divine self-distinction, and from it flows creation.

In the tenth book of his *Ethics* (ch. vii) Aristotle expands upon the character of this divine activity—the pure energy of the formal cause and upon the human analogy to it.

"If happiness be an energy according to virtue, it is reasonable to suppose that it is according to the best virtue; and this must be the virtue

of the best part of man. Whether, then, this best part be the intellect or something else (which is thought naturally to bear rule and to govern, and to possess ideas upon honorable and divine subjects; or whether it is itself divine or the most divine of any properties which we possess), the energy of this part, according to its proper virtue, must be perfect happiness; and that this energy is contemplative has been stated. This also would seem to agree with what was said before, and with the truth: for this energy is the noblest, since the intellect is the noblest thing within us; and of subjects of knowledge, those are noblest with which the intellect is conversant. It is also most permanent, for we are better able to contemplate continuously than to do anything else continuously" (*Nic. Ethics*, X, ch. vii; Bohn's translation).

"But so far as this divine part surpasses the whole compound nature, so far does its energy surpass the energy which is according to all other virtue. If, then, the intellect be divine when compared with man, the life also, which is in obedience to that, will be divine when compared with human life. But a man ought not to entertain human thoughts, as some would advise, because he is human, nor mortal thoughts, because he is mortal, but so far as it is possible he should make himself immortal and do everything with a view to living in accordance with the best principle, for this in power and value is more excellent within him than all. Besides, this would seem to be each man's self, if it really is the ruling and the better part" (*Ibid.*).

"That perfect happiness is a kind of contemplative energy might be shown also from the following considerations: that we suppose the gods to be pre-eminently blessed and happy" (*Ethics*, Book X, ch. viii).

"The energy of the Deity as it surpasses all others in blessedness must be contemplative, and therefore of human energies that which is nearest allied to this must be the happiest. . . . Happiness must be a kind of contemplation" [*θεωρία* is creative knowing and not passive knowing as we often mean by the word *knowledge*] (*Ibid.*).

"He who energizes according to the intellect, and pays attention to that, and has it in its best state, is likely to be most beloved by the gods; for if any regard is paid to human affairs by the gods, as it is thought there is, it is reasonable to suppose that they would take pleasure in what is the best and nearest allied to themselves; but this must be the intellect [*Reason, Νοῦς*]; and that they would be kind in return to those who love and honor this most, as persons who pay attention to their friends, and who act rightly and honorably" (*Ibid.*).

The form of the finite is that of relation to others. The kind of thinking which always takes up a subject as correlate of an-

other is the form of sense-perception. The senses are always addressed outwardly to the world before them—they cognize what is other to them. But the reason has attained to the cognition of the eternal form of the Absolute itself as revealed in the laws of its own thought. Reason therefore knows itself. Moreover, the discursive thinking deepens as it comes to cognize in the general categories these eternal characteristics of eternal form.

The immortal passage in which Aristotle has described this is to be found in his *Metaphysics*, eleventh book, seventh chapter. I translate from the German paraphrase of this chapter by Hegel, and include his running commentary on it:

“The thought thinks itself through participation (*μετάληψιν*) in thought; it is, however, thought through contact and thinking; so that the thinking and that which is thought are the same.” Thought, since it is the unmoved which moves [causes motion], has an object, which, however, passes into activity, since its contents is also what is produced through thought and hence identical with the thinking activity. [The object of thought is first begotten in the activity of thinking, which is therefore a separation of the thought from itself as an object. Here in the thinking, therefore, that which is moved and that which moves is the same; since the substance of that which is thought is the thinking activity, that which is thought is the absolute cause which, itself unmoved, is identical with the thought which is moved by it; the separation and the relation are one and the same. The chief moment of the Aristotelian philosophy is therefore this: that the energy of thinking and the object which is thought are one and the same]; for that which apprehends what is thought and the essence, is thought. Its possession is one with its activity (*ἐνεργεί δ' ἔχων*) [for it is a continuous energy], so that this “total of activity through which it thinks itself” “is more divine than that which the thinking reason supposes to possess that attribute”—*i. e.*, than the content of thought. Not that which is thought is the more excellent, but the energy of thinking itself; the activity of the apprehending produces that which is perceived [the total activity is more divine than one phase or moment of it, seized abstractly]. “Speculation (*ἡ θεωρία*) is thus the most delightful and best. If God, now, is always in this, as we are at times” [in man this eternal thinking, which is God himself, occurs only as individual condition], “then he is admirable; if still more, then more admirable. But he is thus, Life, too, is his; for the actuality [energy] of thought is life. He, however, is activity; the activity returning

into itself is most excellent and eternal life. We say, therefore, that God is the eternal and the best living Being."

On this rock is built the final definition by which Europe and the Western world distinguishes itself from the older world, the world of the Orient. God the Supreme Being is not a formless essence—an empty entity—a transcendent to all thought and to all reflection, because such a supreme being has no existence or outward manifestation. But the true God is infinite form (infinite because self-related). He is divine Reason; and Reason is self-activity that perpetually reveals itself in distinctions and categories, in creation and in human cognition. Man has the divine destiny to partake in the divine life—being endowed with Reason as the light of all his seeing—and able, by diligent application, to purify his thinking and become familiar with those eternal thoughts of the Creator in and for themselves.

A GLIMPSE INTO PLATO.

BY FLORENCE JAMES WILLIAMS.

There is among us now an abiding trust in the method of attaining knowledge that we commonly call Positive or Inductive.

The great sense of certainty which it gives us is all the more remarkable and not the less secure because it is, in some minds at least, accompanied by a sense of its inadequacy, when taken alone, to account for the whole process of gaining insight into truth. This seeming paradox is being gradually satisfactorily solved by a certain *rapprochement* between the more liberal Positivists and the more widely informed Idealists. The bigots on either side, of course, stand apart from this *rapprochement*, and ignore it, or denounce it. Let them go. It is not with bigots on either side that we concern ourselves. The bigots notwithstanding to the contrary, the majority of intelligent people among us are more and more inclined to believe that there is truth on both sides; certain truth to be gained only by the methods of Positivism—a glorious impulse toward truth given only by Idealism, and without which

humanity would be halt of one foot, lame in one hand, and blind of one eye. We must keep and know how to use both Positivism and Idealism. This is to be done only by knowing what each is good for. So much for the present attitude of thoughtful minds as appearing to the writer.

The *glimpse* into Plato here given is intended to show how clear this same thought was to that great, bright mind. Then it was probably impossible—owing to the paucity of proven truth, of positive knowledge—for any but a few far-seeing ones to appreciate the thought. The writer believes that it is now a common thought, more or less vague, however, and therefore that it is well it should be again expressed in such terms as the ears of the nineteenth century are more familiar with than they are with the phraseology, turns of speech, and myths of the old Greek.

It is a peculiar and well-recognized feature of Plato's writings that they are full of germs of thought which, like well-ripened seeds, have served, ever since his time, to cover many harvest fields. Look where you will among the "new ideas" of our own times, or read where you will among the books that have appeared between our times and Plato's, and you will find that the germ of most of their ideas, of their plans of conduct, of their explanations of mysteries, even of their doctrines of religious faith or of their philosophical convictions, were already lying outlined in his pages. It is one of these pregnant seed-thoughts that I take up now—viz., the relation of knowledge to conceptions.

It is, I think, a relation often misunderstood and misinterpreted even by those who consider themselves ardent Platonists, or by those who are admittedly learned in his writings. I, who am but a seeker after truth, can only hope to use Plato's teachings as a help in that search, and even then I must be guided by my own understanding of the writings and of truth, for the search is now no longer his, but mine. Plato himself has wrapped in many seeming contradictions his understanding of this relation between conceptions and knowledge. In the *Apology* we are told that Socrates seeks to find the man that really knows, and that he seeks in vain, coming to the conclusion that he himself is called "wise" by the oracle only because he knows that he does not know. He seeks this knowledge which is to lead him to wisdom, among great statesmen, and does not find it there. From the statesmen—prac-

tical men of affairs, men whose lives are devoted to mastering the science of human life—he goes to the poets and finds their best work done, not by knowledge, but by a certain natural gift about which they *know* actually less than many of the bystanders. Among the artisans he finds real knowledge, but it is so narrow that each man knows only his own art, and misjudges all other things, so that his knowledge is misleading rather than enlightening, as in another part of his teaching Socrates concludes all knowledge must be which is derived from perceptions only. (See the *Phædo*.)

So, then, knowledge alone, however accurate, is not the same thing as wisdom or as virtue—a conclusion in which we shall be forced to concur if we take heed to the character of some of the learned men we may have known or certainly have read about, and contrast them with others who, though unlearned and possessed of very little real knowledge, were both wise and virtuous. Socrates himself had far less knowledge than many an undergraduate has to-day, and there may be much learning with very little wisdom. Yet Socrates holds knowledge to be the chief good of life. Nevertheless, he states distinctly: it is not so much knowledge that is good as it is virtue which is the only good and above all possessions. Knowledge and virtue, then, are not identical. Neither, as we have seen, must knowledge and wisdom be confounded together. What a web of contradictions! Knowledge, Wisdom, Virtue—these are the things that Socrates is seeking. *How* shall he seek so that he may surely find?

Knowledge is the only thing worth living for. No. Virtue is the chief good. Knowledge alone is no good to guide human life.

Neither is Virtue an unmixed good without knowledge.

Yet all men are without *knowledge* of the higher things of life; they have only conceptions of them, and he is wisest who does not even think that he knows. Is this the *conclusion* of Socrates, or does he carry out this line of thought still further?

Many men reach just thus far with Socrates, and then sink down into the inertness or despair, plunge into the life of the senses, or pin their faith to perceptions only, and so their intellectual life becomes sterile, vicious, or, at best, of incomplete development. They dare not, they cannot, or at least they *do* not, “take refuge in conceptions.” This, however, is what Socrates decides he had better do, seeking in them the truths of existence.

But what are conceptions? A conception is an image formed in the mind of something not objectively perceived. It is the formation of an idea in the mind.

A perception is an image formed in the mind from something objectively apprehended by our eyes or by other senses. All knowledge as knowledge only must be perceptive, a knowledge of results only. These are its limits. Therefore it alone is insufficient for the purpose of Socrates. The perception of phenomena, even the careful observation of them, whether in human life or in external nature, may go on for thousands of years without adding anything to our lives, to our wisdom, our virtues, our happiness, or even to our wealth. Not until the true conception of the meaning of the things observed dawns on some one mind can they become fully useful. Wild Indians roamed over this rich continent for centuries, and starved in the midst of its then unknown wealth. Their observations on natural phenomena were extensive and correct, but their conception of the things observed was erroneous or incomplete. The observation of electrical phenomena went on for thousands of years before one came who could even begin to see into their true relations. Phenomena must await conceptions to become valuable to men. Perception and observation alone are inadequate to the development of this value. It is in this sense I affirm that knowledge depends upon conceptions.

Now, it is this conceptive faculty, this beginning to see with the mind's eye, that can alone transform observation into either wisdom or wealth. Desiring above all things that knowledge which leads to wisdom, and that too about the highest things of existence, Socrates recognizes that he must seek it first in true conceptions.

True conceptions are those only that are in accordance with *facts*—that is, according to the use of language as commonly accepted by us all. Any other conceptions would lead us to superstitions, to fancies; these have always been over-abundant in the world, and have done more to retard moral and material progress than acknowledged ignorance has done.

They are that very conceit of knowledge against which Socrates was always fighting. It is, then, all-important to discern between true and false conceptions. The one *may* enable a man to attain to genuine knowledge; the other will lead him all astray.

The true conception, or first power in the mind to conceive a

true idea, will in itself constitute a certain kind of wisdom. It is, at least, a splendid faculty, nobly useful, not only to the man himself who possesses it, but also through him to many others. It is, according to its degree, like the dawn of a new day, in the light of which many men shall do their work. It is also a rare gift, and we do well to call those who possess it *wise*, though they may not be learned—may not even be able to work out their own idea to proof or disproof. Yet such proof or disproof must be sought and accepted to enable us to discern between a true conception and a mere assumption. The essential characteristic of an assumption is that it refuses or is insusceptible of this proof or disproof; therefore the best that an assumption can ever do is to keep men halting between two opinions, while it more often does its worst by plunging men into false beliefs and deepening the darkness of their ignorance.

The very next step toward this discerning between the true and the false, between conceptions and assumptions, must be the sequent development of a conception by right reasoning. This is not to be confounded with the power to form the first conception. It is often found in some other person than he to whom the conceptive power belongs. The originator of the new idea may be unable to take this next *necessary* step, or may only be able to do it imperfectly. In such case there may be a new philosophy—perhaps a deep and true one—but it must remain folded up in embryo. Or it may be a new invention which the inventor cannot fully work out to its application. Or it may be some of those deep truths that are to be found here and there among the æsthetic beauties of great poets, giving them more than mere literary value, but yet not rising to the full value of a new philosophy. In any case, the pure reasoning faculty is needed for this second step in the development of even the most true conceptions. By it alone they can come forth into actual existence, and become living forces added to human lives.

It is, I think, beyond dispute that, with perfectly true conceptions and perfectly right reasoning, one would attain to perfect *a priori* knowledge, to unerring predictive power. But this one would venture to ascribe only to a Perfect Being. Assuredly neither Socrates nor Plato laid any claim to it, nor dare I claim it for them. Yet, in a measure, these faculties are the appanage of

all human beings ; they constitute the rational being, and it is by the use of these faculties that humanity must go forward toward all kinds of new knowledge. If a man stand rooted in his own or any one else's conceptions, maintaining himself in them by an accepted form of dialectical reasoning, he will fall as far short of what he might attain to as he would do if he let himself be dragged about by every baseless assumption or by every new argument. He should be ever ready, able, willing to go bravely on to the next step on the same road toward new knowledge ; he should be ever ready to accept the modifications of all conceptions and of all reasonings by experience ; ever ready to make the new effort and to face the new results. Wisdom, it is true, is right reasoning based on true conceptions. It may precede knowledge, but must bring itself into knowledge by testing its own conclusions against experience. It should know its own limits, and not confound itself and its uses with knowledge, but ever point the road, and incite men to pursue that road fearlessly and with open eyes.

This was the kind of wisdom Socrates had attained to. He did not confound his conceptions of death, immortality, and the gods with knowledge ; but was willing, even glad, to test them against actual experience. This manly, fearless effort, this voluntary passing from the accepted belief to the proven fact, is the essence of all true Virtue. It alone leads to all noble knowledge, and ensures the only genuine happiness, which is peace and courage in the soul. This is the Way which Socrates accepts unqualifiedly and pursues unflinchingly toward the attainment of his great objects. Along this road he delights to go, even though death itself be the next experience that awaits him.

"No man *knows* what death is," says Socrates in the Apology. All we *know* is that it awaits us all. But the conception of death which Socrates has formed is that it is the freeing of the soul, or ruling part ; and he makes use of a myth, or parable, which was familiar to all his hearers, as a convenient method of expressing to them his own conceptions of the true values of life and death to the individual soul. The conception which underlies all he has to say about life, death, and immortality is that of the final triumph of good everywhere, and of the baselessness of the fear of death, or of any other evil, for the good man.

He does not concern himself to particularize how much or how little of the myth seems to him true, only that something like it is probably true of our souls and of their future habitations. This he thinks it befits him to *believe*; it is, he says, worth risking his faith upon, and he asserts it is well that he should let such a belief act as a charm upon him. It inspires him to put forth his best reasoning powers as to the high uses of Temperance, Courage, Justice, Freedom, and Truth; it makes him understand the uselessness of external possessions in comparison with these virtues. It makes clear to him the uselessness even of knowledge which does not lead to higher knowledge. It is the inspiring force that incites to new mental and moral effort, to all self-originating progress. This is the value of Belief. Clear in this conception, made strong by the best efforts of his reasoning powers, his examining faculty, with the whole nature of the man aroused to its highest pitch of energy, of power to do, to dare, and to endure, he springs forward, as it were, to greet the Unknown with a triumphant cheer.

This is the right, the only right way for man to attain to any knowledge really worth living for: From Conceptions, through Reason out into Experience; from the Innermost of human life, by strenuous personal effort, out into individual experience. You might as well cut off a stream from its source and expect it to continue flowing as to cut off a human being from these innermost conceptions and expect continued progress in knowledge derived only from perception. There is no other way of knowing, of growing wise, but by this alone. It is the appointed path, the way over which we must go; Socrates, or you, or I—all alike must pass by it from all ignorance into all knowledge. Whatever be the kind of knowledge we desire to rise into, whether of a higher life here on earth or of a wider understanding of the world we see, or a genuine knowledge of that yet unknown experience of the future which may prove to be the greatest of all experiences to men, it is in this way we must come to a full understanding of it; not like dumb, driven cattle, who must suffer it without understanding it.

“That man should be of good cheer who, having striven after knowledge, thus awaits his journey to the world below, ready to set forth whenever the voice of fate shall call him.” It was this

conception, so strong and clear in the mind of Socrates, of the need of knowledge of a higher and ever higher sort, and of the only way or method of reaching it, that made his long life so full of earnest and unswerving purpose, and his death so serene. He knew no more of death than you and I do. He admitted his own ignorance. He recognized, as proved to the satisfaction of his reason, that death would probably be the greatest of all experiences, leading the good man into a higher knowledge of good, and therefore neither to be feared nor shunned. It is because of this fearless understanding of life and death, because of this clear conception of their uses to all of us and how to attain to those uses, that we still hold Socrates to have been one of the best and wisest of men. Other men have met death fearlessly in prisons, on battle fields, or among weeping friends; but no man has left so clear a record of how to use the faculties of the soul so as to wring out of life its highest secrets, and to wrest from death its idle terrors. This wisdom and virtue of Socrates is the result not so much of any difference of nature between Socrates and other men as it is of his better understanding of the use of faculties common to us all in greater or less degree. Our knowledge, to be fruitful, all depends on the right use of reason, set in motion, animated by, springing from more or less true conceptions. Therefore let us go forward, serene and steadfast even as he was; learning, ever learning as he did, and not afraid to learn anything that life or death may have to teach us.

Where do these conceptions come from? From a self-originating power within the man? From a memory—reminiscences, as Plato sometimes calls them? Or from a World of Ideas in which alone things exist in their true reality? If so, whence comes this World of Ideas? Are these Ideas thoughts of God, conceptions in the mind of God? If so, *how* do these conceptions pass from the World of Ideas, from being the thoughts of God or of Perfect Being, into becoming the conceptions of man?

In order to find any reasonable answer to these questions we shall have to form first a conception of how Spirit, Force, Mind, acts upon matter, which conception must itself be tested upon matter to prove or disprove its validity. For if this World of Ideas exists at all, it must consist of most substantial and most abiding realities; it must be the only True World of Things—as

they-actually-are, as they must be, as they will forever remain, where alone Things can be known in their identity—that is to say, in their unchangeableness. It cannot be a world of notions, fancies, suppositions, more shadowy and ephemeral even than this world of shadows, miscalled facts which we know change, pass away even while we watch them—this world of personality, of things changeable, which is certainly not a world of identity, of things unchangeable.

The only conception that I can form of this world of realities is that man, as well as all other things, has his real existence in this World of Ideas, and that all we see around us and within us are but reflections of this true World of Ideas. We are the shadows cast from this World of Ideas into the external world, whether of our own consciousness or of objective fact.

The Real Things in the World of Ideas are mirrored in the innermost faculty of the human soul, which, by taking heed to the mirrored image of the real thing, learns to understand it—that is to say, conceives its true nature, its meaning, and its relation to other things. This supplies the first conception. Thence, that is to say, from his own conception, the man must turn to find the ratification or modification of it again in external nature, which is the outer periphery or second mirroring of the real thing of the World of Ideas. This gives us an indissoluble connection between the innermost Creative Force of the Universe and its outermost covering, between which true humanity exists, receiving conceptions from the one and testing the accuracy of our conception against the other.

It is not so much my object to decide these difficult questions as to incite the examination of the truth that may be in them, offering itself to our own minds, and having a direct bearing upon our own judgments, and therefore of immediate value to ourselves. Is it thus that we are conscious of our own selves, conscious of external objects, as conceptions in our own mind? This consciousness of the conceptions in our own minds is akin to self-consciousness, and much resembles it in many ways. All these conceptions may be distinct or vague, distorted or complete, just as the reflection in a mirror may be blurred, distorted, or perfect; but they can never be the real things—the real things existing only in their identity, their unchangeableness, their permanence or continuous-

ness in the World of Ideas, or thoughts of the mind of God, and being reflected from it as into a mirror in this innermost faculty of the human soul, the faculty of conceptions. By taking heed to the mirrored image within himself of the Real Thing, and testing it against external fact, man learns to understand it, to conceive its true meaning, its full relation to other things. Thus the Ideal and Real, as we commonly use those terms, are found to be one in their origin, and must ever be more or less in harmony with one another. What we commonly call the real or external world is only real in so far as it accords with the real World of Ideas, which alone is unchangeable, everlasting, and indestructible. Also, if our conceptions are true reflections of the real World of Ideas, they will prove themselves to be in accordance with the external world of facts, if only they be sufficiently tested.

We need, therefore, never fear to test our conceptions against experience.

True conceptions and adequate experience will always prove to be in perfect accord with the everlasting and absolutely true idea.

But whence comes this "World of Ideas"? I am fain to ask this question again and again, and can never rest until I too have not only a distinct idea about it, but a proven answer to it, which I too can test against all experiences wheresoever they may present themselves, even to Eternity. Is not this "World of Ideas" thought out into its objective existence from the mind of God, and by his actual energy impressing itself upon the periphery of matter, which thus becomes the expression of his living thoughts?

Our minds and external nature are thus both partial and imperfect mirrors of the Perfect Idea sent forth by the Perfect Mind.

Plastic, then, before the Perfect Mind lies the world of dumb external nature, the second mirror of the thoughts of God.

Between the two, ever teachable lies the world of human thought, receiving, or at least capable of receiving, new images into itself; ready, at least, if it would learn new truth, to try the new conception within itself against that dumb, external, plastic world.

This seems to the writer not only Plato's idea of the relation of knowledge to Conceptions, but also a true and adequate statement of the relation between Belief and Knowledge.

ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE
AND BELIEF AS TO THE IMMORTALITY OF THE
SOUL.

BY W. LUTOSLAWSKI.

There is one thing in which almost all religions agree: this one common hope of all believers is the immortality of the soul. It should be better named the continuance of the individual after the death of the body, because immortality is a negative idea, which does not include the indefinite continuation of existence. Death is known to us only by the observation of bodies, and therefore the assertion of the immortality of the soul is a truism. We see only *bodies* dying, and so it is superfluous to assert that the soul is immortal. But usually by immortality is meant more than the negation of death. The general acceptance of this word includes not only absence of death, but also continuation of full and conscious existence, and I shall use the word immortality in this positive sense. But still the positive sense of immortality varies according to individual belief. Many believers consider themselves as accepting immortality while supposing that after death they will be quite indifferent to everything which interested them in the earthly life, and that they will be changed in every respect to such a degree that the question arises, Why should they then be held for the same persons that they now are? According to the different conceptions of the state of the soul after death, the word immortality has a very different meaning in different churches, though all the religions of earth agree that man does not cease to exist when he dies.

Not only the religions agree in recognizing this truth, but also most of the eminent philosophers from Plato down to Kant accept it as an important part of their teaching.

Now, there is a very strange contrast between the general religious and philosophical acceptance of the immortality of the soul and the quite as general practical contempt for the consequences of this belief. I dare say that the large majority of religious people of all denominations in the world *do not* have a perfect certainty of their existence after death. It seems strange at first, and may be combatted by many ministers of the

Church, but it is a fact that requires a psychological explanation and deserves the attention of all religious people. It is interesting to find out what kind of efforts will produce more harmony between the theoretical religious teaching and practical life.

My assertion of the fact of a general indifference or want of certainty about the immortality of the soul is based upon the observation that among all the divergencies of opinions between men no difference can be greater and more pronounced than the difference between a man who has an absolute and undeniable knowledge that he cannot cease to exist, and a man who either has no sure conviction about this matter or who openly denies the existence of man after death. The first will look at life on the earth as only a very small part of existence, and will endure the trial of this life as a training for a more perfect state. He will not be afraid to die, nor will he think that death or physical misery is a great evil. He will do his duty with a calm, fixed mind, and will find the true aim of life in the moral perfection of the individual, not in the material prosperity of the community. The individual will seem to him more important than the city, the State, the Church. All communities are to him only abstract ideas, while only the living soul is an eternal reality. He may be taxed with egotism by his countrymen because he is without political ambition, indifferent to social distinctions, a foe to all external show, to titles and honors—only interested in the moral perfection and progress of himself and his friends. He looks to death as to a happy event; but he would not shorten his days because he believes the duties and labors of this life make him better prepared to enjoy the work of a future life.

Of quite another character is the man who denies the continuation of his existence after death. He finds in the earthly life the only scope for all his actions. He works here only to obtain and enjoy immediate results of his labor. He dreads to think of death because his thought of it as the greatest evil deprives him of his activity and spoils his enjoyment of life. He may love mankind, but if he works for mankind he seeks above all to create better material conditions of life, to perfect material existence, leaving moral perfection to the individual conscience and believing that the only source of crime is misery. He does his duty in the hope

of some reward. If he is of a noble mind, he will not strive for riches, but for recognition, honors, glory. He will not hesitate to endanger the life of the individual for what he considers the benefit of the community, because for him the individual has only an apparent and ephemeral existence, while the true enduring entities are the city, the state, and all social organizations. He identifies himself with these complex bodies and lends them his soul. He desires the gratitude of his countrymen and cherishes the idea of living on in their memory.

Of course I have taken the extreme types of two opposite tendencies. But if we look at mankind at large we find that, at least on the continent of Europe, the second type is far more frequent, and not only among the positivists, who frankly profess with Madame Ackermann—

Eternité de l'homme, illusion, chimère,
 Mensonge de l'amour et de l'orgueil humain,
 Il n'a point eu d'hier ce phantôme éphémère
 Il lui faut un demain !
 Elle se dissoudra, cette argile légère
 Qu'ont émue un instant la joie et la douleur.
 Les vents vont disperser cette noble poussière
 Qui fut jadis un cœur !

I have seen also devout people, attending church, abstaining from meat on Friday, confessing monthly their sins to the priest, and affirming their belief in the future life, who nevertheless act in every particular as if this life were the only life they had to live. If we look at their constant craving for material advantages without any regard to their training for another life, we must admit that they do not believe that every act of this life has an eternal influence on the future life.

I find only one explanation of this divergence between the religious teaching and the practical life of the majority of mankind. I find it only in the psychological difference between a *hope* and a *certainty*, between *belief* and *knowledge*. Every religion, so far as it is based on revelation, on the testimony of witnesses, cannot afford to give to the masses more than a mere hope of immortality. I have often heard immortality spoken of as a promise of God to mankind. Granting this, it is easy to understand why

this hope does not rule the actions of practical life. It is because in practical life we have almost at every step a certain *knowledge* of the immediate consequences of our actions. If this *knowledge* shows us that a certain action leads *immediately* to a certain pleasure, then the mere *hope* or *fear* of a responsibility after death cannot overcome this immediate *knowledge*, and men act in conformity with their knowledge of the nearest consequences, without caring about what may occur after death.

A *hope* or a *belief* has not such an influence over the actions of men as *exact knowledge*. This explains the fact that men do not act in conformity with the belief in their eternal existence. They have no strong conviction upon the subject, only a changing hope, or a belief founded on authorities.

The only way to bring more conformity between human life and religious teaching is to change this *hope* or *weak belief* into a *strong conviction* based on *exact knowledge*. One of the greatest thinkers of modern ages, *Kant*, denied the possibility of a perfectly scientific proof of the immortality of the soul. But if I look at the development of philosophy after *Kant*, I must affirm that such a *scientific proof* of man's permanent existence *can be given*, and that the statement of this truth *surpasses in certainty and evidence the truths of all other sciences*. It will not be exaggeration to say that we have no better logical foundation for believing that to-morrow the sun will rise than for affirming that millions of years hence we shall still remain the same persons and be able to remember our limited experience of to-day. In other words, the law of gravitation cannot claim to be better proved than the law of infinite and permanent existence of every single human being.

To give the full proof of it would require a long dialectical discussion, but it is easy to show in a few words what seems to be the only right way of obtaining a scientific proof of this most important truth.

We must start from the logical investigation into the conditions of obtaining truth. In the theory of human knowledge we find the basis for a true metaphysics. It is unthinkable, that nothing exists, and if anything among the many existing phenomena has real existence, then this true being cannot cease to exist, because if it could decay it would not be true being. Now,

among all things which seem to exist there is only one of which we know certainly that it does exist. That one certainly existing thing, as Descartes stated, is *ourselves*. The external material world cannot be of a more certain existence than ourselves, because, as physiological and psychological inquiry shows, every external quality depends entirely upon our own conception. Our eye is the source of colors, our ear the source of sounds. And by closer investigation we find that the eye and the ear are also external to ourselves and do not form any essential part of our person. I can lose my eyes and my ears and almost every part of my body and still remain always the same entire person. Therefore I have a right to claim that I am a really existing being, more than any part of the material world around me.

The idealistic school of philosophy, while acknowledging this fact, still asserted that there is something else which has a more certain existence than the human person—the universal ideas which enforce themselves upon all minds in the same way. But even this view cannot be accepted by a psychologist. The ideas have no existence out of our own minds. They are existing only in our soul, and their existence emphasizes only our own existence.

If neither bodies nor universal ideas have an independent existence, there is nothing left to be a true being save persons like ourselves. Only such persons—and I mean by person only the soul, not the body—have the privilege of knowing that they do exist. Then, if spiritual existence is the only true existence known to me, and I am the only thing that has indubitable existence, this existence can never cease and must continue eternally, if anything exists. But I cannot imagine a time in which there is nothing, and so I must continue to exist for all time and must have existed always in some way.

The above reasoning, if filled out with the detailed arguments given by special inquiry, is quite as sound and strong as any other reasoning in science—nay, it is the strongest argument proving the most certain truth. Only by such philosophical reasoning do we come to a true *knowledge* of immortality—far above all *hopes* and *beliefs*.

If I am right, the only way to bring more harmony between human actions and the teachings of religion is to associate re-

ligion with philosophy and undertake to prove, without any other authority than reason, what is assumed or believed on various historical authorities.

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